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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a comparative historical analysis between Malaysia and Singapore
on the relationship between capitalist development and authoritarianism. Both Malaysia
and Singapore have recorded remarkable economic growths and rapid industrial
development, but both these countries have also shown to be moving toward state
authoritarian rule. The rise of authoritarianism in these countries is analyzed through four
interactive state development-related variables that shape the nature of politics in these
countries. First is the development of institutions that have enabled the state to assume
and strengthen its power over all other social forces. This in turn has empowered the
state to forge alliances with both foreign and local capitalists in order to survive in the
world economy. In this regard, even though so-called democratic institutions such as
representative government and electoral processes are seen to exist, their effectiveness

as genuine democratic institutions is limited. Second, social and political tensions
entrenched in ethnonational-class inequalities have given rise to serious difficulties in the

formation of cross-ethnonational popular alliances. These difficulties arise not from the
multi-ethnonational character of society but rather from the domination of economic
power by one group used to politically subsume other groups. The state also frequently
justifies authoritarian rule as a way to suppress ethnonational tensions and enforce
coexistence between the various groups. Third, the dependent nature of capitalist
development itself aggravates existing wealth concentration, thereby reinforcing statecapital alliances and widening existing disparities. The more dependent the state is, the
more repressive is its administration to accommodate capital investments. Fourth,
peripheral state development has thrust the state into the leading role of economic
planning as well as policy formulation. Thus by exploiting ideologies constructed around

economic nationalism, the state often justifies its authoritarian rule as a politically
legitimate means of attaining an economically prosperous end. Both Malaysia and
Singapore are chosen for this comparative study due to their phenomenal economic
growth, their development toward state authoritarian rule, and their unique social-political
histories, that in many ways set these countries apart from many capitalist peripheral
states.
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CHAPTER 1
STATE, CAPITALISM, AND AUTHORITARIANISM

This dissertation critically and comparatively examines the contradictions that the state
in Malaysia and Singapore faces in the relationship between capitalist development and
democracy. Despite their rapid economic growth, both countries have experienced
increasing trends toward authoritarianism (Zakaria and Alatas 1999, 195; Lingle 1996,

42-47). Maps of modern Malaysia and Singapore are displayed on page 2 in Figures 1.1
and 1.2 respectively.
Malaysia and Singapore have attained rapid industrialization of their economies
within a relatively short span of time. In its policy research report, the World Bank

classified these two countries as belonging to the ‘high performing Asian economies’ or
HPAEs. The Bank attributes these two countries’ economic success to the states’
‘market-friendly’ policies, which encouraged growth-oriented strategies in investments,

savings, and resource allocations (World Bank 1994, 84-86). Although the Asian
financial crisis of 1997 slowed the momentum of economic growth that had been building
throughout the 19903, the economies of Malaysia and Singapore have nevertheless

performed remarkably well. Between 1980-1997, Malaysia steadily recorded an average
of about 8 per cent real Gross Domestic product (GDP) growth rate.1 Singapore, long

considered an economic powerhouse since the 19803, collected foreign exchange
reserves in excess of US$78 billion in 1997, placing it within the top seven richest
economies in the world (Lam 1999, 258). The impressive economic accomplishments of
these two countries earned them memberships into the ‘miracle economies of East
Asia,’ whose collective economic performances outdistanced that of all other regions of
the world’ (World Bank 1994,1-8).
However, impressive economic growth has also been accompanied by increased

state authoritarianism. Each state has been seen to either tighten its grip on political
power (as in Malaysia) or further sustain its social control policies through repressive

measures (as in Singapore), thereby introducing little in terms of democratic
transformation. Although practicing regular free elections within a parliamentary-style
system, both countries have had one-party monopolization of power since
independence.

These states also possess extraordinarily strong executives that exert
tremendous power over other national political institutions to effectively assert their

influence into almost every aspect of social and political life. One major consequence of
this has been the drastic decline in civil liberties over the past decade. Such

deterioration in individual rights can be captured in the way these states have taken
advantage of national security laws and compliant judiciaries to arrest, detain, and

1 Figure calculated by combining reports from World Development Report, p. 208 and
International Monetary Fund Report 2000.

Figure 1.1: Map of Modern Malaysia

Figure 1.2: Map of Modern Singapore
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prosecute individuals belonging to political oppositions.2 The state also controls
the media and frequently utilizes harsh and punitive legislation to monitor public
expression. In this, the ordinary citizen is denied freedom of speech, and has virtually
no liberty to criticize the state.

Malaysia and Singapore are chosen for this project precisely for the
reason that capitalist development through intense industrialization has resulted
in state authoritarianism. Neo-classical liberals, inspiring the resuscitation of
modernization theories, have expounded their arguments on the concurrence of
economic growth, political development, and ‘democracy’ as symptomatic phenomena of
post-cold war global trends (Fukuyama 1992, 337-338; Huntington 1992). These

theorists believe that the tide of democratization would enter the shores of Asia in
conjunction with industrialization and economic development. Indeed, maintream
economists and their media have adopted such concepts and taken them to be the norm

(Jones 1997, 2). Political transformations in Korea and Taiwan toward political
democratization in the late 19905 seemed to have enthused these theorists to turn their
contentions into unversal doctrine.

However, the cases of Malaysia and Singapore do not seem to fit into such a
prespective. The reason behind this is that theories such as modernization theory limit
their analysis to political systems and Ieaderships. In order to analyze the relationships
between capitalist peripheral state development and state authoritarianism in Malaysia
and Singapore, it is important to understand the interconnections between the wider
theoretical concepts of state, global capitalist development, and democracy. Since

capitalist peripheral states are products of world historical forces, the analysis of the
relationship between state, capitalism, and democracy in Malaysia and Singapore
should appropriately take place within a comparative global-historical setting. Thus using
a world systemic perspective, this dissertation analyzes state development in terms of

difficulties faced by the Malaysian and Singaporean state in mediating the penetrating
and contradictory effects of both internal social forces and external global dynamics,
which has resulted in a systematic suppression of democratization processes in these
countries.
The critical analysis of peripheral states both as independent political units as
well as dependent entities connected to the capitalist world economy will lead to the

understanding of the relationship between peripheral capitalist state development and
increasing authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore. As such, it is necessary to
examine, through a short but concise historical overview, the development of the state in
the capitalist world system, and its effects on the development of democracy.
Theoretical and Methodological Approaches:
State, Capitalist Development, and Democracy
The central theme of this dissertation rests on the premise that capitalist
peripheral development has brought on increased state authoritarianism in both
2 Both Malaysia and Singapore inherited the British colonial Internal Security Act that was mainly
used by the British colonial government against suspected communist insurgents during the

19505.

4
Malaysia and Singapore. This dissertation argues that the intense historical interaction
between internal-domestic forces and global-external dynamics has given rise to rigid
state institutional structures and complex internal tensions that have precipitated a trend

toward state authoritarianism. The theoretical framework of this research is based on the
argument that state authoritarianism in these countries is the historical-interactional
outcome of four state-related developmental variables. They are, state institutionalization
processes, ethnonational-class tensions, dependent and uneven development, and state

ideological strategies. This dissertation seeks to illustrate that these variables are
commonly shared by both Malaysia and Singapore as fundamental factors behind the
development toward state authoritarianism.
Hence, it is important to conceptualize first of all, the state in terms of its

historical specificity, through which an understanding of its role in the world system and
its nature as a product of social-class struggles during each epochal transformation can
be attained. In such case, it is only relevant then that we first understand and
conceptualize the peripheral capitalist state in relation to the growth as well as product of
the European-dominated capitalist world economy.
The State and Capitalist Development in Europe
In medieval Europe, wars and invasions that took place between one feudal
kingdom and another, brought about a pluralism of authoritative structures, a process
that led Perry Anderson to regard as ‘detotalization of sovereignty’ (Anderson 1974,
405). This concept is largely based on the unique political transformations taking place,

in which high levels of territorial accumulation crystallized in various regions of the
European continent into disparate political entities that later served the basis for state
formation. Zolberg (1986, 75) asserts that these transformations must be understood as

two simultaneous processes: “the emergence of territorial sovereignty out of entities
aspiring to universal scope, and the aggregation of domination starting from a widely
scattered territorial power.” Increasing trade and social interchanges necessitated an
atmosphere of political stability.

Thus dynamisms occurring as a result of interactions between the various
disparate authoritative enclaves later crystallized into a need for a centralization of
political domination. Polarization of authorities between the Papacy and individual
Emperors further allowed groups of protagonists to accumulate and monopolize
territorial power in their respective regions. With the help of the Church, these
protagonists later became the social crux that politically dominated the newly emerging
monarchies of Spain, France, and England (Hintze 1975, 167). Centralized regional
entities replaced village and city governments to form a sovereign state under a powerful
monarch. This phenomenon, in which internal processes of domination concentration
combined with external processes of state systems formation, soon Ied Europe toward a

systemic configuration of absolutist states (Anderson 1986; Trevor-Roper 1969, 46-89).
Interestingly, this period also witnessed the advancing march of capitalism in

Europe. Newly emerging social forces that emanated under capitalism required a strong
centralized state to manage and diffuse tensions brought forth by competing class
interests. The emerging capitalist mode of production soon introduced the increasing
power of the merchant class and the struggle for democracy against the aristocrats,

peasantry, and working class, resulting in the establishment of bourgeois democracies
(Shannon 1996, 41; Snyder 1976, 77). Capitalism also required the management of
production forces at the national level, whereby taxation, law enforcement, and trade
could be more efficiently operated. And as a security measure, a strong state also
provided a bastion against external threats (Breuilly 1994, 84). The capitalist mode of
production required such characteristics in a state as a means to facilitate and sustain its
systemic existence. Meanwhile, the concept of nationalism had entrenched itself to be

the propelling force behind national integration, thereby shifting citizenship loyalty from
the monarch to the state (Snyder 1954, 77-80).
The French Revolution marked a turning point in European state historical
development. Its principles of self-determination, common citizenship, equality, and
popular sovereignty became increasingly entrenched in the political restructuration of
European societies (Heater 1994). It also imprinted the struggle for democracy as one

of the most important principles in the modern world system (Jalata 2001, 7). Beginning
with England and France, this development gradually transformed the absolutist states
in Europe into nation-states. Charles Tilly (1975) reminds us that there were unique and
favorable circumstances that led to the proliferation of modern state formations in

Western Europe not available elsewhere. These included the pre-capitalist conditions of
a relatively homogenous Christian cultural structure, a largely peasant based economy
with a landlord-centered ruling system, and a highly decentralized political system, which
allowed for much of conquests and takeovers.3 Capitalism finalized the process by
facilitating merchant class sponsorship of the state through financing of military and

bureaucratic operations as well as generating revenues through taxation (Tilly 1975,1731). By the early nineteenth century, the inability of any of the emerging nation-states to
dominate the other made possible the development of a nation-state system in Western
Europe (Shannon 1996, 61-71).
During the period 1500 to 1800, European state mercantilist rivalry extended

throughout the world, in which European explorers pillaged the coasts of South America,
Asia, and Africa for gold, spices, and free labor in the form of human slavery (Shannon
1996, 62-66; Baran 1967).4 An increasingly prominent world division of labor appeared,

in which each of the core states of Europe sought to extract resources from the these
parts of the world as a means to sustain and increase their economic and political power
(Wallerstein 1974a, 36-63; Shannon 1996, 55-57).
Competition between the core nation-states for overseas territories soon became
conflated with nationalist sentiments that justified the exploitation and conquests of

3 Some other conditions favorable to the rise of states in Europe included the efficiency of the
centralized state mechanism itself. Once it was seen to come into force, no other political
organization seemed to be more superior to the state apparatus. However, the rate of statehood

in Europe varied according to many factors. Some of these factors included the capability of the
state in mobilizing citizens on the basis of class, language, and religion; the availability of
resources; the continuous supply of political elite; the relative success in warfare; and the ability
of the state to successfully ally with sections of the landed elite (see Tilly 1975).
4 European looting of the peripheral areas of the world was done in the name of ‘trade.’ These
plunderings of non-European societies of their resources and wealth basically transferred

economic surplus from these areas to Europe, where it paid for the development of
industrialization (see Baran 1967; and Hoogvelt 1995, 17-18).
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foreign lands. In the Malay Archipelago, where a trading network of maritime kingdoms
had existed for centuries, British and Dutch national-mercantile interests competed for
control of the traditional spice trade. The British finally succeeded in establishing their
sphere of influence in the Malay States through coercive treaties with various Malay
rulers and the founding of a mercantilist port in Singapore. The advent of mercantilistcapitalist trade in this region meant the gradual fall of Malay commercial supremacy
(Trocki 1979).
The ideology of imperialism involved the survivalist approach to nationhood, in

which colonization of foreign lands was deemed crucial for political and economic
survival (Thornton 1985). This notion manifestly peaked in the European ‘scramble for
Africa’ in the late 18005. Classical Marxist theorists thought this expansion necessary to
overcome falling rates of profits in core countries. Hobson, Hilferding, Bukharin, and
Lenin identified this period as one characterized by ﬁve basic features. One, the
cbncentration of capital in Europe, two, the emergence of finance capital, three, the
export of capital, four, the emergence of international monopolies, and five, the territorial

division of the world (Larrain 1989, 62-68; see also Hobson 1988; Hilferding 1981,
Bukharin 1976, and Lenin 1978).
The emerqence of the colonial state

Engels (1993, 232) stated: “At a definite stage of economic development, which
necessarily involved the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity
because of this cleavage." Since the state is first and foremost a territorial concept

(Engels 1993, 208), the colonial state can be viewed in terms of the relationship between
the land and the state, in which land becomes valued property subjected to appropriation

and physical enclosure by the state (Young 1995, 172). The formal establishment of a
colonial state was necessary to facilitate the process of capital accumulation; political
processes, especially in relation to land and property, had to be realigned to cater to

capitalism’s needs. Even Hobson (1988, 227) accepted the notion that ‘backward
societies’ must be opened up since the inhabitants of these areas were not progressive

peoples competent enough to develop the arts of industry.
Such notions however, disregarded the centuries-old trading systems that
existed before the incursion of European capitalism into these areas. For most of the

periphery, colonialism was the forced takeover of commercial functions by the
Europeans of goods that were already being traded locally and regionally by the
indigenous populations. It also marked the appropriation of surplus labor and gross

exploitation of the local workforce through a wage labor system, slavery, and indentured
servitude (Jalata 2001, 7-8; Bergesen 1980). As Robert Young (1995, 173) observed in

the historical transplantation of capitalism through colonialism “....goods provided in
exchange for bodies (labor or natural resources) were often articles like iron, copper or
cloth that were already available locally. Such trade had the effect of destroying
indigenous industries and thus deterritorializing and reterritorializing production through
the creation of forms of dependency.”
By the turn of the nineteenth century, this first wave of European expansion gave
way to a second phase, one that was marked by direct control and administration of their

overseas territories (Hoogvelt 1995, 18-21). This geographical expansion was so vast

that between 1800 and 1914, European colonization of the rest of the world increased
from 35 per cent of the earth’s land surface to 85 per cent (Magdoff 1978, 29-35). During

this period, the periphery was created and forcefully brought into an intensifying and
expanding but unequal economic relationship with the core. While resources were
expropriated from the periphery to the core, the core returned with huge infrastructure
investments in urban services, railways, factories, and mechanization of production.

Hoogvelt (1995,18) pointed out that “the period of formal colonialism, especially between
1875 and 1914, witnessed an extraordinary and globe girding internationalization of
capital.” As of 1913, Britain, along with other core countries, which accounted for only
15 per cent of the world’s population, was responsible for 80 per cent of the world’s

manufactured goods and also provided for 85 per cent of the world’s total investment
funds (Chirot 1977, 31). In this capitalization process, the state in both the core and
periphery (colonial state) is seen to facilitate the flow of capital, thereby playing a crucial

role in the rise of capitalism worldwide (Kazancigil 1986, 134).
Hence, the ‘Europeanization’ of the world through capitalist colonial expansion

also entailed another impacting phenomenon on the rest of the world — the creation of
western-type states in peripheral societies. According to Anthony Smith (1983, 25),
“Colonialism denoted a system of legislation in a politically dependent territory, with its
mainly European features adapted to local conditions.” The western model was
transplanted in the administration of colonies as an efficient means of operating
economic transactions between the core and the periphery as well as to maintain
internal order (Shannon 1996, 81-82). But other factors were also crucial in

characterizing the colonial state. A significant one was the psychological exploitation of
indigenous peoples, a sort of ‘colonization of the personality’ as described by Frantz
Fanon in Algeria (see Fanon, 1963; Worsley, 1964), which was meant to psychologically
and subconsciously subjugate colonized peoples to European authority.

Taking economic as well as social factors into consideration, Smith identiﬁed four
basic unifying features of the colonial state in Asia and Africa (Smith 1983). First was the

territorial definition of colonies, in which former kingdoms or territories were carved into
new political dimensions. Second was the strength of the colonial bureaucracy, at which
the heart of administrative functions lies and through which the core states’ interests
were represented. Third was the distinct separation between the colonial state and
colonized societies, usually drawn by racial, cultural, or color lines, where local peoples
were superimposed by the colonial administrative apparatus’ rigorous laws and
regulations. Fourth was the educational ideology that disseminated a belief among
colonized peoples of their colonizers’ well-intentioned ‘civilizing missions,’ which would
uplift their social standards to one that was more superior (Smith 1983, 27-30).
A complementary justification for territorial annexation by European powers had

been the growing intellectual discourse on racial superiority of Europeans over nonEuropeans, spelled out in the infamous phrase ‘white man’s burden.’5 Imperialist

5 The ‘White Man’s Burden’ was a celebrated phrase used by English writer Rudyard Kipling. It
was a given assumption even among European academicians and literary figures, especially the
British, that the duty to ‘civilize’ the non-European world was deemed as ‘morally’ necessary.
Colonization was seen to bring positive benefits not only to Europeans but also the colonized
people themselves (see Thornton 1985).
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nationalism encouraged the ideology of racism, the form of which was often disguised
through ‘scientific rationalizations’ (Smith 1983, 21). Imperialism was translated into a

crusade, rationalized through the idea that conquered lands were state properties that
had to be ‘civilized’ if their societies’ participation in modern commerce was to be

expedited (Smith 1983, 23). Consequently, the paternalistic and forceful ways of the
colonial state reinforced distinctive class and racial relationships between the colonizers

and colonized, and between different groups as well as within the population of
colonized peoples within the territory. The irony of it all was that bourgeois democratic
notions of equality, citizenship, and popular sovereignty did not apply to non-Europeans,
wherever they might be.
The capitalist incorporation and colonial establishment of Malaysia and
Singapore reflected these patterns. British centralization of ‘protectorate’ power over the
Malay States was completed by 1919, which was complemented by its strategic control
of their trade through the Crown colony of Singapore. British Malaya as it became known
then, was administered by a colonial bureaucracy represented by a racial-class

hierarchy of British superiors and indigenous aristocrats occupying the lower ranks
(Andaya and Andaya 2001, 227-228). The British also instituted a division of labor that
was channeled along racial lines, with the imports of Chinese and Indian labor for mining

and plantation, and the entrenchment of the majority of Malays in the peasantry. To
establish and reinforce western superiority over other ethnonational groups, English laws
became paramount and English education became the vehicle for limited social mobility
for a privileged few (Drabble 2000, 63; Roff 1995; Hua 1982).

By the early decades of the twentieth century, the world system comprised
mainly of unequal trade relationships between European core powers and their colonial

possessions. Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States were the core
states, with Italy, Japan, and Russia as part of the semi peripheral areas, and the bulk of
colonial and independent states of Africa, Asia and Latin America making up the
periphery (Shannon 1996, 71). However, it was not long before the colonial states began
to experience internal pressures for independent statehood. Throughout the early
decades of the twentieth century, colonial administrations in Asia and Africa had to

consistently deal with growing opposition within their colonies in the form of
ethnonationalist and religious-based movements seeking to overthrow the colonial state
(Smith 1983, 14).
These anti-systemic movements often legitimized their causes by subscribing to
either some form of universalist or ethnonational ideology that aimed at bringing
progress to or ending race-based inequalities for oppressed people (Wallerstein 1991,
180-183). Nationalism became the dominant ideology in guiding the political actions of a
culturally defined group that saw a common liberating destiny as a people or nation
(Jalata 2001, 9). Yet, it wasn’t until after the Second World War that these countervailing
factors to colonialism actually began to wear away the core states’ colonial
administrative capacity (Shannon 1996, 92-94). National liberation efforts by colonized
peoples were often violent, since the violent form with which colonialism began and
perpetuated itself soon begot similar responses from those who were colonized (Fanon

1963). As such, in some of parts of the world like Algeria, Indonesia, and Vietnam,
where colonial rule was often harsh, national liberation struggles became synonymous
with bloodshed and terror (Girling 1969; Heilbrunn 1966; Tanham 1961).

British world hegemonic decline also spelled the end of its colonial empire in
Asia. In many areas of the periphery, the anti-colonial forces comprised various groups
with different types of ethnonationalist ideologies striving for different ethnonational aims
(Mills 1973). Leftist groups, in particular, were openly propounding serious violent threats

against colonial entrepreneurial interests in the region. European colonialists recognized
that an armed conflict would be calamitous to their commercial establishment in Asia
and Africa, which would severely jeopardize their national recovery efforts from the
ravages of the Second World War. Malaya and Singapore in particular contributed a
major portion to Britain’s war recuperation funds.
On the global scene however, American economic self-interest advocated for all
colonies be given the right to self-governance, further contributing to the call for the
gradual removal of colonial states at the expense of the other core powers (Jalata 1993,
88). Over and above anything else, the aftermath of the Second World War effectively
induced the general European public’s reluctance to support their governments’
prolonged suppression of counterinsurgencies abroad (Shannon 1996, 94). Europe was

undergoing tremendous strains in recuperating from the aftereffects of the Second World
War. All these factors soon dawned on these powers, Britain in particular, that granting
political independence was an inevitable political decision.

In Malaysia and Singapore, national liberation efforts took on three fronts. One
was the elite-led Malay nationalist movement aimed at regaining Malay land from all

foreign occupiers, including the increasingly aggressive and economically powerful
Chinese. The other was the Chinese-dominated communist insurgency bent on
establishing a communist Malaya with close political affinity with China. The third was a
coalition of sorts consisting of leftist Malay groups that politically visualized a merger with
Indonesia to establish a socialist Malay superpower state and various non-Malay

factions calling for citizenship and equality for all races. The failure of a united national
front allowed the British to nurture the elite of the various ethnonational groups to take
over the helm of power through a National Alliance to ensure that a neo—colonial
Malaysia would emerge (Hua 1982).
In Singapore, the process was similar. The British could not afford to lose the
city-colony to forces belligerent to its capitalist interests. The isolation of the communists

and the confinement of insurgency movements to Malaya created a path for the westernoriented English educated elite to take over national political power and secure British as

well as western economic interests in the region through Singapore (Tremewan 1994).
The capitalist peripheral state
The principal concern for core powers, with regards to their former colonies, was

to ensure that a peripheral state could properly function to safeguard their economic
interests by continually providing them with the resources they needed. To minimize
interference with investments and trade of core countries in the periphery, the US as the
new hegemonic power, encouraged newly-established regimes in the periphery to

maintain ‘friendly ties’ with their former colonial masters and to embark on
modernization-oriented national policies that would open their economies to the flow of

core capital. This foreign policy allowed the US to expand its influence to areas
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previously held by other core powers and simultaneously limited any kind of Soviet
presence in those areas (Magdoff 19823, 11-28).
Advantaged by a strong military, the US embarked on a mission to monitor
nationalist movements in areas that were crucial to its economic interests. US
involvement in Iran, Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and Central America illustrates the extent to
which the Americans would carry out their foreign policy of under the guise of
‘democracy promotion’ (Robinson, 1995). As such, in most peripheral states, the
emergence of western-educated nationalists as beneficiaries of state power was the
accepted trend. As Shannon (1996,106) stated, “the reins of power were passed to
leaders of moderate, urban—based nationalist movements and a small, mostly European

educated civil service.” Kautsky (1962) explained that these local elites' nationalism
became their drive for ‘independent’ modernization of their new state through rapid
industrialization. It is not surprising then that those who had been exposed to western

sChooling and had served in the colonial bureaucracy under the colonial state became
the torchbearers of nationalism and leaders of autonomous statehood.
Hence, capitalist peripheral states share similar structural characteristics. At the

core of state power is a loose alliance of local capitalists or ruling elite, state managers,
and core capitalists, whose convergence in goals is in the accumulation of capital and
power through rapid industrialization (Duvall and Freeman 1981, 223-242). Rapid
industrialization greatly benefits the new capitalist class as well as the rising middle
classes (Chirot 1986, 255-256). As Shannon (1996, 116) puts it, “each member of the
alliance stands to benefit from a policy and needs the other members to implement the

rapid industrialization strategy.”
Generally, the state, which is politically influenced by the new bourgeoisie, is
dependent on investments to sustain economic growth (Szymanski 1981 ). As Carporaso
and Levine (1994, 76) noted on the relationship between the state and the ruling class,
“the state defines the political interests of the capitalist class, whose interests define
state action and policy.” Capitalist development through industrialization provides the
state with the means of national capital accumulation, which it utilizes to sustain political
power. Consequently, state policies would mainly reflect the interests of these groups

(Thomas 1984, 109-112). In this regard, it becomes crucial for the capitalist peripheral
state to maintain linkages to the capitalist world economy and facilitate capitalist
development in order to maintain its political survival.
However, earnings from natural resource exports have proven to be extremely

inadequate in covering the costs of imports of mainly capital-intensive products from the
core (Shannon 1996, 100). Also, due to lack of capital and technological capability,

peripheral states often engage foreign capitalists from core countries to stimulate
internal capital investments for national industrial growth (Petras 1984, 117-138; Frank
1981, 96-111). Either way, their inability to independently manage and finance their own
capitalist economy compels these states to borrow heavily from core-owned financial
institutions, incurring exceptionally high financial liabilities in the process and entrapping

themselves in debt peonage (Frank 1981, 133-156). At the same time, core countries,
through their expatriate capitalists and local counterparts, continue to exploit cheap labor
and resources in the periphery that siphoned off major chunks of profits and wealth back

to the core (Magdoff 1986, 9).
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Transition from colonial to post-colonial rule for most of the new states of the
periphery brought little changes as far as their role within the world division of labor was
concerned. Peripheral states continue to sustain a dependent-type development process
premised upon an unequal resource exchange relationship between them and the core
countries. World system theory suggests that a state’s dependent development is a
result of structural constraints imposed by its location within the world division of labor
(Hopkins, Wallerstein et al. 1982b, 51-52). Capitalist state development takes place in

the form of exploitative relationships between the core and the periphery, in which there
is disproportionate exchange of capital flows favoring the former at the expense of the
latter (Chase-Dunn 1989, 238-243; Wallerstein 1984, 61; Hopkins 1982, 21; also Amin

1976; Emmanuel 1972). This dependent relationship often locks these countries into a
permanent position in the world division of labor, and in some cases, further contributes

to their ‘underdevelopment’ (See Amin 1982; Frank 1978).
However, throughout the 19905, Malaysia and Singapore attained high industrial
development to become part of the Asian ‘miracle economies.’6 The manner in which
these states obtained this limited scale of freedom, which enabled them to seize on the
opportunity to enforce successful economic liberalization policies, is dependent on

several factors. Various world system theorists have pointed to a country’s rise through
direct capital assistance by a hegemonic power, as did South Korea and Taiwan from
the United States (Chase-Dunn 1984, 75-106) or through technology transfer from core
powers, as did Germany in the nineteenth century from Britain (McMichael 1985, 130).

Alvin So emphasizes the significance of geo-political dynamism occurring within the
setting of inter-state competition (So and Chui 2000, 281-282). In this case, Japan’s
geographical location enabled it to establish a strong state with an effective politicalmilitary alliance that enhanced its industrial capabilities in a region where core rivals

were relatively weak (Chirot 1986, 124-126).
Today, an additional crucial factor in enabling the ascent of countries such as
Malaysia and Singapore in the capitalist world economy has been the active role of
Multinational and Transnational Corporations (MNCs/TNCs) (Magdoff 1982b, 24). In
quest of cheap production costs, these MNCs, or Transnational Corporations (TNCs) as
they have appeared to be today, transplant their labor-intensive production processes in
the periphery in order to maintain their market competitiveness. In the process, they also

facilitate industrialization strategies in the host countries either through infrastructural
spending or technological transfers, albeit to a limited degree. Both Malaysia and
Singapore rapidly industrialized by beneﬁting from such shifting of capital and labor flows

emanating from East Asia, which began in the 19605. American injection of economic
and military aid into the region resulting from cold war geopolitics in the 19505 enabled
Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan to develop their own export-based

economies with much of their goods directed toward the American market (Chui 1994,
75-114). Competition between the various TNCs greatly invigorated industrial
investments in these countries (Winckler and Greenhalgh 1988, 9).

6 Singapore, which had been ahead of Malaysia in industrial development, is categorized into the
first tier of Asian miracle economies, dubbed the ‘Four Asian Tigers.’ Malaysia, along with
Indonesia and Thailand belongs to the second tier known as the Asia’s newly industrializing

economies (NIEs) (See World Bank 1993,1)
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As Northeast Asian countries reached a cyclical maturation point in production,

whereby real wages rose and competitive export rates fell, investments in these areas
gradually moved to other parts of Asia, where labor was cheaper (Shin 1998, 22). These
‘ﬁrst tier countries’ of East Asia then embarked on higher technological and more capitalintensive production processes. On the other end, new host countries of Southeast Asia
received fresh penetrations of low capital and technological flows associated with laborintensive production process (Numazaki 1998, 64-87). These flows of surplus capital
and technology from East Asia that were absorbed by the countries in Southeast Asia
greatly enhanced the latter’s industrialization capabilities in low-technology laborintensive productions (World Bank 1994, 12-13).
This cyclical trend of technological-production upgrade has persisted into the end
of last century in a series of commodity chains and changing regional division of labor,
and provided the state in Malaysia and Singapore viable opportunities for rapid
development (Gerefﬁ 1998, 93-124). These cyclical series of capital flows soon
resemble a ‘technological ladder,’ in which southeast Asian states tend to follow in linear
progression, their northeastern counterparts in industrial development (Tan 1993, 149).
Exchanges in these capital flows were reflected in the rise and intensification of TNC-led
intra-regional trade, which rose from 54 per cent to 66 per cent of exports and 59 per
cent to 64 per cent of imports form 1970 to 1987 (Drabble 2000, 184; Ariff 1991).

A study of these states’ ascent into semi-periphery status within the world system
can help link each state’s behavior as a function of its adjustments to a new location in
the world system. This observation is relevant to world systems theory, which asserts
that a state's ability to gain some degree of autonomy from the constraints of global
capitalism becomes crucial for its need to ascend in the world system (Shannon 1996,
147-149). In this respect, capitalist peripheral development in Malaysia and Singapore
has been heavily dependent on foreign investments, but regional technological shifts
allowed states some room to maneuver in order act toward attaining its development
goals. The state in both these countries is managed by an elite class that seeks to

protect the capitalist system by taking advantage of and maintaining capital linkages with
the world economy (Jomo 1986; Tremewan 1994).
Democracy and authoritarianism in peripheral statehood

State legitimacy draws on the consent of citizens. Popular democracy in any
country should manifest the practice of a fair and free electoral process customized by
universal and equal suffrage to facilitate public participation in and contestation of policy
formulation ((Linz 1978, 5;Dahl 1971). Robert Falk (1999, 148-149) asserts that the
basic framework of a functioning democracy in a globalized world should also include
the rule of law for checks and balances against state actions, transparency and
accountability in state execution of powers, and provision of human rights with respect to
freedom of speech, information, religious and cultural practices, and access to life’s
basic services such as health and education. lmportantly, conflict resolution in genuine
democracies should not be undertaken through violent and repressive means, thereby
rejecting capital punishment as an option of state control instrument (Falk 1999, 149).
Although many of these institutions of democracy formally exist in many capitalist

13
peripheral countries today, the effectiveness to which these institutions elicit real
democratic practices has been far from satisfactory (Shannon 1996; Held 1987).
The type of democracy that exists in peripheral societies depends on the degree

of popular power exercised by civil society. William Robinson (1996) cautions against
the failure to differentiate between genuine popular democracy and elite-driven

democracy that exists in many peripheral countries, which he calls ‘polyarchy.’ The
former involves “participatory mechanisms for popular sectors to subordinate the state in
pursuit of their interests, with mobilization of civil society as the principal form in which
political power is exercised” (Robinson 1996, 58). Polyarchy, on the other hand, denotes
an insulation of ofﬁce holders from popular pressures so that they may “effectively
govern... which limits democratic participation to voting in elections, but focuses on
forms in elections” (Robinson 1996, 59).
In the core, the institutional ensemble of the state has enabled it to expediently
perform its tasks and organize its numerous apparatuses around capitalist production.
Luhmann (1989b, 130) argues that the concept of the state emerged through capitalism,
since it was in accordance with this period that the state was counter-posed into society,

signifying it with the whole society. Through the establishment of class alliances with the
capitalists and intervention in the world market, the state manages to enhance its
domestic producers’ competitiveness (Wallerstein 1980, 113).
However, statehood is not only a means through which economic concerns are
realized. It also implicates the process of surveillance and internal pacification. At the
core of state actions is its aim in attaining public order and political stability, deemed

crucial for the long-term existence of the regime (Linz 1978, 18-19). Drawing on the
ideas of Fuat Keyman (1997), William Connolly (1991), Bob Jessop (1990), Theda

Skocpol (1985), and Anthony Giddens (1985), this dissertation looks at the state in nonreductionist terms. This means that the state is also explored in light of its locational
point of cohesion of various social forces, including those that belong to the ruling elite
and state managers. To a significant degree, the state relies on particular social forces,
namely the popular masses in order to generate political legitimacy. But the interests of
these forces often run counter to state capitalist interests; hence the state preoccupies
itself with techniques of monitoring these forces while simultaneously imposing its
legitimacy over the citizenry through the guise of nation-building programs, alliances with
particular classes, or by maintaining high economic performance. As Jessop (1990, 361)
points out, “in a historic-specific sense, the relationship between the state and society
often becomes contradictory. This contradiction determines, to a significant extent, the
degree and type of democracy that emerges.”

Theoretically, democracy results from the contradictions and conflicts within
capitalism (Therborn 1979, 96), in which capitalist development is linked, by two

structural effects. One, industrialization weakens large landowners; and two, urban
industrial growth empowers the emerging middle and working classes (Marx 1970, see
chapter 12). The contradiction manifests itself in the way rising national incomes through
industrialization result in unequal distribution of wealth among the various classes. The

dismantling of the feudal system emancipated agricultural workers from their landlords to
work for wages, mostly in newly established urban centers. The declining power of the
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landowning class also ushers in a new political freedom for the rising bourgeoisie to
pursue their interests through the formation of the capitalist state (Avineri 1969, 57-59).
In a capitalist economy, increasing social inequalities between owners of
production and workers as well as political dissatisfaction with state policies by the

working class entail intensifying demands for better political terms (Marx 1972, 106-124).
In an urban environment, collective action becomes a geographically easier
accomplishment, enabling them to more effectively pursue their demands for political
change (Valenzuela 1985; Zeitlin 1984, 30-56). Working class political participation often

indicates a pro-democratic process taking place since it is a result of struggles that lead
to the extension of political participation beyond dominant classes (Zolberg 1986). In
Brazil for example, industrial growth in the 19705 and 19805 facilitated the rise of civil
and labor unions that demanded opportunities for political participation, opening up
democratization processes in the country (Mainwaring 1986, 146-223; Bruneau 1982,
127-145). In Taiwan, the transition to greater democracy surfaced as the country entered
full industrialization by the late 19905 facilitated by the state’s response to the increasing
political influence of the newly emerging and powerful middle and working classes

(McBeath 1998, 73-79).
Unlike core state development, however, most capitalist peripheral states did not

arise simply as a result of these trends evolving naturally, but rather, as a product of
colonialism’s artificial transplantation of capitalism onto non-capitalist societies under the

patronage of a superficial nation-state. As a result of colonialism’s coercive institution of
statehood on plural national societies, political instability arising from domestic
ethnonational and class conflicts has weakened national identification with the peripheral
state (Chirot 1977, 56-59). This does not mean that multi-ethnonational societies cannot
attain democratic statehood. But in many peripheral states, the colonial process had
enabled the domination of one ethnonational group over the others. Colonialism was

often synonymous with racial projects that organized and distributed resources along
particular ethnonational or racial lines (Winant 1994, 24). The legacy of these projects is
inherited by independent peripheral states, the majority of which are controlled either
politically or economically by a particular ethnonational group. Ethnonational-class
inequalities as a common consequence of colonialism has provided dominant groups the

opportunity to define and impose their values on others and equate themwith national
identification (Staples 280-281).

Significantly, such ethnonational-class tensions make it difficult for national
coalitions and alliances between the middle and working classes. Diverse ethnonational
and religious groupings, each with different sets of affiliation and sense of loyalties tend
to affect the prospects for democratization. Divisive value subscription and destructive

social fractionalization hinder the development of workable class alliances, and
oftentimes lead to civil strife. According to Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, 92), “the plural
society, constrained by preferences of its citizens, does not provide fertile soil for
democratic values and stability.” In this light, serious cultural and ethnonational
differences may well pose difficulties for the progress toward aggregated, cross-cutting
interactive memberships, seen pivotal to the effective development of democratic
institutions (Lipset 1994, 1-22). Furthermore, in order to contain political disaffection and
strengthen state power, political suppression is usually applied by these states, branding
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autocratic rule as a prominent trademark of capitalist peripheral statehood (Kamrava
2000, 221-223; Thomas 1984, 96-98).
Furthermore, in many of these peripheral societies, crucial features of its socialcultural institutions were actually spared the destructive forces of colonialism, to be
manipulated instead, as consolidating mechanisms for effective colonial administration.
One such institution was the political authority of the chiefs and kings, through whom the
colonialists managed to indirectly subdue and control local societies. This meant that
desired institutional structures of bourgeois-based modern capitalism became heavily
transfused with local pre-capitalist authoritarian institutions. And whenever wealth and
power is concentrated within the hands of a few, democracy exists only on paper

because citizens become entirely dependent on the state or the capitalist class for their
livelihood (Bernholz 1998, 13; Andreski 1965, 357).

Thus when these colonies gained political independence, the nature of their socalled modern state structures did not truly reflect that of the democratic European
nation-state, but one that resonates an institutional synthesis between a pre-capitalist
autocratic political culture and a modern capitalist production system (Simonia 1992, 4571). In most cases, such state institutions allow dominant classes (within which state
managers also often constitute membership) to build strategic alliances with other

classes in order to advance their goals and interests through the state (Bergquist 1978,
247-262).
In other words, the emergence or absence of democracy in peripheral societies

is also influenced by the degree to which structural class transformations empower
managers of capital to politically sustain pre-capitalist institutions that excludes or limits
full political participation of subordinate classes. As Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens (1992, 166-167) pointed out, “Industrialization raised the potential for
pressures for democratization, particularly for greater political inclusion, because it

strengthened civil society by increasing the interaction among the middle and working
classes, but its political effects were mediated by pre-existing political institutional
structures, particularly party system and the tradition of state intervention in society.”

In Gramscian fashion, such structures usually favor the reinforcement of the
dominant hegemonic class through the mobilization and reproduction of ‘active consent’
of dominated groups (Jessop 1982, 147; Gramsci 1971, 52-53). In peripheral societies,
those who were part of the old dominant classes usually managed to capture state
power under a new and different social order. When political and economic interests
tend to contradict each other, especially in terms of increasing political demands by
subordinate classes, the state asserts its “educative and formative role,” usually through
its elite-driven institutions, to stabilize the social order (Gramsci 1971, 242-243).
Equally important to be reminded of is that capitalist development is contingent

upon the state’s role as a peripheral economy in the world division of labor. Social and
political institutions in such countries exist to facilitate capitalist exploitation of resources
and labor. In each state, class alliances between the national ruling elite and local as

well as foreign core capitalists enabled those at the apex of national political and
economic power to obtain great amounts of wealth at the expense of the citizenry
(Kamrava 2000, 47-48). State interests and that of civil society become clearly
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delineated. As Hoogvelt (1997, 49) argues, “the impossibility of this task (to take their
economic destinies into their own hands) given the economic dependency and unequal

position of these countries in the world order, corrupted the very policies of
development...leading to a deepening chasm between state and civil society.” The
divisive effects of income inequality weaken the development of civil society needed to
counterbalance state power, thereby retarding the road toward democracy
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 72-73; Bollen 1983, Muller 1985).
The role of the state and the process of capitalist development in many
peripheral countries have become very much intertwined, giving rise to the notion of
post-colonial economic nationalism as a persistent feature of capitalist peripheral
development (Hoogvelt, 1995; pp. 48-51). The embodiment of national pride attained

through national economic growth enhances the state’s patronage of national economic
development. As Castells (1998, 270-271) noted in reference to Asian states, “the state
is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote
and sustain development... the state is legitimate when it establishes hegemony or
consensus vis-a-vis the civil society.” Inversely, a state’s inability to develop would be
reduced to explanations of “inefficacy of public institutions to achieve objectives and
programs of modernization, focusing especially on the respective roles of ruling elite,
political parties, the bureaucracy, and the military” (Alavi 1982, 289). In other words,

nationalism has taken on an added dimension in economic growth. It is within such
volatile circumstances that many capitalist peripheral states begin to consolidate their
rule through authoritarian processes, in which many of these states tend to supplement

nationalist ideologies to economic development to legitimize the increasing social
inequalities and the limitation of popular political participation. Thus it is not surprising

that development programs in the form of national modernization projects have been
prioritized policies for many capitalist peripheral states.7
The significance of political legitimacy as a justification tool for state domination
cannot be underestimated. Weber noted, “Custom, personal advantage, purely effectual
or ideal motives of solidarity do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given
domination. In addition there is normally a further element, the belief in legitimacy”

(Weber 1978, 212-213). In western core states the institutional ensemble has been
historically structured to accommodate the demands of the middle and working classes
(Chase-Dunn 1989, 244-248; Hopkins, Wallerstein et al 1982b, 69-70). In these
countries, the democratic process is safeguarded by existing political institutions, in
which political legitimacy implies the adherence to the rules of the system by all parties
concerned, including those in positions of authority.

7 The advocates of modernization theory argue that peripheral societies are ‘non-western
traditional’ by nature, and therefore lacked the logical requirements for industrialization. In order
to modernize, a comprehensive social-political reconstruction plan must be devised and

implemented to facilitate successful industrialization (see Myrdal 1968; Smelser 1964; Hoselitz
1965; Rostow 1960; Lewis 1955), including if necessary, authoritarian governance as an initial

measure to introduce political stability (See Huntington 19.93). Through US foreign aid efforts, this
theory somewhat became a social reform manual for many peripheral states in their quest for

industrial development, and as a result many of these states equated modernization with
westernization.
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However, in many peripheral countries, political legitimacy is often generated by
the belief that a particular regime is able to pursue the realization of their material and
ideal interests through national economic development (Linz 1978, 17). Here, legitimacy

cannot be definitively linked in terms of democracy. To mediate the tensions arising from
capitalism’s paradoxical relationships between interests of the state and civil society, the

former resorts to nationalist ideologies as a means to play down existing conflicts, bind
the various forces under its power, and legitimizes authoritarian rule (Kamrava 2000). As
a result of its social relational processes, the capitalist peripheral state heavily relies on
coercive and violent means to propagate a dominant national ideology in order to
command legitimacy and justify unequal social relations of production. In affirming that
the state is also in itself a product of social relations, Poulantzas (1978, 30) explains that
“the state also acts in a positive fashion, creating, transforming and making reality ..... it
goes without saying that repression and ideological inculcation are present in the
materiality of the state’s current functions.”
Structural theorists often look at ideology as a structurally determined variable
that serves to support and reproduce the capitalist world system (Wallerstein 1988a;
Chase-Dunn 1989). But peripheral state ideology serves to also reproduce the

legitimacy of the existing state structure, and therefore is also -a product infusion of both
cultural-national and modern-capitalist elements. Therefore, at the level of the capitalist
peripheral state, there should also be focus on the historically-specific analysis of
ideology as a strategy of state legitimation process, formulated and implemented by
individuals that manage the state. In this respect, the state should also be seen as an
independent force in social dynamics, whose managers formulate decisions that apply to

society (Skocpol 1985, 20-21; Nordlinger 1981, 11).
Hence, taking into consideration both structural and state-centered approaches
the following points become useful in conceptualizing the state, capitalist development,

and authoritarianism. The first point concerns a state’s existence within modern
capitalism as a speciﬁc mode of production, which Giddens (1987, 31-32) acknowledges
“does not represent the high point of a progressive scheme of development, but rather

the coming of a type of society radically different from all prior forms of social order.”
Keyman (1997, 71) notes that modernity refers to modes of social organization based

“on the interconnections among four institutional clusterings, namely those of the nationstate, capitalism, industrialization and surveillance.” For the capitalist peripheral state,
these interconnections are still very much in the formative stage, thereby generating and
sustaining relatively weak political institutions that impede full political participation by

the citizenry.
This brings us to the second point - the emergence of civil society as a politically
separate concept from the state in peripheral statehood. The Hegelian notion of civil
society determined by free movements of economc forces and individual self-attainment
was revitalized by Gramsci to denote the institutional areas of the state such as
education, trade unions, churches and social organizations, through which the ruling
class could exercise its hegemony over society (Gellner 1991; Gramsci 1971 ). With
politics in the years leading up to the collapse of the Berlin wall aimed at democratization
of the state, civil society also gradually became the arena within which civic groups
challenged the existing ruling structures (Lewis 1992). Since then, civil society has had
a rejuvenated appeal and definition. In light of post-colonial political development that
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has strengthened the position of the state vis-a-vis society, in which citizen participation
had either deteriorated or had been non-existent, civil society has taken on a new
conceptual angle on the long-standing question of democracy. Within the realm of
political economy, civil society serves the citizenry the political space to undermine the

formidable state through aggressive demands for democratization (Keane 1988). For
citizens of the peripheral state, in civil society lies the promise of active participation

through non-state institutions, organizations, and social movements.
Hence on the opposite end, the third point involves the distinguishing feature of a

capitalist peripheral state set in its ability to form, organize, and reproduce its own
national and territorial social formation. Mann (1984, 187-213) and Skocpol (1980, 155201) suggests that the state possesses the capacity to influence social relations under

certain situations it sees appropriate, such as in times of economic and political crises.
Jessop (1989, 216), in summarizing Giddens, recorded the importance of state
promotion of bourgeois-type democracy in citizenship rights and polyarchic pluralism to
reciprocate building possibilities for communications, internal pacification, and
surveillance within its territorial realm, usually done in the name of national interest.
Taking on a Habermasian line, cultural-ideological legitimations imposed by the state

often operate toward mobilizing the support for the existing system, thereby
strengthening the system from a rationalized but false social viewpoint (Habermas
1975).8 In fact, political legitimacy in many perpheral countries is often linked to some
form of nationalist-integrative ideology that favors and justifies state enforcement and
implementation of repressive policies as a means of achieving national development
(Kamrava 2000,7-13; Alagappa 1995, 31-53; Scalapino 1986, 59). Studies in Latin

America showed that such legitimation have effectively mobilized mass support for
authoritarian regimes (Malloy 1987, 243).
Fourth is the significance of the world interstate system, primarily in the dynamics
of unequal relationships between the core and peripheral areas, to accord recognition of
peripheral state sovereign existence in the capitalist world economy. It is within this type
of relationship that the capitalist peripheral state is distinguished from the core. While

peripheral states acknowledge the greater power of the core states, they nevertheless
seek to maintain their autonomy and pursue actions that can maximize their relative
positions in the world system (Wallerstein 1979a, 95-108). But lacking in capital and
dependent on foreign finances, such goals by the peripheral state come at the costs of
internal social economic inequalities and sustained authoritative governance. In concise
general statement, dependent development has been proven to increase socioeconomic inequalities (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Rubinson 1976), which can
hinder the democratization process (Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 72).

8 In the modern capitalist age, for example, scientific and technological rationalizations are often
used to legitimate cultural-ideological processes and decisions (Habermas 1971, 99). The lifeworld depicts an internal perspective vis-a-vis the system, which stands for an external viewpoint.

According to Habermas, life-world and system are two ways at analyzing society. As he sees it,
and with great concern, the life-world is increasingly being colonized by the system, which
impedes free communicative action among society’s members (see Habermas 1987)
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Comparative and Socioloqical-Historical Methodology

A critical understanding of the essence of peripheral capitalist development and
the role of the state in relation to the problem of democracy in these two countries
requires the analysis of dynamic interactions taking place between macro and micro
factors within the capitalist world system. C. W. Mills (1959, 165) declared “structural
problems, and to state them requires that we work in the classic terms of human
biography and epochal history. Only in such terms can the connections of structures and
milieux that affect these values today can be traced and causal analyses be conducted.”
To find causal linkages between the growth of peripheral capitalism and the rise toward
authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore, we need to understand such a process by
also examining historical-sociological and macro-structural factors.
Comparative history has been a methodology used by many prominent social
scientists in their quest to observe and study different types of societies. Attention to

historical patterns is crucial to understanding processes of social change and
transformation. Indeed, social scientists from Max Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville to
Reinhard Bendix and Theda Skocpol have found this methodology an indispensable tool
to understand social dynamics occurring within and across time-related cultural-historical

transformations. 9 Investigation of social life brings forth an interest in comparing such
historical patterns of two or more places or time. As early as the fourteenth century, the

distinguished Islamic scholar Abdel Rahman lbn-Khaldun, who undertook extensive
comparative works on different societies across time, stressed the significance of linking
sociological thought and historical observations (Faghirzadeh 1982; Ritzer 1996, 8). As
Durkheim (1964, 139) commented: “Comparative sociology is not a particular branch of
sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires

to account for facts.”
The sheer importance of comparative history in social investigation motivated
scholars like Sewell (1967, 208-18) and Smelser (1976, 3-5) to even incorporate the

various types of comparative studies into a uniformed methodological logic. In contrast,
Theda Skocpol asserts that comparative history is not a single, homogenous logic of
macro-social inquiry but one that constitutes a complementary relationship between
various sub-branches of this methodology (Skocpol 1997, 90). The three main types of
comparative historical methods identified by her - the Parallel comparative history, the
Macro-analytical comparative history, and the Contrast-oriented comparative history —
together forge a cyclical corresponding system, in which the limitations found in each

type necessitate the use of the others (Skocpol 1997, 91-92).10 This enables the
9 Reinhard Bendix’s work in Nation-Building and Citizenship (Bendix 1977) compared political
modernization of Western Europe to corresponding changes in Russia, Japan, and India to draw

out the contrasts of the industrialization process between those areas. In Social Revolutions in
the Modern World, Theda Skocpol (1997) in pointing out a linkage between the various forms of
comparative history, explained that social revolutions have their roots in macro-structural origins,
and that the understanding of why revolutions occur in certain countries and not others requires
gngagement of a comparative historical methodology.
Skocpol's parallel comparative history develops general theories from parallel cases. But its

limits are set in that it sometimes overgeneralizes a theory. This will force it to call on the
Contrast-oriented type of comparative study to set limits to the overgeneralized theory. This
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comparative-historical approach to be all encompassing, flexible, and reciprocal in its

application to social inquiries of the state and democracy in Malaysia and Singapore.
In examining the development of state and authoritarianism in these two
countries, a broad, flexible, and multi-dimensional methodological approach is
necessary. No single level approach can adequately address the complexities

embedded within the concepts of state, the problem of democracy, and capitalist
development. The usefulness of comparative-historical approaches lies in the ability of

the researcher to interpret micro-variables within large, macro-scale factors. According
to Neuman (1997, 391), in comparative-historical research, “a researcher approaches

the (complex) whole as if it has multiple layers. He or she grasps surface appearances
as well as reveals the general, hidden structures, unseen mechanisms, or causal

processes”. Furthermore, this approach allows the investigation of social problems to be
carried out in a multi-dimensional and inter-disciplinary manner. As stated by Ragin
(1987, 13), “Historical outcomes require complex, combinational explanations.”

Another important aspect of this dissertation is the focus on the state as an
autonomous unit that employs various methods to mediate various social forces in order

to effectively pursue its goals. This implies that the state must be seen as a potentially
autonomous organization situated at the interface of class, gender, and ethnonational
structures and the international system (Skocpol 1979, 33). Weber (1978, 78) stated:
“The modern state is a human community which claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory.” By tying in ‘bottom-up’ action-oriented
factors with ‘top-down’ structural analysis of the state, critical approaches to state
analysis could help engage the study of micro level variables as corresponding

components to time-space structural variables. As Giddens (1984, 219) argues, “Every
research investigation in the social sciences or history is involved in relating action (often
used synonymously with agency) to structure
there is no sense in which structure
determines action or vice versa.” In this respect, this dissertation also takes a look at
state behavior, especially in reference to its legitimation and internal policy
implementation strategies, as a cultural-ideological response to the pressures from both
the effeCts of internal social forces and the repercussions of external global dynamics.

In this dissertation, global as well as state-related perspectives are required in
analyzing the relationship between capitalist state development and authoritarianism in

Malaysia and Singapore. A comparative historical approach is appropriate for this
research since the outcome of interest, state authoritarianism, is examined in both

countries in relation to capitalist development. The comparative agreement method is
particularly useful because the main issue lies in the investigation of what it is about
capitalist development in these countries that brings on state authoritarianism. The
previous section’s discussion on capitalist peripheral development, democracy and
authoritarianism provides the theoretical structure, from which the four developmentrelated variables mentioned earlier in the chapter are extracted for the basis of this
research. The goal is to examine whether capitalist development in both states has

Contrast-oriented comparative history may give rise to Macro-analytical arguments when

juxtapositions of historical trajectories begin to suggest testable hypotheses. In turn, Macroanalytical comparative history can create the need to develop general theorizing that comes
before Parallel comparative analysis (see Skocpol 1997, 72-95).
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given rise to the existence of any of these four variables that contribute to state
authoritarianism. Any variable commonly found in both countries would indicate the
factor responsible for the trend toward authoritarian rule.
The dissertation’s main theme and methodology unfold in chapters that are

grouped thematically according to the theoretical and historical analysis of the two
states. This introductory chapter provides a theoretical understanding of the world
systemic processes, within which the modern state in Malaysia and Singapore had
emerged. Each subsequent chapter presents key propositions to the thematic premise of

this dissertation that the drift toward authoritarianism in these two countries occurred as
a result of the historical process of capitalist peripheral state development.

Like many comparative historical studies, collection of data for this research is
through published histories, governmental and archival records, and other forms of
secondary sources. Many of these sources are compared for data consistency with
other sources as well as for quality assurance. Limitations exist in the non-availability of
data due to restricted access and state censorship of facts as well as to the lack of
‘fieldwork’ carried out in many areas of study.
Theoretical Framework
This study analyzes the interaction among four main clusters of developmentrelated variables — state institutionalization processes, ethnonational-class tensions,
dependent and uneven capitalist state development, and state legitimation strategies, all

of which contribute toward state authoritarian rule in Malaysia and Singapore.
Figure 1.3 on the next page provides a graphical illustration of the theoretical
framework for this research, which argues that both internal and external factors of
capitalist state development contribute to authoritarian trends in both countries.

Autocratic colonial institutions are passed down to the peripheral state, maintaining the
authoritarian character of the state. Ethnonational inequalities arising from colonialism’s
forced division of labor has created not only fertile grounds for ethnonational tensions.
This situation presents not only justification for the state to impose autocratic rule to

diffuse such tensions but also difficulties for effective democratric alliances to form.
Dependent capitalist development results in the strengthening of the state and the

weakening of civil society, producing a trend toward state authoritarianism.

Chapter two functions as the prelude to the subsequent chapters in the
dissertation. It illustrates how capitalist incorporation introduced long-term

transformations in the political economic institutions of the Malay States, Singapore, and
Borneo. The chapter discusses the manner in which capitalism came to the Malay world
through a top-down, coercive process that forcefully replaced and dismantled the Malay
regional economic lifeline. The proposition here is that the oppressive nature of capitalist
incorporation predicated the inequalities that surfaced in the capitalist development
process of the Malaysian and Singaporean states. The importance of understanding
Malay pre-capitalist structure in this chapter, especially the hierarchical nature of its precapitalist institutions, lies in its captive capacity within which authority and legitimacy are
embodied. The autocratic nature of the Malay pre-capitalist structure in the Malay
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Malaysia and Singapore
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States was actually retained and strengthened by the British to effectively subdue Malay
subjects. Third, indirect and direct colonial governance that later appeared in Malaya
and Singapore respectively were attributed to each of their different origins of capitalist
incorporation. In Singapore, the lack of a strong Malay ruling faction enabled the British
to immediately establish colonial administration on the island.
Built on the premises of the arguments in chapter two, the proposition in chapter
three asserts that with the formation of the colonial state, the political institutional
structures inherited through colonialism have contributed to each state’s future
hegemony over other social forces. There are three key points in chapter three. One,
capitalist development in the Malay States and Singapore required the consolidation of

power through a colonial state that is repressive in nature. Two, the colonial state in both
Malaya and Singapore is autocratic because it functioned to serve the emerging
capitalist class as well as to sustain the capitalist system, in which it exists. Three, the
nature of the colonial state in Malaya, Borneo, and Singapore performed separate labor
and production functions within the regional economy giving rise to the separate future
political economic identities of the three regions.

To illustrate these points, this chapter discusses how global economic forces
necessitated the British to consolidate their capitalist involvement in the Malay States,
Borneo, and Singapore through formation of the colonial state. The centralization of

colonial power in Malaysia and Singapore during this time served to facilitate
monopolization of the lucrative tin production and trade under the auspices of the
colonial state. Although modeled after the English political system, in essence the
colonial state reinforced non-democratic elements of capitalist exploitation, which served
to benefit the European capitalist class at the expense of the indigenous peasants and

Asian workers. Herewith began the formal state policies that stratified labor into
ethnonationaI-occupational enclaves, with the Chinese and Indian workers involved in
capitalist production and the Malay peasantry confined to its agrarian functions. This

system also legitimized the state as the paramount social and political force in each
society. The repressive features of the colonial state are an extremely important heritage
in both these countries since they were the blueprints from which future statehood
emerged.

In Chapter four, the underlying proposition is that British colonialism also
produced a complex multi-ethnonationa/ society through a ‘divide and rule’ stratiﬁcation
process that has given rise to persistent ethnonational-class inequalities in these
countries. Primacy for profits and production efficiency during colonialism had

institutionalized ethnonational-class stratification as a distinctive feature in social
relations in modern day Malaysia and Singapore. The effects of colonialism have also

produced uneven regional-demographic capitalist development within Malaysia as well
as between Malaysia and Singapore, which has further reinforced the inequalities

among the ethnonational groups. This chapter takes a look at how capitalist-colonial
state development flourished from its racialized labor policy to consequently produce

class and regional inequalities, which by the end of the Second World War, became
rigidly channeled along ethnonational lines. Such inequalities have provided the
backdrop, against which future ethnonational tensions have persisted, and through

which efforts toward democratization processes in both Malaysia and Singapore have
been extremely complicated.
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Hence, in chapter five the key proposition is that social inequalities and

ethnonational tensions brought forth by the ethnonational-occupationa/ stratification
process have disabled attempts to form democratic alliances in both these countries.
The main points discussed here is that first, ethnonational-class inequalities created
distinct and conflicting ethnonationalism formation between Malays and Chinese, which
has made a democratic popular alliance between these two dominant groups difficult.
Second, the failure of the left to gain influence with the citizenry enabled the
conservative elite class in both countries to consolidate and gain significant influence in
the nationalist movements.
The period of discussion is the end of the Second World War, which provided a
good opportunity for the forging of a popular democratic movement against the British.
But here, the absence of effective and meaningful interaction between Malays and
Chinese inhibited the formation of an effective popular alliance between them due to
their respective entrenchment within a specific function of the colonial capitalist economy
and the tensions that followed. Both the Malays and Chinese had undergone the same
colonial process but had developed distinct social experiences and responses that

translated into the formation of distinct political goals. Such fragmentation made a unified
anti-colonial stand between them difficult. Without a cohesive national consciousness,
the struggle of a unified anti-systemic movement in Malaysia and Singapore leading up
to the years of political independence lacked the popular will and legitimacy to succeed.

As a result, in each country the elite class managed to rise to political prominence by
forging close alliances with the British, thereby facilitating the latter’s neo-colonial
interests.
Through their predominance in the political parties sanctioned by the British, the

elite classes in both countries respectively gained their hegemonic role in the newly
emerging capitalist peripheral states of Malaysia and Singapore. Two main propositions

are discussed in Chapter six. One is that due to world systemic transformations that
elevated the elite class to consolidate political power, the ruling political party in both

countries became sufﬁciently strong to control the state and accommodate foreign
capital in order to facilitate capitalist economic growth, without which it cannot survive.
The state in other words, like many others in the periphery, becomes the dominant
player and establishes political economic associations with the capitalist or other
dominant classes, with whom it shares common beneﬁts of capitalist development
through industrialization (Chase-Dunn 1989, 112-114). Such alliances sustain a
contradictory relationship between the state and civil society, thereby impeding the
growth toward popular democracy.
However, the second proposition in this chapter states that the dependent nature
of capitalist peripheral state development in the world economy limits the state ’5 ability to

fully chart its own course, strengthening inherent contradictions and inequalities within its
political economic system. Dependence on foreign capital has compelled the state to

prioritize. the interests of the capitalist class. But in Malaysia, ethnonational tensions
arising from Malay dissatisfaction of their impoverished conditions forced the state to
reconsider such prioritization and embarked on a new economic policy that emphasized

preferential treatments to indigenous groups. Singapore’s less problematic demographic
and ethnonational structures enabled the state to maintain its supremacy over other
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social forces, but increasing inequalities remains a potential threat to its stability. In both
cases, the long-term aim of the state has been to ensure that the capitalist system
remains undisrupted.

Chapter seven addresses the increasing state authoritarian rule in Malaysia and
Singapore. Notions of developmentalism have dispensed the state in both these
countries with the power and responsibility to effectively intervene and administer the
country’s capitalist development and economic growth, which has been heavily
contingent upon the political stability of the regime. In Malaysia and Singapore, the
power of the state is further validated by the belief that the state alone assumes the
legitimate responsibility in lawfully guarding national sovereignty. The state is able to
socially construct non-democratic forms of ideological legitimations that appeal to the
middle and subordinate classes, which see the state as the true proselytizer of their
social well being as well as the symbol of nationalism. Based on the premise that
ideology is a domination tool produced by the social elite (Kellner 1990; Agger 1978;
Schroyer 1973)”, such controls have become extremely and successfully omnipresent
that citizens can fully internalize them and come to accept them as unquestionable

reality.
Hence, chapter seven discusses how the forces of globalization have intensified
the unequal exchanges between the core and peripheral states within the world system,

resulting in increased economic vulnerabilities in Malaysia and Singapore. Globalization
has also brought on high levels of transnational awareness that threaten to pervade the
national character of the state. Both processes have affected both countries in different
ways but globalization in this sense further threatens state political legitimacy,

strengthening tensions between the state and civil society, thereby causing increased
state authoritarianism (Alagappa 1995, 63-65;Case 1995, 86-90; also see Toye, 1987).
Thus this chapter proposes two issues that relates to the penetrating effects of

globalization. One, as the state takes advantage of structural transformations to attain
economic industrialization, its political orientation has tilted toward greater authoritarian
rule. Two, Social cultivation of state ideologies centering on economic nationalism and
racial politics has fostered political legitimacy of the state and its repressive rule. This
process has enabled the citizenry to overlook the inherent inequalities and injustices of
the system, thereby weakening structural prospects for democracy.

Finally, Chapter eight concludes the dissertation with the discussion of main
differences and similarities in both Malaysia and Singapore by tying together earlier

arguments and propositions within the context of the theoretical-historical relationship
between state, capitalist development, and authoritarianism. It will also briefly discuss
the structural prospects for popular democracies in both countries.

‘1 Both Agger and Shroyer wrote on the ‘critique of domination,’ in which they argued that the
world today has attained incomparable domination by capitalist ideology that there need not be
any form of conscious control on the part of state leaders to enforce it (see Agger 1978; Shroyer

1973)
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CHAPTER 2
INCORPORATION OF THE MALAY WORLD
INTO THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY

This chapter examines the pre-capitalist Malay world, its social-institutional structures,
and the eventual absorption of Malay societies into the capitalist world economy.

Understanding the legacy of the pre-capitalist Malay political structure and the forceful
manner in which capitalism was imposed on Malay and other indigenous societies would

enable one to appreciate the world historical processes from which modern Malaysia
and Singapore came into being.
As in other peripheral areas within the world system, capitalism’s advancement
into the Malay world via mercantilist expansion did not provide for it a social transitional
platform toward democratic statehood. On the contrary, it paved the way for the

emergence of a colonial administration bent on establishing its hegemonic position
through the displacement of indigenous political systems and the military containment of
other core powers in the region. Harry Magdoff (1982a, 16) asserted that “the aim of
colonial policy was to create a self-sufficient empire, producing as much as possible the
raw material and food needs of the mother country and providing exclusive markets for
its manufactures.” A major impact of European expansion into the Malay world was the

gradual demise of the traditional Malay maritime trade under the weight of European
mercantilism and its eventual collapse into separate colonial-territorial entities.
Pre-Capitalist Malay States12 and the World System
Present day Malaysia and Singapore comprise an area that covers the lower half
of the Malay Peninsula and the northern portion of the island of Borneo. Geographically,

both countries belong to the wider region of the Malay Archipelago or Nusantara, which
encompasses the eastern end of Indonesia in the east, the Philippine islands to the

north, and the island of Sumatra in the west. In order to understand the historical
processes of these two countries, it is essential to look at the history of this region before
and during the advent of European imperialism. This requires examining the histories of
the various pre-colonial Malay States and the events leading to their collapse under

colonialism.
The earliest insight into the history of the region has been through the numerous
archeological findings of temple ruins, tombstones, and relics. The daunting tasks of
deciphering the origins and nature of these artifacts have prevented the accurate
reading of dates regarding early human dwelling in the area. A conservative estimate
goes back to almost 35,000 years, evidenced from the human remains found in the Niah
Caves in Sarawak on the northern part of the island of Borneo (Ryan 1976, 4).

The people inhabiting the Malay Peninsula, on the other hand, are believed to
have entered the region much later. An accepted view is that there had been a filtering

17' The state is actually a kingdom, and eventually after the lslamicization of the Malay world,

sultanates. Throughout this dissertation, Malay States and sultanates are used interchangeably.
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of migrations from the northern Asian mainland more than 10,000 years ago by people.
These people were dispossessed of their habitat by a more technologically advanced
people, the Proto-Malays, who arrived from the north in about 2500 BC. Later, the

Deutero-Malays, known for their use of metal, came to the Peninsula sometime during
300 BC and in turn displaced their predecessors further inland (Andaya and Andaya
2001,9)
The movements of these various peoples between the islands of the archipelago

as well as intermarriages between the various groups eventually formed the Malay
population that inhabited the coastal areas of the Nusantara. Due to a common lineage,
the coastal and the inland groups shared many social characteristics. The most
observable bonds between these groups had been their common worldview, societal
customs, religious rituals, and communal ownership of property. As Andaya and Andaya
(1982, 9) wrote “In the slow process of social development and environmental
adaptation, variations in language, appearance, and culture among these peoples
became more marked....but activities of all communities, from the coast to the deep
interior, overlapped to some degree with their neighbors so that no cultural feature was
completely unique.” Bellwood (1978), in documenting the movement of peoples
throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands, asserted that the dispersal of peoples

throughout these regions from a common source is evidenced by their affiliation to the

common Malay-Austronesian linguistic family.13
Existing official documentation of Malay history has been confined mostly to the

establishment of the Malacca Sultanate around the year 1400. The Malay Annals or
Sejarah Melayu is one of the most important sources of information on events
surrounding Malay social and political life prior to the arrival of Europeans in the
sixteenth century.14 But the geographical location of the Malay Peninsula as a crossroad
between the two continental divides of China and India had made the region an
important stopping point for many travelers during the changeover monsoon seasons.
As a result, valuable sources of current information also include the numerous voyage
accounts of travelers, traders, and military personnel, who passed through this region
and whose narratives had been incorporated into various ancient texts and diaries.
Traces of settlements can be found in the northeastern part of the Peninsula

through the discoveries of metal relics and temple ruins, giving rise to the speculation
that these areas had also probably been part of a Hindu colony (Wheatly 1961, 270276). One of the famous states was Langkasuka, situated on the east-central portion of
the Peninsula, and whose civilization thrived around the sixth century. The fact that trade
with Indian and Chinese merchants had been established since the early centuries AD
indicates that the Malay inhabitants had already possessed a significant degree of

navigational and commercial skills. In this, Malay traders and seafarers played an
important part in spreading Indian cultural ideas throughout the region (Andaya and

Andaya 2001, 16-17).

’3 The Malay language, along with other numerous Indonesian, Melanesian, Micronesian, and
Polynesian languages, belongs to the vast Malay-Austronesian linguistic family.

’4 Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals is a traditional royal text recounting the life and times of
various kings, sultans, and court leaders as well as significant events through the use of both
mythical legends and historical facts.
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Contact with Chinese traders was first recorded sometime during the fifth
century, when instabilities in southern China compelled goods from the Persian trade to
be transported by way of the Peninsula through Malay sea cargo vessels to China
(Wolters, 1967). The intensification of the Persian trade and the increasing use of the
sea route as a means of transportation gave rise to the establishment of many entrepots
along the coasts of the Malay Archipelago. From such commerce, the Malays traded
their camphor, lakawood, incense, gold, tin, ocean produce, and spices for cloth, copper,

musical instruments, pottery, ironware, and glass.
By the ninth century, Chinese records had documented the existence of a vast
Malay-Buddhist maritime kingdom of Srivijaya in the western portion of the Archipelago
on the eastern coast of Sumatra (Dunn 1975, 78-100).15 The success of this Empire had
much to do with their diplomatic craftiness as with their commercial prowess. By opening

Up political relations with China through a semi-tribute system, which accorded them
military protection, Srivijaya secured the monopolization of the East-West trade over
other states in the region. Internally, economic prosperity enabled the empire to build a
relatively sophisticated and stable administrative system based on syncretic politicalreligious principles, protected by a relatively strong maritime army (Wolters 1970, 187;

Hirth and Rockhill 1966, 32).
By the end of the thirteenth century, the Sumatra-based Srivijaya Empire soon
lost control over its numerous vassal states to the increasingly powerful Java-based
Majapahit kingdom. On the Malay Peninsula, its dominions began to either break away

or turn to other sources of power, mainly China and Siam. One of the more famous subcenters of Malay trade was Temasik, later named Slngapura (Singapore) (Purcell1965a,
19). Another, Malacca, a city-port on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula

flourished into a leading maritime empire that virtually controlled all sea trades from the
Middle East and China within the region in the next two centuries. Its rapid expansion

was enhanced by the influx of traders and craftsmen from neighboring areas within the
region, bringing with them high culture and technology (Ryan 1976, 17).
Malacca’s supremacy was in fact maintained by a political economic policy

derived from its Srivijaya heritage. The rulers of Malacca instituted good relations with
China, and even accepted the latter’s semi-suzerainty that bestowed on them greater
military protection against the hostile Siamese and Majapahit empires. At the same time

they opened their doors to every ship and trader, from whose skills and knowledge they
benefited. Simultaneously, they built a formidable military force that gradually became
self-subsistent and capable of defeating the Siamese as well as expanding its territorial
sovereignty. The Sultanate government machinery was also efficient, and one that
delivered justice and protection for all traders (McRoberts 1991, 72; Andaya and Andaya

2001, 44).
Trade was carried out with different regions for a variety of goods. Figure 2.1 on
the next page illustrates the main flows of Malacca trade in the fifteenth century. Cotton,
cloth, drugs, dyes, and opium were imported from the Middle-East and India. Rice, meat,

15 The kingdom of Srivijaya comprised the areas stretching from northern Malay Peninsula, the
western riverine territories of Sumatra and as far as western Borneo during its peak.
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and spices came from the eastern end of the Archipelago and Java and silk, pottery,
iron, and silver came by way of China while sugar came from the Philippines. The
Malacca Empire itself provided the world with tin, pepper, ivory, and gold (Ryan 1976,

18-20). Braudel (1984, 484), in his discussion of world-economies between the fifteenth
and eighteenth centuries, mentioned that Malacca was the gravity that tied the various
world-economies together. The city-state was where “everything and anything” could be
found, and whose network of maritime traffic was comparable to that of the
Mediterranean or the Atlantic coasts of Europe (Frank 1995, 167; Braudel 1984, 486-

487)
It is also important to note two significant world-systemic phenomena that took

place, one following the other, during this period. These phenomena created long-lasting
impact on the social and political structures of the Malay world in the following centuries.
One was the rise of Islam as a social, military, and commercial force. The other was the
emergence of the nations of Western Europe and their expansion of trade eastwards.

The decline of the Roman Empire entailed the increasing strength of the Muslim powers.
The Arabs, and later the Ottoman Turks, gradually brought the whole Middle-Eastern
and Mediterranean region under an intricate and vibrant trading network (Braudel 1984,
467-471; Ryan 1976, 40-41). The Muslims’ monopoly of trade allowed them to venture

into the Far East, bringing with them the spread of Islam. Islam first came to Malacca
mainly by way of commercial contacts with India and northern Sumatra. The latter had
already embraced the religion through their contacts with Arab and Gujerati traders
about a century before Malacca.
The hegemonic position of Muslims in the eastern trade also greatly helped

Malaccan commerce. By the fifteenth century virtually the whole empire followed the
Islamic faith. As a result, the volume of trade from the Islamic world into the port

increased, thereby enabling them to meet the demands of their goods by the Chinese.
For Muslim traders, Malacca not only posed a necessary lifeline for their products, but it

also became a place with which they were familiar and comfortable owing to the latter’s
Islamic status. Attracting Muslim businesses spelled increasing trade and wealth

(Andaya and Andaya 2001, 53).
Successful maritime voyages under the patronage of Prince Henry, and with the
help of Arab and Muslim navigators, enabled the Portuguese to penetrate the eastern
seas (Ryan 1976, 44). Finally in 1511, two years following a previous defeat, the
Portuguese under Alfonso d’ Alburquerque managed to conquer and occupy Malacca.

Their arrival was well timed as they had caught the Malay sultanate in a power struggle
that divided the allegiance of the court and military to its cruel and arrogant Sultan,
Mahmud Shah. But the Portuguese did not purely have trade as an agenda for
conquering Malacca. Having been under Islamic occupation for centuries, the lberians
had developed an extreme hatred for the Muslims; the takeover of Muslim trade

simultaneously became a religious crusade (Ryan 1976, 40-46).
When the Portuguese ruled Malacca, they turned the city into a military bastion,
with the construction of an inpenetrable fortress, named A Famosa, that repelled

successive but sporadic attacks by various Malay Chieftains. Although Malacca
continued its entrepot function under the Portuguese, it was no more the vibrant
cosmopolitan city that thrived under the Sultans. The Portuguese were cruel and disliked
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by both locals and foreigners (Hoyt 1993, 43). Malacca had literally turned into a fort,
through which Portuguese trade was protected and Christianity was spread, usually by
force.
Many of the local residents soon migrated to neighboring States thereby greatly
reducing Malacca’s population. With Malacca’s fall, the Sultanates of Aceh (northern
Sumatra) and Brunei (northern Borneo) gained most of the Muslim trade as well as
Malacca’s skilled craftsmen (Ryan 1976, 31 ). Another Malay empire, the Johor-Riau,
soon emerged in the southern portion of the Peninsula, whose rulers were descendants
of the Malacca heirs, and whose political coalition with the Dutch soon created important

political economic repercussions in the region. The rise of Malacca had been a
significant chapter in Malaysian history, because it represented the symbol of historical
pluralism and cultural hybridity that stands to reflect modern-day Malaysia (Thomasz
1993, 69-90). To many contemporary scholars, Malacca also became a central point in

the continuum of Malay history, in which European interference simply retarded an ongoing process of state-formation (Hashim 1992, 281-283).
Pre-Capitalist Malay Political Institutions

A large remnant of pre-capitalist elements exists in present day Malay social and
political institutions. By identifying the various contradictions that existed within precapitalist Malay society, especially the relationship between ruler and subjects, one can
later on appreciate how the colonial process stifled the growth of democracy in Malay

society through the reinforcement of such a structure.
According to David Martin Jones (1997, 20), “a remarkable feature of the Malay
world from the fifteenth to nineteenth century was the capacity to blend Islam with
essentially Hindu and Buddhistic political traditions.” Despite Islam as their religion,
Malay society and culture has remained very heavily Indian in influence. Indian culture
had asserted its predominance in Malay life as early as the fourth century AD (Purcell

1965a, 16). Derived from the practices of the Srivijaya-Palembang ruling tradition, Indian
religious rituals, ceremonies, and even social caste system have very much been carried
over into Malay social and political structures through the sultanate in Malacca (Andaya
and Andaya 2001, 44).

Particularly obvious is the demarcation of power in the relationship between ruler
and subject. Malay-Indian religious beliefs perpetuated the notion that the ruler stood at
the apex of human society as a representative of God on earth. The Malay Annals relate
a covenant being made between ruler and subject, in which both parties had a sacred

obligation to respect and observe the role of the other. It further stated that only God
could have the power to administer punishment for any transgression of this pact by
either party. The ruler is not accountable to his subject but only to God. As transcribed in
the Malay Annals, “ if any ruler puts a single one of his subjects to shame, that shall be a

sign that his kingdom will be destroyed by Almighty God” (Malay Annals translated by
Brown 1976, 24).
Similarly, “it has been granted by God to Malay subjects that they shall never be
disloyal or treacherous to their rulers, even if their rulers behave evilly or inflict injustice
upon them” (Brown 1976, 27). Thus the religiously sanctified position of the ruler
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enabled loyalty, devotion, and respect to be accorded to him by his subjects as an

unquestionable reality in Malay feudal society. The most significant aspect of this
covenant is the concept of dau/at, which is a set of punishment unleashed by semi-

mythical forces, associated with the ruler’s position, on those who commit the crime of
treason or derhaka (de Jong 1964, 235-241). Such beliefs have been deeply
institutionalized in Malay culture despite their embrace of Islam (Purcell 1965a, 23).
The Ruler was heavily involved in trade but as the Malay maritime-entrepot
economy flourished into more complex States, decentralization of political power
became a necessity (Kathirithamby and Wells 1993). Furthermore, the astral standing of

the ruler was not entitlement for dictatorial administration within the ruling elite. The
Malay Annals asserted “No ruler, however great his wisdom and understanding, shall
prosper or succeed in doing justice unless he consults with those in authority under him.
For rulers are like fire and their ministers are like firewood and fire needs wood to
produce a fire” (Brown 1976, 46). The concept of muafakat or cooperation, consensual

agreement was at the heart of Malay community decision-making process (De Jong
1964). To a great extent, the efficient operation of the government depended on the
skills and foresight of the cabinet of ministers in issuing advice to the ruler as well as in
handling domestic issues and international trade (Bedlington 1978, 26).
Thome Pires (1944), a Portuguese royal historian, wrote in his Suma Oriental
that in the Malacca political hierarchy, the Bendahara (Prime Minister) assumed the
biggest responsibility as chief executive and judge. Although the Bendahara lineage

became intersected with those of the rulers, the Bendahara himself was not an
exception to the strictures governing the relationship between the ruler and subjects

(Andaya and Andaya 2001, 46).16 Next on the ranking was the Penghulu Bendahari, or
Chief Treasurer, who controlled all state revenues and supervises all the Syahbandars
or harbormasters. Third on the hierarchy was the Temenggung, who was in charge of
internal state security matters and chief magistrate. Below him was the most powerful

figure in the cabinet, the Laksmana or Admiral, who took charge of the naval fleets.
Below the main elite hierarchy was the class of several noblemen and chieftains,

whose functions were not as clearly delineated, but whose privileged positions rendered
them worthy of consultations in certain state matters. State wealth, although under the

purview of the ruler, is usually shared among members of the elite groups. Some of the
noblemen controlled local riverine trades, which entitled them to portions of overall state
wealth from the larger maritime economy through taxation. It is also important to note the

frequent internal political struggles and private battles that took place among the Malay
ruling elite. Thus the lines of hierarchical power in pre-capitalist Malay society were not
all that rigid as far as chieftains and noblemen were concerned. In more modern
organizational terms, the relationship among these groups of leaders was more matrixlike rather than vertical since inter-leadership consensus had to be derived in much of
the political decision-making process (Gullick 1968).

‘6 The Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals frequently depict how a Bendahara, although powerful,
would refuse to go against the Sultan for unjustly acting upon him since derhaka, was an

unthinkable offence for any Malay (see Andaya and Andaya 2001, 46; Brown 1976).
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At the core of this Indian heritage was a diluted version of its social caste system
that identified each caste with certain occupations. The common subjects, who
constituted the largest portion of Malay feudal society, composed mainly of agricultural
workers and fishermen. Villages became the predominant community group in Malay
feudal society. At the top of the village ladder was the Penghulu (village chief), who was
accountable to the District Chief as well as acted as a representative of the community.
Any matter relating to the village would be discussed and debated through muafakat,
and its implementation carried out through a cooperative gotong-royong (Gullick 1968).
However, in the overall structure, the lines of authority are clearly visible, leaving
little room for those on the lower rung to assert their opinions and views. The precapitalist Malay social system was based largely on a tributary mode of production
system. At the bottom of this hierarchy were the original groups of Malays and other
indigenous groups known as the orang Iaut (sea people) and orang asli (original people).
They are believed to be the precursor to the modern Malay inhabitants, as opposed to

those who came over from Sumatra after the founding of Malacca (Andaya and Andaya
2001, 49). Many of them have intermarried into the Malay groups to be categorically

absorbed as Malays. Not much information has been retrieved on these indigenous
groups other than those gathered through the original Malay texts, which described them
as highly valued for their vast knowledge of the sea and forests and their skills in
retrieving produce from these areas. Generally, hunting, ﬁshing, and washing tin were
the important occupations among the lower castes (Hoyt 1993, 16).

Unlike the rigid Indian caste system however, the Malay social system allowed
the orang laut quite a substantial degree of upward mobility, especially where their

leaders were concerned. Owing to their large numbers as well as their labor expertise,
powerful chieftains consistently brought the leaders of the orang laut into the elite social
circles as a means to strengthen their (chieftains’) economic and political base. Despite
being valued for their skills, many of these people, together with the orang asli, and the
original Malay residents of the Peninsula were extremely powerless. Many were also

categorized into serfdom as orang berhutang (bonded laborers), and ended up as
servants in palaces and elite households and soldiers in private armies.

Besides the strong demarcation between the ruler and subjects, the social and
political structure of feudal Malay society was also rigidly stratified between the nobility
class and the common masses, namely the peasantry. The former extracted wealth from
the latter, who provided crops such as coffee, pepper, gambier (used for dyes in
Europe), maize, rice, fruits and sugar. But since the main activity among the peasants
was subsistence farming, lordship over them by chieftains was usually in terms of free
labor (for war and state projects) under a kerah (corvee) system that entitled them to
free use of land and its produce (as a form of tax) (Hua 1982, 11-13). As in many feudal
and pre-capitalist societies, positions of power and subservience are usually based on

inheritance rather than merit. In traditional Malay society, such characteristics provide a
self-regulating systemic mechanism against political disorder that is strengthened by a
religio-traditional source of legitimacy (Bedlington 1978, 27-28).
Related to labor was the issue of land. Since pre-colonial Malay Peninsula was
sparsely populated, land was considered abundant. As Wong (1975, 10-15) clarified,” at
a time when land was abundant, anyone could, as a simple matter of fact, clear forest
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land for cultivation and occupation” since land belonged to no man but God. There were

three types of land; sawah or rice land, cultivated land or ladang, and land on which
cultivators resided called tanah kampung. Rights over land persisted as long as it was
occupied and worked on, evidenced by the presence of fruit trees (Maxwell, quoted in

Nonini 1992, 34).
There existed three methods of land transactions. One was through a ‘return of
expenses,’ or pulang be/anja, which was in effect, compensation for the original
cultivator’s labor for clearing the land. The other was a ‘let’ or sewa, in which a cultivator
receives a share of the produce for his allowing another to cultivate his land. The third,
which became an initial step toward some kind of commoditization of land, was the
gadai. Here, a debtor became a tenant to his creditor, in which some apportioning of the
produce secured the deal. Land under this transaction can also be used as collateral for

debt, in which all its proceeds from would go to the creditor (Wong 1975, 10-11).
Incredibly however, the sultan did not posses ‘absolute property in the soil’ as the British

later claimed, despite their rights to tithe and taxes from land. Maxwell (1884, 92)
explained that tenant right was the cardinal doctrine in feudal Malay society hence his
absolute right to land was a ‘barren right.’ Although the ruler was aware of his territorial
possessions, there was no real tenurial system of land between him and his subjects
(Wong 1975, 14).
Because Islam arrived in Southeast Asia not through conquest but through a
developing pattern of Southeast Asian trade, it was accommodated with great facility by
Hindu religious views that sanctioned a ruler’s supreme social and political position (Reid
1993, chapter3). The Hindu concept of rule as a form of cosmically divine ritual, where

kings assumed the reincarnations or karma of holy deities, continued to persist. Also,
under Hindu-Buddhist traditions, religious dictums had made it clear that spiritual as well
as material proprietorship was the total prerogative and privilege of the god-rulers,
impelling subjects’ subservience to the power and wishes of the Kings. In other words,

temporal rule was a reflection of divine cosmology (Coedes, 1971). With the coming of
Islam, the rulers transformed their legitimization of power through mythical
reinterpretations of the karma. The Malay Annals noted that Rulers made it known to
their subjects of their moral institutional authority as chosen representatives of the Holy

Prophet”, and that their powers were divinely and magically embedded in a higher and
godly empyrean structure (Gullick 1991, 29; Brown 1976; Wolters, 1972).
The Malays were deeply devoted to their traditional customs and devout in their
practices. Deliberate resistance among the common people against the Sultans was

rarely initiated for fear of the dau/at imposed on them, securing political stability for the
rulers against his subjects (Gullick 1968, chapter 8). The politically syncretic relationship
that legitimized the pattern of interaction between the state and subjects later on

’7 The ancient Malay Annals or Sejarah Melayu, is a product of the royal court, which cleverly
rationalized the Ruler’s legacies in Islamic terms. One of its more significant functions was in the

legitimization of unstable political systems that centered on unpopular leaders. It stated that a
ruler by the name of Raja Tengah, received a vision through a dream or wahyu, that the Prophet
had chosen him as the one to lead his kingdom into a powerful and affluent empire. Raja Tengah
became Sultan Muhammad Shah l. The tale has varied forms throughout the Malay Archipelago.
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provided the Europeans with great advantages in their dealings with the Malay rulers to
facilitate their colonial expansion.
European Mercantilist Expansion

The failure of any one state to dominate the other in Europe during the sixteenth
century could be seen in the context of continuous wars aimed at achieving regional
hegemony. The main powers, Spain, England, France, and the Netherlands were
consistently involved in economic and military efforts to impose their dominance on the
others, which extended beyond the shores of Europe into the Americas, Africa, and Asia.
Spain, which absorbed Portugal under the Hapsburg monarch, was experiencing
a gradual decline in its economic as well as military capabilities. Wallerstein (1974a,
165-221) cited a number of reasons for their decline, namely the absence of state

encouragement for agriculture and manufacturing, an inefficient bureaucracy, reliance
on foreign borrowings for state finance and imports, and a parasitical aristocracy. Such a
political economic system could never accommodate the rising demands of the new

capitalist economy that was sweeping through western Europe through the
commercialization of agriculture, urbanization, and wage labor.
The core countries of Europe, England, France and the Netherlands became
continuously locked in bitter confrontations and rivalries over markets and resources. In

1609, a treaty was signed between Spain and the Netherlands, which won
independence for the latter. By now, Western Europe had already achieved economic

superiority over other parts of the continent through its high technology, extensive
economic system, trade and finance specialization, and craft manufacturing (Shannon

1996,56)
The Dutch in the Nusantara

By the end of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had gained reputation as
‘cargo-carriers’ of Europe, for their ships distributed goods throughout the continent,
including the spices that the Portuguese had brought from the Malay Archipelago (Ryan
1976, 64). Spain’s blockade of Dutch ships into Lisbon forced the Dutch to seek control

of the spice trade by venturing into the islands themselves. Although the Dutch
mercantilist economy soon expanded into Africa and Asia, they were frequently denied
entry into ports held by their competitors, the British and the Portuguese.

In their goal to control the spice trade, they established the United East India
Company (VOC). This was perhaps the ﬁrst transnational corporation functioning within

the world capitalist economy. The VOC was backed by a well-organized network of
capital resources and operated on a philosophy divorced from any religious constraints
(Ryan 1976, 66). The Portuguese had been reluctant to negotiate or sign accords with
Muslim States due to their fierce animosity toward Muslims. Their fanatical missionary
goals and cruel disposition drove many traders away from Malacca to the sultanates of
Johor, Brunei, and Aceh, contributing to the growth of these areas (Hoyt 1993, 43). In
contrast, the Dutch signed many treaties with Muslim rulers, the ﬁrst of whom were those
from the Spice Islands of Mollucas. In strengthening their foothold in the Malay world,
the Dutch decided to remove all other European competitors. They established their
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fortress in Batavia (Jakarta) on the island of Java. From there they prepared for the
conquest of Malacca, which they planned to use as a guarding post to protect their
ships.

Unable to attack the Portuguese on their own, they sought the help of the Malay
Johor Empire. In 1641, the Dutch took over Malacca when the mainly Johor army
successfully captured the fort.18 In return, the Dutch promised to grant Johor trading
rights denied to all other local States. The victory over the Portuguese produced three

important consequences. One, it enabled the Dutch to control the spice trade through
Batavia, since Malacca had been removed as competitor. Two, the Johor-Riau entrepot
economy began to flourish and their military might, fresh from the victory over the
Portuguese, brought them into power throughout the Malay Peninsula. Three, the
emergence of the Bugis people in the political economic life of the Malay Peninsula.
The Bugis had left their native homeland in south Sulawesi (Celebes, see Figure
2.1, page 29) to seek fortune across the Malay world. Renowned for their military and
seafaring skills, they were often used as mercenaries in war. Eventually their
involvement in the politics of the Malay states bestowed upon them the role of
‘kingmakers’ and court warriors, especially in the Johor-Riau Empire. Although the Dutch
began to monopolize the spice trade, they would soon discover that Johor-Riau’s
success actually became increasingly detrimental to their commercial interests. VOC
officials could only watch as the Johor port of Riau (on the island of the same name)

prospered with clientele from Britain, Scandinavia, the Middle East, North Africa, and the
Mediterranean (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 79). According to the Bugis literary figure
Raja Ali Haji (1981, 43) in his Tuhfat al-Naﬁs, “Johor prospered, and was famed not only
for their refinement in customs, but also for their refinement in culture.”
The early years of the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of Britain as a core
industrial power, which was greatly helped by their domination of the Atlantic fisheries

and their control of their Indian trade through its East India Company in Bengal
(Shannon 1996, 64). The Napoleanic wars in Europe had ushered in a shift in the
balance of power that served as a prelude to the military and commercial decline of the
Dutch as a world power. Capitalism in Europe had brought developments in technology,
increasing close cooperation between the state and commerce and the shortening of

long distances through rapid improvements in communications. British technological
advancements and efficient state and military organizations emerged during these years
to push the country fon/vard into becoming a world power.
Significantly, the Malay Peninsula provided the growing Europe capitalist
economies with the raw material needed for industrialization. The rivalry between Great
Britain and the Netherlands culminated into the Anglo-Dutch Wars in the late eighteenth
’8 The Dutch-Johor military alliance was in fact an overstatement designed by European history

makers as a European victory over another European power. Historical records show that the
Johor forces were mostly responsible for the victory, since the Dutch, with only a few men, merely
provided back-up services. According to Van Heeres, a VOC official, "we must continue to
remember that the Johor people contibuted substantialy towards the conquest of Malacca.

Without their help we would never have become master of that strong place (Heeres, J. 1895.
Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlandersin en Ma/ischen Aechil, vol. 3 The Hague, iv.
As quoted in Andaya and Andaya 2001)
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century. Nevertheless, the desire for a peaceful regional atmosphere in the East, within

which successful trading could operate materialized into a détente-like Anglo-Dutch
Treaty in 1824. The effect of this treaty was the division of a large part of the Malay

world into two areas of domination by the two powers (Bedlington 1978, 31).
The Dutch obtained a much larger territorial dominion in the form of the vast
Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) spreading from Sumatra in the west to the Spice Islands in
the eastern end of the Archipelago. But the British asserted their control within a more
strategic locale. The British had earlier established a post on Penang island in 1786 with
the aim of restricting Dutch trade in the Malay Peninsula. This treaty effectively gave
them the heart of the trading route between the east and the west. Also through this
treaty, the British took over Malacca from the Dutch and ruled by the East India
Company (EIC) from Calcutta (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 121-123).
This compromise between these two powers effectively severed the social,

cultural, and economic unity between the eastern half of the island of Sumatra with the
Malay Peninsula and the southern islands of Riau. Later, the effects of this Treaty also
entailed the partitioning the Johor-Riau Kingdom through British colonial establishment
in Singapore (to be discussed in the next section) and Dutch takeover of the Riau-Lingga
islands south of it (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 122).19 These ‘spheres of influence’
between the British and the Dutch created the formal boundaries that eventually became
the political basis of modern day Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
The Purchase of Singapore and the growth of a mercantilist port

By the turn of the nineteenth century, the British had made successful inroads
into the East by conquering Portuguese and French bases in the Indian subcontinent
and taking over their trade in these areas. To break the Dutch trade monopoly in the
Malay Archipelago, the Calcutta-based British East India Company (EIC) established a
trading post on the island of Penang, off the northwestern coast of the Peninsula (Ryan

1976, 94).20
Penang soon thrived to become a busy entrepot that collected pepper, betel-nut,

caphor, rattans and resins and tin from surrounding areas, as well as a distribution
center for opium, tobacco, and textiles in the region (Cowan 1950, 198-203). However,

‘9 The Anglo Dutch Treaty of 1824 provided the later colonial division of the Malay world down the
Straits of Malacca (Melaka) and is thus the basis for the contemporary boundary between
Indonesia and Malaysia. The British had earlier established a trading post at Bencoolen, on

western Sumatra. In order to locate their respective possessions within the demarcated lines of
the Straits of Malacca, Bencoolen and Malacca were exchanged respectively between the Dutch
and British. (See Andaya and Andaya 2001 ).
2° The acquisition of this island from the Sultan of Kedah, a vassal of Siam, had been made under
false pretences. Francis Light, the company’s captain, had initially promised to assist in its

independence from Siam and to protect the Sultanate from retaliatory Siamese attacks. This
promise was repealed after the Company refused to provide finances for any type of involvement
in local affairs. Angered, the Sultan launched an attack on the British to regain the island, but was
defeated. Finally, a treaty signed in 1791 gave the EIC the right to construct a settlement on the

island. Although the sultan received a meager compensation, there was still no clause in the
treaty about military protection for his sultanate (See Ryan 1976, 94).
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Penang became more beneficial to British interests as a military base than anything
else, having been used as a launching pad for its military expeditions in the Far East.

Commercially, the island’s location was too removed from the goings-on of Malay
maritime trade, and with Malacca’s entrepot becoming dysfunctional, Dutch Batavia
emerged as the center of trade in the region (Kennedy 1962, 89). The failure of Penang

to divert the eastern trade away from the Dutch encouraged the EIC to search for
alternative bases in the region.
An officer of the EIC, Sir Stamford Raffles, became one of the most aggressive
proponents for deeper British involvement in Malay political affairs as a way to gain
heavier and far-reaching influence in the region. Raffles, whose knowledge of Malay
history had been outstanding, sought to establish a British post on Singapore, located on
the southern tip of the Johor mainland. As he wrote to a friend, William Marsden, “You
must not be surprised if my next letter to you is dated from the site of the ancient city of
Singapura” (Turnbull 1989, 8). Despite the protests of the Dutch and the uncertainty of
British support, Raffles went ahead to exploit a succession crisis within the Johor-Riau

royal court to install and recognize a puppet ruler, Sultan Hussein, which enabled him to
establish a settlement on the island of Singapore. Singapore was at the time, the
residence of the Temenggung of Johor, and it was through his assistance that Raffles
managed to complete the purchase of the island in 1819 (Winstedt 1933,163-166).
Within the span of a few years, Singapore began to attract thousands of settlers
from around the Nusantara as well as immigrant labor from China, and merchants from
as far away as the Middle East. By 1821, the island had a population of 5000, of whom
3500 were Malays, 1000 were Chinese, and 500 were Indians, Arabs, Armenians,
Europeans, and Eurasians (Turnbull 1989, 13). By 1871, however, the Chinese came to
be the dominant population, numbering around 87,000, while Malays numbered about
22,000 and Indians about 11,000. Singapore’s early internal success during these early
years was actually the work of its British Resident James Farquhar, who worked closely

with local Malay rulers to bring some sort of stability and order to the island. But Raffles
envisioned Singapore to be something more dynamic and urged for the exploitation of its
location between the Indian and Pacific oceans and its ‘very seat of the Malayan empire’
to further push British domination in the area (Raffles 1991, 378). In 1823, Raffles
stripped Farquhar of his command and took over the position of resident.
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 later enabled the three British possessions of

Penang, Malacca and Singapore to be unified under the Straits Settlements government
of India in 1826. The issues of costs and expenditures became the very foundation on
which the debate on political intervention in Malay States had rested. On the one hand,
the British saw a dire need to launch further British influence into the Malay Peninsula
not only to enable more efﬁcient control of trade in the region but al50 gradually
incorporate them under the domain of the British Empire. On the other hand, further
involvement into the complex world of Malay politics had proven to be financially and
politically disastrous. In 1831, British attempts to extend its land and judicial system

beyond Malacca and into a strict lslamic-matrilineal Malay society in Naning (northwest
of Malacca) were met with violence (Kennedy 1962, 117-119). This year-long conflict
nearly squeezed the British dry of their finances and stood as a reminder of the

unforeseen dangers of intervention in Malay social affairs (Andaya and Andaya 2001,
123)
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Singapore’s growth depended heavily on the demands for tin and tropical
produce from the surrounding Malay Archipelago (Arasaratnam 1972, 16-18). During this
period manufactured goods from Europe steadily entered the region by way of
Singapore. By 1823, nearly 3000 vessels arrived in Singapore, in which its trade totaled
$8 million; $5 million was carried in Asian craft and $3 million in European craft (Turnbull
1989, 13). In 1840, Singapore was opened to American trade, exposing it to a wider

network of trading operations across the globe (Ahmad 1965, 241-157). Table 2.1 below
illustrates that by the 18705, Singapore’s growth as a staple mercantilist port began to

surpass the other ports in the Straits Settlements, which increasingly assumed the
subsidiary role of feeder ports to Singapore (Chiang 1978, Table 1). Trade through
Penang and Malacca also began to fluctuate as a result of the disturbances created by
Chinese civil strife in the hinterlands (Turnbull 1972, 161). With its newly opened port
facilities, Singapore became the new financial and trading center that imported
agricultural and industrial produce from the Malay states of the Peninsula and the
surrgunding areas of the Dutch East Indies, to be re-exported to Britain, Europe, and the

US.
Singapore soon found itself as a center of regional capitalist economic
specialization (Huff 1994, 49). As Singapore’s economy flourished, so did its merchants.
Comprised mainly of Chinese and Europeans, particularly British, these merchants
enjoyed the colony’s high opulence as beneficiaries of the island’s prospering economy.

Any grievances these merchants had were mostly directed toward what they perceived
as the ElC’s inefficient and suffocating role in the economy. Among their concerns was
the rampant violence by Chinese secret societies, the increasing presence of Indian
convicts who were imported for cheap labor, and increased piracy in the high seas by

Table 2.1: Annual Average Growth in Total Trade of Straits Settlements Ports,
1833-1873.
Percentage growth rates of port trade
Years

1833-1843
1843-1853
1853-1863
1863-1873

Singapore

Penang

Malacca

4.0
1.6
6.4
4.3

1.6
5.1
9.2
4.2

-0.3
12.7
4.6
-4.8

Source: adapted from Drabble 2000, p. 34

2‘ To protect tin industry and keep its supplies under British control, Britain prohibited the export
of tin ore from the Malay states except to the tin-smelting center in Singapore. In this case, the
British gained permission from Malay rulers to extract the ores and transport them to Singapore,
thus enabling the supplies and transport of tin to remain under British control, which greatly
benefited Singaporean economic development (See Huff 1994,61 ).
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Malays who had been displaced by the surging European mercantilist trade. Other

worrying features were the rising poverty and malnutrition caused by fluctuations of
employment and overcrowding as well as excessive opium smoking among the new
Chinese immigrants, which produced many negative health and social side-effects
(Turnbull 1989, 69-71; Little 1848, 1-79). Most importantly, the merchants had become

highly aggravated by the many forms of inconveniences placed on them by the EIC
government through the latter’s inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy.
A proposed solution to their concerns was the separation of the Straits
Settlement from British India. A petition was sent by influential merchants to London to
request for the Settlements to be dependencies administered directly from England.
London refused this option due to the expected burden on the national treasury and

maintained that any consideration of direct colonial rule must be preceded by
Singapore’s capabilities in sustaining its existence (Ryan 1976, 131).22 The increasing
awareness of Singapore’s plight entailed a replacement of the incumbent governor with
Sir Cavenagh, who initiated many new projects, especially improvements in social
services (Turnbull 1989, 71-72; Cameron 1965, 60-70).
Despite these developments and the introduction of the Stamp Act to make the

Straits Settlements self-supporting, London still refused to take responsibility for any
form of dependency governance on their part. It was only when the War Ofﬁce became

compelled to consider Singapore as an alternative military base to Hong Kong, due to
the latter’s problematic circumstances, did the administration of the Straits Settlements
finally come under direct control of London (Turnbull 1989, 73). In 1867, the Straits

Settlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore became Crown Colonies of Britain, with
its capital in Singapore (Preston 1990, 80).
British incursions into Sarawak and northern Borneo
Early Chinese records indicated that a vibrant maritime tradition had existed in
what is now Brunei as early as the fifth century, which the Chinese called Po’ni (Ryan

1976, 38). The people of Po’ni were thought to be northern Malays belonging to the
North Borneo-Philippines group such as the Visayas and Muruts (Andaya and Andaya
2001, 57). By the end of the fifteenth century, the influence of Muslim traders provided
the groundwork for conversion into Islam in the area, the product of which was the
kingdom of Brunei (Harrison 1970, 648-651). After the fall of Malacca in 1511, many
Malays from the fallen sultanate migrated to Brunei including members of the royal court.
The intermarriage that took place between the nobility incorporated Brunei into the realm

of the Malaysian-Muslim world that presently connects the Sultan of Brunei with the
various sultans of Peninsula Malaysia.
Much of Brunei’s success was attributed to its well-organized political and
administrative systems. The kingdom was first visited by the Spaniards, and later the
Portuguese, who reported on its opulence in the sixteenth century (Ryan 1976, 39).
Traders from China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Moluccas, Java, southern Philippines (Sulu

22 British Parliamentary papers in 1861 (XIII, No. 423, pp. 69-373) reported that the Secretary of
State for the Colonies would only take control of the Straits Settlements if they would pose no
burden on the Exchequer (Treasury) (see Turnbull 1989, p.71).
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Sultanate), the Middle East, and India frequented the port, which was situated in the
splendid natural harbor of Brunei Bay. Trade consisted mainly of sea and jungle produce
from Borneo, which were highly demanded by the Chinese, and silk, porcelain, cloth,

ornaments, and tobacco from the Middle East and China.
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 did not mention Borneo, thereby rendering its
relationships with the British and the Dutch pretty much ambiguous. The Dutch, with the
advantage of having secured the eastern territories of the Archipelago, made various
treaties with numerous sultanates on the southern parts of Borneo. But because of the
treacherous terrain as well as ﬁnancial constraints, northern expeditions by the Dutch
became restricted. In the early nineteenth century, an English adventurer, James
Brooke with a small but potent armed force, became embroiled in the politics and

conflicts within the Brunei kingdom (Bedlington 1978, 40). For his assistance in brutally
suppressing Malay chieftain uprisings, Brooke induced the Sultan of Brunei into

receiving a fiefdom in the vast area of Sarawak in return for an annual payment of 500
Sterling Pounds to the Sultan. Setting up his capital on the Malay village of Kuching and
assuming the title ‘Raja of Sarawak,’ Brooke managed to command the authority of not

only the Malays but also the Dayaks and lbans of the interior.23
Further northeast of Sarawak, the territory in what we now know as the
Malaysian state of Sabah had been largely controlled by the Muslim Sulu Sultanate in
the east and Brunei Sultanate along its southwestern coast (Warren 1981). lnhabited by
mostly non-Muslim peoples in the interior and Muslims along both the coasts, the area
was first approached by Americans in 1865 to obtain concessions from Brunei to set up

a post along the western coast. Later in 1881, a group of British entrepreneurs received
a royal charter from the British government to establish the British North Borneo Charter
Company (BNBCC) and operate the various concessions received from the Sultans of
Brunei and Sulu (Lee 1965, 16). Sparsely populated, Sabah faced chronic labor

shortage. Hence, the Company brought in immigrant labor from China as well as
encouraged transmigration of Malays from other parts of the Archipelago to work in the
numerous tobacco plantations, the sago producing areas, and the growing timber
industry (Purcell 1965, 375).
Although Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) came under British mercantilist

domination, formal British political involvement in these regions had been absent before
the Second World War. As in Singapore, the discouraging factor came from the high
costs of maintaining direct colonial control. However, fearing French advancements in
Indochina, London did provide many forms of assistance through grants and charters to
the Brooke government and the BNBCC, since these proved to be an inexpensive form

of extending British influence in the region (Ryan 1976, 167). In fact, the British royal
Navy assisted James Brooke in suppressing piracy, and even in attacking Brunei

(Andaya and Andaya 2001, 127). Following the armed conflict with Brunei, Brooke
signed a treaty with the Sultan in 1847, whereby for its part, His Majesty’s government

23 At this time, the Malays and lbans had already developed a symbiotic relationship with each
other. The lbans and Dayaks, known for their fierce warrior skills and head-hunting, accepted

Malay overlordship of the coasts, and with whom they intermingled freely for trade and other
matters of mutual concern (see Bedlington 1978, 41).
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received Labuan island as a naval base. In victory, Charles Brooke gained full
sovereignty of Sarawak as well as becoming the First Governor of Labuan (Ryan 1976,
119)
As the Brunei sultanate became weaker, the Brooke government took the
opportunity to expand its territories and attain more land concessions in return for cheap
compensations. In the case of the BNBCC administration, it was usually by force.
Although a private enterprise, the British institutions in Sarawak and Northern Borneo
followed a colonial pattern of administration, founded on the separation of ethnic groups
through specialized occupations, an authoritarian governing machinery, and the ruthless
extraction of natural and human resources (Bedlington 1978, 48-50). Significantly, In
1888, both Sarawak and Sabah, as well as Brunei received formal British protection in
areas of defense and foreign policy (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 187). This brought the
economy of the two states closer to Singapore, which reaped huge profits from the
exports of their products through its port economy.

Incorporation into the Capitalist World Economy
The gradual incorporation of the Malay States, Singapore, and Borneo into the

world capitalist economy spelled the end of traditional Malay maritime empires, and with
it, Malay control of trade and commerce in the region (Trocki 1990). Simultaneously, the

consolidation of British interests in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo increasingly took
shape through the signing of various trade ‘treaties’ with individual Malay rulers. The
rationalization of the capitalist production process through a colonial administration was

a consequence of the need to facilitate the increasing commodification of labor, land,
and circulatory use of funds in pursuit of profits in the Malay States.
British residential system 1874-1895
The later part of the nineteenth century witnessed the rapid political economic
changes that had swept throughout the world from the West. While the countries of

Western Europe were industrializing at an infuriating pace, more and more lands in
Africa and Asia were being simultaneously acquired to accommodate the rising
demands for resources and markets for industrial goods. European imperial expansion
began to spread the seeds of capitalism throughout the globe, and in the process, began

to gradually tear away indigenous economic and social systems that for centuries had
provided these societies their own economic sustenance and political sovereignty. The
Malay world, situated at the corridors of international trade and commerce, became

gravely affected by the impact of advancing capitalism, which brought Asia nearer to
Europe.

During this period, British dealings with the Malay States were still very much
within the context of ‘non-intervention’ trade relations between Malay rulers and officers

of the Straits Settlements. As will be discussed later on, the British government in
London had emphasized a ‘liberal dogma’ of non-state involvement in the east, which
later came to haunt them as one of the biggest paradoxes in British overseas policy. But
as the capitalist system warrants it, the state had to increasingly protect its national

interests abroad. Hence, one of the primary reasons for further British incursions into the
Malay Peninsula was the safeguarding of the newly found tin trade monopoly. Rising
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demand in the West for processed foods had caused an upsurge in the demand for tin.
For centuries, tin had been mined for the production of crafts as well as of home utensils
by Malay miners. Since the fifth century AD, Malay tin had already been exported to
India for use in alloys and in production of religious ornaments (Andaya and Andaya
2001, 14). The Malay tin industry had taken on the form of cottage-type production, but
its trade was confined to that of luxury items. By the sixteenth century, tin had made its
way to Europe from the rich deposits found in the Malay state of Perak, on the west
coast of the Peninsula, contributing to its fame and prosperity.

By the nineteenth century demands for tin plate manufacturing, helped by the
repeal of import duties on tin in Britain, stimulated a monumental increase in its
production and trade (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 136). Britain managed to acquire and

control the tin trade in very significant ways. One, although British policy had been one
of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Malay States, the Straits Settlement
colonies provided them with bases from which further encroachments into the various
Malay States were carried out in the guise of ‘trade protection.’24 Two, and relevant to
the first, the emergence of Singapore as a new staple port not only enabled the British to

redirect the tin trade into its harbor, but also to use it as a springboard from which
political influence could be pushed into other parts of the Malay Peninsula (Huff 1994,

14-16). Three, the British had signed an accord with the Siamese in 1826 that kept the
latter from claiming any interest in the tin-rich states of Perak and Selangor (Purcell
1965a, 69). Finally, the availability of capital and funds gave the British insuperable
dominance in the extensive extraction of the mineral.
At the same time, the Malay States were caught in internal rivalries and civil strife
over territories and taxation rights on their tin trade. Large numbers of Chinese migrants
had been imported to work as laborers on the numerous mines that had been opened
and mostly owned by Chinese capitalists. Many of them also worked the gambier,
pepper, and opium farms throughout the Straits Settlements and the Malay States. The

existence of numerous secret societies within the Chinese mining communities added to
the complexity of the problem by entangling respective Malay chieftains on each of their
sides (Blythe 1969; Chapter 2). Soon, private wars between these gangs created

disturbances that warranted the British East India Company to intervene (Cowan 1967,
45).
The British had invested much capital and labor in the tin industry, and such civil
chaos was becoming increasingly disruptive to their commercial interests.25 In London,
the Liberal government began to notice the failure of their laissez faire trade policy to
protect British merchants, and embarked on new approaches toward intervention
(Kennedy 1962, 156-157). But these considerations were not the only reasons for the
change in policy. There were serious apprehensions of intervention by other European

24 From the early to middle nineteenth century, the British East India Company had been given
permission, through treaties with various rulers, to enter the tin-rich states of Perak, Selangor ,
and Negri Sembilan, and conduct tin mining.
25 In the early part of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company (EIC) had intervened

numerous times in the civil conflicts taking place in the Malay states of Perak and Selangor. The
Low Treaty of 1826 gave the Perak Sultan protection by the EIC, a license for the EIC to
intervene on behalf of British interests in these states on many occasions prior to 1874 (see

Kennedy 1962, 146).
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powers. Cowan (1967, 46) quoted the Colonial Secretary, "We would not see with

indifference interference of foreign powers in the affairs of the Peninsula, on the other
hand it is difficult to see how we should be justiﬁed in objecting to the native states
seeking aid elsewhere it we refuse to take any steps to remedy the evils complained of.”
Thus the period of so-called ‘liberal trade’ was witnessing its end as far as British
colonial policy was concerned, since the civil disorder created by Chinese societies
provided the jus belli for official intervention in the western states of the Malay Peninsula
(Wang 1994).
“The Malay world,” according to Professor Wolters (1970, 176), “had a

momentum of its own.” Although the swift pace of trade had brought dramatic changes
to the Malay world, the Malays seemed oblivious and insulated from the implication of
such changes, particularly with regards to the intentions of the British and their capitalist
interests. The Malay rulers’ contact with foreigners had always been through trade, and
in relation to the big powers, an added advantage was seen in their ability to protect the
Malay state from other hostile enemies. For such purpose, the friendship of the British
was highly desirable. Therefore, when in 1873 Raja (Prince) Abdullah of Perak invited
the British to aid him in his conflict against another prince for the throne, he never saw
what the consequences of his action could have had on the future governance of his
sultanate. The British seized this opportunity by responding to his request and

expeditiously drafting a Treaty of Pangkor the following year to articulate the conditions
of their ‘assistance,’ which included their right of trade protection in the state. Soon, a
British-led constabulary was sent into the affected areas to quell the disturbances. This
treaty gave the British Dindings, a territory near the mouth of the Perak River, and

recognized Abdullah as the legitimate Sultan in return for the appointment of a British
Resident, with whom ‘the Sultan must seek advice on all matters except Malay religion
(Islam) and customs’ (Ryan 1976, 156; Purcell 1965a, 74).
The Residential system was in effect, the beginning of British colonial
involvement in the Malay States in the form of a Protectorate. The system was a
separate administration from that of the Straits Settlements since the nature of the Malay
States’ politics and economy was quite different from that of the ports of Penang,

Malacca and Singapore. The existence of Malay rulers influenced the British to take on
an indirect from of governance, which was thought to be more cost-effective and stable.
Nevertheless, implementation of the British Residential system had far-reaching
consequences on the political life of the Malay sultanates.

The British utilized similar type treaties to intervene in local conflicts in Selangor,
Pahang (on the east coast) and Negri Sembilan, thereby establishing similar residential
systems in these states as well. The accomplishment of the Residential system in

strengthening British control of the Malay states rested on its paving the way for direct
ties with the Sultans, whose responsibility under the system was to carry out all tax

collections. By manipulating the respective Sultans, the British, through the Residents,
managed to procure almost direct management of lands, state ﬁnancial matters, and tin

and other revenues (Loh 1969, 123).
British presence in the Malay States did not go without strong Malay resistance.
From mid-18005 to the early 19005, sporadic but fierce wars took place against British
troops throughout the Malay States. Despite the use of modern weaponry, the British

45
proved no match for the highly skilled Malays, who devised flintlock muskets with tin
bullets, and were more formidable in hand to hand combat (Amin 1977, 64-66). Only
after a combination of factors including reinforcements of Gurkha and Arab troops as
well as other Malay factions, did many of these armed encounters ended in favor of the
British. British retaliation was ruthless. Villages were burnt and suspected rebels were
mercilessly hanged or exiled. In the Negri Sembilan War, there were more British deaths
than Malays, but the latter suffered more casualties and faced severe lack of
ammunitions. At its conclusion in 1875, the British were convinced that ‘such a lesson as
will effectually satisy other native states of our supremacy’ (Parkinson 1964, 288).
The residential system had transformed the Malay political structure in two ways.
First, by assuming the role of ‘king maker’ through its recognition of the sultan in power,
it ceremoniously strengthened the prestige and position of the Sultan. Such a move

effectively marginalized the powers of the various local chieftains and leaders (Gullick
1989). In fact, the feeble feudal structure of Malay society facilitated British control of the

Malay States through their strengthening the sultan’s position, which in turn
strengthened its hierarchical character. As Steinberg (1971, 191) remarked, ”what the
protectorate system protected most of all was the shape of structure of traditional

society, from the top down.”
Second, the new state administrative system also created salaried positions for

the various members of the aristocrats, thereby effectively taking away their traditional
prerogatives in controlling local trade (Ryan 1976, 162). Those who were not on the
‘civil’ list were left without any source of income, while many who were included found
their revenues dropping drastically. For example, the Syahbandar of Pahang, who had
previously been able to raise an annual income in excess of $1200, received a capped

salary of only $720 (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 169). The old Malay government
machinery soon gave way to modern western style bureaucratic administration, whose
power radiated from the Resident. These transformations, along with the enforcement of
standardized British-type laws, helped shield the processes of tin extraction and
transportation in the Malay States from any civil disruptions.

In 1877 the first State Council was formed in Perak, whose function was to
"’connect with the government of the country influential natives and others, with whom
the government may consult, regarding proposals for taxation, appointments,
concessions, the institution or abolition of laws and other matters” (Colonial Office
Records 1877, 273). In effect, it was a rubber-stamp legislative assembly, presided by

the Sultan as figurehead, and consisting of government-endorsed appointees of British
notary persons, some members of the Malay ruling circle and top Chinese merchants
(Sadka 1968, 276-277). There had been no resistance to the formation of this council
since Low had already ‘explained’ that the council was “an institution that everyone must
be prepared to admit was necessary“(Sadka 1954, 72). In time, the other Malay states
followed suit by establishing their own respective councils. In Sarawak, the Supreme

Council, later renamed the Council Negeri, was created in 1855. Comprising of
European and Malay Officials, lban leaders, and later prominent Chinese community
figures (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 129). The blueprint for colonial state formation soon

began to surface through a British dominated government machinery administering the
daily affairs of the state, and complemented by a state council that oversaw matters
pertaining to formulation of laws and regulations.
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The Residential system brought with it generous land lease and labor tax laws in
response to the demands for agriculture and mining (Drabble 2000, 63). The British
declared that all lands were vested in the ruler. Of course this was only by proxy since in
reality rights to lands were actually held by the respective Resident in each state. In the
decade between 1879 and 1889, General Land Regulations based on standardized
leaseholds were introduced in Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan (Nonini 1992, 52).
Malays in rural areas were now required to register the lease of their lands from the new
government for 999 years in return for quit rent. Lands not actually cultivated or occupied
were to become ‘state land’ (Jackson 1968, 252-253). In effect, land was transformed
into private property with prescribed rights and obligations, which greatly enhanced
production processes and the management of revenues in British hands. It facilitated the
growth of the tin trade as well as provided the impetus for greater agricultural mass
production, particularly pepper, gambier, tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee, and later, rubber
and palm oil.

New land laws launched a proliferation of land concessions to Europeans, many
of whom were friends of the Resident, to be developed into workable agriculture land.
By 1888, the largest concessionaire in the state of Selangor, Hill and Rathbone,
managed to obtain 999 year-leases for lands that totaled more than 10,000 acres for
tobacco, coffee, and pepper (Loh 1969, 119-120; Selangor Secretariat 1888). For many,

a wide gap even existed between the concessions granted and actual development of
land, owing to an acute shortage of labor. One of the major concessionaires in Selangor,
Huttenbach, even contemplated hiring Italian immigrants to work on large-scale rice
production (PAR 1888). For the Malays, the new land laws enabled the precipitation of

sale and losses of their lands to Chinese and Indian moneylenders, since many had
placed their lands as collateral for loans, as well as to plantations and land agents, who

regarded lands as commodity (Kratoska 1975, 9-11).
In 1882, a poll and land tax system levied on the Malay peasantry was
implemented. The then Resident of Perak Hugh Low’s justification for this was that it

was “a fair tax in exchange of the forced service (old corvee system) of irregular
exactions to which the people had been subjected to under the former Malay rule”

(SSGG 1878, 29). In reality, although the bonded system was abolished, these taxes
functioned to convert what used to be free labor into surplus value. The State

government collected around $11,000 from such taxes to wipe out its debt by 1883 (Loh
1969, 12; Purcell 1965a, 79). Naturally, the Malay peasantry resented having to pay
these rentals since it became a new form of financial burden for them. Most importantly,
their traditional ties to the land did not open for them any avenue away from small-hold

agriculztéire, and as such remained the poorest class (Loh 1969, 123-124; Harrison
1944)
Various types of labor legislation were introduced to streamline wage labor and

revenue collection for the state, which also basically loosened Chinese workers from
repressive bonded labor known as the truck system. Under this system, Chinese

26 When introduced to the Malay chieftains, many objected to the high rates of taxation, citing that
the ordinary Malay could not afford the amount, and that it would make them unpopular with the

rakyat (ordinary people). (reported in Perak Council Minutes 1877-1879 in C. W. Harrison. 1907).
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towkays (headmen or ‘advancers’) were responsible for the recruitment and
maintenance of their workers into the Malay States. They were also the ones who
provided these workers with expensive supplies, in which loans were usually made at
double the market rates as ‘payments’ for their boarding and transport (Jackson 1961,
40). To add to the complex structure of Chinese labor, secret societies enabled
employers to control their labor with an iron hand (Wong 1965b, 40-41). Although the
British controlled the overall tin production process, such profitable enterprise allowed

Chinese firms to dominate the tin industry in the early years of British colonial
administration (Wong 1965b, 81).
Although the British did not directly interfere with the labor-employer structure for
fear of discouraging investments by Chinese capitalists, new labor control measures
were nevertheless introduced. Labor reforms such as the Discharge Ticketing System
and the Labour Code of 1895 enabled workers to work under a new and less harsh
wage labor structure, in which productivity of work could be gauged and revenues could
be collected for the state (Loh 1969, 147-155). In addition, a Protector of Chinese labor

was set up in 1887 to supervise the recruitment and smooth transfer of Chinese migrant
workers into the Malay States (Blythe 1947, 2-75). The effects of such measures

contributed to a better organization of labor for the newly emerging British capitalist
industries. Daily wages increased from 33 cents to 80 cents, and many workers began to
show preferences for this system (Drabble 2000, 66).

Interestingly political considerations of land usage, particularly Malay lands,
mirrored the greater British concern for the preservation of the Malay culture. British
power and legitimacy of rule in the Malay States, especially that of the Resident,

depended heavily on its civil relations with the Sultan. It was imperative that the Malay
identity and the Sultans’ ‘sovereignty’ be maintained as a means to serve the legitimacy
of British ‘protectorate’ rule in the Malay States. Since Malay existence is largely
embedded in the people’s relationship with the land, it became a policy that Malay
ancestral land would not be available for any type of large-scale agricultural

development during this period. The only exemption was in the case of minerals found in
these lands. Since all minerals were proclaimed to belong to the state, outsiders could
be allowed to enter these lands for purposes of mining (Loh 1969, 124-127). To the
British, the flow of revenues from tin became too crucial to be interrupted.
In 1878, export duties on tin accounted for 70 per cent of Perak’s revenues. In
1895, tin revenues from the four British protectorate Malay states amounted to around
$3,379,000, and had seen a steady rise from 1889 as compared to land revenues, which
showed more fluctuations (Loh 1969, 24; PGG 1897, 724). Table 2.2 on the next page

illustrates both land and tin revenues collected from 1889 to 1895 in the Malay States of
Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan. Therefore, while agricultural land laws
were initially ambiguous, indiscriminate and problematic in their enforcement, regulations
dealing with tin mining lands were less haphazard. Since tin provided the mainstay of the
new capitalist economy, lands in which potential tin deposits could be found were strictly

dealt with in terms of clear and uniformed laws.
The commodification of land and labor in the Malay States was a process that was

highly integrated with the use of monetary funds to inject mercantile investments in trade
and production. The most important impact of capitalist incorporation of the Malay world
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Table 2.2: Revenue from the four Federated Malay States under the
British Residential System, selected years from 1875 to 1895.
Revenue Collected From Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan And Pahang (British
Protected States Through Residential System)
(in thousand Straits Dollars)
Year
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895

Total
5013
4841
4572
5347
6413
751 1
8481

Land Revenue
190
166
199
300
347
457
468

Tin Revenue
1750
1609
1573
2097
2602
3238
3397

Source: Perak Government Gazette 1897, p. 724.

was the increasing use of monetary capital in the production process, manifested in both

long-term fixed assets investments and short-term circulatory financing of daily
operations. Profits from trading operations became the initial source of capital for the
European and Chinese mercantilists. One of the earliest forms of investment funds was

revenue farming.27 The Straits Settlement government was not strong in enforcing
taxation among the population, mainly Chinese settlers. Thus private Chinese individuals
would purchase from the government, rights to collect taxes for a specified period on

liquor, gambling, and opium (Butcher 1993, 35-40).
Funds collected from these activities enabled early Chinese capitalists, through
their interconnected mercantile structure, to later dominate tin production and also to

diversify investments into technology, retail, and banking (Drabble 2000, 56). During the
18705 to 18905, such funds provided the investments into the steam-powered pump by

Chinese miners to facilitate extraction of tin in mines away from reliable water sources.
This technological advance greatly enhanced tin output. In the 18905, with the use of
hydraulic devises in the form of gravel pumps and high-pressure hose, Chinese miners
accounted for 90 per cent of output from mines in the Federated Malay States (Yip 1969,
140-141).

Emerqinq racial hierarchy in occupational structure
Large-scale tin mining also fueled other activities of the modern capitalist
economy into the Malay States such as retail, consumer durables, and supplies. It

became largely responsible for the urbanization process in this region, which contributed
to the growth of Singapore and the cities on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula.

27 Revenue farming was first introduced by the Dutch in the East Indies as a means of tax
collection from foreign merchants, which was then emulated by indigenous rulers, who in turn
introduced it to the Chinese in the Straits Settlements.
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Tin production serviced the needs of a growing industrial manufacturing base in the
west, in which case, capital-friendly land and labor laws became important antecedents
to the consolidation of British economic interests in the Malay States. As British influence
became more evident through the spread and reinforcement of the Residential system,
Rulers in each of the Malay States became increasingly aware of their own frailty
manifested in their dissipating ability to control their own destinies.
The region’s trading system and participants also changed drastically with the
coming of the capitalist economy. Drabble (2000, 40-42) noted that the trading system in
the Malay States, Singapore, and northern Borneo throughout the nineteenth century
was characterized by a three-tier participatory structure. At the top is group of large-

scale entrepreneurs dealing in imports and exports, consisting mainly of Europeans and
later on in the case of Singapore, some Chinese. This group, backed by huge capital,
dealt mainly in vast bulk of wholesale items. The second group is made up of mediumscale bazaar-type traders, situated usually in the ports in the form of small import-export
firms. Chinese merchant houses, and to some extent limited Indian companies,

performed many of these groups’ activities goods collection and distribution and
retailing.
The third group consists mainly of on-the-ground, small peddlers and market
traders. This group, which comprises mostly of Malay and other indigenous peoples,
operated throughout the Malay world in the ports as well as in the hinterlands of deep
forests and jungles. Goods are usually primary products to be exchanged for small
quantities of imports. Interdependence of the system is reflected in the finance and credit

networks that filtered down from the top through banks and manufacturers (Drabble and
Drake 1981). Over time, commercial activities of the lower tier became increasingly
subsumed by the more prosperous traders from the middle and top tiers, resulting in the
eventual detachment of Malays and other indigenous peoples from the mainstream of
the capitalist economy (Drabble 2000, 45-46). Detailed discussion on this occupational
structure, especially the impact of Chinese and Indian labor as well as the
commodification of land and labor on the Malay peasantry, will be discussed in chapter

four.
Conclusion

The absorption of the Malay world into the capitalist world economy brought on

numerous complex changes within its social order. The Malay kingdoms had always
established their governance centering on regional maritime commerce. The
involvement of rulers and kings in trade was manifested in the state’s political and social
structures, which placed them in the forefront of both policy formulations and social
prestige. But authority and revenue collection was not the monopoly of the sultan or
ruler. The whole royal hierarchy had a system that distributed power and wealth

somewhat generously amongst the ruling class.
The onset of British colonialism into the Malay States was a period of gradual
disintegration of Malay economic domination as well as political restructuring to

accommodate the emerging capitalist economy. Initial British presence in the area took
not the form of a colonial state, but rather, that of treaties between private mercantile

establishments, namely the British East India Company, and Malay rulers. The British
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took advantage of the autocratic Malay feudal hierarchical structure to impose its indirect
governance on the Malay States. By bestowing legitimacy on each particular ruler, they
managed to directly deal with the rulers and impose laws and institutions that facilitated
their economic interests and intensified their political influence in the region. Such a
process marked the functional beginning of the Malay world’s servitude to the material
needs of core European powers.
The incorporation process of the Malay States into the capitalist world economy
was coercive; hence the repressive nature of the emerging capitalist administration. The
transition from the tributary pre-capitalist social structure to capitalism under colonialism
had been a forced compromise between the new capitalist class, represented by British
entrepreneurs, and the old ruling class represented by the Ruler, which included

members of his close aristocratic circle. But to the benefit of the Malay rulers, their
esteemed positions were not abolished by the British Residential system. On the
contrary, under the residential system, the royal institution of the sultanate was
strengthened by its legitimacy as undisputed ruler of Malay society. At a time when

various Malay rulers were facing dissentions and revolts from rival chieftains and
pretenders, the British stepped in to salvage their sovereignty in exchange for rights to

‘trade.’ Indeed, such an arrangement became a convenient method of indirect rule for
the British.
Singapore’s incorporation into the capitalist world economy was synonymous

with its ‘founding’ as an important center for regional trade and British colonial expansion.
The role of Singapore as a mercantilist port was in itself a continuation in the pattern of

shifts taking place between centers of trade in the region. As its mercantilist economy
grew, the demand by the new capitalist class for greater administrative efficiency also

became more aggressive. The political importance of Singapore as a growing British
commercial bastion in the Malay world was its creeping detachment from the larger Malay
world. Devoid of an established Malay royal household, the island’s exposed
circumstance to colonial rule inevitably came quicker than the Malay states. As the
decades passed, Singapore became less and less identified with its Malay social cultural
heritage.

Capitalist incorporation of the Malay States and the northern Borneo regions was
expedited by two kinds of social process under the Residential system. One was the

redefinition of land in terms of capital in order to generate revenues for both individual
entrepreneurs and the state. As such, laws were formulated to enable the efficient
transfer of landed property into the hands of individual capitalists. Not only was land now
legally owned as individual property, the state also managed its transactions through laws
that secured its expropriation of minerals and resources. Two, labor had to be organized
under a wage system for purposes of extracting surplus value to facilitate the newly
emerging capitalist production in the Malay States. The shortage of labor compelled the
British to recruit labor from overseas, the impact of which is discussed in chapter four.

These processes were significant landmarks in Malay political economic history since
they became the crucial transitory factors that ushered the feudal Malay world into the
world capitalist economy. They also became the turning points of active Malay

involvement in the regional economy.
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It is obvious that unlike western European societies, the social transformation of
Malay society as a result of colonial encroachments was not a process resulting from
internal dynamic forces but rather from coercively external, top-down factors. In the late
nineteenth century, further consolidation of British capitalist interests was realized

through the unification of some of the more affluent Malay States into a formal and
autocratic colonial state. This topic will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE COLONIAL STATE IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

This chapter examines the colonial state in Malaysia and Singapore as a result of

increased penetration of capitalist development into the region. In light of increased
expansion of German and French colonial forces into Southeast Asia, disparate treaties
between Malay rulers and representatives of the British state had become politically
insufficient in dealing with the protection of British capitalist interests in the region. Also,

as market demand for tin soared, a consolidated political structure of Malaya and
Singapore was constructed to expedite British capitalist production and protect British
interests from internal as well as external disruptions. In such a political structure,

relations between the British and Malay rulers had to be institutionalized and the needs
6f capitalist production were prioritized.

In the face of indigenous revolt, and to ensure smooth functioning of export—
oriented economic activities, the colonial state’s primary concern was to maintain order
(Shannon 1996, 81). Therefore the essence of the colonial state remained centered on a
common theme — the establishment of political institutions that catered to the needs of
the capitalist class, both European and Chinese (mainly British subjects of the Straits
Settlements), in the emerging capitalist economy. Colonial governance varied between

Malaya, Singapore, and northern Borneo in the form of indirect rule to direct rule to
private administrations, each according to their respective placements and functions
within the wider regional division of labor. As far as the British were concerned however,
the protection of capitalist interests remained in the enforcement of repressive colonial

policies of the colonial state. Since the incorporation of the periphery into the capitalist
world economy was mainly through oppressive colonial forces, the intrinsic nature of
colonial administration was inevitably dictatorial and repressive. The exploitative and
repressive character of the colonial state would later provide the foundation upon which
modern statehood is built as a means to facilitate capital investments of core countries.

The Character of Colonial State in British Malaya 1896-1941
By the late nineteenth century, new challenges had emerged in Europe to

threaten British hegemonic power in the capitalist world system. One was the rise of
Germany, which by the late 18905 had become a powerful industrialized nation with a

strong and capable military. The other was France, which had already established huge
colonies in Indochina and Africa. Sensing that German and French influences were
threatening to flow into the Malay States, the British began to consider embarking on a
more effective approach to consolidate their interests in the region.
A formal state apparatus was established in order to fortify British colonial
administrative power and facilitate colonial capitalist development in Malaya and
Singapore. The result was the centralization of British influence in the Malay States

under a Federation in 1896. The eventual incorporation of the other ‘unfederated’ Malay
states in 1909 into the colonial fold, created a larger regional entity known as ‘British
Malaya.’ As the colonial state developed, the nature of Federal governance was still
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subject to much deliberation in London as to whether a centralized or decentralized

political system was the more desirable form of effective governance.
At the heart of the problem for the colonial state in Malaysia was the consistent
problematic synthesis between preservation of traditional pre-capitalist Malay structure,

which had been a key to the control of the Malay and indigenous peasantry, and the
need to build a modern state, a fundamental feature for efﬁcient capitalist production.
The tensions created by this dilemma became a contradiction in itself. On the one hand,
as illustrated in the previous chapter, the Malay rulers played a crucial role in legitimizing
British rule. As Simon Smith (1995, 7) asserted: “The reciprocity of the relationship
between Britain and the Malay Rulers can be drawn into the wider debate on the extent
to which such indigenous monarchs can be seen as a collaborative elite upholding
British interests.” On the other hand, Malay traditional structures also posed a barrier to
greater economic efficiency, namely in policies relating to land and agriculture.

Hence, for the colonial state in Malaysia, the two competing elite classes that
demanded the British colonialists’ constant attention were the Malay ruling elite for

reasons of political expediency, and the emerging European and Chinese capitalist
class, for reasons of economic rationalization. Such a situation is not inconsistent with
the arguments put forth by Badie and Birnbaum (1983, 97) that in view of the cultural
characteristics of the periphery, colonial state formations generate types of political

centers other than the modern state. In handling such a problem, the colonial state had
to juggle its policies to accommodate the interests of the two classes.
Centralization of colonial administration in Malaya

Frank Swettenham, the engineer of the residential system mentioned that the
system aimed to ”preserve the accepted customs and traditions of the country, to enlist
the sympathies and interests of the people in our assistance, and to teach them the

advantages of good government and enlightened policy” (quoted in Sadka 1968, 105).
Bestowing British recognition to the respective rulers also greatly enhanced their political

legitimacy among the indigenous Malay population. Swettenham (1906, 282)
acknowledged that such a policy had been to “conciliate or overawe” the chieftains,
many of whom were more powerful than the sultans or rulers. By asserting heavy
influence on each individual ruler under the residential system, the British also began to
successfully tailor each state policy toward strengthening their imperial interests in the
Peninsula. But the residential system had its limitations. As the British colonial economy
expanded, there came a necessity for a closer political alliance among the four separate

British-protected Malay states of Selangor, Perak, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan.
The streamlining of regulations dealing with land, labor, taxation,
communications, and criminal justice was imperative to more efficiently carry out British

administration in the Malay States. The vision of a coalition between these states
materialized in a rather expeditious fashion through a treaty signed in 1895 to
incorporate the four Malay states into a Federation the following year. Thus the
Federated Malay States was born in 1896. The unchallenged and formidable power of

the new colonial rulers swiftly set in motion the road toward facilitating an export-led
capitalist development, in which private enterprise could burgeon. Simultaneously, the
pace of changes within the social and political landscape in the Malay states was
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dictated by the goals of establishing a British-style colonial society, where relations
between Europeans, Asian immigrants and indigenous Malays became increasingly
regulated.
Andaya and Andaya (2001, 183) noted that none of the Malay rulers had been
adequately ‘advised’ on the implications of such centralization of British power. The
Federation Treaty that produced it was said to be both ambiguous and confusing in its
articulation. Despite the treaty’s condition it would not be “diminishing the powers and
privileges which the rulers now possess nor be curtailing the rights of self-government
which they now enjoy,” its implementation certainly took away any glimmer of conviction
that the rulers were actually governing through the advice of their residents (Andaya and
Andaya 2001, 183; see also Emerson 1964, 503). With the formation of the federation,

the rulers soon realized they were beginning to lose whatever little power they had
previously enjoyed. The respective state councils, which had been established in each
state to allocate the Malay rulers’ political participation, became virtually defunct.
The new Federation operated through a Federal Secretariat and was headed by

a Resident-General, who had power over each of the four respective residents in the
Malay states. A capital city was established in the tin mining town of Kuala Lumpur,
where all federal departments of police, public works, telegraph and post, railways, and

treasury came to be located (Drake 1979, 274). A colonial civil service bureaucracy and
a new system of courts, filled by Europeans, were also created to better dispense
English laws throughout the new political entity. In 1909 the Federal Council was formed
to galvanize colonial financial and legislative processes (Thio 1969, 200). It was headed
by the Governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore, who also now functioned as the

High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States, and assisted by the ResidentGeneral in Kuala Lumpur. This Council included European and Chinese representatives

from the plantation and mining industries, and in effect operated as an extension of the
Governor’s powers. The Council was highly attractive to Singapore, which considered
any move toward a merger between itself and the Malay States to be a financial safety
net in times of recession (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 184). The realization of this
ambition became nearer at hand when the Resident-General position was abolished and

replaced by a Chief Secretary, further reducing the Malay sultans’ powers and
prerogatives (Sadka 1968, 379).
At the local level, the British District Office, which had functioned as the

Resident’s delegated representative before the Federation, was maintained and
strengthened. The District Officer’s task was mainly to oversee law and order, supervise
justice and public health as well as the enforcement of tax collection at the District level.
As intermediaries, the British preserved the role of the Penghulu, or chief of the parish

called Mukim. Now part of the colonial administrative structure, the pengulus were
salaried personnel and assumed a crucial role in their explanation of British laws to the
very fabric of Malay traditional life. Due to the closeness of ties between penghu/us and

the local community, which averaged around a population of 2000, the colonial system
became more efficiently absorbed (Hua 1982, 30).

Although called a federation, there appeared to be no sharing or division of
power between the states and the federal government. In effect, it was a highly
centralized union of states with the Resident-General, and later Chief Secretary, calling

55
the shots in policy matters. Prior to the federation, the respective sultans manifested
their sovereignty, albeit more ceremonial than real, through their positions as heads of
their respective state councils. British residents also used to ‘advise’ the respective
sultans on administrative matters. Now the sultans, through their membership in the
Federal Council, were in practice advising the British and emblematically bowing to the
authority of the Governor. As Ryan (1976, 175) noted “In this Federal Council the sultans

were no longer the rulers of their own states but advisers to others who were ruling their
states for them.” The sultans were not amused nor were they fooled by the creation of
this council. As the Sultan of Perak remarked at the Second Rulers’ Conference (Durbar

of Rulers) in 1903, “A Malay proverb says there cannot be two masters and one vessel;
neither can there be four rulers over one country” (Colonial Office Records 1930, 76).
Apart from the four states of the Federated Malay States, there were also the
four other Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu located in the
northern portion of the Malay Peninsula, which came under the suzerainty of Siam, and
the southern independent state of Johor. These five states were referred to as the
Unfederated Malay States (UFMS). The British recognized that while it was important to
maintain friendly relations with the Siamese in order for it to function as a buffer state

between British Burma and French Indochina, the time had come to seriously prevent
other western incursions into the Malay states. Asserting British influence in these states
not only served as a shield for the tin producing states but also an opportunity to officially

expand their interests into the area. British merchants had begun to complain about the
lack of protection and support for investments in these areas, cautioning that such a
posture would allow other Europeans to seize the opportunity instead (Andaya and
Andaya 2001, 196). The Germans had already attempted to open up business

concessions in Kedah while the Americans were reportedly interested in the islands off
the coast of Trengganu (Ryan 1976, 178). Hence, a treaty was signed in 1909 with
Siam, in which these four states came under British protectorate with a special British

advisor attached to each state. The effect of this treaty was similar to the Anglo-Dutch
Treaty about a century earlier. By allowing Siam to retain the rest of the Malay regions in

the southern part of its kingdom, the treaty effectively partitioned the northern Malay

world into two spheres, the British and the Siamese.28
Perhaps the biggest issue for the British to handle was the incorporation of Johor
into the realm of its protectorate. The British had for a while, accorded a special position

to Johor and its Sultan in order to safeguard their interests in the state since the royal
family was very much open to modernization and were themselves extremely
westernized (Thio 1967, 95-115). In fact, Sultan Abu Bakar, who died in 1895, had been

dubbed the ‘Father of Modern Johor.’ The sultanate had a well-organized bureaucracy
that skillfully managed an emerging but vibrant agro-based capitalist economy. In fact,
the Sultan devised an efficient agricultural production system. Thus justification for
intervention on grounds of mal-administration could not stand. On many occasions,

Johor ignored the colonial wishes of the British pertaining to matters of both politics and

28 The Malay kingdoms of Pattani and Liqor were centers of great Islamic scholarship. Their
incorporation into what is now Thailand bequeathed future Thai governments huge problems in
absorbing a culturally and ethnically distinct Malay Muslims into a predominantly Buddhist Thai
state.
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the economy (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 199). Partly, Johor’s celebrated standing as a

legacy of the Malacca heritage as well as a glorified historical past in the Johor-Riau
Empire, which flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, strengthened its
reputation as a highly regarded independent state.
Contentions between the British and the Sultan of Johor over administrative
controls frequently surfaced out of the latter’s refusal for his state to be treated in the
same standing as other Federated Malay States. Before his death, Abu Bakar
promulgated a constitution that clearly defined the relations between Johor’s ruler and
the state council that would effectively render his action ultra vires should he attend any
of the British-initiated meetings of Malay rulers and sultans (Allen, Stockwell, and Wright
1981, 77-100). Exasperated and pressured into seeing the formation of a complete
‘British Malaya’ before his tenure was up, Governor Swettenham resorted to criticizing
Sultan Ibrahim for his ‘un-Malay’ qualities (Sinclair 1967, 100). It was not until 1914, out
of debt and the inability to secure financial support from London, that Johor finally

agreed to accept a British adviser accountable to the High Commissioner in Singapore
and to open up its government machinery to European administrators (Andaya and
Andaya 2001, 200). A map of British Malaya in 1935 is shown in Figure 3.1 on the
following page.

By the beginning of the First World War, all the Malay States had accepted some
form of British advice, enabling Britain to secure a sphere of influence against any
trespass or incursions by any other European power in the Malay Peninsula and North
Borneo (Wlnstedt 1968, 240). Despite the increasing power and influence of the colonial

state’s executive branch of government in state matters, the British sustained the
traditional and ceremonial status of Malay rulers (Hashim 1972, 33).29 It was beneficial

for the British to accord political recognition to the Sultans and wield their power within
the advisory system in order to control the Malay masses (Stockwell 1979, 74).
By the 19305 however, the separate but co-existing entities of the Federated
Malay States with the UFMS became a source of many disputes not only between the

various Malay Rulers and the British but also among British officials themselves. The
Sultans of the Federated Malay States were persistent in their demands for
decentralization of power. The Sultan of Perak declared in 1932: “We urge most strongly
that without delay the relations between our four states be converted into a true
federation and that full authority be restored to ourselves and our State Councils in all
matters that are not agreed to be truly federal” (Colonial Office Records 1932, 2). Some
British officers, particularly new High Commissioner Cecil Clementi, supported this call
and even proposed for the disbanding of the federation to reincorporate all Malay states
of the Peninsula under a looser coalition (Sidhu 1966, 17-25).

The Colonial Office in London became quite uncomfortable with this suggestion
since raising the Rulers’ position would entail administrative inefficiency as well as prove
unpopular with the growing non-Malay population (Smith 1995, 29). Indeed, many

29 In the cases Mighell vs. Sultan of Johor, and Duff Development Company v. Government of
Kelantan, the British certified that the respective rulers enjoyed legal immunity in the eyes of Her
Majesty’s Government, thereby recognizing these states as sovereign entities (See Hashim

1972)
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European and Chinese capitalists had expressed their anxieties and lack of confidence
in a decentralized political entity to safeguard their wealth. Also joining the British

conservatives against any move toward a new form of coalition with the Federated
Malay States were the rulers of the UFMS, who had perceptibly enjoyed relative
autonomy under the present status quo.

Despite these deep reservations, the British began to realize that given the
complexities of the Malay States, a middle path between centralization and
decentralization became necessary to satisfy all parties concerned. Decentralization was
seen to function as a measure to uphold indirect rule, which has been the core concept
of British colonial goals to reconcile emerging capitalist economies with societies that
had already established a strong pre-capitalist political structure (Fisher 1991, 440-441).

Any effort to dislodge the Malay sultans of their position, authority, and prestige was
seen as detrimental to British policy and interests (Ryan 1976, 213-214; Mills 1942, 60).

Furthermore, issues of huge expenditures and declining efficiency of the central
government to administer complex matters had earlier been questioned. But uniformity

of laws was necessary as a means to consolidate colonial rule. For the British, as long
as their power was entrenched in the coordination of the Federated Malay States’
finances and revenues, the devolution of power to the states would not have been a
major concern.
In this respect, the reversion to the old ideals of indirect rule, but with the

solidification of the federal government’s powers through the High Commissioner and
the Federal Council, was seen to be the most pragmatic step to take. This move would
satisfy both the rulers as well as those who advocated for stronger British governance.
Hence, ‘decentralization’ came into effect with the abolition of the Chief Secretary post in

1935, and its replacement with a Federal Secretary. The respective State Councils were
enlarged with additional non-Malay members, and each state took upon themselves
matters of health and public works (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 243; Mills 1942, 63-66).

The Federal Secretary’s powers would be confined only to federal matters and to acting
as the High Commissioner’s chief adviser, who in turn would take over advisory powers

held previously by the Chief Secretary (Smith, 1995, 30) In spite of having disappointed
the supporters of a truly unified and centralized British Malaya, this ‘decentralization’
move was a clever way of appeasing local rulers, while accommodating to the needs of
a growing capitalist economy. Unification, it was thought, would inevitably emerge from

the waves of a strengthened economy.
But decentralization instead turned to enhance state particularism, rather than a

move toward closer political affinity between the various Malay states, something the
British had hoped to eventually result from the new arrangement. The Second World
War interrupted the ensuing debate on whether indirect rule was an effective governing
mechanism for the British in light of its declining hegemonic role in the world economy.
All relevant and powerful opinions seemed to point toward direct rule. Consequently, a

plan was on the horizon for a full union of British Malaya through direct colonial rule, the
details of which were being worked on in London during the period that British Malaya
and Singapore were occupied by the Japanese.
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The colonial state and capitalist class interests in British Malaya

Capitalist development in British Malaya was helped by the colonial state largely
through its structural facilitation of an export-driven economy. The state systematically
intervened on behalf of the increasing number of European merchants and capitalists in
order to stimulate export production. A clear example was the colonial state patronage in
the tin industry.

Tin mining became the driving force for capitalist expansion in the Malay States.
But as the industry expanded, so did competition among a multitude of forces. While the
British secured the macro-managerial and marketing aspects of tin production, Chinese
capitalists controlled labor and methods. The various Malay aristocrats, as a product of

British indirect colonial governance through local rulers, eased the political facet of
production by smoothening the process of land legislation. According to Swettenham,
“the progress made in development (in the Malay States) was due to local effort and
Asiatic capital” (Swettenham 1948, 351). Before 1895, both European and Chinese
investors, mostly based in the Straits Settlements had been reluctant to part with their
capital in the Malay States unless protection could be secured. The development of the
tin industry was correlated with incessant armed violence between competing Chinese

gangs and their Malay allies that disrupted the tin trade, and which provided justification
for British intervention in the Malay States. Thus British colonial rule was synonymously
famous with the introduction of its military force to maintain internal security and peace.
Consequently, investments in the tin industry during this period especially soared.
In the early years of the twentieth century, Europeans controlled only about 15
per cent of tin production, the large share being the domain of the Chinese (Harper
1999, 24). Since there had been no net inflow of capital into the Malay States, most
production processes were pretty much labor-intensive (Drabble 1974, 203). As

industrial manufacturing in the world economy grew, so did the demand for tin,
especially from the canning industry. Together with newly found peace, the introduction

of efficient technology contributed to a tremendous surge in tin production. By 1898, the
steam engine and centrifugal pump helped control the problem of flooding in mines while
hydraulic slicing and gravel pumping contributed to a total yield of about 40,000 tons,
making British Malaya the largest tin producer in the world (Lim 1967, 4). At the turn of

the century, Chinese miners accounted for 90 per cent of output from mines in the
Federated Malay States (Yip 1969, 140-141). So exploitative was the technology that
readily accessible deposits were depleted to cause tin production to decline from 49,000

tones in 1895 to 39,000 in 1899 (Wong 1965, 199).
As the tin production intensified to meet world demands, a more efficient means

of tin production, both in extraction and in marketing were needed. Further investments
in tin production required expensive capital investments in large areas of tin mining, in

which the all-encompassing and technologically advanced dredges could be utilized to
extract the mineral in a more profitable capacity. The colonial government responded by
readily providing leasing licenses to lucrative investors in the Federated Malay States it
controlled, which also happened to contain rich mining areas (Andaya and Andaya 2001,
210). Meanwhile, financial backing, especially in the capitalization in technology was

secured through funds drawn from agency houses in Singapore, which eventually
converted many private estates into joint—stock companies (Parkinson 1996). Finance
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was also carried out through reinvested profits of local Chinese businesses and Indian

moneylenders, who also supplied loans to individual Europeans (Brown 1994, 79).
Bigger conglomerates and merchant houses from Singapore such as Straits Trading
Company, Guthries, and Boustead managed the marketing of tin and even bought over
some Chinese-owned mines for larger profit generation (Harper 1999, 25). Between
1870 and 1900, consumption of tin tripled, and between 1900 and 1930, it doubled. The
United States provided the main market for Malayan tin, purchasing at an average of

2,450 metric tons per year in the 19205 (Lim 1967, 3-5).
Soon, European mining conglomerates with more effective tin appropriation
methods took over the tin trade from the Chinese to complete the Europeanization of the

tin industry in the Malay States and Singapore. Large-scale production methods also
favored investments from joint-stock European companies, which possessed better
organizational stability than the smaller Chinese firms (Drabble 1991 ). As such, the first
twO decades of the twentieth century marked an enormous volume of foreign direct
investments in Malaysia (Drabble 2000, 59). In 1914, a sum of $194 million was
pumped into the country in the form of portfolio investments, which accounted for $44
million, and entrepreneurial investments, which accounted for $150 million (Brown
1993). From 1913 to 1920, returns of profits by tin companies totaled about £11.09
million to £5.35 million on capital invested (Khor 1983; Yip 1969, 141-143). Without the
‘capitalization’ of the political system in the Malay States, investment opportunities by the
British could not have flourished as it did in the years to come. By 1937, Europeans
owned two-thirds of all British Malaya’s tin concerns thanks to the assistance meted out

by the colonial state to use its influence with London financiers in internationalizing the
tin industry (Allen and Donnithorne 1957, 150-157).
The tin industry almost single-handedly contributed to economic infrastructure
development in British Malaya. The colonial government increased public utilities works
by providing networks of highways and railroads that soon connected major cities and
ports with tin fields. In 1901, the Federated Malay States Railways (FMS Railways), the
precursor to the existing Malayan Railways, was born. The port of Singapore was linked
to the Siamese border by both highways and rail lines in 1928 (Andaya and Andaya

2001, 207-208). Also constructed were electricity, telegraph, and telephone lines as well
as wharves and docks to accommodate the rapid demand in both land and sea

communications (Kaur, 1985, 135-137). As a result, migration was made easier and
settlements expanded to turn mining camps into cities and towns along the western
coast of the peninsula. Urbanization in Malaysia was indeed a product of the tin boom,
and by the late 19205, capital machinery imports into the Federated Malay States
reached its pre-World War Two at.$14.6 million, indicating increased overall domestic
activity.(Abdul Khalid 1981, 325-327).
By the turn of the twentieth century, the western land tenure system had already

been enforced to replace customary Malay land rules, mainly with the aim of
transforming virgin jungles into vast European settlements and plantations. A major
industry to come to the forefront was rubber. First experimented in 1888, the colonial

state introduced special land regulations in 1897 to encourage rubber cultivation as a
way to promote long-term land use and settlements by Europeans. Soon, the growth of
the automobile industry in the United States and Europe caused a rubber boom in the

years 1905-1908, increasing total area of rubber plantation five fold to about 110,000
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hectares (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 214). Again, the colonial state drew up various
policy steps that were encouraging to rubber planters in the form of capital and labor
flows, and land alienation, which greatly contributed to the growth of the industry.
European companies such as Guthrie’s and Harrison & Crossﬁeld began to purchase
Malay lands and old Chinese tapioca and gambier plantations for replanting of rubber,
as did many Malay and Chinese smallholders begin to plant rubber with the aim of
selling their lands to Europeans. The number of land acreage and estates dedicated to
rubber rose by more than 100 per cent between 1909 and 1913, and by 1916, rubber
overtook tin as Malaya’s main export revenue, and made Malaya the world’s largest
rubber exporter (Jackson 1968, 6).
In 1922, return of profit by all registered sterling companies dealing in rubber in
Malaya reached £47.22 million on capital investments worth £35 million (Voon 1976,

164-165). But the depression years that followed threatened to place the big
conglomerates in dire straits, already causing many European companies to falter on

their production costs. One of the more obvious assistance programs by the colonial
state to plantation owners and big rubber companies was the Stevenson Scheme in

1922 (Drable 2000, 128). The Scheme provided a quota system for a fixed period of four
years to stabilize the price of rubber. In the 19305 the worldwide depression again took a
toll on the rubber industry, following which an International Rubber Regulation
Agreement was signed in 1934 among rubber producers in the region (Drabble 2000,
130-131).30 Such schemes were internationalized, but their original stimulus came from
the colonial state, whose intention was to protect European capital in Malaya.

While such schemes and agreements had been beneficial to the big European
conglomerates, they were harmful to Malay and Chinese smallholders (Yip 1969, 264284). The big companies were able to switch their attention to palm oil, a new plantation
crop, but the smallholders lacked capital to do the same. Despite peasant smallholders

accounting for 217,000 tons of rubber production compared to the estates’ 260,000 tons,
no smallholder representative was included in committees that dealt with these
schemes. Instead they composed almost entirely of Europeans. At the end of the first
duration of the restriction, smallholders’ share of production leaned to nearly 113, 000
tons, while that of estates’ was practically unrestricted, as shown by their 246,000 ton

production figures for the same period (Lim 1967, 144). In the long run, such protections
were self-defeating and detrimental to Malaya’s rubber industry. American corporations,
rubber’s main consumers, were equally hurt by the sustenance of rubber prices and
began opening their own estates in Latin America. Soon, synthetic rubber was
manufactured to eventually displace natural rubber in American markets (Drabble 1991,
Chap. 6).
As the colonial state poured out all its available resources to aid European

concerns in the tin, rubber, and palm oil industries, there was a contrasting relationship
when it comes to colonial state relations with Malay peasants. With the
capitalist economy, many Malays in the agricultural sector remained as
fishermen (Mahmud 1980). A Malay Reservation enactment passed in
keep specified tracts of land, mainly rice lands, under Malay ownership

coming of the
rice farmers and
1913 sought to
(Hua 1982, 35).

3° The Signatories were Malaya, Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), Thailand, Nigeria, and
Bolivia.
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Such forceful legalization of land proprietorship ensured Malay economic specialization

of food production for the colony. With much of the labor now absorbed into the newly
emerging industries, labor for food production became insufficient. Initially, Chinese and
Indian laborers were not interested in the long-term proﬁtability of rice farming, since the
majority came as contract workers searching for quick monetary reaps and return home.

But as the demand for food became more intense and migrant residential patterns
became increasingly settled, many Chinese showed keen interest in rice cultivation. In
order not to upset the economic specialization balance, the reservations, functioned to
prevent Chinese ownership of rice lands (Lim 1977, 187). Other than Chinese

involvement in operating the more lucrative rice mills, the British practically ensured that
rice farming became a Malay preserve. The racialization of labor in colonial Malaysia
and Singapore will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.

Despite this policy, British assistance to the Malay peasantry was very much
lacking. In Kedah, known as ‘the rice bowl of Malaya,’ the Sultan himself initiated a
policy to expand rice-growing areas in the state (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 217).

Finally, an irrigation scheme in Krian was built by the colonial state in 1906, but far from
being a form of assistance, it instead burdened the peasants with increased taxation as
part of payment for the project (Lim 1971, 59). It was not to be another until 1932 when
the Department of Drainage and Irrigation Department was established that the British
provided any further aid to rice farmers (Hua 1982, 37).
A severe rice shortage problem during the inter-war years heightened the
colonial state’s cognizance of the importance in adequate food supply from rice
production. Although the state helped with the construction of an irrigation system, it was
basically Malay effort that increased rice production and acreage. From 1920 to 1924,
rice production averaged 224.000 metric tonnes per year and constituted only 38 per
cent of total consumption (Drabble 2000, 134; Goldman 1974, 27). Ironically, the
majority of rice comes from the UFMS, with 60 per cent grown in Kedah, Perlis and

northern Perak, and another 20 per cent in Kelantan and Terengganu (Hill 1977, 197).
Soon after the emergency, peasant interest waned, and rice production dropped to

206,00 metric tonnes per year (Cheng 1973). The depression soon encouraged some
state help in establishing a couple of irrigation schemes in other parts of the Federated

Malay States, especially in Perak and Selangor, increasing production to 337,000 metric
tonnes in the 19305 (Drabble 2000, 134; Lim 1977, 184). But overall, since the colonial
state focused its priorities on serving European capital in plantation industries, rice

farming suffered from the lack of structural attention.
Furthermore, the restructuring of the land tenure system under the capitalist

mode of production detached Malay peasants from their traditional sources of credit,
against which labor or produce had been used as collateral. Increased commodity
production and exchange brought on a corresponding reliance on circulation credit that
was usually identiﬁed with usury capital (Jomo 1986, 42). Since the dealing of interest
was against the tenet of Islam, most peasants chose to deal with wealthier classes of
Malay creditors, usually drawn from the upper echelon of the social hierarchy, who used
a money-lending idiom centering on the denial of usurious activity (Abdul Rahim 1973,
399). The Islamic prohibition on interest was conveniently circumvented through
collection of hardship payments, service fees, or other value-added costs that financially

benefited the creditor (Wilson 1958).
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The Malay Reservations, enactment of 1913 provided the social conditions within
which these creditors operated. For those peasants who went outside this circle, as a
matter of survival, credit was contracted from non-Malay money-lenders operating at the
primary levels and frequently transacting on ‘Malay terms’ as well (Jomo 1986, 49).
Either way, expansion of capital circulation contributed to major social economic
transformation among the Malay peasantry and the further dislocation of Malay
peasantry from capitalist development. While the law protected Malay ownership of
reservation land, circulation credit also placed tremendous pressure on Malay non-

reservation landowners to charge their lands as collateral, since non-Malay creditors
began to express interests in such an arrangement (Abdul Rahim 1973, 413). According
to Jomo (1986 52) “The unity of peasant interests, as against those of circulation capital,
has been undermined by the state policies which in effect, generally favor wealthier
peasants over poorer ones.” The state’s stress on Malay specialization of food

sufficiency, manifested in the Rice Lands and Coconut Preservation Enactment of 1917,
barred the replacement of rice by rubber, thereby creating an inescapable route to
poverty for Malay peasants by having them remain on the land.

English ‘Real Estate’ in Borneo
The best way to describe British involvement in Sarawak and Sabah is that of an
expanding private landownership by the Brooke dynasty and the British North Borneo
Chartered Company (BNBCC) respectively. Despite signing a treaty with Brunei, the
British government did little to stop Brunei’s forced cession of its territories to the
Brookes and the BNBCC. The Sultan of Brunei remarked that his empire had been

reduced to “a man, with only his head and feet lef ” (Crisswell 1978, 160). In 1906, A
British adviser was instituted in Brunei, preventing the now tiny kingdom from being
totally absorbed by Sarawak, thereby stopping further dismemberment of the Sultanate
(Tarling 1992, 14-19). In 1888, although Brooke remained the head of state for Sarawak,

the British government accorded him formal protection. Similar to the BNBCC in Sabah,
where British protection and support became a precautionary measure against “intrusive
foreign interest,’ the British indirectly held Sarawak as a colony (Wright 1970, 146-148).

In 1912, the British government and the Dutch entered into a treaty to define the borders
between British and Dutch Borneo, which secured the frontiers of the Brooke
government and the BNBCC from future encroachments by other European powers.31

Despite treating Sarawak as a ‘private feudal domain’, the Brooke system of
administration was quite similar to the style of indirect rule in British Malaya that co-

opted local ruling structures into colonial English governance (Fisher 1963, 101-106).
The Brookes also sought to protect native lands against foreign incursions while
simultaneously prohibiting natives from gaining fresh lands (Hong 1987, 38-42). In the
19305 under Vyner Brooke, the third White Rajah, there was a move toward

professionalizing Sarawak’s civil service. Like the Malay States, decentralization became
the method with which state administration was carried out. In each sub-territories
known as Divisions, a Resident was appointed along with his own council of local

3’ This border remains today to delineate the Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah from the
Indonesian Kalimantan provinces.
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chiefs.32 A state Chief Secretary’s post was created to work closely with the Council
Negeri (State Council) to formulate the various enactment and codes as well as
coordinator for the various Residents (Pringle 1970, 335). One of the major effects of
Brooke’s administrative modernization was the imposition of civil order and allegiance to
a central authority in Sarawak (Kedlt 1980, 58-59). The complexities of an emerging

capitalist economy required the Brooke dynasty to develop well-organized state
structures to manage revenues and expenditure and safeguard commercial transactions.
Territorial administration of Sabah by the BNBCC was less efficient as compared
to Sarawak. Lack of an effective bureaucracy and poor knowledge of local cultures
proved to be astronomical handicaps the Company had to endure in their effort to

administer a geographically vast and ethnically diverse land. Being a business
organization, the BNBCC governed as ‘a purely administrative company’ (Tregonning
1965, 52). At the top of its political hierarchy was the Governor, responsible to its Board
of Directors in London. Sabah possessed a type of Advisory Council, but unlike the
Malay States and even Sarawak, save for an occasional Chinese merchant or two, the
council was virtually an all-European affair. Sabah was divided into various ‘residencies,’
each with its own resident but dependence on local feudal structures for administration

somewhat perpetuated further fragmentation instead of allegiance to the state authority.
Its administration was harsh and impersonal, and resentments by local peoples against
the Company were high. Unreasonably high taxation and the engagement of coercive
measures to extract revenues by the colonial authorities became the source of
antagonisms among the local people toward the British. The Company’s extreme

insensitivity to local customs further aggravated the problem. The consensus was that
life was comparatively easier for the locals under Brunei Sultanate rule, in which fines
and taxation were negotiable. Under the rule of the ‘white man,’ every penny was
promptly demanded and punishment for non-payment was carried out in quite brutal

ways (Black 1968, 184-185).
Although outside capital was restricted and resources were not as abundant and
intensively extracted as in British Malaya, by the end of the nineteenth century, Sarawak

recorded a trade worth $13.5 million, mostly as trade channeled through Singapore
(Ryan 1976, 184). Tobacco, coffee, sago, pepper, gambier, and later rubber became

main export crops, with the last two generating the most income (Sutlive 1978). Later,
with the decline in rubber prices, Sarawak’s economy was sustained by the discovery of
oil in Miri. In contrast, Sabah under the Company was on the verge of bankruptcy, only
fortunate to be saved by revenues from local collection of jungle produce for the China
trade. Later, the development of the timber industry contributed to massive increases in
state revenues. By 1937, timber exports reached around 178,000 cubic meters, which
pushed the eastern coastal city of Sandakan to become one of the most important
timber ports in the world (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 220).
By the end of the Second World War, political economic realities and unending

internal bickering compelled both the Brooke dynasty and the Company to surrender
their authorities to the British government. Such surrender to the British Crown

3’2 In fact, Hugh Low, who perfected the residential system in the Malay states, had learned of its
concept from Rajah James Brooke, especially on the administration of large territories cheaply
with a handful of Europeans (see Harper 1999, 19).
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exemplified a necessity under capitalism for a formal colonial state to manage and
accommodate an increasingly complex form of commercial and trade transactions. After
the war, both Sarawak and Sabah became Crown Colonies, each ruled by a Governor,

and remained so until their merger with Malaya and Singapore to form the Federation of
Malaysia in 1963.
The Colonial State in Singapore 1867-1941
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the emergence of colonialism in Singapore
came through the exploitation of the island’s strategic free port status and cheap labor.
Since the state catered mainly to implement policies beneficial to the merchant class,
who did not initially intend on making Singapore their permanent residence but rather a
marketplace for profiteering, social policies on the island-colony did not really reflect a

concern for the long-term development of democratic statehood.
From 1873 to 1902, Singapore’s trade volume expanded six-fold from an annual

average of $67 million to $431 million (Huff 1994,11).33 Its main import-export specialty
shifted from exotic tropical wares to primary agricultural products such as rubber, tin,
and palm oil, and later to smelting and processing (Turnbull 1989, 89). The opening of
the Suez Canal in 1869 and the advance of steamship technology notably contributed to
the growth of Singapore’s economy. The Straits of Malacca came to the forefront of
international shipping to the orient, as ships no longer sailed around the Cape of Good
Hope through the Sunda Straits in Java.
However, the colony’s economic growth could not have taken place had early
‘internal problems’ not been straightened out. As a free port, Singaporean society had

been relatively free from government restraints. Since the island’s takeover by the
Colonial Office in London from the Indian government in 1867, the colonial authorities
have concentrated on basically catering to the needs of its business class, who had
become main players in the colony’s economic development. A main uneasiness among
the merchant community had been the social lawlessness and violence created by the
increasing Chinese population, who organized their lives around secret societies and
gangs. Another pressing need for the merchants was a more forceful British policy in the
Malay states to enable the expansion and protection of their commercial interests into

the Malay Peninsula.
At the head of the colonial government in Singapore was the Governor of the
Straits Settlements (of which Singapore was also the ‘capital’). He was also the High
Commissioner to the Federated Malay States. As head of the civil service, the
operational aspect of colonial administration was the responsibility of the Colonial
Secretary (Ryan 196, 204). Leading businessmen and merchants had pressed for more
power sharing in government. In meeting the demands of a ‘liberal society’ the state

introduced a legislative body in the form of an Executive Council. Headed by the

33 Volume was calculated in Straits Settlements Dollars.
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Governor, the Council comprised of 13 British officials and 13 ‘unofficials,’ which
included three Chinese, and one each of Indian, Malay, and Eurasian.34

Although there was some significant extent representation of the various
communities, the Council had been constructed in a way that a heavily weighted
European presence could ensure western dominance in governance. Members of this
Council, all of whom came from prominent and wealthy backgrounds, were nominated
by their respective business and cultural organizations. In spite of the Council’s function
to legislate, it was not uncommon for dictatorial and non-consultative decisions to come
from the Governor, whose role was to oversee British national and security interests in
the region. Tensions between private commercial and state political interests often
manifest in the relationship between the Council and the Governor. Singapore’s

Governor Sir Harry Ord, commented that “the mercantile community...takes hardly any
interest in anything beyond their own immediate interest” (quoted in Turnbull 1989, 83).

However, realizing the significance of addressing these merchants’ grievances
and needs in relation to their contribution to the development of the capitalist economy,

successive governors began to work more closely with them. But issues regarding the
Chinese population’s activities often placed the state in a dilemma of political economic

contradictions. For instance, taxes on opium had until 1937 been the monopoly and
main income earner of the state. But opium was also the source of many social ills that
were closely tied to social disorder and criminal activities among the Chinese, greatly
disrupting peace on the island. Health-wise, it greatly affected the poor among the
Chinese. A research in the 18505 showed that nearly half of Chinese adults, mostly low
wage laborers, were addicts (Cheng 1961; Braddell 1857, 66-83; Little 1848, 1-79).
Ironically, Chinese businessmen feared that a total prohibition on opium smoking would

deter immigration, thereby reducing much needed labor (Cheng 1961, 52-74). Hence,
when the state acted to solve the problems associated with opium smoking and sale, an

outright ban was not in the books; the state only enforced a mandatory registration for all
smokers. It was not until after the Second World War under severe Japanese occupation
that opium smoking began to signiﬁcantly diminish.

In 1877, a Chinese Protectorate was established by the state with William
Pickering as its head, and in 1890 the Societies Ordinance was passed (Jackson 1965,
95-98). These were important steps in managing the Chinese population in relation to
monitoring criminal activities, deemed crucial to the smooth and peaceful operations of
commerce. Chinese labor was badly needed to work the mines and plantations in the
Malay States as well as in Singapore’s growing economy. But the Chinese migrants had
brought with them their traditional triads that contributed to astronomically high rates of
armed violence, gambling, prostitution, and labor abuses (Campbell 1971, 1-15). During
the 18705 a significant portion of the 30,000 annual Chinese migrants into Singapore
had been made up of professional gangsters, whereas the small number of women had
mostly been drafted to work as prostitutes (Turnbull 1989, 81; Lim 1967, 58-110). The

Protectorate became initially responsible for protecting Chinese labor from secret
societies. and employment abuses, but soon extended its authority to generally

34 During the colonial period, Eurasians, mainly Christians, usually identified themselves with
Europeans, although they were never fully accepted by the latter as social or political equals (see

Sherman 2000).
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controlling the Chinese community at large. The Societies Ordinance, which was
enacted to regulate secret society activities, did not entirely eliminate gangsterism
among the Chinese; rather, it effectively reduced their large-scale riots that had
previously immobilized businesses on the island for long periods of time (Ng 1961, 9297).
The modernization of Singapore came at a time when sea communications
technology and commercial expansion into the Malay states brought enormous
opportunities for trade and growth for its businessmen. In many ways, the colonial state
became responsible for stimulating the drive toward modernization. Continuous civil
strife for the most part of the nineteenth century created an atmosphere of uncertainty
for traders on the island. Hence, the colonial state’s iron rule brought with it a significant
measure of control and stability that Singaporean merchants had longed for. Many new
‘visionaries’ appeared in the Singapore colonial government like Sir John Anderson, who
served as Governor from 1904 to 1911. Anderson was a proponent of pulling Singapore
and the Federated Malay States politically closer together, and was responsible for
many policy proposals that could have drained much of the Malay States’ revenues into

the island. Although a full merger was not attained, Singapore’s British connection
served well enough to forge an economic linkage between the two political entities,
enabling Singapore to handle most of the Malay States’ exports, thereby contributing to
the prosperity of its businessmen. It did not take long for Singapore to reassert itself as
the indisputable metropolitan center for the Malay States, which in turn served as the

regional periphery for its expanding capitalist economy. By 1903, Singapore was the
seventh largest port in the world.
From 1910 to 1927, trade expanded four-fold to reach $1.8 billion (Huff 1994,
11). With capitalist development came the mushrooming of private enterprises and

commercial houses, mostly belonging to Europeans. Guthrie’s, founded in 1821, was
Singapore’s oldest company and one of the most successful. During the turn of the
twentieth century, Guthrie’s business flourished in areas of commodity trade, banking,
and insurance. It later ventured into rubber plantations in the Federated Malay States.
Holding monopoly on shipping services for exports of commodities were the merchant
houses, which initially started with five; Boustead & Company, Borneo Company,
Adamson, Giilfillan, & Company, Paterson, Simmons, & Company, and the German

Behn, Meyer, & Company (Huff 1994, 122). These houses virtually controlled the estates
that produced the commodities, namely rubber, through their representations in the
various estates or companies’ boards of directors. Through agreements with shipping
agencies, they also gained full management in the exports of these commodities. Not

surprisingly, these houses grew to be among the most thriving companies in Singapore.
Others such as the Oriental Telephone and Electric Company and the Straits

Trading Company were formed to take advantage of new opportunities in the growing
communications and tin-smelting industries respectively (Turnbull 1989, 90-95). Fraser

and Neave expanded into a range of businesses from its original soda drinks
manufacturing, while Malayan Breweries and Diamond Metal Products concentrated
respectively on beverages and household consumer items (Makepeace, Brooke, and
Braddell 1921, 194). Singapore’s position as a seaway hub also attracted many shipping

firms including the German Norddeutscher Lloyd and the British Ocean Steamship
Company. Closely related, Singapore’s rapidly intensifying sea trade also required badly
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needed dock reconstruction and services. Firms such as the P & 0 Company and
Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, which was taken over by the state and turned into a
statutory body known as the Singapore Harbour Board in 1917,35 soon took advantage
of these new prospects to venture into wharf construction and port expansion projects. In

banking, The Chartered Bank, Shanghai Banking Corporation, and Mercantile bank, all
British-owned, pioneered the road toward financing of new enterprises in the expanding
economy (Lee 1990, 77).
Chinese businesses in Singapore were mainly owned by wealthy families from

the Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca. Most of these families had already
made immeasurable fortunes in the Malay States, and initially sent much of their
earnings back to China. A number of them, such as Tan Kah Kee, Tan Beng Swee, and
Tan Kim Ching even expanded their Singapore-based commodity trading and ricemilling businesses into other parts of Southeast Asia as well as China (Feldwick 1917,
836). In 1890, three Malaccan Chinese, Tan Jiak Kim, Tan Jeong Salk, and Le Cheng
Lam, together with a few Europeans, founded the Straits Steamship Company, the first
large Chinese conglomerate in the shipping business (Turnbull 1989, 92). In 1903,
Kwong Yik Bank, the first Chinese bank, was opened (Lee 1990). Although Europeans

began to increasingly dominate the capital-intensive manufacturing and processing
industries, these Chinese merchants continued to hold on to many of their commercial
forte in retailing, property, and banking. As the prosperity of the Chinese merchants
increased, so did their influence in politics. In 1906, the ChineSe Chamber of Commerce

was formed. From here, prominent members of this community participated in many
political and social works, especially in the funding of Chinese schools, clinics, and
community centers.
Singapore’s urban-port economy soon expanded into a proportion that required

reformation of its municipal administration. The original municipal committee was
reorganized after a commission in 1909 found squalid living conditions in many parts of
the city had given rise to many social problems including high mortality rates and crime.
Municipal elections were virtually a non-entity since many of the city’s inhabitants either
had no confidence in the system or simply had no knowledge whatsoever of the political

process. In 1913, the Municipal Ordinance enabled the autocrat Anderson to take
financial matters into the power of the Governor, who also obtained the privilege of
nominating commissioners for the Municipality. Consequently, he successfully managed
to have the elections abolished. Surprisingly, while Europeans opposed this move, a
supporting voice came from the Chinese Commercial Association (Turnbull 1989, 115).
Perhaps the wealthy Chinese elite had realized that the nomination mechanism would

better serve their interests, since democratic electoral processes would potentially oblige
them to hand over political power to the workers. The political line between Europeans
and Asians were clearly demarcated by the racial consciousness imposed by

colonialism. Within the Chinese community, intra-ethnonational class struggles were
seen to be more realistic. As a result, this municipal structure remained the same up to
the Second World War.

35 As the port expanded, many new facilities were in need of improvements, on which the
company was reluctant to embark. The colonial government was forced to intervene and
expropriated it into a public-owned Board (see Turnbull 1989, 93).
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Brief Colonialism under Japan 1941-1945
The Japanese invasion of the whole of Southeast Asia was quick and decisive.

The Japanese imperial army invaded Malaya from the northeast in 1941 by courtesy of
Thailand. At Singapore, the British miscalculated a naval attack from the south, and had
their artillery power pointing toward the sea. The Japanese army surged ahead to
Singapore from the north on bicycles (Swinson 1970). With the flight of the British, the
Japanese took over the administration of British Malaya, Borneo, and Singapore, which
they renamed Shonan.
The municipal structure of Singapore was preserved under the Japanese. The
city was ruled as a colony with a mayor placed in charge. It also functioned as a regional

military administrative center that included Sumatra, known as the Southern Region
(Harper 1999, 36). The Federated Malay States, along with the UFMS, Penang, and
Malacca, was incorporated into a single political unit headed by a Governor. The
ultimate goal was to establish a permanent colony in Singapore and a protectorate in the
Malay states. In Sarawak and Sabah, separate Japanese military governments were

installed. In 1942, as a reward for its declaration of war against the United States and for
the use of its territory for advancing Japanese troops into Malaya, Thailand was given
the northern Malay States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu. The
administrative machinery of the Japanese colonial state was to accommodate the
Malaya and Singapore into the wider policy concept of its “Greater East Asia Co-

prosperity Sphere,” designed to unify all of East Asian peoples under Japanese
hegemonic leadership (Lee 1961, 33).
As part of its propaganda, the Japanese sought to inspire the indigenous peoples
of Asia to join Japan in a new era of regional political confederation with promises of

self-governance and political autonomy. Such a vision was hindered by two factors.
First, the ongoing war necessitated the Japanese to concentrate on siphoning resources
and strategic planning of Malaya and Singapore toward their war efforts. For the duration
of the war, Malaya under Japanese occupation served as the supplier of raw material for
the home country and its other possessions. For example, about 60 per cent of Malayan

rubber went directly to the military, while the remainder found its way into the hands of
Japanese firms (Harper 1999, 38). Japanese kaishas exerted monopolies over
production, supply, and distribution of these materials, which led to black-marketing and

rapid escalation of prices (Horner 1980). Overall, the increasing isolation of the Malayan
economy and the retreat of European capitalists during the war restricted its export
capacities. Iron ore production dropped about 45,000 tones from 1942 to 1943, coal by

285,000 tonnes from 1943 to 1945, and tin by two-thirds of 1940 production levels in
1945 (Yip 1969, 291). In Borneo, oil became a precious war resource to enable its

output to recover to nearly half of prewar levels (Cramb 1993).
The Japanese colonial state was initially headed by the military sector of the

government, which had been engaged in a rather contentious relationship with its civil
counterpart. Even when the military soften its grip on the state, its existence had been
very much felt in the many militarization programs evidenced in the formation of auxiliary

police wings and self-defense corps that recruited mainly young Malay men. Meanwhile,
the civilian branch embarked on a coercive Nipponization policy that took on the agenda
of bonding together the people with the state through a new Asian-based political

7O
ideology, which emphasized Asian supremacy under Japanese leadership. Yet, such
vision was always tempered by the needs of war and the urgency to appease local
opinion in the face of the new colonial state’s many unsavory policies (Elsbree 1953,

44).
Economic policies, for instance, were often tainted with disastrous
experimentation in food growing and drastic supply controls that brought on crop failures
and astronomically high consumer prices (Gullick 1989, 7; Van 1948, 121-122). Famine
and malnutrition were the most extreme of consequences of failed Japanese economic
policies in Malaya, while profiteering and hoarding were common. Unsurprisingly, the
Japanese also embarked on a racial division of labor with Malays recruited into the local
armed force and agriculture, and the Chinese, although treated badly, allowed to carry
on a significant portion of retail and trade. But war efforts required heavy taxation, and

the Japanese colonial state passed a mandatory $50 million military contribution from
Chinese capitalists to help in their war campaigns (Tan 1946, 1-12). Many Chinese and
Indian-owned banks were liquidated and funds transferred to Japanese banks (Drabble

2000,151)
Unemployment brought on by a stagnant economy created an abundant labor

pool. Thousands of young men of all ethnonational backgrounds were forced to work on
the warfront projects, such as the Death Railway between Thailand and Burma, while
some were even conscripted into the Imperial army (Turnbull 1989, 207). There were

approximately 20,000 Chinese evacuated from Singapore to various destinations in
Asia, and about the same number of Malays deported to construction sites and labor
camps in Thailand and Indochina. From the roughly 80,000 laborers sent abroad, nearly
30,000 died there, and thousands more were left stranded (BMA Report, 1945). The
display of state repression under Japanese colonial rule could best be seen in the

activities of the kempeitei, a military police constabulary formed to ferociously weed out
any local resistance to the state (Lee 1977, 99). Subjugation of and atrocities toward the
Chinese had been an accompanying fact of Japanese war policy, tracing its origins to
the bitter war with China since the early 19005. As a result, many Chinese became the

brunt of kempeitai brutalities. For example, between February and March 1942, an
estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Chinese were reported to have been systematically
massacred by the Japanese in Singapore (Chin 1976; Purcell 1965, 259).
The second factor that disabled Japanese attempts at encouraging the Malays to

join them in their new ‘Asiatic’ confederation was the colonial nature of their relationship
with Malays. As the war drew on, Nipponization took the form of encouraging local
nationalism among the Malays as a way to detach them from the Sultans and rulers,
who although were allowed to remain in their positions, were not accorded the prestige
and recognition previously enjoyed under the British. The program’s main aim was to
stimulate an anti-western drive aong the locals in order to mobilize their support for the
new Japanese colonial state. Thus the Japanese also began to sponsor new groups and
associations among both the Malays and Chinese that tailored to this program. These

new ‘nationalist’ organizations were also established to disconnect Malays and Chinese
from supplying information and material to local resistance movements, an initiative later

emulated by the British in their war against local communist insurgents (Lee 1961, 39).
Gradually, even hostility toward the Chinese relaxed, as many Chinese capitalists were

actually engaged to bolster a war-torn economy (Harper 1999, 38; Andaya and Andaya
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2001, 251 ). But in the end, the commanding and repressive nature of Japanese direction
in these associations drove many Malay nationalists to form either their own groups or
join existing underground movements (Harper 1999, 32-33).
The aftermath of the Japanese occupation was an arena of intense racial
tensions and communal violence. For political convenience, the Japanese colonial
administration had maintained the patronage policy the British had adopted toward
Malays while taking on a generally hostile attitude toward the Chinese. In other words,
the Japanese implemented its own version of a racial division of labor. Many Malays
were recruited into the local police force. On the other hand, the bulk of the resistance

movement fell with the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which although
contained some armed Malay units, was principally dominated by the Chinese.36 In the
absence of a strong local armed police, and as a reward for its organized struggle
against the Japanese, the MPAJA was initially relied upon by the British Military
Administration to maintain law and order immediately after the war.
Such a move proved catastrophic as the MPAJA took laws into their own hands
to assert vengeance upon anyone whom they suspected of having collaborated with the

Japanese (Salmon 1989, 160-165; Cheah 1983, 173). Many Malays, on suspicion of
having collaborated with the Japanese, received the brunt of violent reprisals through a
system of ’kangaroo court’ justice (Cruickshank 1983, 195-210). Seeing these events in
terms of Chinese brutalities toward Malays, many Malays in turn formed armed groups
for purposes of self-defense and counter-attacks (Stockwell 1979, 146-148). It was
interestingly noted that instances of violence were most often precipitated in areas
where close economic proximity fuelled latent tensions. Under an atmosphere of
uncertainty and pent-up antagonisms, rumor mongering became a primary source for

such clashes, and the killings and counter killings, which claimed thousands of lives,
continued well into the early 19505 (Burridge 1957).
In general, the Japanese colonial state caused three significant impacts in
Malaysia and Singapore. One, it re-invigorated Malay ethnonationalism, which had been

cautiously stifled under the British. Resistance against the Japanese also contributed to
the rise in Chinese ethnonationalism, which later on played a crucial role in the politics of
both Malaysia and Singapore. Two, whatever racial ‘balancing act’ the British
manipulated under its colonial rule practically boiled over under Japanese occupation,
which violently pitted one ethnonational group against another in the quest of controlling
Malayan and Singaporean societies. These issues will be further examined in chapter
four. Three and related to the above, ethnonational tensions that arose under Japanese

occupation convinced future Malayan and Singaporean leaderships that a strong
national state seemed to be the solution to the prevention of racial violence as well as to

achieving ethonational integration under a single nation-hood. These topics will be
discussed further in chapters four and five.

36 Andaya and Andaya (2001, 253) note that there had been a percentage of pure bandit and
secret society elements within the MPAJA. The MPAJA had also often used ruthless tactics of
intimidation among the civilian population to attain their aims.
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Forging Ahead with State Centralization in Malaya and Singapore
The defeat of Germany and Japan, the devastation of Europe, and the rise of the
Soviet Union, compelled the United States, the new hegemonic power, to rearrange a
new world order that would accommodate its political and economic needs abroad. The
signing of the Atlantic Charter, declaring the rights of nations to self-determination, was a

principal tenet of American foreign policy intended to detach European powers of their
colonial possessions (Hoogvelt 1997, 33). British policy toward its territories, including
Malaya and Singapore, now had to cater to the demands of its newly rich and powerful
ally (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 254).

The surrender of Japan to the Allies in 1945 brought the British back
unceremoniously to Malaya, Borneo, and Singapore. Despite the very few who had
stayed behind to endure the Japanese occupation, most Europeans had scuttled back to
their homelands and other ‘safe-havens’ to escape the war (Chapman 1951 ) The War
enlightened the people of Malaya that European supremacy was not all that it had been

made out to be, since they witnessed first-hand the indignities suffered by Europeans at
the hands of fellow Asians. Thus all Malayans held the return of the British in even
higher contempt than their presence before the war.

Upon their return, the British had four main problems to deal with in their mission
to prepare the framework of an independent Malayan state. First, a relatively strong
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which formed the pillar of the MPAJA, had surfaced

to dominate the local political scene. Second, the influence of left-wing Malay
nationalism had gained significant momentum in calling for a Pan Malay-Indonesian
statehood. Third, increasing ethnonational violence and tensions caused national
administration to become troublesome, and fourth, the economy was in ruins. In an

expedient move, the British instituted a military administration known as the British
Military Administration (BMA), under Lord Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander
of Southeast Asia, immediately after the war (Latiff 1977, 120). During this time, the
British hoped that some investigation could be pursued in order to gauge the best

alternative government to lead an independent Malaya.
From the Malayan Union to the Federation

To the British, the economy was a priority above the rest (Latiff 1977, 90). But the
economy could not be restarted if the other problems were not equally addressed. An

independent Malaya must be one that could safeguard their commercial interests
through a modern, liberal, and western-based government (Donnison 1956). Consensus
in London pointed toward a plan devised in 1944 by Sir Edward Gent, Assistant
Permanent Under-Secretary of Colonies, to incorporate the Federated Malay States,
UFMS, Penang, and Malacca into a Malayan Union, with Singapore administered as a

separate colony.37
Under this Union, Malaya was to be centrally administered by a Governor, a

legislative council, and an executive council. The Sultans and Rulers were to retain their

37 The ‘gift’ by Japan to Thailand of the Unfederated Malay States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and
Trengganu was declared illegal by Britain.
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positions, but with their sovereignty ceded to the British Crown. Most importantly,
citizenship and equal rights would be open and accorded to all ethnic groups, regardless
of national origin. In the words of Andaya and Andaya (1982, 255), ”All previous treaties
signed over the years in which the British had acknowledged the sovereign rights of
Malay rulers were annulled. The pretence that the British were merely assisting the
Malay rulers to govern their lands was finally removed.” As preparation for selfdetermination, such a structure would be an ideal set up for an independent pro-British
state.

The British were surreptitious with their plans. In 1945, the British managed to
procure from all the Sultans and rulers, a new set of treaty agreements that abrogated all
previous ones.38 In January 1946, a White Paper was submitted to the British Parliament

to introduce steps toward the Union’s immediate implementation in Malaya (Bedlington
1978, 70). But the British miscalculated political realities in favor of economic
expediency. Although the Malays had always maintained a politically apathetic
predisposition, such proposals touching upon the reduction of sovereignty and
citizenship inflamed their passion onto a higher level of nationalist sentiment. In March
1946, about 200 Malay delegates from 42 associations together with hundreds of other
Malay protestors took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur to demand the repeal of the Union
(Hua 1983, 77). The Malays had threatened to disown the sultans should they continue
to maintain their stand, which signaled that a big scale revolution could have been the
imminent choice of action (Cheah 1988, 1-25).3
For the British, such an event was quite an awakening. To avoid revolutionary

warfare, a serious reconsideration of the plan had to be taken. In London, several former
officers who had served and advocated for decentralization in Malaya including
Swettenham, Maxwell, Winstedt, and Clementi, opposed the Union by petitioning
protests to the Parliament and the Prime Minister (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 256). The
strong lobby against the Union provided enough evidence for the British to seriously
reconsider their plans. Despite its ofﬁcial implementation in April 1946, the Union never
actually got off the ground, and in 1948, it was completely revoked for a Federation of
Malaya (Harper 1999, 84). Requirements for citizenship for non-Malays were restricted

to at least fifteen years residence in the last twenty-five years, a declaration of
permanent settlement, an oath of allegiance, being of good character and some degree
of competence in Malay or English (Hasan 1974, 1-7).

Throughout this whole episode, there emerged a new group of Malay
nationalists, with whom the British finally saw a solution to the leadership issue.
England-trained and elitist in origin, leading members of the new United Malay National
Organisation (UMNO), under the leadership of Onn Jaafar, impressed enough upon the
British to renegotiate an independent Malayan proposal. Through mediations with
UMNO, the British went ahead with plans for a Federation of Malaya, in which

38, The sultans had been eager to show loyalty to the British after they had been used by the
Japanese to formalize their administration. Much threats were directed to the rulers by the British
representative, Harold McMichael to obtain their consent (Hansard 1946, Vol 240)

The famous shout “that the rulers either pay heed to the people's will or be swept into the
dustbin of history" became a rallying cry by the Malays against their Sultans for their role in the
Malayan Union. (See Utusan Melayu, 12 October 1945.)
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sovereignty of the Sultans and Rulers were guaranteed and Malay special privileges
upheld (Bedlington 1978, 75). A central government with legislative powers was created
but the respective eleven states continued to have jurisdiction over a number of issues.
The late phase of colonial state in British Malaya from 1948 to 1955, in the form
of a new Federation, was marked by the state’s prioritization of economic reconstruction,

war against communists, and nation-state building for an independent Malaya. A new
Malay elite surfaced from the social disorder brought by the war, to forge a coalition with
emerging Chinese and Indian elite groups, a topic that will be discussed in the following
chapters. Such an alliance proved a satisfactory step to ensure a smooth transition from
British rule to independence, safeguarding the structures and institutions that could
accommodate Malaya’s role in the world economy.
Late colonial state in Sinqapore 1945-1963
As in Malaya, the British were prepared for the eventual independence of

Singapore. But Singapore’s value as a regional strategic political and economic center
for the British influenced them to leave the island-state out of the Malayan Union
package. Different problems were also prevalent in the island that distinguished it from
Malaya. Singapore’s historical trajectory from Malaya and Borneo was manifested in its

long working and middle class existence, a product of its relatively more advanced
industrial functions under the region’s division of labor. Industrial unrest and militancy
correlated with the nationalist aspirations of the working class population in Singapore.
Singapore’s strategic role in the military and economic affairs of the British could

not be compromised. Aware that a move toward Singaporean political autonomy was
unavoidable, the British embarked on a plan to nurture ‘friendly parties,’ with whom they
could pass down their leadership. While the British concentrated on fighting the CPM in
the jungles of Malaya, the first step in Singapore then, was to foster an atmosphere in
which such parties could grow (Sweeney 1977, 203). The first of these, the Progressive
Party (PP) and the Singapore Labour Party (SLP) had memberships made up of English

educated individuals with the former consisting mainly of middle class professionals,
while the latter lower middle class unionists. The British favored the Progressives, but a
1955 electoral victory went to the Labour Front instead (Turnbull 1989, 251-252).

The structure of the colonial state was still evident in the heavy presence of the
British starting with the High Commissioner and down to the many representatives in the
Legislative Assembly as well as the local police and army. While local Singaporeans
held the various Ministerial positions, including the Chief Minister, their power was

extremely restricted. Throughout the 19505, the British had not been ready for the
release of Singapore since the turbulent political atmosphere did not warrant a group of
capable proteges to come forth. Eventually, internal struggles and political back-stabbing
within another party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), saw the emergence of a proBritish Lee Kuan Yew, who went on to become Chief Minister, and play an important role

in the island’s independence through a merger with Malaya to form Malaysia in 1963.
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Conclusion

Colonialism’s top-down process was contradictory, harsh, and undemocratic. In
both countries, the colonial state that resulted from the strengthening of the capitalist
economy was repressive and discriminatory. Colonial states are products of artificial and

forceful impositions of capitalism, created over a previous social structure to cater to
specific capitalist class interests both in the colony and in the homeland. The dictatorial

policies of the colonial state were derived from its most offensive function — exploiting
local resources and labor for the benefit of foreign capitalists, local collaborators, and
merchants. To enhance the efficiency of this organization, the borders of the state had to
be drawn and its citizenry had to be mobilized and integrated. The fact that Japanese
occupation in Malaysia and Singapore also functioned along the lines of the British
illustrates the point that regardless of the colonizers, the aims of colonialism remained
the same.

Owing to the two countries’ different role functions within the world economy, the
British were presented with rather distinct sets of problems in pushing their capitalist
interests into Malaysia and Singapore. In Malaya, once the colonial state was
established, the dilemma was not whether democratic institutions should dictate political

patterns, but whether a direct and centralized form of colonial state would be a more
effective preference. The introduction of democratic political processes had not been a
viable alternative since it would have led to a whole myriad of ‘westernizing’ projects
from education to political empowerment of the Malays.
The same can be said for Sarawak and Sabah. Initial British lack of interest was
superseded by the realization that the region had to provide a buffer against expanding
rival French and German interests into Southeast Asia. Hence, geopolitical and military

factors played crucial parts in keeping these two states under any form of British
influence. Colonial rule for these Sarawak and Sabah was even more restrictive under
the respective private domains of the Brooke dynasty and the BNBCC. But as the

economy of these states became more entangled with that of Singapore, and to a lesser
degree Malaya, these ‘private administrations’ had to give way to formal and direct
colonial governance. Unlike Malaya however, there had been no strong indigenous ruler
that claimed a political stake in any of these two states. This made British direct control
after World War Two a logical and easy action to undertake. The separate development
of colonial political structures in these two Bornean states from Malaya was to later
influence the political problems in both these states as well as their relationship with
Malaya in Malaysia.
In Singapore, an absence of a strong and established Malay ruler allowed the

British to set up direct colonial governance, whose objective aimed at controlling the
island’s commerce and at securing their political influence in the region. The similarity
between Singapore and Malaysia ends in the island’s greater strategic importance and
its more rapid pace of capitalist development, which necessitated a stronger urgency for
a.direct-ruled colonial state. Despite the unimpeded establishment of capitalism there,
democracy did not emerge with capitalist development. Instead, as Singapore’s capitalist
economy grew, an increasingly repressive colonial state began to surface, and whose

priority included imposing harsh labor restrictions and clamping down union activities.
Gradually, as in Malaysia, preparation for independent statehood meant that the political
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structure must accommodate a leadership that would preserve and maintain British

interests in the region.
In Malaysia, and much later in Singapore, at the heart of the social issue was the
problem of conscripting the various ethnonational groups toward a sense of loyalty to the
colonial state. The Malayan Union fiasco was more of an attempt at cementing state
sovereignty and state power than anything that was related to the implementation of
liberal practices of common nationhood, as the British had asserted. The most important
political goal of the colonial state in both these countries was the fostering of the bond
between statehood and citizenship, through which capitalist production could be more

efficiently transacted - the effort of which proved to be extremely difficult.
Under colonization, direct or othenivise, the social and political institutionalization
process became instrumental in consolidating the political structure toward servicing
c'apitalist production. Investments in land, labor and technology could only be enforced if
the political structure could facilitate the smooth flow of capital. The consolidation of
political power through the formation of a colonial state provided an environment within
which such activities could expediently take place. Hence, despite impending
decolonization, the nature of the colonial state would inevitably become a blueprint for

successive state practices in these two countries in order for them to effectively adapt to
the world economy. Therefore it is not solely the institutional structure of the colonial
state that mattered. After all, the colonial state was modeled after a democratic beau
ideal of representative government. What matters is the nature of the state in its value to
capitalism, under which repressive policies are formulated and autocratic governance is
carried out. In this regard, British protectorate and colonial rule had set the stage for
future authoritarian trends in Malaysia and Singapore when both countries emerged as
peripheral capitalist states in the modern world system.
The repressive character of the colonial state became a primary variable in
inhibiting social and political development toward democracy in Malaysia and Singapore.
It laid out the basic framework of modern governance for both these countries as they
later sought to actively engage in the world economy. But other important factors also
emerged within the process of colonialism, to stifle the attempts by anti-systemic forces
against the oppressive rule of both the colonial rulers as well as their political protégé
within the newly independent states. In the next chapters, the focus will be on the

inability of these various ethnonational movements to form a sufficiently strong popular
alliance for democratization, due to the social inequalities and diverse ethnonationalisms
that existed among the various groups.
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CHAPTER 4
COLONIALISM, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT, AND
ETHNONATIONAL-CLASS INEQUALITIES

Social economic inequalities present one of the major constraints to the development of
popular democracy in any particular country. According to Bob Jessop (1990b, 178),
”there are real obstacles to effective political participation owing to the unequal
distribution of resources and the uneven incidence of opportunities for collective action.”
Indeed, the failure to establish effective popular coalitions has been a persistent problem
in both Malaysia and Singapore during the course of their capitalist development.

This chapter concerns the extent to which capitalism through colonialism has
provided a blueprint for a social structure that, until today, has been rigidly stratified
along ethnonational-class lines. Capitalist development in Malaysia and Singapore,

facilitated by the colonization process, worked in two main directions to create severe
inequalities between and within each ethnonational group. One, the stratification process
was based on the identification of certain sectors of the economy with a particular
ethnonational group. Such a process caused different rates of development among the
different groups in the emerging capitalist economy. In addition, British preservation of
Malay traditional pre-capitalist structures as a mechanism to impose indirect rule also

guaranteed Malay peasants’ entrapment within an impoverished and marginalized
agricultural sector. Two, colonialism functioned according to different regional
specialization of labor that brought on different rates of capitalist development between
Malaya, Singapore, and northern Borneo as well as between the rural and urban areas.
Such uneven development served to further reinforce and perpetuate ethnonationalclass disparities.
Ethnonational-Occupational Formation in
Malaya, Singapore, and Northern Borneo
Under British Colonialism
Capitalist development during colonialism necessitated the import of labor from

China and India to meet shortages faced in the tin mines and plantations. British divide
and rule strategy served not only to efficiently organize labor along ethnonational lines,
but also consequently caused significant levels of social, economic, and political
inequalities among as well as within the main ethnonational groups. In order to
understand these inequalities, it is important to analyze the historical stratification
process brought on by British colonialism in both Malaysia and Singapore.
Pre-capitalist Malay entrepots had always attracted visitors and settlers from
abroad. The ﬁrst Chinese migrants to the Malay Peninsula and Borneo were traders and
merchants. From AD. 400 to 1400, Chinese residents in the Malay world had been the
result of ‘practical relationships’ established between the various Malay chieftains and
rulers of China with the objective of maintaining trade ties between the two regions

(Wolters 1963, 540-552). During the Ming Dynasty’s imperial voyages to the sultanate of
Malacca in the fifteenth century, the Chinese historian Fei-Hsin recorded that there had
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already been “fair-skinned Chinese people living in Malacca among the people with skin

like black lacquer” (Wheatly 1961; see also Groeneveldt 1960).
The Chinese had been discouraged from making other countries their permanent
home since Confucian principles dictated the significance of filial piety and ancestral

worship. But the political turmoil in China during the reign of the Manchu dynasty,
compounded by famine, crop failures, and abject poverty compelled many to seek better

living conditions in the Nanyang (Chinese reference to Southeast Asia) in the
seventeenth century (Hoyt 1993, 23). These Chinese migrants consisted of five major
dialect groups, the Teochew and Cantonese from Kwantung, the Hokkein from Fukien,
the Hakka from the mountainous areas of Kwantung, Kwangsi, and Fukien, and the
Hainanese from Hainan island (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 137).

By the time of the Dutch administration of Malacca in 1678, the Chinese had
constituted about 17 per cent of Malacca’s population (Purcell 1965b). Known as

peranakans, many made Malacca their home and gradually assimilated into the Malay
culture, adopting the Malay language and customs, and a good proportion accumulated
enormous wealth.40 When Malacca’s prosperity began to slide however, a large

proportion of them emigrated to Penang and Singapore. While many were contracted to
work in these ports, the lure of urban areas for the Chinese lay basically in the
advantage of commercial openings that came along with British capitalist
establishments. During the early years of the nineteenth century, Chinese migration to

Penang from both the Straits provinces and mainland China increased at a rate of 2,0003,000 a year (Purcell 1965b, 297). By 1868, Penang was practically a Chinese city,
having formed the majority of the island’s 70,000 people (Parkinson 1960, 6-7).
In Singapore, the Chinese population greatly oven/vhelmed the native Malays. By
1867, it constituted 65 per cent of the population of 55,000, and between 1881 and

1901, it doubled to reach 142,000 making it the largest single community on the island
(Huff 1994, 57;Turnbull 1989, 16). Unsurprisingly, the bulk of Chinese immigration to the
Malay States via Singapore was related to the growth of the mining industry. Both

immigration and production volume simultaneously peaked in 1895 at 150,000 persons
and 50,000 tons respectively (Wong 1965, 63-80; Pountney 1911, 64).

From the Straits settlement colonies, most of the Chinese migrants made their
way to the mining areas in the Malay states, which later grew into main urban centers
(Ryan 1976, 135). The cycle of urban growth was reinforced when many Chinese who
were either freed from their contract or possessed sufficient capital flocked to the towns

in search for employment and investment opportunities. This pattern of migration
continued into twentieth century Malaya, characterizing a demographic phenomenon
associating Chinese residences with cities and towns.
The predominant dialect group was the Hokkien, who dominated trade and
commerce and who rivaled the Teochews for business. The Cantonese and Hakkas, on
the other hand, were laborers, miners, and manual craftsmen, and many passed through

to the Malay States to work (Yen 1986, 117-118). The Straits-born Chinese, who arrived

4° These ‘peranakans’ or ‘Straits-born Chinese were to constitute a major portion of first tier

wealthy capitalists in the Straits Settlements and the Malay States.

79
in the city from Malacca and Penang and settled down as merchants, became
naturalized British subjects under Straits Settlement laws.
The Indians by 1860 became Singapore’s second largest community with a
population of about 13,000 (Turnbull 1989, 37). Most were Tamil speakers, who came as
laborers and convicts while others such as the Benggalis and Gujeratis were traders.
The Malays, having lost their hegemonic position on the island became increasingly
marginalized under the new capitalist economy. Gradually, the orang laut vanished as a
distinct communal group, as many blended in the many Malay groups who had settled in
the various villages. Capitalist economic growth also took its toll on the Malays, who
participated marginally in the new economy as hawkers, as many of their settlements

either became excluded from economic growth or were physically demolished for
modernization projects (Turnbull 1989, 37; Andaya and Andaya 2001, 133). According to

Cameron (1965, 35) “Their one day of glory was in the New Year’s sports in Singapore
when the Malays and orang laut in boats of their own design invariably triumphed over
Europeans, Chinese, Bugis, and all other competitors,”

The opening of European plantations in the Straits Settlements in the early years
of the nineteenth century for export crops did not yield the expected profits. Instead, the

Chinese proved that their agricultural efforts had become a successful endeavor.
Available capital, abundant human resources, technical ingenuity in planting contributed
to prosperous returns in the tapioca, pepper, and gambier industries. Begun in the
eighteenth century, the Chinese had developed commodious pepper and gambier
estates in Singapore by the 18305, expanding their exports from China to Europe
(Purcell 1965a, 216). The same accomplishment in tin mining ensured their hold in the
production processes of this industry (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 136).
Significantly, Chinese entrepreneurs who provided investments in these
industries reaped huge returns to become the newly rich bourgeoisie. By 1937, the

magnitude of Chinese capitalists’ holdings in Malaya was estimated around $200 million
compared to western investments of $453 million, of which 70 per cent was British

(Callis 1943, quoted in Hua 1982, 55). By 1938 Chinese capital was invested in more
diverse industries such as pineapple, which accounted for 1.2 per cent of Malaya’s
export trade (Hua 1982, 55).
An important part of the economic success of the Chinese lies in their well-

organized labor distribution networks and family organization of trade. The structure of
rights and obligations tied together family members, clansmen, and friends into an
efficient system of commerce that was highly adaptable to and facilitative of the capitalist
system (Lee 1991, 250). Chinese workers not only were willing to work under capitalist
wage organization, they also introduced new technological innovations that facilitated
capitalist production (Yip, 1969, Allen and Donnithorne, 1957).

But as the character of the plantation and tin mining industries became
increasingly ‘capitalized’ by larger British and European companies, many Chinese
workers later found their way into relatively independent wage earning occupations such

as retail and wholesaling, light industries and petty trade. Despite the enormity of fortune
accumulated by many Chinese in Malaya, there was a significant portion that remained
trapped within the confines of harsh labor conditions and therefore suffered from utter
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poverty and destitution. As an immigrant community, the Chinese were driven by social
and economic hardships that enabled them to be easily absorbed into the capitalist
system, through which they rapidly rose to economic supremacy over the Malays. In

1941 alone, Chinese migrants in Malaya sent back nearly $110 million to relatives in
China (Ongkili 1985, 6;Purcell 1965b, 241-242).
British attitudes toward the Chinese were inherently racist in nature, and the
Chinese were often depicted as diligent and thrifty but lacked discipline and integrity

(Andaya and Andaya 2001; Bedlington 1978, 128). To the British, such a perception
was in line with the Chinese’s emergent roles within the colonial division of labor as both
comprador capitalists and the local working class (Rahim 2001, 239; Harper 1999).
Among the Asian ethnonational groups, the British admired the Chinese for their
adaptability and aggressive participation in the capitalist economy. The high level of
communal organization among the Chinese also overtly impressed the British that they
implicitly left them alone to handle their own affairs (Enloe 1973, 22). To the British
however, only European racial supremacy was worthy of directing and controlling the
Chinese. In a comparative relationship between Malays and Chinese, William Pickering,
the first Chinese Protector concluded that the possibility of Chinese being governed by
the Malays was “like white settlers of America submitting to the rule of the Indian chiefs”

(Emerson 1974, 503).41
Although migrants from India had been trickling into the Malay states through
Penang since the late eighteenth century, the demand for their labor began to pick up
when the ‘direction’ of Chinese workers proved to be an increasingly arduous
responsibility.42 Satisfied for the time being in using Chinese labor to generate revenues,
but increasingly anxious at their lack of discipline and respect for authority, the state
turned to an alternative source of labor for European plantations. British experience in
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and India persuaded them to believe that the inexpensive and

manageable nature of Indian labor was most suitable for work in the tropical climate of
the Malay States (Loh 1969, 146).
The Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Frederic Weld was particularly
enthusiastic about the import of Indian labor, seeing that British protected Malay States

had a population of only about 1 million with vast areas of untapped resources to be
exploited. Weld added, “(the Indians) are a race eminently suited to the country, and
fitted to develop its resources, not only as coolies but small landowners, which they
would speedily become” (PLCSS 1881, 187). Weld was also of the view that Malays
were ready to receive the Indians as newcomers to their land because of the historical
ties that bound the Malay States with India (Loh 1969, 146). But the most important

reason for favoring Indian workers was the fact that they came from British India, making
41 Such perceptions ignored the fact that in the relatively prosperous sultanate of Johor, Chinese
labor not only were well-organized under Malay political administration, but also relations
between the two groups were not as tensed and distanced as under the colonial areas of the

federated. Malay States (Andaya and Andaya 1982)
42 A huge problem for the British was the secret society activities of the Chinese miners that

created armed skirmishes and disrupted social order. Although British labor and land laws
provided the needed social order that they were looking for as well as the revenues that they

sought from Chinese labor, Chinese industry and creativity did not seem compatible with
European management.
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the recruitment process a less difficult task (Parmer 1960, 19). In 1883, the Government

of India consented to the emigration of Indian labor to the Malay States (Loh 1969, 147).
An interesting condition in the recruitment of Indian labor was its prohibitive use
in the mining sector (SSFS 1883, 1). Such a stipulation was meant to preserve the
stability in the mining industry, which had come under the domain of the Chinese. The
recruitment of Indian indentured labor was undertaken by private organizations in
Madras.43 But many also came by way of the kangani system (Andaya and Andaya
1982, 179). This method involved the hiring of workers via a village headman in India,
who received a speciﬁed amount of commission for his effort.

This ‘free Iabor’ system became more intensive during the opening of rubber
plantations in the Malay States. During the rubber boom in 1899, 5,247 indentured
migrants and 15,176 kangani laborers came to the Malay states, and after this period
most Indians came on their own through the latter system (Harper 1999, 24). Later in

1907, a Tamil Immigration Fund was set up to subsidize Indian migrants, that facilitated
the mass recruitment of Tamil Indians from southern India to the estates and plantations
of Malaya as cheap wage labor (Tinker 1974, 57).

Like in Singapore, not all Indians came to the Malay States by way of indentured
labor. Some came by way of trade, and among them were the Hindu and Muslim traders
from the Malabar and Coromandel coasts of southwestern India, Sind, and Punjab, and
also from the northern parts of India (Hua 1982, 56). There was also a stark contrast of
fate between lower caste Indians who arrived to work in estates, plantations, and public
work projects and those who belong to the upper castes, who sought employment in the
civil service and commercial retail (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 180). The latter group

controlled many of the textile and money lending chettiar fields in urban centers around
the Malay States as well as in Singapore, and had little or no contact with their lower
caste counterparts. In fact, many of the upper castes made extra effort to disassociate
themselves from the Indian laborers of the lower castes. As Arasaratnam (1970, 88)
mentioned, “These (upper castes) people would use the word ‘coolie’ in the same
derogatory sense as the Europeans in Malaya.”
Overall, the conditions in which the Indian laborer endured were oppressive and

harsh. The Indians had brought with them their rigid social caste system that facilitated
the suppression of workers, most of whom fall into the lower castes and uneducated,
who became easily submissive to the authorities of the estates. But if there has been

any positive impact of Indian migration to the Malay states however, it was the ability for
some from the lower castes to gradually penetrate social barriers through English
education and successfully attain higher status by becoming lawyers, teachers, doctors
and other professionals (Bedlington 1978, 129). But although many Indians managed to
escape initial poverty, the majority has become trapped within the impoverished confines
of their estates and plantations. Poverty, disease, and alcoholism plagued much of their

43 Indian is used, in colonial demographic terms, to denote every ethnic group from the Indian
sub-continent, which includes Sikhs, Benggalis, Gujeratis, Malayalees, Telegu, and Tamils. Most
of these who migrated to work in the plantations and public works were mostly the Tamils from
southern India.

82
living conditions in the estates, despite stipulation in ordinances for the provision of
medical services (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 180).

Perhaps the group that was most affected by the incorporation of the Malay
States into world capitalism was the Malay peasants. Malays in general became
eclipsed by the emergence of the new economy, as the majority had been traditional
subsistence farmers, ﬁshermen, and craftsmen. The common Malays were unable to
appreciate the newly introduced British laws and wage system. Their resistance to wage
labor practically left them out from meaningful participation in the emerging capitalist
economy (Loh 1969, 154).

As the alien world of large-scale mining and agriculture rapidly encroached into
the Malay world, the whole tributary-peasantry based Malay economy began slowly to
disintegrate. But the rigid social delineation between nobility and peasants somewhat
incapacitated the lower class from gaining any upward mobility. Furthermore, British
policy of extending recognition to the Malay ruling institution only reinforced this deferent
attitude the Malays had for their leaders (Bedlington 1978, 37). Politically powerless and
economically dysfunctional, the Malay peasantry in time found themselves in perpetual
poverty and social disenfranchisement.
In Sarawak, the Brooke government embarked on a similar stratification policy it
considered vital for consolidation of its authority. Immediately after its suppression of the
Malay rebellion against the Sultan of Brunei, the result of which he obtained Sarawak,
the first Brooke ‘rajah’ pardoned the various chiefs and gave them some limited form of
authoritative positions. He went on to divide the peoples of Sarawak into three basic

groups; Malays (including other Muslim indigenous groups), indigenous non-Muslims,
and Chinese (Bedlington 1978, 44). In so doing, the state broke up the centuries-long
social alliance between the Muslim Malays and the non-Muslim lbans (sometimes called

Land Dayaks). Such divisions paved the way for further British territorial expansion. The
most effective method of swallowing up more Malay and lban lands was the war on
‘piracy.’ Under the cover of combating piracy, many suspected Malay and lban villages
or strongholds were indiscriminately attacked. A ruthless campaign was launched in

1846, resulting in the killing of about 800 lbans by bombardments from four British ships
and seventy boats belonging to lban allies (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 126).
This crusade justified the removal of Malay leadership from lbans, which the
state claimed was the basis of pirating raids (Bedlington 1989, 42). Soon afterwards, the
state began a process resettlement of Malay communities away from lban areas, which
opened the door to the annexation of vast lban territories. As in the Malay States,
Malays and non-Muslim indigenous peoples in Sarawak were seriously discouraged by

the British from participating in trade due to their significant social attachment to land.
Thus if they were not occupationally involved in the lowest rungs of the civil service, they
were bound to work as subsistence farmers or small holders (Andaya and Andaya 1982,
128). The lbans, known for their warrior status, were mostly drafted into the police and
other units in the armed forces under Brooke’s personal military.
Under the Brooke administration in Sarawak, Chinese migration was also

encouraged to fill in the need for labor in the various mining and plantation fields, as well
as the expanding agricultural sector (Purcell 1969b, 367). Soon their trading skills
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afforded them the domination of commerce, produce distribution, and operation of the
highly lucrative timber industry. As in the peninsula, major cities and towns sprouted
from around the newly found industries. By 1840 the Malay fishing village of Kuching,
which Brooke had turned into his capital, became a predominantly Chinese town

(Andaya and Andaya 1982, 136). Many of the Chinese took part in the active trading life
of the city as well as the gold mines in nearby Bau (Ryan 1976, 121).
But, as in the Malay States, the Chinese had been quite troublesome for the
British through their frequent secret society network and rioting. Furthermore, the
incursions of Chinese settlers into the rich forest areas became entangled with the
complex traditional landholdings of the non-Muslim indigenous peoples, particularly the

lbans. Many violent clashes erupted between these two groups, especially where large
tracts of lban jungle were being rapidly deforested by appetent Chinese settlers (Pringle

1970,313)
In Sabah, the BNBCC followed a similar policy of separating the coastal Muslim
groups from the non-Muslim groups of the interior (although these two did not have the

similar close alliance as in Sarawak). Most Muslims remained in fishing villages and nonMuslims such as the Kadazans and Muruts occupied the interior to live largely as
subsistence farmers in wet rice and sago. Some from these two groups found
recruitment into the civil service (mainly the elite) and armed constabularies respectively,
with the Chinese left alone to carry out mining and agricultural work in plantations and
timber production (Lee 1965, 16). Chinese labor was also directed to areas near the
Brunei border in the pepper and gambier plantations as well as in the newly discovered
timber industry.
The indigenous peoples of Sarawak and Sabah were more heterogeneous than
in the Malay States. For all of these groups however, the new capitalist economy
resulted in similar social circumstances with their brethren in the Malay States. Their
economy centered on subsistence farming and inland gatherings of tropical products. An

absence of a unified identity among these groups enabled the Brooke government and
the BNBCC to easily subjugate them into full recognition of colonial authority. Brooke’s
rigid policy of ethnonational labor stratification was reinforced by vast geographical

separations of the various ethnonatioal groups into definite social enclaves.
Uneven Regional Development
Colonialism ensured that both countries became heavily entrenched within the

periphery of the capitalist world economy through the demographic specialization of
labor. This means that structural transformation during the British colonial period also
resulted in disproportionate development patterns in Malaya and Borneo, and between
the Malaysian region and Singapore, each performing its speciﬁc roles in the emerging
capitalist economy.
It is important to note at this point in the discussion of future divergent
developmental patterns of the Malaysia and Singapore in the world economy. As a result

of a demographically distinct labor division taking shape in the world economy, the three
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colonial entities of British Malaya, Northern Borneo“, and Singapore experienced
disproportionate rates of economic development. The growth of the Malayan and
Singaporean economies, based on their respective status as the world’s leading
producer and exporter of tin and rubber, was by no means balanced. As Huff (1994, 68)

noted, “Development began with rapid growth in one sector - mining, and this led to
response in others — transport, processing, and trade. The result was to shift the whole
Western coast of the Malayan economy onto a higher development plane, with

Singapore as its communications, commercial, and ﬁnancial center.” A significant
characteristic of this uneven development defined the general development pattern and
relationship within and between the modern Malaysian and Singaporean states today.

The role of Singapore as a regional service center enabled it to experience a greater
developmental growth than British Malaya and the Northern Borneon states of Sarawak
and Sabah, with which it enjoyed a rather advantageous one-sided relationship.
Naturally, among the three British protected states and colonies, Singapore stood
to benefit most from the new capitalist economy. Its role as a regional trading and
communications center pushed its economy higher than the other areas within the
region. Its primary exports alone, constituting staples and produce from the Malay
States, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies, increased from an average of $117 million in

the 1911-13 fiscal years to about $313 million in the 1935-37 fiscal years. Total primary
imports of manufactures and foodstuff for the same period increased from $91.5 million
to $147.4 million (Huff 1994, 91).
By the 1957-59 fiscal years, Malaya constituted 19 per cent of Singapore’s
imports and 20.7 per cent of its export market, with Indonesia providing 27.3 per cent
and 7.3 per cent, and Sabah and Sarawak, 5.1 per cent and 4.9 per cent respectively
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 1960). Singapore’s growth as a mercantile staple
port for the surrounding areas as well as its newly found status as an international
capitalist entrepot also led to surges in shipping tonnage and vessels. About 5,326 large

merchant vessels45 weighing an annual average of 6.2 billion tons entered the port in
1904/1905, and in the 1928/29 fiscal year, it rose to nearly 10,000 vessels with an

average tonnage of 15 tons (Straits Settlements 1940).
Singapore’s municipality began to grow as an international cosmopolitan center,
with all the furnishings of modernity and affluence. Having consistently held four-fifth of
the island’s population, its boundaries have remained unchanged until today (Huff 1994,

157; Hallifax 1921, 339). By 1936, it had a population of nearly 500,000, with the
Chinese constituting 76.3 per cent, Indians, 9.7 per cent, Malays, 9.1 per cent, and
Europeans and others 4.8 per cent (Huff 1994, 158). Despite its prosperity, it was

obvious through its divisional enclaves, that Singapore was a haven only for a few. As
Emerson (1964, 306) captured it “The colony is run by a small group of insiders living a
life in comfort and luxuries of which are rarely impaired by too close contact with the
sordid poverty that has set its stamp on the great bulk of the population....government is

run by those who have won through to power and wealth..”

44 Northern Borneo used to denote both Sarawak and Sabah.
45 Vessels registered at weighing 5 tons and above.
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Even within the former Federated Malay States of Malaya, there was a stark
contrast in economic development between the two top mining states of Selangor and
Perak, and the other two states of Pahang and Negri Sembilan. Paved highways and rail
lines were mostly built along the Selangor-Perak corridor. Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and
Penang served as main artery points of all communications (Dick and Rimmer 1989).
Development in the other states of the Federation did not progress as rapidly. It was not
so much the absence of prized resources that held back development as the uncertainty
associated with geographical and infrastructural barriers. For example, Pahang, the
largest state in what used to be the Federated Malay States, was almost entirely
covered by virgin jungle and cutoff geographically by a high mountain range. The
building of modern transportation did not take place there until the 19205, before which
transport was mainly by river (Kaur 1985). By the time development took place, it had

already been too far behind the more advanced states on the western coast (Andaya
and Andaya 1982, 181-182).
Within Malaya, a multiplier effect of tin and rubber industrial growths benefited
only particular sections of society. The greater economic growths of mainly urban
centers in Malaya and the corresponding economic marginalization of rural areas
created disproportionate urban-rural income distributions. Rice farming and subsistence

agriculture were not the prime economic activities the British were concerned with. Thus
although the peripheral areas of the countryside provided the urban centers with needed
food supplies, it experienced extremely disproportionate development compared to the
urban centers (Nonini 1992).

Tin mining, the industry that propelled Malaya’s economic development, tended
to be concentrated in Selangor and Perak where rich alluvial deposits were found. To
accommodate the tin industry’s needs the development of social and economic
infrastructure was similarly confined within these areas. As a result urbanization, which
largely attracted the Chinese population, was also most intensive in tin mining areas
(Lee 1994 112-114). Hence, when rubber and oil palm later came about as lucrative
export prospects, their plantations were also more likely to have been established
around tin-mining areas due to the readily available communication network of good
roads, telegraph services, rail lines, and other urban amenities (Evers 1983, 333-336).
Cities such as Ipoh, Seremban, and Kuala Lumpur on the western coasts of

Malaya grew out of the tin and rubber industries. Urbanization also converged mostly in
Selangor and Perak, in line with growths in trade, housing, retail and administrative
centers to supply the needs of a growing population base (Gullick 1990, 15-20).
Concentration of public sector investments in towns also contributed to the rural-urban

drift for much of Malaya, growing at an average of 5.84 per cent per annum in the years
1947-1957’ (Sharif 1982, 85; Evers 1983, 331). In 1957, there were 36 urban centers with
a population of 10,000, constituting 26.6 per cent of the total population of Malaya). The

Chinese, up to the present, makes up the majority of the urban population on the west
coast, despite greater Malay migration rates to the city after the war. Urbanization rates
for Malays from 1947 to 1957 averaged at 7.1 per cent as compared to Chinese with 5.9
per cent, and Indians, 4.6 per cent (Taib and Ismail 1982, 106; Sharif 1982, 86).
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By contrast, in the predominantly Malay-based agrarian economies of the
UFMS,46 there was a severe lack of economic growth compared to the kind their
federated counterparts had experienced. The main economic activity in these states was
subsistence agriculture, namely rice farming. Furthermore, in these states, civil strife and

political tensions arising from internal Malay rivalries and anti-British presence pretty
much persisted into the early part of the twentieth century (Andaya and Andaya 1982,
197-198).
Investments into the hinterland were inevitably inhibited by the lack of support by
the colonial state or British government. As such, there was a corresponding lack of
interest by related funding agencies to venture further into these areas. Apart from
Johor, which had already entered into an emerging capitalist economy with a modern
bureaucracy, there were direct linkages between the ruling elite and state economic
activity in the former states of the UFMS. But as Talib (1984, 221) noted, the privileges
these elite received in terms of land concessions and revenue collections placed them
not as a genuinely entrepreneurial class but “merely as a consuming class.” These
states remained very much agricultural in their economy and tributary-peasantry in their
political structure.

In both Sarawak and Sabah, the bulk of the population hardly gained any social
or economic advantages since the framework and infrastructure for a capitalist economy
did not really develop (Reece 1988, 25-27). And where it was available, basic provisions
of healthcare and education were beyond the common citizen’s reach. In Sarawak, while

older cities such as Kuching, Miri, and Sibu grew largely out of Chinese-centered trade
activities in timber, pepper, and rubber, newer towns were slow to develop due to poor

communications infrastructure. Roads were virtually non-existent save for the few
kilometers that linked the few major towns, severely marginalizing the majority of the
peripheral population from modern capitalist development (Chew 1990, 68-70).
In Sabah, capitalist development was far slower. The attempt to construct
railways and bridges across a wide and rugged geographical landscape incurred

massive losses (Kaur 1998 86-88). Relatively few urban areas sprouted around
intensive economic activities, specifically the timber processing centers and trading ports

along both the South China Sea and Sulu Sea coasts. New towns such as Jesselton and
Sandakan, along the coasts, grew as a result of their trade with the interior (Johari and
Sidhu 1989, 158-159). In both these states, the rate of urbanization had been

significantly dragging considering their relatively sizeable land mass, sparse populations,
and harsh geographical terrain. In 1957, Sarawak’s urban population constituted only
12.6 per cent of the state’s total population, while Sabah’s urban areas make up 12.9 per
cent (Masing 1988).
Contradictions in British-Malay ‘Special’ Relations
Unlike Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah, where the native social structure lacked

a formidable and established ruling class, British colonial policy in Malaya centered on
an indirect administration. As a result, a ‘special relationship’ developed between the
British and the Malays. Understanding the contradictions within this British-Malay

46 Specifically referred to here of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu.
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relationship is essential in exploring a significant source of racial tensions in Malaysia
and Singapore as well as comprehending the extreme impoverishment of Malays under
the capitalist system.
British-Malay political relations were embedded within colonial rule’s ‘moral
forcing’ system that pitted perceptions of European cultural supremacy against inferior
Asian traditions (Kratoska 1983, 224-229). The propagation of racial ideologies played a

strong part in morallyjustifying racial divisions in colonial Malaysia and Singapore. At a
time when Social-Danivinist thoughts permeated the very heart of colonizing campaigns,
there was inevitably a genuine perception that different Asian groups were genetically

suitable for specific functions within the racialized capitalist economy.
In this case, the British seriously believed that Malays and other indigenous

groups of Sarawak and Sabah such as the Melanaus, Dayaks, lbans, and Kadazans,
were culturally and even biologically unsuitable for the modern economy (Esman 1994,

49; Ongkili 1985, 2-7). To the British, the Chinese and Indians were more adaptable, but
were however, transient workers, who and as most initially did, would return to their
homelands with their newly found fortunes (Esman 1994, 50). In order to legitimize their

rule in Malaya, the British colonial state had to ensure that the Malays were accorded
legitimate status as indigenous peoples of the land. This meant that the Malays had to
be guaranteed against any encroachment into their ‘sovereignty.’
British social policy was very much programmed toward the goal of retaining the
majority of Malays within the peasantry class. Malay political subservience to the Sultans
was a vital precondition of British indirect rule. Therefore preserving Malay traditional life
was essentially the basis of British colonial legitimacy. Safeguarding of such ‘Malay

sovereignty’ came through a declamation of ‘special rights’ for Malays. Under these
‘special rights,’ Malays as the indigenous people of the Malay Peninsula formally
received special protection against political infringement by the other ethnic groups.

These rights were entrenched through several mechanisms. One was the preservation
of the Sultans and rulers as undisputable ceremonial leaders of Malays, second was
through official recognition of Malays as original inhabitants of the land, or bumiputeras,
and third was through the preservation of Malay rice tracts in the form of Malay Land
Reservation Enactment of 1913 (Lim 1977, 112-113).
In 1917, the Rice Lands Enactment was passed stipulating that Malay land
originally appropriated for rice production had to be cultivated only for rice. Penalties for
transgression included confiscation of crops and fines (Lim 1977, 119). The effect of this
enactment prevented shifts in agricultural away from rice for Malays in many States
(Nonini 1992). Since British colonial legitimacy drew upon Malay traditional-structural

legitimacy, which in turn was contingent upon the maintenance of their agricultural
functions, such preservation policies performed a rational colonial function.
And here is where the contradictions began. To ideologically legitimize their
governance, the colonial authorities exploited on the moral necessity to bring modernity
to indigenous societies, and liberate them from their state of ‘backwardness.’ Hence,

there was a need to adhere to their ‘civilizing mission’ to educate and modernize the
Malay population. The formation of various state councils opened up some limited

opportunities for a few notary Malay aristocrats in modern state administration. But
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although these positions performed merely a ritualistic function they served to radiate the
notion that there had been Malay involvement in the administration of their own country.
On the other hand, it also became economically imperative to keep Malays on their

occupational positions as agricultural workers. Thus opening up extensive educational
opportunities for the Malays would be both financially unprofitable and politically

destabilizing for the British, and continued to remain a cautious endeavor.
Hence, one method of justifying the marginalization of Malays from modern-type
educational setting was to exhort the notion that Malays in general would be better off
living on the land; shifting outside the world of husbandry and farming could ‘disrupt’
their customary way of life. Such a notion was repeatedly emphasized under the facade
of British ‘non-intervention’ policy, a primordial condition embedded into earlier treaties
with Malay rulers (Roff 1995, 122). As the Director of Agriculture recorded in 1934,” Our
trusteeship for the Malay people demands that we administer the country on lines with

their welfare and happiness...that end will be attained rather by building up a sturdy and
thrifty peasantry living on the lands they own and living by the food they grow than by
causing them to forsake the life of their fathers for the glamour of new ways. ...the
market for which depends on outside world conditions beyond their orbit” (quoted in

Haynes 1933, 293).
To complement these laws, the systematic effort of keeping Malays within the
ambit of poor quality vernacular education also successfully worked toward the social

and economic marginalization of Malays. In Perak for example, from the nearly 3000
Malays who left the vernacular schools in the state in 1903, only one found state
employment as a clerk (Annual Report Perak 1904, 11). As E. Birch (1912, 444), then
Resident of Perak commented “It is very satisfactory to know that this system does not
overeducate the boys...who almost all followed the avocations of their parents or
relations, chiefly in agricultural pursuits.” Overeducation was a term used to denote the
creation of an educated class of malcontents who may potentially challenge colonial

authority (Roff 1995, 25).
In 1920, the Director of Education (Federated Malay States Report 1920, 20)
commented, ”The aim of the Government is not to turn out a few well-educated youths,
nor a number of less well-educated boys; rather it is to improve the bulk of the people,

and to make the son of the fisherman or peasant a more intelligent fisherman or peasant
than his father had been, and a man whose education will enable him to understand how

his lot in life fits in with the scheme of life around him.” By 1931, more than 85 per cent
of the 241,754 working Malays in the FMS had remained peasant cultivators and rubber
smallholders living in rural areas (Roff 1995, 123).
Another practical way to overcome the paradoxical predicament in their
relationship with the Malays was for the British to perpetuate the presumption that
Malays were genuinely unprepared to deal with the complexities of modern life (Alatas
1977). British patronage was made out to radiate the perception that the British were

assisting. the Malays in adjudicating the responsibilities of civil administration. Glimpses
of this worldview can be captured in the body of literature about life in Malaya that
reinforced stereotypical profiles of Malays. Frederick Weld, Governor of Singapore and
Straits Settlements from 1880-1887, asserted: “I doubt if Asiatics (Malays) will ever learn

to govern themselves; it is contrary to the genius of their race, of their history, of their
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religious system, that they should” (quoted in Sadka 1968, 17). Another prominent
figure, Frank Swettenham (1913, 2-3) wrote: “The real Malay is
courageous ..... extravagant, fond of borrowing money....venerates his ancient customs
and traditions and has proper respect for constituted authority....He is a good imitative
learner (but) lazy to a degree....and considers time of no importance.” Unsurprisingly,
‘scholars” who depict Malays in such light had held at one time or another, high ranking
colonial positions in the Malay States. Such stereotypes remained right up to the early

years of Malaysian independence, and became a source of reference for other
ethnonational groups to justify the marginalization of Malays in commerce and
educaﬁon.
At the same time, the British had been very wary of the increasing prominence of

the Chinese in the economy that imperiled to submerge Malays into political oblivion.
Also, by the turn of the century, the Chinese had already formed the largest majority
non-Malay ethnonational group. Table 4.1 below illustrates that between 1891 and 1901
the Chinese population expanded by 83 per cent, placing them numerically at par with
Malays, whose population only grew at 34.9 per cent (Chai 1964, 127). While the non-

Malays were needed to work the economy, the threat that their economic superiority
over Malays would be potentially accompanied by its political strength became

increasingly real for the British. Furthermore, an important vehicle of social and political
mobility for non-Europeans was English education, in which Chinese and Indian
students easily outnumbered Malay students. As it stood in 1900, of the 1,629 students

in the 24 mostly state-sponsored English schools throughout the FMS, a great majority
was non-Malays, namely Chinese, Indians, and Eurasians (Parliamentary Papers
1905,12-15).
Detaching Malays from the capitalist economy had become a paradox. In other
words, the British failed to foresee how such a policy of keeping Malays out of their

westernizing projects could lead to a political backfire. At the same time, increased
expenditure relating to the recruitment of British officers into Malaya became somewhat
of a pressing crisis (Federal Council 1923). Suggestions were now being seriously
weighed for the possibility of including more Malays in civil service employment as part

of the effort to equip Malays “to take their proper place in the administrative and
commercial life of their country” (Guillemard 1937, 65). Unfortunately, limiting Malay
access to English schools also effectively limited their employment in government.

Table 4.1: Population Increase in the Malay States (Perak,
Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) between 1891 and 1901.
Ethnonational Group

Number

Percentage increase

Malays*
Chinese
Indians
Europeans
Eurasians

312,456
299,739
58,211
1,422
1522

34.9
83.4
188.8
98.3
169.8

* including some 20,000 orang asli (non-Malay indigenous groups).
Source: Chai, HQ 1964, p.127.
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Malay Ieaders’ vocal concern over their loss of governance, due to the relegation
of State Councils to the Federal Council, also compelled sympathizers of British
decentralization to press for more Malay involvement in Federal administration. In

response to this as well as to the shortage of Malays in government positions, the
colonial state began to upgrade efforts to facilitate English education for the upper class
Malays as a means for them to be recruited into the lower posts of public services. As
Roff (1995, 24) noted,” the twentieth century was to see the development of a new and
more purposive policy, based on the old, but designed unashamedly to create from the
traditional elite a new class of colonial civil servants whose association with the British
might, on the one hand, satisfy the myth of continued Malay sovereignty and on the
other, serve as a bulwark against possible political encroachment from the resident non-

Malay population in the future.”
Previously, the few English schools in urban areas had only ‘reserved spots’ for
Malays of royal blood (Gullick 1965, 102). In 1907, an Eton-style residential school was

established in Perak, which catered exclusively for Malay aristocratic children. Called the
Malay College, the school was designed to equip Malays ‘of good birth’ the skills and
opportunities for civil service jobs as clerks, surveyors, and court interpreters (Drennan

1995, 7-10). Graduates from this college would likely have ended up in the Malay
Administrative Service or MAS, a junior branch of the European-dominated prestigious
bureaucracy, the Malayan Civil Service or MCS. Unsurprisingly however, calls by

various Malay district chiefs to establish similar schools in the rural areas were rejected
(Andaya and Andaya 1982).

Lifting of stringent admission and transfer requirements for Malay students into
English schools enabled more Malays to receive English education (Cheeseman 1938,

36-37). In ten years from 1923 to 1933, Malay enrollment rose from about 700 to 2,464
(Legislative Council 1933, Appendix III). But even then, Malay employment in state
services lagged behind the other groups. In 1938, only 1,742 Malays were employed in
key departments as compared to 4,936 Indians and Chinese (Federal Council 1938, 21).
Table 4.2 below illustrates the breakdown of occupation according to ethnonational

groups in the various sectors of government employment.
Overall, Malay under-representation in both English schools and state
employment was still obvious. Additional factors can be attributed to the fact that most

English schools were located in the urban areas and that many were jointly run by
Christian missionaries. Both these factors effectively further limited the Malay student’s
accessibility to English education, the former for geographical reasons and the latter,
cultural. But more than anything else, it was extreme poverty that restricted Malay
mobility to English schools. Lack of resources rendered Malay vernacular schools ill
equipped and poorly structured for preparation to the higher-grade English education

(Roff1994, 110-111).
The combination of these factors served to entrench the Malay psyche into a social

dislocation away from the wider economic development (Alatas 1965). Having been
marginalized from the modern economy, for example, Malays were totally unaware of
the importance of English education as a vehicle for upward mobility. Furthermore,

motivation to venture into urban occupations was absent, since in general Malays were
encouraged by the colonial state to remain farmers and fishermen. Isolation from urban
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Table 4.2: Employment in Key State Departments by Ethnonationality, FMS
1938
Occupational Type

Indians

Chinese

137
175
102
419

465
3
64
73

336
55
24
329

97
7
35
78

Railway administrative staff
Postal and Telegraph administrative staff
Hospital services

1,277
414
257

302
175
87

485
408
105

263
81
27

Total

3,181

1,169

1,742

588

Lower level administrative & clerical services
Public works supervisors & supervisors
Teachers, in public English schools
Technical assistants

Malays

Others

Source: Adapted from Federal Council Proceedings 1938, p. 821.

areas as well as modern lifestyles only worsened the situation for a majority of Malay
parents, who found it difficult to comprehend the usefulness of English education for
upward mobility (Roff 1994, 112).
In general, British relations with Malays were complicated by the contradictions
that served not only to hold back the Malays within the agrarian world, but also later to
promote Malay impoverishment vis-a-vis the other communities. While a few members
of Malay aristocratic families gained limited concessions from their ‘special privileges,’

the majority was condemned to a rural life disconnected from the economic progress
that was taking place in their own land. The few educated commoners, who benefited
from some form of government vernacular schooling, were drafted back into the Malay
education system with no prospect of upward social mobility. From this group of Malays

emerged the core of Malay nationalists associated with Islamic and socialist groups, who
were fiercely anti-British as well as anti-traditionalist, but whose number was extremely
small. A majority of those from this educated class formed the bulk of conservative and
pro-traditionalist Malay nationalism.47 A detailed discussion of this takes place in the next
chapter. From this policy of isolating Malays from the commercial sectors of the

capitalist economy, the perpetuation of Malay poverty continued into the independent
years of both Malaysia and Singapore, which only served to further place the Malays in

severe disadvantage within the ethnonational-occupational divide. In the long run, such
patronage was not only actually detrimental to the social economic welfare of Malays,
since it sought to keep them on the land, but it also became a source of intractable

disdain among the immigrant groups toward Malays. Such perceived preferential
treatment of Malays brought on repercussions that ran deep to affect future
ethnonational relations in both Malaysia and Singapore. On the whole, British patronage
of the Malays’ ‘special position,’ while preventing them from becoming a landless people,
was for the most part, beneficial to the elite class and detrimental to the peasant majority

(Nonini 1992, 73).

47 Traditionalist Malay nationalism recognized the preservation of Malay sultans and the Malay

hierarchical traditions (Roff 1995).
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Ethnonational Economic Inequalities

The unsettling element within the delicate ethnonational balance as well as in the
uneven demographic development in Malaya and Singapore was the rigidly unequal
economic structure, which channeled along particular ethnonational alignments. In
chapter one, the dissertation discussed how incorporation of the Malay world into the

capitalist world economy began to generally display a three-tiered occupational
hierarchical structure, with Europeans at the top, the Chinese in the middle, and Malays

and indigenous groups at the bottom. By the first decade following the end of the
Second World War, the intensification of capitalist development in Malaya and
Singapore resulted in this primary structure developing into a set of rather statically
institutionalized identifications of class with ethnonationality.
Ethnonational economic structure 1945 — 1955
By 1941, Malaya’s ethnonational balance stood at 2,418,615 Chinese; 2,248,579
Malays; 767,693 Indians; 30,251 Europeans; and 80,035 other groups including the nonMalay indigenous groups, Eurasians, Pakistanis, Arabs, and Sri Lankans (Harper 1999,

35). In 1947, Sabah and Sarawak indigenous groups still constituted the majority of its
331,000 and 546,000 populations respectively (Drabble 2000, 90-1; Tate 1979). By
1947, 60.8 per cent of the ‘immigrant’ population had been born in Malaya, and the ratio

of women to men among the Chinese rose to 837:1000 from 513:1000 in 1931 (del Tufo
1949, 58). A pattern of more permanent and diverse Chinese settlements, with growing
numbers of women, and with their inhabitants involved in agriculture and retail trade,
began to appear (Loh 1975, 93). A social survey in 1947 estimated that 72 per cent of
Chinese on the island had never returned home and only 40 per cent had sent some

form of monetary remittance to China (Singapore Department of Social Welfare 1947,
112)
While the majority of all the Asian ethnonational groups were located at social
strata lower than British and Europeans, income and wealth between them also varied.

Involvement of Chinese and Indians in the capitalist economy gave them the advantages
of higher income, access to English education, and social mobility as compared to
Malays. The respective Chinese and Indian bourgeoisie also benefited from and held a

common interest in the new capitalist economy. In Malaya and Singapore, Chinese and
Indian capitalists predominated the small industrial, retail and wholesaling, and banking
fields (Lee 1990). And although these groups were disdainful of the close British
relationship with the Malay elite, the political relationship between their elite groups and

the British was not dissimilar. It was not uncommon for leading Chinese capitalists to be
involved in the state political machinery through the various State Councils. Indian
money-lending associations too for example, were ever eager to foster close relations

with the state, which sometimes resulted in some members being rewarded with
administrative appointments (Arasaratnam 1970, 86).
Ownership of rubber estates during the lucrative boom period, for example,
manifested the proportion of wealth among the various ethnonational groups in Malaya.

In the FMS, Europeans owned 665 estates covering a size of 821,049 acres, followed by
the Chinese with 299 estates and an area totaling 92,389, the Indians, with 119 estates
and an area of 26,927 acres, and finally Malays, most of whom were part of the nobility,
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owned just 23 estates with an acreage of 4,883 (Drabble 2001, 161; Silcock and Fisk
1963). In the Straits Settlements, Chinese ownership outnumbered everyone else with
162 estates covering an area of 52,864 compared to Europeans and other foreigners,

with 87 estates, but with a bigger area of 146,809 acres (Malayan Statistics Handbook
1932, 15). By 1947, the income distribution among the three main ethnonational groups
in Malaya had clearly reflected the occupational stratification structure that culminated
from the previous decades’ capitalist production. Malays, with their concentration in
primary sector received an income per capita of $258. The Indians, mostly engaged in
wage and salary jobs in estates and government services, received an average per

capita of $560. The Chinese, more evenly distributed between the two sectors but
derived a heftier portion of profits, generated an income per capita of $656 (Drabble
2000, 159-160). Table 4.3 below illustrates incomes by ethnonational group in the year
1947, while Table 4.4 on the next page illustrates the breakdown of job categories
between Malays and Chinese in 1957.

The income disparity between Malays and Chinese was reflective of the way
both groups become increasingly polarized within the agricultural and commercial
sectors respectively as a result of the colonization process. By 1957, the year Malaya

gained independence, the occupational structure between these two ethnonational
groups became entrenched in Chinese predominance of higher-income job categories,
and in Malay prevalence within the agricultural sectors as well as the lowest ranks of the
armed forces and state bureaucracy (Tham 1983,59-89). Such disproportionate
representation by the Chinese in commerce and Malays in government has continued

quite significantly into the early decades of Malaysia’s independence.
The extent of poverty and social disenfranchisement among the three main
ethnonational groups in Malaya can be captured in their respective infant mortality rates.

In 1947, the Malay infant mortality rate was 259 per 1000 live births, while the Chinese
recorded 141 and Indians 199 deaths (Palmore, Chandler and Fernandez 1975). Ten
years later in 1957, overall rates declined but for Malays and Indians, the numbers were

still relatively high at 191 and 151 deaths per 1000 live births respectively (Department
of Statistics Malaysia 1976). Both Malay and Indian infant mortality rates were affected
by socioeconomic and demographic factors such as lack of healthcare and basic
modern amenities in rural areas and estates. Colonialism’s uneven capitalist
development across urban centers, rural areas, and estates caused massive

discrepancies in the provision of clean water supplies, sanitation services, medical
facilities, and educational development (Sharif 1982, 68-69).

Table 4.3: Incomes by Ethnonational Groups in Malaya 1947
Ethno-

Wages/salary

Own account

Profits

Income per

(%)

(%)

(%)

capita ($)

Malays

28.35

68.60

3.05

258

Indians
Chinese

64.69
36.93

26.41
36.81

8.90
26.25

560
656

National Group

Overall
519
Source: Drabble 2001, 160, table 9.2; calculated from Silcock and Fisk 1963,
Table 1.1
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Table 4.4: Job Categories in Malaya by Ethnonationality (Malay and
Chinese) 1957 (in 000)
Ethnonationality
Selected Job categories
Agricultural workers 8 ﬁshermen
Hawking, vending, & stall-keeping
Owners of small businesses
Sales and related occupations

Upper Managerial positions
Armed Forces and police
Bureaucracy positions

Chinese

Malay

98.6
35.5
34.9

482.0
9.4
14.2

120.4

28.9

18.0

1.6

8.5
0.9

97.8
2.9

Source: calculated from Government of Malaya Census of Malaya 1957, Table
14

Table 4.5: Population of Singapore by Ethnonational Group
(percentage) for Selected Years
Year

Chinese

Malay

1824
31.0
60.2
1836
45.9
41.9
1931
75.1
11.7
1947
77.8
12.1
1957
74.7
13.6
Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore, 1991

Indian

Others

7.1
9.9
9.1
7.4
6.4

1.7
2.6
4.2
2.8
4.2

In Singapore, the breakdown of ethnonational groupings was far more weighted
toward the Chinese. Already by 1870, the Chinese made up more than two-third of the
p0pulation, and by 1914, it consisted of more than 75 per cent, a proportion it has
relatively sustained since (Tremewan 1994, 8-9). The Malays, who formed the majority
group in 1824, were surpassed by the Chinese by 1836. In 1947, Malays constituted
only 12.1 per cent of the island’s population, and in ten years’ time increased lightly to
13.6 of the total population (Saw 1983, 41). Table 4.5 above shows the increase in

population by ethnic group for selected years.
The island’s stratification process mainly took shape along similar lines as in

Malaya. The business class comprised mainly Europeans, Chinese, and a few Indians
(Hua 1982, 56). On the other hand, Malays have faced consistent social-economic
problems as a disadvantaged group, thus ethnic relations in Singapore have been
structured mainly by socioeconomic differentiation between the Chinese majority and
Malay minority (Lai 1995, 16-17). The development of the Malay community in
Singapore was very much related to its peripheralized existence in the overall capitalist
economy. By 1931, the Chinese had dominated all aspects of the capitalist economy,
comprising 73 per cent of the labor force compared to the Malays 8.5 percent, and

Indians, 13.9 per cent, and 3.9 per cent others, mainly Europeans and Eurasians (Chiew
1985, 52). Among the Chinese, a major portion of its labor force were involved in
commerce, finance, and professional services, while Malays dominated transport and
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agriculture, and Indians the clerical services. Table 4.6 below illustrates the breakdown
of the labor force by ethnonationality in Singapore in 1931.
Although the trajectory of Singapore’s ethnonational-stratification history was
marked not so much by inter-Chinese inequality as it was by the marginalization of

Malays, a brief knowledge of class formation within the Chinese community is helpful in
understanding the dynamics of working class opposition to colonial rule after World War
Two. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese population was divided into four different
dialectical groups, with the Hokkien and Teochews dominating commercial life, among
them the peranakans, or Straits Chinese, who migrated by way of Malacca and Penang,
forming the early Chinese capitalist class. The second distinction is seen between the
English and Chinese educated merchant classes. The former, mainly composed of the

Straits Chinese, initially became involved in the capitalist economy as an intermediary
merchant class, managing much of the island’s labor supply and entrepot trade. As
British subjects, this group embraced the spirit of the Empire by having their children
enrolled in English schools and successfully becoming professionals and civil servants
within the state colonial administration. Having partially assimilated into Malay cultural
life, few had complete eloquence in Chinese. The China-born Chinese, on the other

hand, had little interest in colonial rule, preferring to direct their attention instead toward
developments on the Chinese mainland (Tremewan 1996, 11).
The class distinction between the two groups was standardized in two major

organizations, the Straits Chinese British Association and the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce (Chui 1991, 72-76). The former identified closely with the British even during
the Anglo-Chinese wars in the 18505, hence posing no threat to the British. As Turnbull
(1989, 55)suggested of the Straits-born Chinese, “the Chinese merchants leagued
themselves with the ruling elite against the rank and file of their own countrymen.” The
China-born merchants, who initially intended to return to China, distanced themselves

from colonial administration and focused on politics and philanthropy within the circles of

Table 4.6: Occupational Sector by Ethnonationality,
Singapore 1931
Sector
Agriculture, fishing,
mining

Chinese

Per cent
Malay
Indian

Others

11.6

30.5

5.4

2.6

18.1

9.2

7.9

10.1

15.2

31.2

15.6

5.8

23.6
0.2

7.0
2.5

17.2
3.6

20.5
20.2

31.2
100.0

19.6
100.0

50.3
100.0

40.8
100.0

Manufacturing,
utilities, construction
Transport &
communications
Commerce & Finance
Public administration
Professional &
clerical services
Total

Source: Vlieland, CA. 1932, pp. 256-279.
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their own local community. This distinct Chinese social pattern continued into the

decades and impacted heavily on the political struggles of the island after the War
(Regnier 1991, 270). Rapid industrialization eventually gave rise to a substantially strong
working class, constituted by mainly Hakka and Hainanese Chinese (Turnbull 1989,
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Hence, while class distinctions among Malays became quite obviously divided
between the aristocrats and the peasantry, the class alignment patterns among the

Chinese was more complex. The Chinese had been socially restructured along new
class lines through their residence in both Malaya and Singapore (Esman 1994, 58-59).

Cleavages existed between the propertied class and the successful merchants on the
one hand, and the impoverished and non-skilled workers on the other. Further social

divisions also appeared between the educated and uneducated and between the
Chinese-schooled and the English-schooled. With the Indians, a small wealthy and
educated urban group would remain distanced from their fellow brethren in the estates
and plantations.
Ethnonational inequalities in northern Borneo 1945-1963

As in Malaya, the colonial stratification process produced a social structure that
was delineated by a distinct ethnonationaI-occupational division. In Sabah, the mainly
Christian Kadazans of the western interior and coastal areas occupied the farmlands,
while the English educated go on to enter the state bureaucracy as clerks and lowranking officials (Sack 1971, 43-46). The Bajaus and other indigenous Muslims that
resided on the eastern coastlines also partake in agricultural and fisheries as well as in
cattle herding (Sather 1997). The Muruts, partly due to inhospitable terrain, were the

most neglected by the British, and thus suffered from low education and health levels
(Bedlington 1978, 135). The Chinese, like in Malaya, dominated the local economy with
their active participation in commerce as well as agriculture, and through English
education, also fill various governmental clerical positions (Bedlington 1978, 136).

There has been more intense ethnonational stratification in Sarawak due to its
more diverse and larger population than Sabah. In 1960, lbans (Sea Dayaks) constituted
31 per cent of the total population in Sarawak, which stood at the time at 744,529, with

the Chinese making up close to another 31 per cent. Malay share of the population was
about 18 per cent, with the Bidayuh (Sea Dayak), Melanaus, other indigenes, and
Europeans contributing the rest (Bruton 1993, 61). The occupation-ethnonational

structure was also biased toward the Chinese, who were employed in the more lucrative
sectors of the economy. The general breakdown of industry-related sectors illustrates
the Chinese dominating commerce and manufacturing in 1,960 with a total of 26,404
workers, while Malays followed suit with 8,167 workers. The Chinese also control the
production and marketing of agricultural products, principally rubber, pepper, and the
remunerative timber industry (Leigh 1974, 5). Table 4.7 on the next page illustrates the
breakdown of worker population in the Professional and Technical job categories by

ethnonationality. Out of a total 6,220 workers, Chinese and Malays eclipsed other
groups in this field with 3,194 and 1,017 workers respectively, (Bruton 1993, 74). The
majority of the indigenous peoples remained in the lower sections of agriculture,

fisheries, and also the armed constabulary services, and therefore constituted the larger
portions of the impoverished sectors of the economy in the state (Bruton 1993, 62-75).
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Table 4.7: Professional and Technical Workers

by Ethnonationality in Sarawak, 1960
Ethnonationality

Number of workers

Bidayuh

319

Chinese
lban

3,194
712

Malay
Other indigenous communities

1 ,017
764

Total

6,220

Source: Bruton 1993, 74.

Racism and the division of labor
In British Malaya, Sinqapore, and northern Borneo

One of the most glaring contradictions in capitalism was manifested in the
relationship between colonial masters and their subjects. There are two aspects of

capitalism that need to be understood in order to further discuss this point. First, the rise
of capitalism in Europe had been ideologically accompanied by so-called modern
enlightenment principles of universal equality and human rights. For the European
bourgeoisie, their eventual rise to positions of privilege and power in society was justiﬁed

by a meritocratic ideology that people were rewarded for their skills and abilities to
compete over others. Second, the accumulation of wealth and capital under capitalism
required the continuous commodification of labor, land, natural resources, and

everything else that pertained to production and marketing of goods and services. Only
through this process could factors of production be quantified in terms of their value so
that profits could be extracted. Therefore it was imperative that the productionexploitation process not be disrupted.
Colonialism was a process that placed these two aspects of capitalism into a

contradiction. Under a colonial administrative system, European colonial masters should
have been compelled to apply universal humanistic principles onto non-European
subjects but the de facto practice of this ideology clearly excluded non-Europeans as
well as women. Thus Eurocentrism created a disposition that excluded non-Europeans
from their human moralist principles because they were very much dissimilar from
Europeans in the civilizational elements that they (Europeans) cherished as highly
supreme — religion and culture. In fact it became a moral duty for Europeans to
‘Europeanize’ others, even if they resisted, before these people could be accorded some

form of equalities. As a result, colonialism became a process that justified violence,
repression, and discrimination against indigenous peoples as a morally righteous
civilizing project (Young 1995, 30-36).
However, an expanding capitalist system needed all the labor and resources
ayailable. In the case of colonialism, total violence against non-Europeans would not
have been efficient and profitable since it would have kept away valuable labor and
caused continuous social disorder, disrupting the capitalist production process.
Maximization of profits and efficient production needed the minimization of costs, and as
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such, indigenous labor needed to be absorbed through a system that would maintain a
disproportionate hierarchy benefiting the colonial masters. Thus by according and
maintaining a myth that colonized people were inferior in status, European colonizers

dispensed the notion that guidance, direction, coercion, and even repression were
necessary elements of colonial administration. Through colonial social and political
institutions, racist indoctrinations of European superiority were effectively disseminated,
inculcated, and to be accepted among non-Europeans. As long as non-Europeans were
perceived to be less civilized, subjugation and repression was necessary to impose
social order. The contradiction became more visible when even ‘Europeanized’
indigenous peoples remained subjected to or treated as second class. This was so
because labor under capitalism needed to be controlled and divided, and racism was
conveniently used as an ideological justification for such treatment of labor among
colonized pe0ple. According to Wallerstein (1987, 7), ”racism operationally has taken the

form of what might be called the ‘ethnicization’ of the work force, by which I mean that at
all times there has existed an occupational-reward hierarchy that has tended to be
correlated with some so-called social criteria. But while the pattern of ethnicization has
been constant, the details have varied from place to place and time to time, according to
what part of the human genetic and social pools were located in a particular time and
place and what the hierarchical needs of the economy were at that time and place.”
In British Malaya, Singapore, and northern Borneo, such a process helped
maintained the capitalist system for the benefit of the British, and to some extent, the
Chinese capitalists. The British had hierarchically ranked the division of labor according
to certain criteria that were beneficial to the production process. Racism served the

colonizers in several ways. Philosophically there was an obligation to ‘modernize’
Malays, but the danger to the colonial state was an educated Malay mass that could
later disrupt the colonial economy. Thus the British sought to explain ‘shiftlessness’ of
the Malays and other indigenous peoples of northern Borneo as the reason behind their
suitability and eventual predominance in the agricultural sphere of capitalist production.

The ‘warrior—like’ qualities of many Malay and indigenous men also saw their recruitment
into the lowest ranks and units of the colonial state’s armed forces and police
constabulary. Racial discrimination in education further ensured that Malays remain

within these fields to serve the colonial state in food and agro-related production. Racist
perceptions of Tamil Indians also served to justify their placements in the hard labor
occupations of the rubber estates, plantations, and public construction projects. That

social opportunities such as education were in a neglectful state for Indians was not a
concern since their economic role was restricted to hard labor. Also, due to their
circumstances as organized immigrants, the Chinese were perceived as diligent and
innovative, enabling them to function as comprador capitalists and economic
intermediaries between the Malay aristocrats and European capitalists. Meanwhile the

lower class Chinese, uneducated and coming mainly from different sub-ethnonational
groups, provided the basis for an emerging working class. Finally, social inequalities
among ethnonational groups became a self-fulfilling prophecy for the system’s
benefactors - the British, their collaborators, and ‘Euro-Christian’ cultural protagonists,

whose coordination and administration of the Asian groups within the colonial state
became justified.

The racial division of labor under such a ‘divide and rule’ strategy emphasizing
British racial superiority enabled the British to strengthen their position as colonial
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masters. The British came to this region and employed a policy that kept the various
ethnonational groups apart for several important reasons. One, it sought to impose
English laws and institutions, perceived as meritocratic and fair, as measuring standards
under which all groups could be stratified. Racist explanations became the logic of

stratification in order to provide and maintain the efficient production and marketing of
tin, rubber, rice, and other natural resource-based export commodities. As such, any
inequalities could be justified as a natural outcome of meritocratic practice, and thereby
justified. At the same time, rising demand for land and resources kept racist sentiments
alive among the various Asian groups as well. Keeping the various ethnonational groups
apart, functioned to prevent any formation of class-consciousness and opportunities of
forging popular alliances between these groups against the British.
Conclusion
The colonial state’s immediate concern was the expediency of capitalist

production, which required the sustenance of social order and the strengthening of
colonial institutions and infrastructure. The extent to which a particular ethnonational

group was engaged in, or a certain region was economically valuable to, the capitalist
economy would determine the degree of its development experience. Such

disproportionate development was justified by self-fulfilling British racist prophecies that
were premised on a perceived notion of a natural hierarchy of races. The higher

mobilization rate of Chinese and Indians in the emerging capitalist economy entailed
greater involvement in wage labor, education, health services, and occupational mobility.
But even within these groups, favorable income and wealth distribution depended on
particular caste or linguistic-ethnonational locations. Among the Malays, social
stratification also flowed mainly along pre-existing class lines, with the privileges and
benefits the nobility had enjoyed preserved under capitalism. Capitalist development in
Malaysia and Singapore created a small privileged class within each ethnonational

group that served the interests of the British capitalist class through the colonial state. In
both these countries, groups that were dependent on the capitalist system for their
survival monopolized the accessibility to resources through the help of a racist and

repressive state system that insulated them against mass resistance.
Capitalist development also brought about uneven patterns of economic progress

between various regions of Malaysia and Singapore. To a significant degree, the urban
areas of the resource-rich states of Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan together with
Penang and Malacca received higher infrastructural investments than other regions
within Malaya. The heavily Malay-populated agrarian-based states of Perlis, Kedah,

Kelantan, Trengganu, and Pahang on the other hand, suffered from underdevelopment
owing to geographical and economic constraints. As a result there was a disparity in
economic development between the west and east coasts of Malaya. Such
disproportionate regional development, which gravitated toward different demographic
and ethnonational lines, tended to further polarize Malays and non-Malays as well as
rural and urban populations.
Finally, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak belonged to different regional

tiers within the capitalist economy. Serving as a financial and trade center for the other
areas, Singapore fast developed into a modern urban-based economy. The Malayan
hinterland provided the natural resources as well as markets for commodities imported
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through Singapore, as did Sarawak and Sabah, thereby creating a network of
metropolitan-periphery relationship between Singapore and these areas. As we shall see
in the following chapters, such an unequal commercial relationship between these
economic zones became the primary reason for the maintenance of a separate political

system for Malaya and Singapore, the end result of which translated into different
developmental rates of worker consciousness.

Inequalities arising from the capitalist stratification process were to be a longstanding structure, which plagued ethnonational relations and prevented formidable
alliances to emerge after the war. The inequalities that serviced the British colonial
economy would later serve their neo-colonial objectives when social and political
disparities between the main ethnonational groups, namely the Malays and Chinese,
generated into conflicting worldviews and forms of ethnonationalism.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE ELITES
AND POST-COLONIAL STATES
IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 1945-1965

This chapter discusses the failure of a popular democratic alliance to emerge that
enabled the rise of the elite class in Malaysia and Singapore. Significant economic
disparities between and within each ethnonational groups, as discussed in the last

chapter, resulted in each group’s social and political alienation from the other, impairing
the crystallization of a unified nationalist movement. These ethnonational inequalities
had given rise to incompatible and particularistic political worldviews between these

groups. For democracy to develop, formal democratic institutions must be backed by a
commitment to soften particularistic demands in the light of broad popular-democratic
objectives (Jessop 1982, 250-251). Malay and Chinese wealth disparities, especially,
have produced divergent ethnonational trajectories that have not only made broad
popular objectives unclear but also a workable democratic coalition between them
difficult.
The first portion of this chapter deals with the difficulties of nationalist movements

in forging a popular revolution against the British after the Second World War. According
to Wallerstein (1986, 149), anti-systemic consciousness as displayed by nationalism,
requires the “stretching of the interpretation of the historical evidence in ways that
disinterested observers would consider partisan.” In the case of Malaysia and
Singapore, Malay and Chinese ethnonationalism developed from each group’s
distinctive response to the harsh experiences of colonial rule, thereby placing a barrier
on a cohesive form of consciousness needed to launch a successful revolution.

The second part of this chapter examines the rise and strengthening of the local
elite class in both countries. The problematic circumstances surrounding the
establishment of a viable united democratic front opened up for the elite class the

political vigor to emerge as political leaders in an independent Malaysia and Singapore.
In Malaysia, the elite class of all three main ethnonational groups, and later of Sarawak
and Sabah, formed an elite-based ‘consensual alliance’ that has sought to extend their
hegemonic role through their control of the state apparatus. In Singapore, the Englisheducated elite class established its political dominance by ruthlessly weeding out its
opponents, particularly among the radical Chinese-educated working class.
While the struggle for democracy did take place, the comparative histories of

Malaysia and Singapore illustrate that the early democratization process in both these
countries could not move beyond the lowest levels of bourgeois democracies. For the
popular movements, there was the inability to move past their own particularistic
ethnonational concerns. In both these countries, state repression and ethnonational-

class differences have continued to distract the various groups away from a unified
political front that could othenlvise subdue the state into instituting popular democratic
reforms.

102
Fragmented National Consciousness
Decolonization of the periphery after World War Two was the result of the

proliferation of nationalist ideologies and movements that aggressively promoted the
rights of each nation to self-determination. Despite the oven/vhelming superiority of
European military forces, nationalist movements in the periphery managed to mobilize
mass anti-systemic struggles to launch effective political opposition against colonial rule
(Shannon 1996, 92). These liberation movements often premised their struggle upon
universal concepts of nationhood, freedom, and equality. In Southeast Asia, David
Martin Jones (1997, 23) wrote, ”mass organization further introduced millennial ideas of
liberation through collective action that clearly threatened not only colonial rule, but also
traditional practices... The new ideologies introduced into politics a new identity and a
democratic principle.”
Nationalism and the notion of nation-statehood are complex issues often

complicating the process of nation-building. In Malaya and Singapore, there were
problems in aligning the various ethnonational demands toward a common national
consciousness. Rosa Luxemburg (1976, 141) once posed the question “The nation

should have the right to self-determination. But who is that ’nation’ and who has the
authority and the right to speak for the nation and express its will?” Gellner (1983)
consigns nationalism, from which nations are created, as a political principle, which
maintains that the national and political unit should be conformable. Anderson (1983, 15-

16) argues that a national imagination precedes any notion of nationalism and
nationhood. The nation then is an imagined political community because its very entity is
entrenched in the common historical bonds of language, culture, or religion. Under
subjugation and suppression, nationalism seeks to turn the imagination into political

reality. Anderson continues (1983, 19), “It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into
destiny.” The differences in the type of imagination of the Malayan nation, and the
question of who should lead and speak on its behalf, were at the very heart of MalayChinese discord in the popular struggle for independence against colonialism. Malays
saw an independent Malaya as a continuation of Malay nation-statehood dating back to

the pre-colonial era, viewing colonialism as a politically interruptive period in an
otherwise longer period of Malay historical predominance in the region. For the Chinese,
Malaya was a new political unit carved out from an historical transitional period, in which
common citizenship should apply equally to everyone.

The opportunity was ripe for a solidarity-based revolutionary front to surface in
Malaya and Singapore after the Second World War. But three main factors prevented

the formation of national democratic alliance among the various ethnonational groups.
One, as explained in the last chapter, British ‘divide and rule’ policy produced a

stratification structure that fell along ethnonational lines, creating an unequal wealth
distribution between the various groups. Ethnonational-class inequalities between the
Malays and Chinese in particular, presented an exigent political position in which the
Chinese possessed economic power over the other while the Malays sought to preserve
their newly found political strength. Unequal relationships in this case served to stultify

attempts at democratic alliances between the two groups, since deep mutual distrusts
and divergent political aims resulting from political economic inequities prevented a
unified national consciousness between them. Two, the segregating nature of British
colonial policy, exacerbated by a brief but highly segregating Japanese colonial
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occupation, evoked a mutually hostile and retributive relationship between Chinese and
Malays. This kept these two dominant groups politically and culturally apart. Both these
factors caused the third - the division of Malaya and Singapore into ‘Malay and Chinese
preserves,’ which provided a problematic environment for a unified national imagination
or consciousness to emerge. An examination of Chinese and Malay ethnonationalism
illustrates these problems.
Chinese ethnonationalism in Malaya and Sinqapore

The initially transient nature of Chinese labor meant that Chinese political
interests were not ‘Malayan’ in scope, but rather within the orbital interests of their
homeland. Chinese print media and schools in the Malay States, northern Borneo, and
Singapore were tailored specifically to inform of developments in China. In the absence
of state aid for Chinese education, Chinese schools here were often financed by the

various kongsis, clan-based organizations (hui guan or guanxr),48 and community
associations (Trocki 1990, 10-12).
As the political atmosphere in China grew more intense, Chinese schools in

Malaya and Singapore gradually catered to political propagandizing rather than
intellectual pursuits as Chinese communities in these countries closely followed the
debates between the reformers and revolutionaries in the mainland. Representatives
from each side came to Malaya to generate political and financial support for their
respective causes. Unfortunately schools became breeding grounds for political
mobilization, and less on rudimentary education. In the process, classical Confucian
education emphasizing disciplinary aspects of Chinese culture and often associated with
Manchu rulers was undermined and sequentially edged out (Harper 1999).

The 1911 Republican revolution in China brought the standardization of
Mandarin as the Chinese lingua franca, and Chinese schools in the Malay States took
no exception in implementing it as their medium of instruction. The political stand of the

Chinese, as engendered by the events in China in which European and Japanese
armies were increasingly subduing its government into treaties, became staunchly antiforeign and anti-western. Such hostile attitudes were cultivated and reinforced in the
schools among the young, evident in the fanatically anti-foreign and xenophobic text and
reading material that almost all the Chinese schools were using. With the power struggle
taking place in China between the Kuomintang (KMT- Nationalist Chinese Party) and the

Communist Party of China (CCP), Chinese ideological indoctrination reflected a parallel
contest in Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. It became glaringly obvious to the
British that Chinese education had turned into a hotbed of ideological recruitment.
By the late 19305, the import of Chinese labor had virtually stopped with the
mechanization of European tin enterprises. Concerned with anti-western sentiments

brewing in Chinese schools and the nature of Chinese residence becoming more
enduring, the British took the initiative to control Chinese education through a
registration process as well as endowments of federal grants. In 1935, the Education

48 Kongsis and hui guans were often associated with secret society and triads. Such
organizations included everything from business partnerships to regional associations of triads
and cultural preservation groups (See Trocki 1990 and Yen 1986).
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Department introduced progressive changes in Chinese education through a teacher-

training program and recognition of Mandarin as language of instruction (Andaya and
Andaya 2001, 226).
But Chinese distrust persisted, and many schools rejected any form of British aid

or support. Meanwhile, KMT influence reigned supreme, not only in Chinese schools, but
also in Chinese political activism. The Chinese, mobilizing behind the KMT, formed the
most organized and financially stable political communities. In fact, KMT party branches
grew throughout Malaya and Singapore to become the largest political organization in
prewar Malaya. By 1948, its branches reached a total of 219 with a membership of
nearly 30,000 (Harper 1999, 33).
Driven by deep-seated attachments to their ancestral homeland, a huge part of
Chinese ethnonationalism in Malaysia and Singapore was motivated by an

o'venrvhelming sense of ethnocentrism. Confinement within one’s own community and
inheriting the traditional Chinese parochial sentiments, which emphasized the greatness
of Chinese culture over every other, ethnocentrism provided the platform from which

Chinese ethnonationalism surfaced. Western invasions of and victories in the Chinese
mainland further aggravated any-preexisting antagonisms the Chinese had for the
British. In addition, British patronage of Malay rulers and colonial policy that seemed to
politically marginalize the Chinese only served to heighten an already rancorous stand
toward colonial rule. With the rise of the communists in China, many Chinese in Malaya
and Singapore found inspiration in the new movement’s egalitarian principles.
Yet, despite this, Chinese ethnocentrism remained embedded in the belief that
the Chinese were the best people to spread revolutionary ideals into Malaya and
Singapore. For the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, a problematic political worldview

was manifested in the difficulty to reconcile the distinction between a territorial nationstate, guojia, and a nation as a cultural community, minzu (Harper 1999, 87). Chinese

revolutionary thought, although succeeding in merging these concepts to unite mainland
China under the Kuomintang banner, failed to elucidate the Chinese in Malaya and
Singapore on the larger political realities of their existence in southeast Asia. Therefore,
efforts by various Chinese cultural establishments as well as the CPM to instill a unique

pride in being a ‘Chinese-Malayan’ and to reorient the popular struggle for freedom away
from China toward Malaya and Singapore were intensified (Tan 1988).

Yet, even within the leftists, whose politics were more grounded to local and noncommunal conditions, the issue of the extent of Chinese domination in the struggle and
the position of the non-Chinese as potential equal partners in a new republic was clear.
The Chinese, as they saw it, were the most advanced non-European community in both

Malaya and Singapore, thus a visionary Malayan People’s Republic was to be inevitably
led by them. Internationalist approaches to anti-colonialism, although localized, were
still not able to effectively distinguish for the Chinese, the politics of race with that of the
Malayan nation (Harper 1999, 88).
As a result, according to Esman (1994, 59), there emerged three different

political categories of Chinese, each related to their respective social economic situation
at the time. The poor and the Chinese-educated, angered by British political

marginalization and ‘preferential treatment’ of Malays, opted for the creation of a
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theoretically egalitarian communist state as the only viable solution to colonial rule. The
second group comprised those who believed that the future of the Chinese in Malaya
was dependent on their ability to successfully become full-fledged Chinese-Malayan
citizens, similar to their countrymen in any other independent capitalist state. Their view
lay on the premise that only Malayan citizenship would enable the Chinese to acquire
the rights to resist the threat of institutional subordination in a country that was destined
to attain national independence. Many commercial associations, occupational guilds,
and cultural organizations took on this political stand (Esman 1994, 60). Finally, there
was a small group of Chinese, who were English-educated, middle class, and extremely
committed to seeing a Malaya in the reflection of a western secular state. This group
adamantly dismissed Malay indigenous status as a ‘myth,’ and was extremely derisive of
the other two groups’ political beliefs and accommodations (Esman 1994, 61). In due

course of Malaysia and Singapore’s later history, the second and third group would
respectively represent the Chinese ruling class within the larger national political scene.
A major reason for this was the economic power they possessed over the first group.
Politics of desperation: origins of Malay Ethnonationalism

To the Malay rulers, the coming of the Chinese and Indians to the Malay States
as temporary laborers was similar to that of guests to their homes - they were expected

to leave when the time came (Andaya and Andaya 1982). Unfortunately, the few
interactions that existed between Malays and Chinese usually centered on impersonal
economic relations. For the Malay peasant, social-economic engagement with the
Chinese was either through a middleman, who had often been perceived as greedy
proﬁteers, or the village retailer, who sold goods unreachable to most Malays. The
increasing number of permanent settlers attracted to the abundance of opportunities in
the Malay States worried not only the rulers but also the common peasant, who saw

these immigrant communities as “colonial parasites” working together with the British
(Cheah 1983, 15-16).
After many Malays were attacked and murdered by armed Chinese members of
the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) on suspicion of being Japanese

collaborators, social distance between the two groups took a turn for the worse. Malay
apprehensions of and antagonisms toward the Chinese was further fuelled by wealth
imbalances that favored the Chinese and an enormous migrant population that was

swallowing them into minority status. Such a situation gave in to fears that the Chinese
in particular would overrun the tanah air (homeland) and enslave Malays not only
economically but also politically. In 1947, the Malay media in Kuala Lumpur and

Singapore made efforts to raise such awareness and called for a unified identity of all
sub-ethnic Malay groups under a greater Malay ethnonational consciousness (Harper

1999, 86, Utusan Melayu 1946).49
The subjugation and impoverishment of Malays through colonialism drove some
segments of the emerging Malay literati to form various Malay organizations as a way to
improve their conditions and assert their cultural identity. Roff (1995, 254-257) identified

49 The Malay press urged for all Malays, who settled in from other parts of the Nusantara as well
as those residents of Malay-Arab and Indian mixed backgrounds to consider themselves as
Malays rather than Malayan citizens, (see Harper 1999, 86).
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three main Malay ethnonationalist groupings. The earliest anti-systemic Malay group
sought to reform Malay traditional society through Islam. The second group constituted

of Malay-educated intellectuals recruited mainly from vernacular colleges and schools,
and the third, an English-educated circle drawn from the Malayan bureaucracy.
Malays who had gone through the Islamic madrasah schooling system found
their way to the universities of Cairo, Jerusalem, and Baghdad. Upon their return, they

brought with them the Islamic concept of science and philosophy, including the concept
of egalitarian statehood under the notion of ummah, that had been deprived to Malays
both through colonialism and their strict adherence to traditional pre-lslamic customs.
Referred to as Kaum Muda (reformers), these scholars urged for the cleansing of Malay
Islamic practices from the corruption of the existing Malay feudal structure, especially the
so-called paramount and infallible identity of the ruler, which served to stand in the way
of Malay social economic progress (Roff 1995, 254). Debates concerning Malay future
development along these lines ensued between, but not limited to, the Kaum Muda and
the more firmly incorporated Kaum Tua (Traditional establishment). Although the kaum
muda lacked the effective support from a tradition bound Malay populace, its roots as an
anti-establishment movement was carried on by its more radical disciples, who later

sought political platform through secularist channels (Tregonning 1962, 165).
By the 19305 political developments in Indonesia, largely propagated by
revolutionary Islamic and leftist youth groups, began to spill into Malaya and Singapore.

Before long, a significant number of Middle-eastern educated Islamic intelligentsia began
to team up with a small group of radical Malay-educated activists (Milner 1995, 257281). Led by members of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM - Young Malay Union),
these Malay ethnonationalists fought their struggle on a leftist platform and advocated
independence through a union of Malaya with Indonesia or Malaysia Raya (Greater
Malaysia/Indonesia) (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 249). Drawn largely from the peasant

class, this group was extremely critical of all existing establishments, particularly of the
special relationship between the British and Malay rulers (Yaacob 1957, 24).
Just before the Second World War, the British interned many of the KMM

members under its Defense Regulations for their extremist views (Yaacob 1957, 26).
During the war, the Japanese disbanded the KMM, and created their own patronage
organization Pembe/a Tanah Air (PETA — Defenders of the Motherland) to monitor the
Malays, and through whom they promoted for a greater Indonesia concept (Cheah 1979,
85-120). The tragic events of post-war inter-communal riots kept many Malays from any

association with Chinese left-wing groups. Apart from a small band of Malay urban
intellectuals, the KMM’s following among the conservative traditional rural sector was
extremely minimal (Roff 1995, 255).

The third Malay group that became increasingly aware of the pathetic plight of
Malays vis-a-vis other ethnonational groups was the Malay officers of the colonial civil

service. Highly knowledgeable and in touch with current events, Malay bureaucrats
became the most sensitive group to any form of ‘alien incursions’ manifested through

Chinese claims of equal rights. In the 19305, various Malay associations cropped up
from among this circle in response to their alarm at the rapid rate of domiciled Chinese in
the Malay States (Adam 1991). These associations professed support for the traditional
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Malay institutions and even for British colonial rule as a temporary buffer against the
‘rapacious demands’ of the non-Malays (Roff 1995, 235-237; Hamidi 1961, 1-6).
Malay anxiety of increasing non-Malay political empowerment came to full alert
with the 1946 Malayan Union proposal that threatened to lodge the future of the Malay
States in ‘foreign hands.’ For Malays, the term of ‘Malayan’ as a designation for the
people of Malaya was itself a misnomer (Harper 1999, 92). As far as many Malays were
concerned, Malaya was the land of Malays as China was the land of the Chinese, and
the status of the sultan represented the symbol of Malay nationhood (Firdaus 1985, 5759). To the majority of Malays, British plans to reduce the status of the sultans and

subordinate them to the Crown of England under the Malayan Union offered the
prospects of de-legitimizing Malay sovereignty. Furthermore, the Union’s liberal
citizenship laws seemed to open the door for non-Malays to gain equal political power

(Omar 1993, 49-56). It was hardly surprising then that many Malays, bent on upholding
Malay social institutions as a way to preserve Malay nationhood, became inspired by the
third group of ethnonationalists. Thus If Malay ethnonationalism before the war had
seemed diversified, the Malayan Union plan served to unify many conservative and

traditional-oriented Malay organizations under a defensively ethnocentric outlook. It was
from this struggle that the conservative-traditionalist United Malay National Organization
(UMNO) emerged as the dominant party with whom the British engaged for discussions
on Malayan independence.
Failure of Democratic Front in

Malaya and Singapore:
The CPM and Anti-Federation Movement 1930-1947

The years leading up to the Second World War witnessed a politically igniting
period in Malaya and Singapore largely due to the involvement of the Communist Party
of Malaya (CPM) in these countries’ politics. The CPM was born in 1930 out of the
General Labour Union (GLU). The depression years gave the CPM the opportunity to
gain mass support from among the mainly Chinese workers engaged in the export
industries (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 251). While it maintained a commitment to a
visionary international communist political order, the CPM gradually became a Chinese

based organization, much to the concern of visiting COMINTERN leaders (Harper 1999,
89).
The war with Japan in China unified the Chinese in Malaya across all social
categories. In 1936, it allied with the KMT branch in Malaya and Singapore to form the
National Salvation Movement - in emulation of the United Front in China, which was an
alliance between the Chinese KMT and the Chinese Communist Party against the
Japanese invasion of China. It is through this allied movement, however, that the CPM
began to extend its organization (Yong 1992, 203-254). Although originally oriented
toward events in China, the successful anti-Japanese struggle gave the CPM the

confidence needed to turn their attention toward self-determination in Malaya. Advised
by its patrons in China, England, and in the COMINTERN, the CPM withheld its plans for
an armed revolution by taking on a less aggressive path for Malayan independence

through its infiltration of labor unions (Brimmel 1959).
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The CPM and trade union activities

The CPM’s objective for an independent Malaya was based on the inclusion of
Singapore. Its strategy for insurrection was three-stepped; provocation of strikes to
cripple the economy, followed by complete communist control of inland areas, and then
the use of armed force to secure important bases (Stenson 1970, 217). In 1946, the

Pan-Malayan General Labour Union (later PMFTU - Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade
Unions) was formed. By the following year, it had a cross-ethnic and cross-occupational
membership of 263,598, constituting nearly half the labor force in Malaya and 85 per
cent of all unions (Stenson 1970, 104). The British were bankrupt after the war and
acquired an external debt in excess of £3.4 million. Malaya’s tin and rubber provided
them the only source of gold and reserves, while the US provided cheap markets for
these commodities; and this meant that wages had to be suppressed (Hua 1982, 73).

Taking advantage of the depressed conditions of the workers, the CPM
organized nationwide strikes at various factories, estates, and mines. Shipyards,
factories, docks, plantations, and even public transportation were systematically

paralyzed in the first few months after the call. Clashes with police were sometimes
violent and several people were reported killed throughout the country. The CPM’s
armed unit, the MPAJA, had taken over several urban administrative centers. In
contrast, there were instances, as in the Malayan Collieries and Singapore Traction
Company cases, in which workers succeeded in their demands for better wages and
improved working conditions (Stenson 970, 145, 199).

At the same time, the CPM also helped galvanize the various unions into the
Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) (Sweeney 1977, 200-201) It was not

unexpected that the CPM, already acquiring a strong working class base on the island,
became heavily involved in the early politics of Singapore. Initial strikes organized
throughout Malaya and Singapore had been quite successful. In February 1947 alone,

171,000 man-days were lost in Singapore, while 96,000 were lost in Malaya (Stenson
1970, 198).
Anticipating trouble, the state was ready for trouble and issued a “shoot to kill”
ordinance to stifle any further thought of a strike (Stenson 1970, 179-180). State
suppression of union activities was complemented to some extent by waning activism

among members as well. By 1948, working conditions in most occupations had
improved. The colonial state also played their communalist cards well when an
increasing number of Malay industrial workers, who had begun to pour into urban areas,
were taken advantage of to fill in worker vacancies during strikes. Soon, with no major
claims being presented and in the absence of extreme worker discontent, interest in
mass union activities gradually died out (Stenson 1970, 193-197).
The PMFTU also grew more detached from the CPM. The need for revolutionary
action became more distant as the CPM itself was hesitant in completing their
insurrection strategy. Membership within PMFTU, especially the rank and files, soon
preferred the adaptation of the new opportunities that developed before them through

the Federation rather than in the pursuit of proletariat goals (Stenson 1970, 199-200). As
the economy improved and Malaya and Singapore recovered significantly from the war,
interest in trade unionism soon waned. In 1949, the fall in trade union membership in
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Singapore was by 25,000 while the reduction in Malaya was even more - from 70,037 in
January 1949 to 42,288 in December of that year (Morgan 1977, 191).
Trade union activities, which had been fervent before the war and reached its

peak in the strikes after the war, were seriously curbed with the banning of the SFTU
and PMFTU under a 1948 Trade Union Ordinance (Stenson 1970, 48-51, Onraet 1946).
lncapacitated and politically ineffective, future union activities became state-sponsored
and confined to purely economic matters until today.
Infiltration of CPM into the anti-federation movement

Singapore provided the setting for the attempt at a unified Malayan nationalism
with many fragmented groups converging together on a political front known as the AllMalaya Council of Joint Actions (AMCJA), formed in December 1946 (Means 1970,

Chapter 7). This front was made up mainly of non-Malay groups that had opposed the
manner in which the Federation of Malay plan was drafted exclusively between the
British, UMNO, and the Malay rulers (Silcock and Aziz 1953). Among the more
prominent associations were the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), led by a group of
English—educated westernized non-Malays advocating for a modern Malaya, the SFTU,

and the Straits Chinese British Association, and the Malaya Indian Congress. Its
affiliates included the MPAJA and Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU).

The AMCJA’s leadership was held by its Chinese-Malayan Chairman, Tan Cheng Lock,
and included some distinguished personalities such as Gerald De Cruz, Philip Hoalim,
and Lim Hong Bee of the MDU. By 1947, it drew a membership of 400,000 (Ongkili
1985,60)
Meanwhile, Malay radicals in the newly formed Malay Nationalist Party (MNP)

disagreed with the conservative approach of UMNO as well as the scant regard the
UMNO-led groups had for leftists within the organizational structure (Boestamam 1972,
87). Drawn from the leadership of Malay leftist groups including the now-defunct KMM,

the MNP was led by Dr. Burhanuddin AI-hilmy, and other Malay leftists such as Ahmad
Boestamam and lshak Haji Muhammad. Refused by the British to join in the Working

Committee for the Federation of Malaya, the MNP mobilized other Malay-Muslim groups
such as the Angkatan Pemuda lnsaf (Liberated Youth Corps), the Peasants Union, the
Islamic Hizbul Muslimin, and the Angkatan Wanita Sedar (Women’s Liberation Corp) to

form the Pusat Tenaga Raayat (People’s Labor Center) or PUTERA (Ongkili 1985, 63).
In March 1947, with a membership of more than 150,000, PUTERA joined forces
with AMCJA to provide Malaysia and Singapore with their first popular inter-communal
alliance. Although at first glance, AMCJA-PUTERA portrayed itself as a coalition of

strange bedfellows, both sides eventually worked well to come up with their ten
principles of constitutional self-government for Malaya. They were as listed below
(PUTERA-AMCJA, 1947, 2-3):
1. A United Malaya, inclusive of Singapore;
2. A fully elected central legislature for the whole of Malaya;

3. Equal political rights for all who regarded Malaya as their real home and as
the object of their loyalty;
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4.

Malay rulers to assume the position of fully sovereign and constitutional

rulers, accepting advice not of British ‘advisers’ but of the people through
democratic institutions;
5. Matters of Muslim religion and Malay custom to be under the sole control of
Malays;

6. Special attention to be paid to the advancement of Malays;
7. Malay as official language of the county;
8. Foreign affairs and defense of the country should be the joint responsibility of
the Government of Malaya and His Majesty’s Government (Britain);50
9. The term ‘Melayu’ should be the title of any citizenship or national status in
Malaya; and

10. The national flag of the country should incorporate the red and white of the
Indonesian national flag.
At best, these principles reflected the compromises of the various factions within

this coalition. Both sides not only made concessions to parts of their own ideological
manifestos, but also took into account the position of the dormant Malay peasantry,
whose political awareness had not yet been awakened. Principles (4) and (6) were
drafted with this in mind. The AMCJA clearly wanted western-type governance, while the

MNP faction of PUTERA insisted on a more socialist state with close ties to Indonesia.51
Besides the ten principles, the coalition emphasized that eligibility for citizenship was
open to all, and that citizens were to “enjoy equal fundamental rights and opportunities in
the political, economic, educational and cultural spheres, regardless of race, creed,
colour, or sex” (Ratnam 1965, 150). The socialist elements within this coalition could be

seen from the spectrum of demands for better and fairer working conditions that included
minimum wage, the right to strike, and social security (PUTERA-AMCJA 1947, section
12-17). The concept of Malay was also somewhat de-racialized and extended to be

inclusive of the other ethnonational groups (Omar 1993).
These principles were embedded into the draft constitution for submission to the
British. In fact, the leading newspaper Straits Times commented that the draft
constitution prepared by the AMCJA-PUTERA as far-sighted and idealistic (Stenson
1970, 177). Unsurprisingly, the British rejected them on grounds that they never were

interested in negotiating with elements that they had sought to exclude, such as the
various CPM-led trade unions and the Malay leftists (Stenson 1970, 177). Left leaning
groups, both Malay and non-Malay suffered from the colonial state’s repressive antiMarxist policies. Furthermore, the British had just found in UMNO, a very reliable procapitalist and western group that would make the ideal neo-colonial ally.

In response, the AMCJA-PUTERA, through its link with the Associated Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, proceeded with a hartal (stoppage of work for a specified
period) on October 20, 1947. The hartal was extremely successful and caused an
estimated loss of £4 million (Purcell 1954, 8). Despite the effectiveness of the hartal, the

British carried on with the declaration of the Federation. When a second hartal was
called, the fragmented vision of the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition reared its divisive

5° This was deemed a temporary provision, (PUTERA-AMCJA 1947).
51 It was highly anticipated that the socialist faction of the Indonesian Revolutionary Army would

ultimately influence the direction of Indonesian independence, (Suryadinata 1989).
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elements. The turning point began in the defection of Chinese right-wing groups such as
the ACCC’s for political and economic gains to be made from the improving economy,
mainly baited by British promise of representation in the Legislative Council (Harper
1999, 91; Blythe 1948). Even the CPM, realizing the futility of hartals in the present
atmosphere, called their trade unions not to participate, and instead contribute their

earnings to its ‘struggle fund’ (Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs 1948, 16 quoted in
Stenson 1970, 179). In 1948, the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition met its demise.
The failure of the coalition has rarely been attributed to other factors outside the
diverse factional aims of the various component groups; the MNP, with their Malay
socialist greater Indonesia concept; the CPM-dominated PMFTU with their Chinesebased worker state ambitions; the Chinese Chambers of Commerce with their capitalist

outlook and citizenship issue agenda. The ideological pursuits of the main groups within
this alliance, PUTERA’s MNP, AMCJA’s MDU, Chinese Chamber of Commerce,
PMFTU, and the CPM, manifested the structure of ethnonational-class tensions that had

permeated the coalition from the very beginning (Cheah 1983, 299).
At the core of the coalition’s division was the inability to agree on a common
notion of what was Malayan or Malay within the imagination of a new and independent
nation (Rahman 1985). The MNP, through PUTERA, was basically espousing a Malaybased socialist Malaya. Its belief in the nusantara as homeland to all Malays had been
entrenched within the Malay ethnonational worldview that sought to keep Malaya from
foreign political domination, including Chinese and Indians (MNP 1946, 2). To the MNP,
the concept of Malayan followed the colonial mould, which ovenrvhelmed the Malay
identity in quite degrading terms (Said 1992, 271 ).
To the Malay leftists, Malay constituted the correct political labeling for the

citizens of Malaya and Indonesia, implying that the requisite of some degree of
assimilation of non-Malays to Malayism, specifically through a significant level of
adoption of the Malay language and culture (Said 1992, 264; Boestamam 1971, 131).
The MNP’s intended affiliation with Indonesia was to serve a two-fold benefit for Malay

socialists. One, it would demographically enlarge the Malay population, and two, it would
place Malaya in an advantaged socialist superpower position within a new world order.
As Dr. Burhanuddin Alhelmy declared," there is no room in this world of the atomic age

for small isolated countries and that the free Malaya of the future should become part of
Indonesia as it was before” (quoted in Said 1992, 264 and Stenson 1980, 124)

Despite its left-wing appearance, the MDU basically commanded a Singaporebased English-educated, non-Malay professional membership (Harper 1999, 85). Within
a socialist agenda, their main struggle was for equal citizenship and access to political
power for non-Malays. Although initially there had been agreement by the MDU on the
propagation of ‘the Malay language’ as the basis of national consciousness, at least
among the top leaders (Boestamam 1971, 131), such an understanding became fragile
at best and would have unlikely sustained itself into political permanency (Cheah 1983,
3.00). Behind its political correctness, the MDU was well aware of the coalition’s
potentially disadvantaging implications on non-Malays in an independent Malaya (Yeo

1973, 38).
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The Chinese-dominated ACCC and the CPM, despite struggling on opposite
ideological platforms, shared similar sentiments for a Chinese dominated Malaya. The
CPM attempted to conspicuously inject a Chinese ethnonational flavor into Malay or

Malayan socialism along the lines of the Sinoization of Communist China or
Russiﬁcation of the Soviet Union. But more worrisome for Malays had been these
organizations’ exuberant attitude of emphasizing Chinese superiority over Malays, which
caused Malays to consistently hold them in suspicion and contempt. Such ethnocentric
posture can be captured by a statement made by the former Chairman of the AMCJA,

Tan Cheng Lock’s (1949, 2) regarding the economic position of Malays and their
beneficial cooperation with the Chinese: “inferior races are raised by living in political
union with races intellectually superior.”
Another reason for the failure of this coalition was the inability of the Malay left to
influence the Malay peasantry. The role of the Malay peasant in this democratic alliance

had been severely lacking the reason being not so much for their deep allegiance to the
rulers as to their experiences with and misperceptions of the left. Despite the strict feudal
structure, Malay peasants were not a fixedly passive class. James Scott (1985, 298)
documented that in the pre-colonial Malay States, peasant resistance was mainly

deployed in the form of ‘weapons of the weak’ against more formidable authorities. Such
resistance included willful and massive non-compliance with laws as well as

demonstrations and sit-ins (Talib 1982, 114-174). Although swiftly suppressed, a few of
such forms of resistance have been quite violent (Nik Mahmud 1974, 65-75).
In fact, Malay peasant sympathy for the CPM had become increasingly

significant in the predominantly Malay states of the East Coast, where the all-Malay
tenth Regiment of the CPM had quite a significant following among villagers in these
areas (Short 1976, 209). Malay leadership in the CPM itself was quite significant. Its
central committee chairman Musa Ahmad was Malay as were prominent members
Abdullah C.D, Rashid Maidin and Shamsiah Fakeh (Caldwell 1977, 225). Many of the

Malays who joined the ranks of the CPM were ”disgruntled local boys opposed to the
Colonial Administration because they felt that under it their race was being deliberately

impoverished. . .they were not alone in this view and so enjoyed widespread support in
the surrounding countryside” (Abdul Razak quoted in Shaw 1976, 97).
But generally for the Malay peasants, particularly those who lived in states that
were not predominantly Malay, the CPM-dominated union manifesto had no bearing on

their personal lives. Memories of MPAJA vigilante justice shortly after the war were still
hauntingly fresh for many of them and thus many stayed away from any association with
communists. Accordingly, the Malay traditionalist elite through UMNO took advantage of
this situation to remind Malays that the Sultans and rulers stood as symbols of ‘Malay
ownership’ of the land. Deprived of capitalism’s opportunities and subjected to political

anxieties brought on by an increasing influx of non-Malays, the Malay peasantry
preferred the security of UMNO. Incredibly, just like the British, these Malay
traditionalists in UMNO rejuvenated the flailing prestige of the rulers as a source of
rallying support for their cause.
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Elitist Alliance in Malaya:
Forging an Elite-based Malayan Consciousness
With the gradual isolation of the Malay left as well as the CPM, the triumphant
emergence of UMNO from the ashes of the Malayan Union debacle led to its dominating
role in Malayan and later, Malaysian politics. Taking a conservative pro-western stance,
UMNO gained the faith and confidence of the British to adapt well to the Iatter’s neocolonial designs on Malaya.
After the war, Malaya’s economy was the most prosperous in Asia, constituting a
vital part of Britain’s economic revitalization plans. In 1951, Malaya’s rubber exports to
the United States alone were valued at approximately $405 million, while total exports
from the United Kingdom to the US were less than $400 million (Tremewan 1994, 12).
As seen from Table 5.1 below, Malaya’s Gross Domestic Product per capita exceeded

many other Asian economies in 1950 (Drabble 2000, 113: Van der Eng 1994). Malaya
was indisputably the most vibrant economy in East Asia, clearly making it Britain’s
colonial ‘bread and butter’ (Li 1982, 169-170). In order not to disrupt the economy, the

British were compelled to ensure Malaya attained a peaceful transition toward
independence.

However, the hegemonic pressure from the United States’ anti communist
policies necessitated an independent, ‘democratic,’ and western-friendly Malaya. This
meant that the British had to suppress left-wing political mobilization in Malaya and
Singapore, which turned out to be harsh and brutal. By the end of 1948, about 13,000

people were arrested and many among them deported to China (Hua 1983, 95).
Repatriation was legal since most Chinese in Malaya and Singapore were neither British
nor Malayan subjects but rather had remained Chinese nationals (Tremewan 1994, 13).
The suppression of trade union activities in Singapore propelled the CPM to

wage an armed revolt against the British in the jungles of Malaya through its military
wing, the Malayan Races’ Liberation Army (MRLA). In response, the British swiftly
imposed in Malaya and Singapore, the Emergency Regulations 1948, outlawing the

CPM and other left-wing organizations such as MNP’s Angkatan Pemuda lnsaf (Ongkili
1985, 88). The emergency laws empowered the colonial state among many things, to
detain suspects without trial, ban left wing publications, impose curfews, and institute the
death penalty for firearms possession (Khong 1984, 151-152). The MRLA launched an

Table 5.1: GDP per capita selected countries 1900-1950
Countries
1900
Malaya
600
Indonesia
617
Philippines
735
South Korea
568
Thailand
694
Japan
724
Source: Drabble 2000, p. 113; Van der Eng 1994.

1929
1910
1009
1106
945
623
1 192

1950
1828
727
943
565
652
1208
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equally brutal campaign, targeting civilians, villages, plantations, and public utilities
throughout Malaya (Short 1976, 64-66). Unfortunately, many who joined the armed

forces were Malays, and the campaign against the communists increasingly took on a
communal flavor. The emergency period, also known as the ‘war of the running dogs,’
lasted a good twelve years, resulting in 90,000 communists deported and more than
20,000 detained (Josey 1980, 189; Barber 1987).
While the British were fighting the communists on one front, they were also
drawing up plans to prepare an elitist coalition for independent statehood on another.
Taking into consideration the significance of Chinese and Indian capitalist economic
participation in the economy, one of the requirements for independence was the sharing
of power with members of the Chinese and Indian elite class; there would be no
independence until ‘racial unity’ was forged (Tan 1979, 30) The result was the founding
of the National Alliance, which comprised UMNO, the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) as its main component parties (see
Ongkili 1985, 75-94; Hua 1982).
The formative process of this elite coalition was neither smooth nor fully
consensual. Underlying the problem was the significant amount of ethnonational distrust
that prevailed between the Malay and Chinese elite class over the nature of nationstatehood and the distribution of power in an independent Malaya. Also, despite colonial

rule having thrived on ethnonational divisions and exploitation of tensions, ironically the
British now desired a western non-communal type Malaya. To the British, a political
conglomeration of various ethnonational-based parties was both unreliable and unstable
in safeguarding their neo-colonial interests.
Efforts were initiated by the British to encourage informal meetings between the
elite of the various ethnonational communities in order to forge closer cooperation
between them (Von Vorys 1975, 96-110). A series of low-profile elitist rendezvous led to
the establishment of a Communities’ Liaison Committee, with which the British hoped an

ironing out of ‘racial friction’ to create a trouble-free and unified Malaya would materialize
(Harper 1999, 173; Abdullah 1971, 165-168). The premise on which bargaining was to
be made lay in Malay concessions on Chinese citizenship in return for Chinese
acknowledgement of allegiance to the Malay Rulers and greater Malay economic
participation quid pro quo (Harper 1999, 317; CLC 1949, 10).
Although the leadership helm of UMNO was basically in the hands of Malay
aristocrats, the organization’s membership now comprised staunch factions of Malay

traditionalists and nationalists. Products of anti-Malayan Union reactionary rhetoric,
which had induced Malay ethnonational consciousness to a more militant level, these
people vowed to keep out Chinese political control of the country. Their complaints were
reflected in the assertion by prominent UMNO stalwart, Panglima Bukit Gantang, that
Malay economic woes lay in Chinese ‘strangulation methods’ that squeezed Malays out

of not only urban and rural commerce, but also their agricultural and fishing livelihood
(CLC 1949, 2). Increased political power for the Chinese, he pointed out, would
complete the drive toward Malay political economic obsolescence. They also contend
that the extent of Malayan/zation for non-Malays include significant recognition of Malay
language and culture as dominant. European CLC members agreed that Malay social-
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economic welfare must first be addressed before Chinese political power could be
discussed and that Malayanization was synonymous with the adoption of Malay as the
national language (CLC, 1949, 7).

Embodying leaders from the various Chinese Chambers of Commerce and
representing the local comprador class, the MCA was adamantly opposed to any
Malayanization plans that subjected the Chinese to assimilation into Malay culture or to
recognize Malay as the national language. Most importantly, the MCA demanded more
political power and a more liberal citizenship policy for the Chinese in the new Malaya.
Furthermore, an independent Malaya, the MCA insisted, must remain within the British
Commonwealth to guarantee the maintenance of Straits Chinese privileges (Lee 1960,
69). Unsympathetic to Malay social economic disenfranchisement, the MCA leadership

also felt that the cause of Malay poverty rested more on Malay cultural shiftlessness
rather than on Chinese structural control of the economy (Von Vorys 1975, 97).
Unsurprisingly no clear compromise could be made between the two parties.
British anxiety over the delicate political situation evoked another initiative to establish a

multi-ethnonational ruling coalition. They worked their way through the two party leaders,
Onn Jaafar of UMNO and Tan Cheng Lock of MCA, who were strong personal allies of
the British. Advised by the British, Onn Jaafar dropped a bombshell by proposing to
abolish the present structure and open up UMNO to non-Malays. But faced with mass

opposition to his plan, Jaafar left UMNO and formed the Independence of Malaya Party
(IMP), with Tan as its Chairman. Jaafar’s overestimation of his position as supreme
Malay leader as well as his underestimation of the ground support in UMNO manifested
in the few members that followed him to his new party. Although the IMP did consist of

formidable leaders, they were, as the newspaper Melayu Raya described, “just like a
factory with a manager.... but without machinery or labor” (quoted in Harper 1999).
Within UMNO a new leader appeared in Tunku (Prince) Abdul Rahman, who
promised Malays that Malaya’s independence was his organization’s top priority.
Somewhat embarrassed by Tan Cheng Lock’s tie to the IMP, the MCA sought
rapprochement with UMNO. MCA wanted an independent Malaya, but one in which they
could be an integral part. There was obvious tenacity in UMNO’s pursuit of
independence as was its energy to mobilize a huge portion of the Malay population. The
IMP, although favored by the British, did not have a similar political capacity. Hence,
they were playing their cards well when they approached UMNO to forge an alliance for

the upcoming Municipal elections.
With the war against the communists gaining successful momentum, support for
the MCA among the Chinese had grown quite substantially. The fight against the CPM
entailed the controversial resettlement of the sporadic Chinese rural population into ‘new

villages’ under the Briggs Plan (Ongkili 1985, 92-93; Thompson 1966). By 1952, over
420,000 squatters had been resettled into 410 new villages (Sandhu 1964, 152). Here,

the MCA was encouraged by the British to oversee the welfare of these villagers and to
‘reorientate’ the Chinese proletariat in general toward a capitalist Malaya. As General
Templer, the commander of Malaya’s armed forces, was quoted as saying “The answer
(to the Communist problem) lies not in pouring more troops, but in the hearts and mind
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of the people” (cited in Clutterbuck 1967, 3).52 Helped by new opportunities in a
rejuvenated economy that brought improved infrastructure to these settlements, the

MCA made substantial inroads into winning over many of these new villagers (Harper
1999, 150-155;Lim 1971, 31-47).
After Onn Jaafar’s departure, UMNO reorganized its internal structure, and did its
fair share of purging those they considered potential threats, especially those who had
critically challenged the leadership. The feudal-tributary type elements that existed in
traditional Malay politics began to appear within UMNO, seen in its increasingly
autocratic nature both in its management as well as in its assumption of paternal
leadership among Malay professionals and peasants alike. Its attraction to its supporters
remained in its political platform, which asserted the unconditional attainment of Malay
hegemonic rule and increased Malay economic participation. Dissenters were often
associated with unpatriotic and pro-colonist labels.

By 1951, UMNO claimed 903,682 members, while the MCA 204,906 and the IMP
only 2,200. An UMNO-MCA Alliance performed well in the ‘experimental’ Municipal
elections from 1952-1953. Out of a total of 119 seats, the Alliance won 94, with the IMP

only 3. These successes spurred UMNO and MCA to demand that two-thirds of the
existing Federal Legislative Council of Malaya be composed of elected representatives.
When the British rejected their demand, the Alliance withdrew all their members from the
Council in protest.
In order to avert a political crisis at a time when Malaya’s economy was picking up and
the fight against communist insurgents was not quite over, the British finally relented. In
the 1955 Federal Elections, the Alliance routed the opposition, who won only one seat
through the Pan Islamic Party (PAS). Onn Jaafar’s new Party Negara did not win a

single seat. Results are as shown in Table 5.2 below. Added to the ruling National
Alliance was the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), who previously had sided along
Jaafar’s camp.

Table 5.2: Results of 1955 Federal Elections in Malaya
Party

No. of

No. of

Candidates

Candidates

fielded

successful

Votes

Percentage

of Votes

Alliance

52

51

818,013

Party Negara

33

-

78,909

79.6

7.6

Pan Islamic Party

11

1

40,667

3.9

NAP
Perak Malay League

9
3

-

20,996
5,433

2.0
0.5

Progressive Party

2

-

1,081

0.1

Labour Party

4

-

4,786

0.4

Independents
18
31,642
Source: Election Commission, 1956, and Harper, 1999, pp.345.

3

52 The Briggs Plan was intensively implemented under General Gerald Templer, in order to
demographically sever the CPM away from the support of the Chinese rural population.
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In 1957, Malaya gained independence with the Alliance firmly in control. The
1959 elections saw greater participation throughout the country, although registration
and voting requirements still prevented many from going to the polls. There was greater
voting among the Chinese and Indians, who in 1959 constituted 35.6 per cent and 7.4
per cent of the electorate as compared to 11.2 per cent and 3.9 per cent in 1955

respectively (Ratnam 1965, 188). The 1959 elections also displayed a referendum of the
constitutional contract that initiated vertical mobilization between the UMNO and MCA
(Von Vorys 1975, 146-150). Table 5.3 below shows the voting breakdown according to
ethnonationality for the 1955 and 1959 Federal Elections.
The events leading up to independence was an illustration of power struggles
and contradictions among various elite circles, including the British. The British had
called for a ‘democracy that must be built from the ground up’ (Von Vorys 1975, 107).
But fearful of grassroots empowerment, the British actually wanted an elite-based,

English-educated non-sectarian leadership that was western-capitalist in outlook, and
one that could secure their interests in an independent Malaya. The British attempted to
rope in their individual allies and build a leadership circle around them. Onn Jaafar and

Tan Cheng Lock, intending to prop their own interests, both believed in a delay of
independence, the former for the sake of enhanced Malay economic development, the
latter for fortifying and sustaining Chinese capitalist privileges vis-a-vis Malay political
development. In this, the British shared similar aims since postponed independence
would mean more time to fully quell the communists as well as to oversee the

development of a secular state that was ‘Malayan’ in scope.
However, nationalist fervor among Malays for independence overrode political

considerations from other quarters. UMNO had by now become a bastion of Malay
political power. Also, the MCA found a potential source of support in the Chinese
population that was slowly turning their focus away from China toward Malaya. Leaders

of UMNO and MCA, with the newly found grassroots base of their respective
communities, took advantage of pushing the independence agenda more diligently. Both
had much to gain from being part of the ruling class through independence; for UMNO it
was political hegemony; for MCA it was the enlargement of their commercial
opportunities (Heng 1988, 64-67). The magnitude of the desire for a piece of the political

pie in an independent Malaya was illustrated in the willingness of the CPM to seek a
dialogue with the Alliance in 1955 in Baling, northern Malaya, for possible political
bargaining. The truce talks failed when the CPM ‘5 condition for ending the struggle,
which was political recognition of the CPM, was rejected by the Alliance (Clutterbuck

1985,227)
Table 5.3: Ethnonational Composition of the Electorate in Federal
Elections of Malaya in 1955 and 1959.
Ethnonationality

Malays
Chinese
Indians
Others
Total

Electorate

1955
1,078,000 (84.2%)
143,000 (1.2%)
50,000 (3.9%)
9,000 (0.7%)
1,280,000

Source: K.J. Ratnam 1965, pp.187-200

1959
1,217,000 (56.6%)
764,000 (35.6%)
159,000 (7.4%)
4,000 (0.3%)
2,144,000
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In 1955, Malays made up 80 per cent of the national electorate, and it was

apparent that the Alliance, through UMNO, had become extremely dependent on Malay
votes to establish their rule (Ness 1967, 57). Harnessing its victorious challenge against

the Malayan Union, and having rid itself of radical factions, UMNO established its
reputation among the Malay peasantry as the champion of Malay rights (Chee 1991).
UMNO had grown into an efficient organization, mobilizing its support base among the
Malays through its efficient hierarchical machinery and a rallying battle cry — the
unconditional protection and promotion of Malay interests in a new Malaya (Milne 1986,

122-123).
The results of the 1955 elections were somewhat heartening for proponents of a

pluralist Malaya, since for a short while, the Alliance seemed to serve as a modus
vivendi among the three main ethnonational groups (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 270).
The excitement of independence and the disillusionment with communist insurgency
tactics that disrupted civilian life had induced the hopefulness among the people of a
new democratic nation. The success of the 1955 elections for the Alliance seemed to
actually reflect a multi-layered support that the parties initially enjoyed (Gomez 1998,

232)
But the realities of ethnonational differences soon surfaced to affect the potential
support base for the Chinese in MCA. In 1959 new citizenship laws increased the
Chinese electorate to a significant 35 per cent (Sothi Rachagan 1993, 111-112). An
ethnocentric leaning faction behind Dr. Lim Chong Eu took over the MCA leadership
from the moderately conservative Tan Cheng Lock group, and presented an ultimatum
to UMNO for an increase in its allotted 28 out of 104 electoral seats to 48 (Andaya and
Andaya 1982, 268). When UMNO threatened to go to the polls alone, MCA withdrew its
proposition and ousted its Sino-centric elements within the party. A majority of the
Chinese then began to look for political direction in other leaderships they believed could
help prevent their total submergence by Malays (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 268).

The UMNO and MCA partnership reflected the convergence of ruling class
interests that enabled them, despite divergent short-term goals, to forge political
alliances. Both parties believed in the significance of capitalist autocratic governance as
a means to sustain the system that has nourished their economic needs and interests

(Harper 1999, 323-324). Thus both parties adopted similar kinds of paternalistic
platforms, on which popular support was generated through the narrow confines of
ethnonational sentiments. Nevertheless at the leadership level, there was a common

awareness of political realities. For those in UMNO, there was recognition that Chinese
assimilation into Malay culture was idealistic but impractical. For the MCA leadership,

there was a realization that reduction in Chinese-Malay disparities should be
acknowledged for the sake of their own long-term economic future (Von Vorys 102-104).

The MIC, a political party whose leadership base constituted mainly of upper
class professionals, joined the alliance right before independence order to secure its

elitist interests. Commanding only a small fraction of Indian support, which itself
constituted only 8 per cent of the total electorate in 1955, meant that survival of the

organization and the Indian elite class could only be ensured through the National
Alliance (Arasaratnam 1980). The MIC nevertheless, later managed to work through its
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National Land Finance Cooperative Society (NLFCS), which gained substantial interests
in the plantation sector, to garner political support from the Indian working class (Gomez
1998, 232). To further control Indian workers, the MIC developed strong links with the

National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW), whose leader P. Narayanan was also
chairman of the Malayan Trade Unions Council (Vasil 1971, 91-93).
The basic accord between UMNO, MCA, and MIC was an informal one put
together between leaders of each of these ethnonational organizations around three
sensitive issues — citizenship, education and Malay special rights. UMNO agreed to
citizenship for non-Malays on the basis of jus soil, in which everyone born in Malaya
would be conferred automatic citizenship, in return for the other groups’ recognition of
the official status of Malay as the national language, as the indigenous people enjoying
basic rights and privileges, and the favorable ratio of Malays to non-Malays in the civil
service, the traditional bastion of Malay elitist power (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 269).
Termed ‘consociational alliance,’ this political economic arrangement required enormous

trust and good will between the leaders of each ethnonational community (Von Vorys
1975). The ability of each elite group to enforce this agreement on its constituents

became pivotal for the effectiveness of such a political compromise (Esman 1994, 65).
The National Alliance, registered in 1958 as a political party with one vision, one
manifesto and one direction under the UMNO leadership, was undoubtedly treading on
unstable mass support. Apart from UMNO, it became obvious that the elite class within
MCA and MIC were hitching a ride to secure their capital interests. Each group’s
endeavor to generate support from their respective electorate, whose aspirations and

ethnonational visions had been diverse and fragmented, impeded the formation of a
cohesive and common ‘national’ political ideology between them (Gomez 1998, 233).

But the ability of the three main parties’ leaders, who share a common class and
educational background, to negotiate and bargain on political issues had been central to
the Alliance’s survival. The paramount agenda binding the three main parties together
lay in their leaders’ prioritized consensus that Malaya always remained a pro-western
capitalist state (Jomo 1986, 247; Beaglehole 1969, 218).
Outwardly however, there was a need for each to protect its political turf through
the patronization of the lower classes by propagating to act on behalf of ‘ethnonational
interests.’ In other words, while understanding the need for cross-party political
cooperation, each party stood firmly behind the ethnonational character of their political

ideologues. Problems arising from the failure to address these contradictions would later
erupt in political turmoil. In the next chapter, the dissertation partly discusses the

volatility of this situation. For the meantime, as the Alliance began to prove its political
mettle, the British became increasingly convinced of its ability to perform the comprador
role in a newly independent Malaya.
Formation of Malaysia: Regional Elitist Consolidation

The formation of Malaysia in 1963 through the merging of Malaya, Sarawak,
Sabah, and Singapore, was in part, a consolidation of elitist rule in the region in light of
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expanding communist rebellion taking place in major parts of Southeast Asia.53
Threatened by Singapore’s potential collapse under leftist anti-government subversions
and the increasing pendulum swing toward greater communist influence in Indonesia,
both UMNO and the British initiated the Malaysia Federation as a bulwark against further
leftist incursions into the British sphere of influence (Bedlington 1978, 103-104).

Incorporation of Singapore into the federation (to be discussed in the next
section) would place its internal problems, if spiraled out of control, into the hands of
Malaysia’s more organized and better-trained military and police. And the inclusion of
Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei into the Federation would also serve as an effort to

appease Malay ultra-conservatives within UMNO, repulsed by a predominantly Chinese
Singapore addition, that the ethnonational balance would be corrected by extra
indigenous populations from the two states (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 271).
For the British, the formation of Malaysia was a convenient solution to anti-

communism efforts in Southeast Asia. Post war reconstruction for northern Borneo was
too daunting a task to undertake considering the benefits to be derived did not seem to
be worth the costs. But communist insurgency and political influence was heavy in the

Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaya. Indirect economic aid and military advisory
through Malaysia would have been the best method to contain the spread of the red
armies into northern Borneo, where oil and gas fields in Brunei had been helping
replenish British coffers. The main fear of course, came from Indonesia, where the Partai
Komunis Indonesia or PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) faction looked comfortably

strong in gaining full control of the state (Jones 2001).
The Malaysia merger, which served as a decolonization of Sarawak and Sabah,
also accelerated the development of political parties in these two states (Ongkili 1985,
169). The leading political groups in both Sarawak and Sabah consisted of members
mainly from the privileged class, who had served either under the previous colonial

governments or had come from traditionally established families involved in various
businesses. In Sarawak the two biggest parties were the Sarawak National Party

(SNAP) and the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), while in Sabah the United
National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) and the United Sabah Organisation (USNO)

maintained the largest following. The National Alliance extended its coalition to include
the Sabah and Sarawak Alliance, joined by all the parties in Sabah and all but the SUPP
in Sarawak (Bedlington 1978, 96-98; Ongkili 1972).
The Sabah and Sarawak Alliance won the 1963 elections in their respective

states to earn the mandate of setting the terms of entry into the Federation. Due to the
special circumstances surrounding their membership, these two states were enticed with
greater freedom and sovereignty than their counterparts in Malaya (Andaya and Andaya

1982, 272). The terms and conditions for agreeing to join the federation included:

53 At the advise of the British, Brunei rejected the offer to join the Federation when the Sultan
realized the potential lowering of his status and substantial personal loss of his oil revenues. In
1962, a leftist rebellion led by Azahari of the Partai Rakyat Brunei, although crushed, had
sufficiently antagonized the British.
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a) Both states given exclusive authority over immigration, including Malaysian

citizens from other states;54
b) Malay would be recognized as the national language but English (colonial
language in both these states functioning as the lingua franca) would
continue as a medium of instruction in education and state government until
the State Legislative decided otherwise;
c) Islam as the official religion although other religions could be propagated;
d) Indigenous peoples of these two states would benefit from similar privileges
that the Malays enjoy in Malaya;
e) The guarantee of Federal funds for economic development; and
f) The separate Federal public service for these two states to train local officers.
The small ruling classes of Sarawak and Sabah, channeled along ethnonational
lines, stood to defend their political turf from Malayan elitist encroachment. Most staunch
in its opposition to Malaysian proposals were the Chinese-based parties such as the
Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), on grounds of dissatisfaction with policies
regarding Chinese education and land allocations (Bedlington 1978, 98-99; Leigh 1974).

But since the nature of elite groups in Sarawak and Sabah was itself diverse, each group
did not possess an adequately formidable support base to assert a serious challenge to

the federal elite.
Furthermore, since ethnonational groups in Borneo share the indigenous status
with the Malays, there has been more political accommodation between these groups

and the Malays as compared to the situation in the Peninsula. Most importantly, decades
of paternalistic British governance have managed to politically subdue these groups into
accepting colonial deference that accepting Malayan elite patronage went without much
contention, especially in Sarawak (Bedlington 1978, 93). As Michael Leigh (1974, 39)

stated “Rather than making racial blocks more rigid, as occurred elsewhere in Malaysia,
this political division within racial communities provided a ready basis for compromise,
forcing factions to seek allies outside their community in the quest for political power.”

Despite the Alliance’s flexibility and relatively minimal intervention in relation to
dealing with these two states, any ‘out of line’ secessionist hint coming from the latter
was not tolerated. In 1966, Sarawak Chief Minister Stephen Ningkan of Sarawak
National Party (SNAP) was replaced by another lban politician, Tawi Sli, who appeared

to have been more amenable to directives from Kuala Lumpur (Andaya and Andaya
1982, 277). In 1967, Sabah Chief Minister, Mohammed Fuad Stephens, of the UNKO
having displayed boldness in calling for more state rights, was pressured out of office.
He was replaced by the philanthropic and charismatic Sulu chief Datu Mustapha Harun
of USNO, who later on would also be eased out of office due to his rampant abuse of

power.
Internationally, the formation of Malaysia was staunchly opposed both by

Indonesia, on grounds that it was a western neo-colonial plot to re-govern Southeast
Asia, and by the Philippines who claimed that Sabah was historically part of the
Sultanate of Sulu, now a province of the Republic (Subritzky 2000; Andaya and Andaya

5‘ Includes the restriction in the sale of land and property in the two states to Malaysian citizens

from Malaya.
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1982, 274). On both these countries’ demands, a United Nations plebiscite was held for
the people of Sarawak and Sabah in 1963 to gauge their sentiments on the Malaysia

issue. When the plebiscite went in favor of a merger with Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines repudiated the results of the survey (Means 1976, 316). Malaysia was
formed on September 16 1963, evoking the severance of diplomatic relations by these
countries with the new state.
Indonesia pursued a konfrontasi (confrontation) policy against Malaysia, in which
its ‘Crush Malaysia’ campaign became a key strategy to ultimately dismember the

federation (Subritzky 2000). During this conflict, sporadic and low-intensity skirmishes
took place mostly along the Borneo border, all of which resulted in Malaysia successfully
repelling the aggression of its larger neighbor. The confrontation finally ended and
diplomatic relations resumed after a bloody campaign against the communists and its
supporters from the state took place in Indonesia in 1965. The Philippines, despite
r'ecommencing of diplomatic ties with Malaysia in 1966, has yet to ofﬁcially drop its claim
on Sabah. Mutually cooperative, peaceful, and friendly relations between the two
countries and Malaysia only gradually steadied and strengthened with the establishment

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.55
The Strengthening of the
English-educated Elite Class in Singapore
The failure of the AMCJA-PUTERA alliance did not mean the complete

withdrawal of the leftist from Singaporean politics. The CPM (now banned), while fighting
a war in the jungles of Malaya, also began to infiltrate into the most potent hotbeds for
recruitment in Singapore — the Chinese secondary schools. Chinese school students
were particularly vulnerable to propaganda since there had already developed high
levels of indignation among them against their English-educated counterparts, who
enjoyed greater access to social privileges and mobility (Clutterbuck 1985, 75).

Furthermore, their Chinese language education was often injected with ethnocentricities
of Chinese culture, prompting them to identify more with China than to Malaya or

Singapore. By the early 19505, these schools provided the training ground for the CPM
for its warfare in Malaya (Hanrahan 1954).
Class subterfuqe in the PAP

In 1953, the British drafted the Rendel Constitution, which recommended the
transfer of a large degree of power into local hands (Yeo and Lau 1991, 127). CPM
inspired riots comprising of student-labor movements presented instabilities to the new
Singapore Labor Front (SLF) government of David Marshall, who assumed the colony’s

Chief Ministership through the 1955 Municipal elections. Although declaring to be a left
wing party, the SLF was very much molded in the image of Britain’s Labour Party and
was governing under severely limited powers ascribed by the Rendel Constitution

(Tremewan 1994, 23). Despite the protection and nurturing of center parties by the
British, left wing radicalism flourished under the provisions of the Rendel. Furthermore,
the British were reluctant in unnecessarily using armed force to suppress left-wing riots

55 Initial members of ASEAN were Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore,
but now includes Brunei, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

123
since the island’s conﬁned area would render such drastic measures harmful to British

interests. Thus the way was paved for a resurgence of CPM dominated groups found in
the labor unions and Chinese students unions. It was only a matter of time that the SLF
would collapse.
Meanwhile, another faction of leftists was working within the newly established

People’s Action Party (PAP). It was also through the PAP that an English-educated
bourgeois class was also attempting to extend its political role in the independence
process. Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, a British university graduate, the PAP
was a two-sided coin. The left-wingers, led by Lim Chin Siong, controlled the grassroots
branches, in which mass support of the Chinese-based left movement had been
particularly active. But to mask its pro communist inclinations, a huge chunk of
leadership positions within the PAP’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) were held by

members of the English-educated class (Tremewan 1994, 22).
There were no pretensions of plans between the two factions of PAP, as each
had been well aware that both they and the other were really together in a marriage of
convenience, utilizing the PAP for their own political ends. Lee Kuan Yew’s national
aspirations were well known.56 He revealed his class interests in a speech delivered to a

group of students shortly before returning home from college in England in 1950, “We,
the returned students, would be the ideal type of leaders that the British would find
relatively the more acceptable...But if we do not give leadership, it will come from the
other ranks of society, and if these leaders attain power, as they will with the support of
the masses, we shall find that we, as a class, have merely changed masters” (quoted in
Minchin 1986, 48).

In May 1956, Marshall led a delegation, which included both Lee Kuan Yew and
Lim Chin Siong, to London for constitutional talks on self-government. The British
colonial office declared that it was too early and that they did not wish for Singapore to
be a communist outpost and a ‘colony of Peking’ (SLA 1956, 31 ). The British were only
prepared for a fully elected legislative assembly with British power retention in matters of
internal security and defense. Inspired by the rapid pace toward independence in

Malaya, and disappointed for having failed to initiate one for Singapore, Marshall
resigned in 1956 and was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock (Turnbull 1898, 257).
In a general campaign to control subversive activities, Lim Yew Hock, perhaps

flexing his political muscle to prove to the British of his seriousness in dealing with the
communists, dissolved seven communist ‘open’ front’ organizations, including the
Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Students’ Union. In 1956, the administration
managed to quell a wave of student-labor protests organized by Lim Chin Siong, which
turned into a riot that killed fifteen and injured more than 100 (Clutterbuck 1985, 128-

129). In spite of its scandal-ridden image, the SLF administration did straighten out some
internal policies dealing with education, language, citizenship as well as the
Malayanization program (Turnbull 1989, 258).5 When Lim and Lee headed the all-party

mission for the third time in 1958, the British were impressed enough to award them the

56 Lee Kuan Yew is an English-educated Straits Chinese, who initially spoke only Malay and
English.
57 In Singapore’s term, referring to localization of administration program.
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State of Singapore Act, which opened up direct preparations for political independence

(Turnbull 1989, 261). The upcoming 1959 elections would decide which party was to
form the government.
Against party policy, Lee had earlier agreed to the British in London on the
condition that for independence to be achieved, of an Internal Security Council (ISC)
was to be established that would empower the British to pin down leftists throughout
Malaya and Singapore (Tremewan 1994, 22-23; Minchin 1986, 84). This angered the
leftists in PAP, and in the party’s CEC elections, they decided to unseat him. With half of
the seats taken by the left faction and backed by almost the entire grassroots population,
they nearly did. But soon after the elections five of the left-wing members were arrested
under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, a move in which Lee denied having
involvement (George 1984, 43; Pang 1971, 4).
Lee’s double-faced political drama continued to manifest itself when he

c00perated with the British and the Labour Front administration to weed out leftists from
even his own party. When the Labour Front government attempted to negotiate full
political independence, Lee chastised it for being a stooge of the British (Tremewan
1994, 23). The plan was clear. Lee and his faction needed to navigate uncharted waters

by ‘riding’ on the leftist tiger, in order to garner mass support, and then ‘dismount’ when
the time was ripe to rid Singapore of the left (Bedlington 1978, 199-201).
The 1959 elections saw the PAP sweep to power. Prior to the elections, the
Labour Front government had been discredited for its corruption scandals involving
misuse of funds (Turnbull 1989, 263). The PAP exploited the issue with promises of
better living conditions through an ‘honest and efficient government’ that would turn

Singapore into an industrial society ‘to obtain for the general masses of the people a
happy, full and secure livelihood (Toh, quoted in PAP 1959, 8). The PAP won 43 out of
the total 51 seats, with the Singapore’s People Alliance (Lim Yew Hock’s new party)

obtaining 4, the UMNO-MCA Alliance winning 3 seats, and the final seat won by an
independent (Ong 1975, 68).

Although the PAP showed administrative dynamism in their first years in office,
its handling of internal rival groups and challengers was autocratic. Lee personally
purged his party of dissenters, ambitious individuals and potential challengers, both

within the left as well as within his circle (Bedlington 1978, 204). Lee’s exceptional
tardiness in implementing ‘socialist’ programs, his dictatorial disposition, nonchalant
attitude toward improving Chinese education, and insistence upon keeping the ISC
angered the left in PAP (Pang 1971, 9-10). The final drift from the left faction came when
Lee pushed through for a merger with Malaya to form Malaysia. For the PAP, a unified
Malaya with Singapore was always the paramount goal and a ‘historical necessity,’ one
in which Lee’s vision encompassed a Malaya serving as a periphery to the core in
Singapore (Turnbull 1989, 267;Rajaratnam, quoted in PAP, 1959). But the left and
communists found the prospects of subjugating to a conservative Malay government in

Kuala Lumpur quite reprehensible; they desired a separate Singapore in which they
could willfully exert their influence (Bedlington 1978, 205).
In 1961, thirteen members of the PAP left wing led an exodus of dissidents to
form the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) on the opposite side of the legislature
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(Osborne 1964, 16-20). On the verge of near collapse, the PAP learned to strengthen its
administrative machinery and vetted future entries into the party. The CEC was
empowered to suspend, demote, or expel any member. The party virtually became a
rigid hierarchical organization with Lee wielding tremendous power (Bellows 1970, 24).
Finally, the PAP managed to outperform the left and the Barisan Sosialis using two
approaches. One, it used the state apparatus to systematically harass its leaders and to

de-register its grassroots organizations and its affiliated trade unions. Two, it enhanced
its effort in implementing much needed social programs in housing, education, and
health through its own community organizations (Tremewan 1994, 27). For example
expenditure on education increased from 1960 to 1963 from $600,000 to $10,000,000

and its development plan was ahead of schedule (Ministry of Finance, Singapore 1964).
Once the left had been dislocated, the stage was set for the 1963 elections. Next, the
PAP engineered a 1962 public referendum to join with Malaya, Brunei, Sarawak, and
Sabah to form a Federation of Malaysia. The implementation of the referendum was, in

Bedlington’s words, a “Catch-22 Referendum” (Bedlington 1978, 207). Gerrymandering
in the execution of this referendum enabled the PAP advocacy for a merger into
Malaysia returned in its favor.
PAP’s English-language centered and western capitalist oriented policies did not
go down well with the Chinese educated segment of the population. Despite receiving
similar amounts of funds and aid from the state, Chinese education proponents resented
being drafted into the state system. They also felt that many of the privileges of self-

government benefited the English educated, while they saw themselves as bearing the
brunt of discrimination and increasingly lacked the power to influence policies (Wang
1968, 210-225). While the PAP gave some leeway and compromises were made,
Chinese educationists were steadfast in preserving a pure Chinese system. Backed by
funds from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Barisan Sosialis vowed to defeat

the PAP (Turnbull 1989, 277).
To ensure a victory in the 1963 elections, the PAP made the campaign and
voting registration process extremely difficult for the Barisan and its supporters (Starner
1967). It also detained without trial, 111 opposition leaders and members under

Operation Cold Store, and refused the candidacy of incarcerated political figures
(George 1984, 65-69). The result was staggering. Through the help of the state-owned
media, a series of legal persecutions of the opposition as well as the British political
system that emphasized one-member constituencies, the PAP won 73 per cent of the
seats with only 47 per cent of the votes (Minchin 1986, 130-131). Barisan won 33 per

cent of the total votes. The success of the Lee faction lay in its ability to transform a leftwing PAP into one that was nationalist bourgeois in political orientation and pro-west
capitalist in its economic philosophy. From an anti-imperialist party with a majority
membership consisting of lower class Chinese, PAP became a political vehicle for a
small pro-British English-speaking capitalist class. Through the years his elite class

managed, through repressive as well as pragmatic means, to generate the support of
nearly Singapore’s entire population. Its success in Singapore however, could not be
repeated in Malaysia (Tremewan 1994, 29).
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Brief Malaysian experience 1963-1965

Unlike the PAP, the UMNO-MCA 1963 Malaysia Agreement had been rankled
with extreme haggling over taxation, finance and trade, with Singapore unbending over
attaining the best bargain. Singapore was interested in Malaysia as a common market
for the products of its rapidly growing industries. By 1960, manufacturing, trade, and
finance constituted nearly 40 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, totaling almost
S$1.2 billion (Ministry of Finance, Singapore 1981, table 1.2). The terms arrived in 1963
were highly assenting to Singapore, including the potential for a single market to be
gradually imposed throughout the following twelve years (IBRD 1963). On the other side,
Singapore refused to abandon its free-port status until the effective enforcement of the
market, which greatly benefited Singapore.
Another factor that brought discomfort to the Malaysian elite was the economic
prowess as well as relatively huge population of Chinese-Singaporeans. Malays, in
particular, had always identified the Chinese with the brutalities of the postwar period. It
was also a common perception among the Malays that a majority of Singapore’s
Chinese population had been staunchly leftists and highly chauvinistic. The Malayan
leadership was particularly worried over the Chinese population tipping the balance

against Malays, thus the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak.
However, the Malaysian elite was also concerned about the increasing
momentum of the Singapore communists. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Prime

Minister, retorted that an independent communist Singapore would be worse than a
hostile Chinese-dominated state within Malaysia (Turnbull 1989, 270). Thus Singapore’s
entry benefited both the Singapore and Malayan elites since a stronger Malayan army
and police force could be used to control and suppress subversive left wing activities in
the city-state. Neverthelesss, the PAP’s 1963 elections victory, which politically
marginalized the left, did little to allay the fears of the Malays since the its ethnocentric

tone proved to be no different. PAP’s advocacy for a “Malaysian Malaysia” call, which
basically trumpeted for an end to Malay and indigenous privileges, upset many Malays
and only reinforced their distrust of the Chinese-dominated PAP.
Even more displeased with the PAP’s entry into Malaysia was the MCA. The

PAP strategy involved displacing the MCA as the Chinese partner in the ruling coalition.
In 1964, it entered its candidates in the federal elections in the Peninsula. The PAP
managed only one victory, but went ahead to establish its branches throughout Malaya.

This move infuriated the MCA and brought them closer to UMNO in their suspicion of
PAP ambitions in their backyard. In the same year, a series of UMNO-PAP tussle for
power, both exploiting on ethnonational frictions to deliver their message, instigated a

number of Malay-Chinese riots in Singapore that killed 12 people and injured 109, with
another 240 arrested (Clutterbuck 1985, 321 ). Increasingly frustrated at the failure to
dislodge the MCA or win over UMNO, the PAP formed a united coalition in 1965 in the

form of Malaysian Solidarity Convention that attempted to gather all Malaysian
opposition parties under its leadership (Bedlington 1978, 209). This Convention turned

out to be a mainly non-Malay front, thereby impairing the PAP plan to generate as many
Malays under its wing.
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The PAP’s unrestrained assertiveness in exploiting communal issues
increasingly heightened racial tensions in both Malaysia and Singapore. Its explicit
intents in usurping the MCA to represent Chinese interests in Malaysia within a new
political coalition had agitated many Chinese Malaysian capitalists, who dreaded the

encroachment of their commercial sphere by Singaporean capitalists. To avoid further
communal bloodshed as well as upsetting the traditional UMNO-MCA alliance, Malaysia
unceremoniously expelled Singapore and the PAP from the Federation in 1965
(Tremewan 1994, 29; Fletcher 1969, 36).
Conclusion

Both Marx (1972, 112-113) and Engels (1967, 10-11) documented the
significance of the industrial proletariat as forces of anti-systemic struggles. The unity of
Malaya and Singapore was not only a matter of economic rationality, but it also served

as an antecedent to a unified working class popular alliance. As such, a unified Malaya
and Singapore was detrimental to British interests. Separate political entities not only
served to keep away any threat of a united opposition front between the two colonies,

but they also ensured the cultural distance of the two countries from each other, thereby
reinforcing the existing political economic obstacles to an effective mass alliance
between them.
An independent Singapore without Malaya seemed to many as an unfeasible
political economic existence. Since the Malayan and Singaporean economies were
inextricably linked, anti-colonial efforts had to involve popular uprisings on both the

island, where the Chinese working class was formidable, and in the ‘peninsula,’ where
Malay peasants could be mobilized for effective mass support. The state of Chinese-

Malay relations was crucial for social and political stability as well as for prospects of
democratization in Malaysia, and Singapore. In Malaysia, both groups respectively
dominated the economic and political spheres, thereby injecting significant influences in

the political economy of the country. Singapore’s historical process involved a similar
path with Malaysia, but its urban-based economy and Chinese-dominated population
produced a working class that was heavily urban Chinese in membership. In order for

anti-systemic groups to function as potent energy of social revolutions, their mass
mobilization through a unified vision of national liberation and democracy had to be
ideologically clear as well as perceptibly pragmatic.

However, the urban working class in Singapore and the peasantry in rural
Malaysia were divided in terms of ethnonationality and sense of worldviews. As a result

of the inherent historical complexities emanating from within the colonization process as
well as external global factors, Malay and Chinese ethnonationalism were mutually
antagonistic and divergent in their aims and objectives. Each group had developed
distinct experiences of racial and class exploitations by British colonialism. Thus the
promise of political liberation for each group was developed along ethnocentric forms of
social identifications. It comes as no surprise that a major reason for the failure of any
popular democratic class alliances in Malaysia and Singapore has been the inability for
the Malays and Chinese to effectively foster political consciousness beyond. their
respective ethnonationalism to move toward concerns of democracy of the greater

national community.
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Neither the Chinese-dominated CPM nor the Malay leftists succeeded in

establishing a cohesive class-based national vision. Despite advocating the ideals of
equality and justice, the political realities of the capitalist system that functions on the
principles of competition over resources compelled these factions to place ethnonational
concerns over communitarian ones. At the mass popular level, political mobilization

seemed to succeed on issues of culture and language. These are social institutions that
serve to represent the character of national identities. According to Reicher and Hopkins
(2001, 122), “the nature of institutions: the buildings and rules and regulations which
govern our social exchanges and in which we live our everyday lives.....differ from
country to country and could well explain national differences.” National identities are
especially significant to those who do not enjoy class privileges and power. This is
because the nation is always conceived in terms of deep, horizontal comradeship, in
which all members stand as equals at least as far as nationality is concerned (Anderson
1983, 15-16). In Malaysia and Singapore, the concept of nation had difficulties moving

beyond a singular identity due to the multitude of conflicts over power and resources,
which happened to also fall along race and ethnonational lines.
Furthermore, structural forces in the form of world systemic transformations also
contributed to the failure of popular movements in Malaysia and Singapore. Abiding by
American hegemonic demands to suppress popular anti-systemic movements, the

British succeeded, through armed means, in preventing further mobilization of such
forces. The failure of a popular democratic alliance to surface enabled the British to
facilitate the elites in Malaya through UMNO, and in Singapore through a ‘revamped’
PAP, in forming the future governments of both countries. Structural theorists contend

that the capitalist class is divided along a variety of dimensions, and competition and
private property within capitalism make it inevitable that this class would also be

fragmented due to short-range conflicts of specific interests (Hurst 2001, 140; Aldrich
and Weiss 1981; Poulantzas 1973). To a significant extent the underlying conflicts
between the British, UMNO, MCA, and PAP served to illustrate this point. On the other
hand, the realization between them that their survival necessitated a political coalition
also evidenced that a ruling class alliance was the answer to their political survival. As

William Domhoff (1998, 72) asserted, “Social cohesion is important from a classdominance perspective because the most socially cohesive groups are the ones that do
best in arriving consensus when dealing with a problem.” The fact that the Alliance
managed to smoothly package a deal in light of advancing political adversity showed the
usefulness of common social economic backgrounds as a vehicle to arrive at a
consensus.
When wealth and privileges are concentrated within the hands of a few who
consolidate their power through the state machinery, the opportunities for a popular
alliance to emerge become slim. To add to the complexities in Malaysia and Singapore,
the class structure is heavily channeled along ethnonational alignments, making crossethnonational alliances problematic. In the next chapters, it becomes obvious that both
the states in Malaysia and Singapore found it convenient to accentuate and exploit class
and ethnonational tensions as a means to strengthen state power against popular-

national democratic forces.
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CHAPTER 6
CAPITALIST PERIPHERAL DEVELOPMENT:
STATE, CAPITAL ACCOMODATION, AND INEQUALITIES
IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 1960-1990

This chapter examines the interactive relationship between dependent state capitalist
development and the rise of the UMNO-led National Alliance (renamed the National
Front after 1970) in Malaysia and the PAP in Singapore.
For the state, capitalist development now serves as an impetus for economic
growth as well as a source of political survival. A crucial element of peripheral
development is the dependence on foreign capital. In order to secure capital investments

and maintain linkages with the world economy, without which it could not survive, it
becomes imperative that the state consolidates its political power over civil society by
forcefully intervening in the national economy (Kamrava, 2000). It does this either by

building alliances with foreign capitalists or by patronizing its own capitalist class. Over
and above this, the state ensures the sustenance of the capitalist system by providing
physical infrastructure and a political environment conducive to business transactions.
In comparative perspective, the nature of peripheral capitalist development in
these two countries is distinguished by two factors. First is the distinctive role of each
state in the world economy reflected by their respective location along the demographictechnological commodity chain of East Asia. Second is the type of internal tensions that
have threatened to destabilize the social-political order and jeopardize capitalist

investments. In resource-rich Malaysia, the state has been performing a balancing act
between the sustenance of its political legitimacy through Malay electoral support and
the formulation of policies favorable to capital investments, which has always threatened

to further marginalize a majority of Malays from the economy. The state embarked on an
affirmative action policy to protect Malay interests, a crucial element in political stability,
while courting foreign capital remained imperative. The result has been the formation of
new forms of inequalities in a newly industrializing Malaysia.
In Chinese-dominated Singapore, its limited resources have forced the state to
rely heavily on foreign capital in striving toward a metropolitan-type capitalist
development. Given its ‘Chinese’ existence within a Muslim-Malay region, the state’s
survivalist approach to development has been accompanied by social control policies
that subjugate and weaken the working class and Malays, thereby widening
ethnonational-class disparities. To prevent internal tensions from disrupting its political
stability and the health of its economy, the state pursues a policy of heavy intervention in
both its industrialization drive as well as its domestic affairs.

In both these countries, the maintenance of the capitalist system through the
patronage of the state becomes the main policy approach. In this process, the state
accumulates political power at the expense of a fragmented proletariat, peasantry,
women, and in the case of Malaysia even the middle classes.
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State, Capital, and Ethnonational Balancing in Malaysia 1957-1969

Injection of US investments into capitalist Asia with its center in Japan created
rippling effects throughout the region. The flow of commodity chains across Asia has
enabled the industrialization process to gradually take place in systematic and temporal
as well as demographic stages. A consequence of this US policy was the development
of Japan into an industrial powerhouse, whose products had privileged access to US

markets, as well as the rise of South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong as semi-peripheral
regions that served to oblige Japanese industrial needs and products (Gereffi, 1998).
Low labor costs and the relatively stable political environment provided Japanese

industries with a suitable investment climate in these countries. The accessibility of US
markets was also extended to these countries’ products, and as a result, these countries
were able to benefit from an export-oriented manufacturing economy that fuelled the
remarkable economic growths of these ‘Asian miracles’ in the coming decades (Cho and
Kim 1998, 125-127).
Malaysia’s location in a dynamically changing Asian industrial division of labor
within the capitalist world economy has provided it with opportunities for extraordinary

economic growth. But for the period of the 19505 and 19605, its natural resources were
the only lifeline to the world economy. While an import-substitution economy was taking
place, Malaysia’s growth strategy emphasized expansion of commodity exports (Rao,
1980).
The first decade of Malayan/Malaysian independence was a period in which the
elite classes solidified their positions and utilized the state apparatus to advance their

political economic interests. It was also a phase when foreign capital accumulation
through import-substitution strategies was the state’s economic lifeline and source of
political sustenance. The effect of both these complementary phenomena was a
politically strong one party state and an economic structure marked by social
inequalities.

The National Alliance functioned in a cabal-style political agreement premised on
the constitutional rights of Malays and other indigenous peoples to special privileges, in
return for recognition of non-bumiputera citizenship. But to the Malays, the actual
framework of governance within the Alliance was based on the preservation of Malay

political hegemony; UMNO drew its legitimacy from its guardianship role of Malay
interests (Chee 1991). For the Chinese and Indian elites, this arrangement for the time
being was convenient since political reality emphasized Malay electoral support as
crucial for the Alliance’s political survival. This meant that their capital interests had been
fastened to the political existence of the Alliance. At the same time it also became

evident to UMNO that although foreign investments were crucial for Malaysia’s survival
in the capitalist world economy, the party’s political sustenance was dependent on
Chinese, and to a lesser extent Indian, capital and industry (Zakaria and Alatas 1999).
While Malay and non-Malay capitalist interests have been struggling for policy
prioritization, there has been scant disdain for foreign capital by both Malays and nonMalays. At the onset of independence, both Malay and non-Malay elites had become
aware that survival of a peripheral capitalist state depended on the constant supply of
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capital investments. Local commerce, traditionally under the control of the Chinese
business community, drew their finances from the apex of the commodity circulation

structure, usually controlled by a few but large European monopolistic firms
(Puthucheary 1960).
Hence, along with foreign capital, a small but quite significant portion of
investments came from local Chinese capital, which could be categorically distinguished
into two groups. One is capital connected to national economic production (national
market), and the other is capital directly involved in the international commodity circuits
(Jomo 1986, 215). The first group comprised mainly Chinese capital neither tied to the
import or export of trade. Such capital is invested in the production of goods for local

consumption such as foodstuff and building material, and in the provision of local
services such as transport and real estate (Lee 1978, 218). The second group consisted
mainly of Chinese capital invested in production chains that are dependent on the export

or import sectors (Lee 1978, 221; Wheelwright 1963, 214). Although initially constrained
by the domination of British capital, Chinese capital had little conflict with British or
foreign capital (Jomo 1986, 237).

It is also quite useful to note that concentration of capital has been a prominent
feature in the Chinese commercial capital structure. For example in 1968, a competitive
atmosphere prevailed within local commerce, in which 93 per cent of retail outlets in
Malaysia were sole proprietorships compared to only 6 per cent partnerships (Lim 1968).
But 7 per cent of these firms employed only 18 per cent of all workers despite

accounting for nearly 55 per cent of all sales. The smallest 60 per cent took in about 30
per cent of employees and engaged in 30 per cent of transactions (Sieh 1974, 51-53).
For the Alliance, Chinese capital through MCA commercial networks was
increasingly becoming its financial lifeline. But for UMNO, over-reliance on the MCA
threatened to weaken its institutional independence. The opinion among the Malay ruling
elite had been that an UMNO based Malay capitalist class was the key to complete selfsufficiency of the political organization. UMNO members were aware that the British had

not been serious in their effort to aid Malay capitalism. The British had founded the Rural
and Industrial Development Agency (RIDA) as a token promotion of Malay economic
development. But the lack of state support and the half-heartedness in colonial efforts to

actually enhance Malay economic development had caused this agency to perform
miserably. In light of this, as early as 1957, efforts by UMNO to create a Malay
entrepreneurial class had already taken root (Jomo 1986, 247).
Under the Alliance, RIDA was reformed to cater toward assisting Malay capital
accumulation through Malay participation in and ownership of commercial enterprises.
But UMNO had not yet attained a sufficiently dominant position within the Alliance during

the first few years of independence to ‘infringe’ upon issues relating to commerce and
finance, a stranglehold of the MCA and MIC. Despite the state’s seemingly increased
commitment to aid Malay business participation, these efforts were ultimately unfruitful.

Apart from the advantaged few at the top echelon of Malay community, Malay advances
in capitalist sector remained unimpressive (Jomo 1986, 246- 248).
Fearing that Malay industrial failures would trigger faltering Malay expectations of

UMNO, RIDA in I965 was re-instituted into a trust agency in the form of the Maj/is
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Amanah Rakyat or MARA (Indigenous People’s Trust Council) (Gomez and Jomo 1997,
21). Through MARA, the state planned to procure and hold indigenous capital with the
aim of increasing bumiputera equity shares. In the same year, a nationwide dialogue on

Malay private interests were held through a Malay Economic Congress, and a state
backed equity financial institution, the Bank Bumiputera Berhad was set up to service
Malay capital investments (Tham 1973, 45-56).

Despite these promising efforts for Malays, the spirit of Alliance compromise,
which had thus far inspired its cohesion, disabled any further effectiveness of these
undertakings (Jomo 1986, 249). Class consensus was based on Malay elite stronghold
on political hegemony and Chinese capitalist control of the private sector. Such Malaybased projects required some degree of cooperation from local Chinese businesses. But
organized largely along kinship distribution networks and ethnocentric associations,
Chinese commercial entities were virtually impenetrable fortresses. Furthermore, both
fbreign and non-bumiputera capital had been strongly embedded in the country’s

manufacturing industry (Drabble 2000, 244).
But with independence came a somewhat different relationship between foreign
capital and state-led development. The Malaysian state now possessed some degree of

effective policy dictation as far as investments direction was concerned. The World Bank
had ‘advised’ for a diversification of the economy through import-substitution
industrialization, in which the state would provide foreign corporations with social and

economic infrastructure as well as the ‘open’ markets for imported goods, including
favorable tax incentives (IBRD 1955). State nationalization of industries and trade

barriers, on the other hand, were highly discouraged. Although the Alliance incorporated
most of the Bank’s recommendations into Malaya’s industrial policy, it was fairly
unbending on fixing tax holidays for the country’s ‘pioneer industries’ (Lo 1972, 74-77).
In 1958, the Pioneer Industries Ordinance was formulated, which allowed pioneer
status companies tax relief measures for varying periods depending on size of
investments (Jomo 1986, 220). In 1960, the Malayan Industrial Development Finance
Limited (MlDFL) was established by the Alliance government as a step in attracting

foreign investors in the import-substitution industries. From 1962 to 1966, the state
nurtured manufacturing growth behind considerably excessive tariff and quota
protection, which bestowed great advantages to foreign firms (Edwards 1975, Lim 1973,
261; Wheelwright 1963, 214). Effective protection rates rose from 15 percent in 1962 to
45 per cent in 1966 (Edwards 1975, 293). Furthermore, according to Raja Mohar (1976,

4), “Foreign investors were allowed to own one hundred percent of the equity even when
they had full protection of the domestic market for their products.”
Over the period of the 19605, the timing and volume of foreign direct investments
(FDI) became crucial determinants of the pattern and rate of national growth (Drabble
2000, 240). Much of the earlier investments were directed toward the resource-based
industries, but Malaysia’s import-substitution strategy facilitated by the Pioneer

Industries Ordinance enabled large foreign manufacturing firms to flourish under tariff
protection (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 16). Investments in light manufacturing, chemicals,
consumer products, electronics and capital goods, gave rise to the growth of private and
public limited companies, which grew respectively from 38.5 per cent and 6.95 per cent
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of all business concerns in 1959 to 54.76 per cent and 23.7 per cent in 1971 (Hoffman
and Tan 1980, Table 11.2).
Due to the lack of state support, local development in manufacturing and
technology remained small, with domestic capital, mainly involving Chinese commercial
investments in light industries, contributing only a small share to import-substitution
efforts (Khor 1983, 24-25). The state had political reasons not to be seen encouraging
Chinese industries, thus the opening of investments to foreign companies. Nevertheless,
the Chinese capitalist community was able to exploit whatever opportunities were
available especially in areas such as construction, government contracts, and finance
(Drabble 2000, 243). In Sarawak and Sabah, the largest groups of capitalists were also
Chinese, primarily accumulating their wealth through the profitable timber industry, light
resource-based manufacturing, real estate, and retail. Nevertheless, their scale of
business was relatively labor-intensive and technologically less complex (Jesudason

1989, 64-65; Leigh 1988; Lee 1976).
Most lacking was bumiputera capital participation. Despite the setting up of state
initiatives to encourage indigenous capital investments in pioneer status companies,
bumiputera capital could not move beyond the traditional cottage industries, transport,
and contracting. Import-substitution tended to benefit those Malay entrepreneurs who
had political links with the ruling Alliance, and who together with their Chinese
counterparts established joint ventureships in pioneer status companies (Crouch 1994,
20-21). The various state-sponsored programs had failed to stimulate the growth of
successful Malay entrepreneurs and capital. In 1970 Malay ownership constituted only
2.5 per cent of total assets held in the corporate sector, compared to the Chinese at 22.5
per cent, and foreigners at 60.7 per cent (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 19).
Malaysia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew an average of 4.7 per cent from
1961 to 1965 and about 5 per cent during the period 1966 to 1970 (Drabble 2000, 186;
Rao 1974, Table 8). Although the import-substitution strategy tended to encourage

foreign firms’ investments in the 19605, a huge portion of these had been carried out
through their local subsidiaries, which handled component assemblies, and packaging,
with capital and technology imported from the parent companies overseas. Despite rises

in wages, there was limited capability in the local markets to absorb these products.
Furthermore, these industries had little linkages to the local economy, resulting in no
reduction of unemployment (Jomo 1990, 12-13).
That all these factors contributed to the maintenance of social inequalities is

hardly surprising. With foreign capital dominating the national economy and Chinese
capital picking up the left-over resources, income gaps between the various
ethnonational groups increased. Table 6.1 on the following page illustrates income

distribution by ethnonational groups. In 1957/58, the mean and median household
incomes of Malays were $140 and $112 respectively. In 1970, Malay mean and medium
incomes both rose to $172 and $122 respectively. In contrast, Chinese mean and
median household incomes in 1957/58 were $302 and $223, while Indians $243 and
$188. These rose to $349 and $261 for Chinese households in 1970, and $260 and
$191 for Indians (Shari and Mat Zin 1990; Snodgrass 1975).
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Table 6.1: Household Income by Ethnonational Group, Cohorts
1957/8 and 1970 (percentages), in Peninsula Malaysia
Malays
Chinese
Share of Income
1957/8
1970
1957/8
1970
Mean Income
140
172
302
381
Median Income
112
122
223
269
Source: Shari and Mat Zin 1990; Snodgrass 1975.

Indians
1957/8
1970
243
301
188
195

Table 6.2: Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) by Ethnonational
Group and Sex in Peninsula Malaysia 1957 and 1970
Malays

Chinese

Male
Female
Male
Female
1957
108
83
51
43
1970
54
41
32
25
Source: Sharif 1982, 71; Department of Statistics, Malaysia 1976.

Indians
Male
83
51

Female
68
41

Meanwhile, intra-ethnonational disparities increased sharply for the
predominantly rural Malays as compared to the heavily urban Chinese, by about 40 per
cent and 15 per cent respectively (Pang 1983, 317). Many of the Malays whose income

increased were urban residents. Although a rural development program was developed
in the first decade after independence, the state’s expenditures for public infrastructure
to accommodate foreign capital benefited mostly the urban areas in terms of
communications, transport, and power supplies. This was equally true for Sarawak and
Sabah (Leigh 1979). In fact, half of all public expenditure developments under the First

and Second Malaya Plans (1955-65) and First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) were routed
toward infrastructure (Schatzl 1988, 35-36). Such disproportionate share of development
toward mainly urban areas contributed to unequal social services across the urban-rural
divide. For instance, although health services delivery had become more widespread as

compared to the colonial period, rural areas and plantations still lagged behind cities and
towns in quality improvements (Sharif 1982, 71). For example, infant mortality for Malays
was still higher compared to Chinese and about equal to that of Indians in Peninsula
Malaysia in 1970, despite improved rates for all groups, as Table 6.2 above illustrates.

The incidence of poverty in 1970 in Peninsula Malaysia was 65 per cent for
Malays, 26 per cent for Chinese, and 39 per cent for Indians. While the figures for Sabah

and Sarawak are not available for that year, the 1976 data show 67.1 percent and 68 per
cent poverty rates for bumiputeras in Sabah and Sarawak respectively. For the Chinese,
it was 22.2 per cent and 29.6 per cent in the respective states (Drabble 2000, 278;
Malaysian Government 1991, Table 6). The consequences of these inequalities were to
exacerbate ethnonational tensions by the end of the decade.
It seemed apparent that the ‘ethnonational compromise’ to foster Malay

economic growth and increased non-Malay political participationwas not successful. In
1968, Malays still made up the bulk of the agricultural workforce in Peninsular Malaysia
with 65.8 per cent of all employment, compared to Chinese 31 per cent and Indians 51.8
per cent, with these two groups predominantly found in the higher production scales.
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The Chinese still dominated the commercial, manufacturing, mining, and services
sectors with 64 per cent of all employment in these areas, while Indians constituted 37.8
per cent, and Malays 30.2 per cent (Salleh and Osman 1982, 135-137, Malaysian
Government, 1971, 98). Even within the government sector, which had been the
traditional Malay employment stronghold, the number of non-Malays actually exceeded
the number of Malays in the highest paid management position categories. In 1968, nonMalays made up nearly 64 per cent while Malays 36 per cent (NOC 1969, 22-23).
End of Fragile Balance: May 13 1969 Racial Riots
The period of the late 19605 was a politically vulnerable stage in Malaysia.
Sustained impoverishment of the majority of Malays led to their disillusionment with
UMNO and the Alliance, and many began cozying up to the opposition Pan-Islamic Party

(PAS). For the Chinese, although the PAP had left the Federation, the impact of its
‘Malaysian Malaysia’ ideals lingered on in the aspirations of many, who now place their

support behind the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP). Frustrated by proMalay educational policies, Chinese cultural and educational groups as well as Chinese

schools’ associations also began to openly question Malay privileges and special rights.
A recurring issue was their demand for the establishment of the Merdeka University,
aimed solely at promoting Chinese culture (Von Vorys 1975, 270-275). Such a demand
simultaneously served as a symbolic protest against the state policy of introducing Malay
as the national language.

Angered at the pathetic plight of the Malay community, Malay extremists blamed
the Alliance for being ‘too soft’ on the Chinese. Along the same note, Chinese
chauvinists twithin the DAP pointed to the MCA as traitors, proclaiming that Malay
privileges were intolerable, as was Malay political hegemony a travesty, and Malay
cultural pre-eminence a banal joke (Von Vorys 1975, 279). Interestingly, both the Malay

and non-Malay factions most dissatisfied with the Alliance belonged to groups that had
begun to harvest the fruits of state economic policies (Zakaria 1982, 95). Many urban
middle-class Malays were annoyed at the slow pace of economic participation of Malays.

In their view, modernization was the result of state nurturing of Chinese businesses. The
fact that many of these businesses had consistently been reluctant to open their doors to
Malay employees only heightened their antagonisms toward the Chinese (Funston 1974,
23-24). Similarly, those who complained most among the non-Malays were those who

had gained from the economic growth, who had also become frustrated at their lack of
political power. For the more militant factions, solutions to each of their political

grievances culminated into simplistic formulae - for the Malays, ‘ to send the Chinese
back in the slow boat to China,’ and for the Chinese, ‘ to teach the primitive Malays a
lesson and send them to their proper place (in the jungle)’ (Von Vorys 1975, 280-285).

Meanwhile, three separate incidents served to aggravate tensions between both
these groups and in their relationship to the state. In 1968, the state succumbed to
political pressures, both internal and international, to commute the death sentences of

six Chinese men, allegedly members of the Socialist Front, who had been charged with
treason during the Indonesian Confrontation (Straits Times August 17 1968). Many

Malays saw this as a big let down by the state since many who served in the armed
forces were bumiputeras. Then in April 1969, a Malay UMNO worker in Penang was
murdered by Chinese youths as he attempted to stop them from vandalizing election
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posters. To avoid aggravating racial tensions, the state arranged a quiet funeral and
prevented extensive media coverage on the murder (Straits Times April 25 1969; Koh
1970, 71-73). Later in May, a Chinese secret society member, who was also a Labour

Party member, had been killed by a Malay police officer outside the capital city when the
former and his accomplices attacked a police patrol (Straits Times May 5 1969). In

contrast, his planned funeral procession of nearly ten thousand turned into a political
statement by the opposition, outﬁtted with ethnocentric slogans, anti-government
banners, and chants of provocation against the police with messages of “returning
violence with violence” (Von Vorys 1975, 286-287). For the Chinese, such extravagant

display of public force enhanced their political confidence that the ‘Malay’ state was
actually weakening. For the Malays, such ‘weakness’ of the state became a matter of
serious anxiety.
The results of the 1969 Elections were disappointing for the Alliance. Although it

managed to retain a slim two-thirds majority of Parliament, the margin of victory had
been heavily reduced. Compared to the 1964 elections, in which the Alliance had won
89 out of a total of 101 seats, the 1969 victory was on a 66 out of 104 seat leeway (Vasil

1972, 20-25).58 Elated opposition supporters in Kuala Lumpur, all of whom were Chinese
and Indians from the DAP, Labour Party, and Gerakan, organized a ‘victory procession’
that was marked by provocative taunts, slinging of racist slurs, chants of Obscenities
against Malays, and aggressive challenges to the police (Ongkili 1985, 204; Von Vorys
1975, 334-337).
UMNO supporters, outraged at the behavior of the Chinese and Indians, in turn

organized their own victory procession. Altho'ugh on police orders these processions
took separate routes, the two bands eventually collided into armed confrontations. Malay

composure over the previous months’ events exploded into uncontrolled rampage.
lntensified by speculation and rumors, mob violence took over the streets. After four
days of rioting, approximately 800 people were killed (mostly Chinese), thousands more

injured and millions of dollars’ worth of property damaged (Von Vorys 1975, 337-338).
For the next few days, the city came under a military curfew with sporadic violence,
looting, and arson occurring throughout. Isolated battles took place well into the next few
months (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 280).

The riots revealed the delicateness of the ethnonational balance throughout the
decade, and how deep the undercurrents of distrust had been running between the
Malay and non-Malay communities (Andaya and Andaya 2001, 281). The 1969 elections
were contested on highly passionate questions of education and language, made worse
against a backdrop of persisting inequalities. At this point, the ethnonational balance was

shattered with the Alliance suffering a credibility problem. UMNO received fewer Malay
votes and the Prime Minister withdrew from political office. The MCA, who had won

solely on Malay votes and sought to distance itself from the Alliance after the results,
heightened Malay suspicion of their loyalty in the days before and after the riots (Von

Vorys 1975; Ongkili 1985, 203).

58 Elections for Sabah and Sarawak were suspended and held in July 1970, in which the

Allaiance won only 23 out of the 40 parliamentary seats (Ongkili 1986, 203).

137
In order to restore order, Parliament was suspended for over a year and the
country was administered through a National Operations Council (NOC), headed by the

new UMNO chief Tun Razak Hussein.59 Consensus among the leadership was that in
order for social stability to be attained, Malay welfare had to be earnestly dealt with.
Such assessment was to materialize into one of the world’s most extensive affirmative
action programs for indigenous people in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP).
The NOC refuted allegations by non-Malays that they had been excluded in the political
economy of the country. Instead, in light of the wealth disparities and income differentials
in both private and public sectors tilting favorably toward non-Malays, the Council (1969,
22) concluded that: “the Malays who already felt excluded in the country’s economic life,
now began to feel a threat to their place in the public services. No mention was ever
made by non—Malay politicians of the almost closed-door attitude to the Malays by the
non-Malays in large sections of the private sector in this country.”
New Economic Policy (NEP) and State Industrialization 1970-1990
The 19705 period onward witnessed an expansive role of the state in economic

planning and restructuring. The state, through its technocrats in the bureaucracy,
became the single most important institution in the national economy. It was also in the
state that the attainment of NEP goals was expected (Zakaria and Alatas 1999). The
NEP aimed at the eradication of poverty through national unity and the restructuring of
society through economic parity between the bumiputeras and non-bumiputeras. One of
the most important ‘readjustment mechanism was education, especially through

ethnonational quotas favoring bumiputeras in higher institutions. But the underlining
interest for Malays was their greater participation in the country’s commercial life, in
which Malays as a group were to attain 30 per cent of the country’s corporate assets by

1990. To target these goals, the state sought to increase its role in public expenditure
allocations and in ensuring sustained economic growth (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 24).
Foreign direct investment and economic growth

In the 19705, the Asia-Pacific area was transforming into a newly emerging
division of labor within the world economy. The light industrial commodity chains of both
producer and buyer driven manufacturing were rapidly shifting from the second tier

countries of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong toward the third-tier ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) nations of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
(Bernard and Ravenhill 1995, 171-175). Partly due to higher labor costs in the first group
of countries, which at this point began focusing on attracting capital-intensive
investments, many TNCs needed appropriate investments in low and semi-skilled labor
for apparel production and electronic component assembly (Numazaki, 1998, 70-73).

Thus many Japanese and American TNCs were in the hunt for both labor-intensive
industrial manufacturing and low cost capital-intensive production needed for these
growing industries (Numazaki 1998; Gerefﬁ 1998).

59 The NOC comprised of Alliance members, but also included the National Consultative Council,
represented by various social organizations seeking the obtainment of racial harmony and nation-

building through forums and dialogues (Ongkili 1985).
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Under the NEP’s Second to Fifth Malaysia Plans, the foci of the economy were
on continued rural development and commercialization of agriculture, regional
development, ancillary policies to enhance access for bumiputeras to education and
commerce, and the promotion of industry through export-oriented industrialization (EOI)
(Drabble 2000, 197). The flow of capital toward Southeast Asia provided the state the

opportunity to absorb these investments through FDI, which was utilized to jump-start
the NEP programs. The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) was passed in 1975 to
facilitate the funding of NEP projects through state-coordinated capitalization, centered
within the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) (Low 1985, 87-88). But since the Chinese, as

main domestic savers, were reluctant to allocate their capital for such projects, FDI
became its principal source of capital accumulation (Drabble 2000, 240; Fong 1989,

203)
The state laid down various restrictions on investments within the ICA as well as
other numerous legislations such as the rejuvenated Investments Incentive Act 1968 that
aimed at requiring at least 30 per cent bumiputera participation in ventures. Many
Chinese and foreign investors were initially turned off by the NEP’s investment
guidelines (Low 1985, 80-83). While several chose to solicit their capital within the new

policy, many others took theirs elsewhere. From 1975 to 1985, Malaysia experienced a
total of almost $12 billion in Chinese capital flight (Tan 1993, 88). In 1977, the Act was
amended to allow some realistic leeway for investments. Despite that, the ICA had an

overall depressing effect on investments due to its ‘bumiputera equity requirements,’
which estimated a 30 per cent fall effect for Chinese equity share, and around a 30 to 40
per cent for foreigners (Jesudason 1989).
Despite the ICA, many foreign investors came to do business in Malaysia; it had
been obvious that the state remained firmly in control after the riots, therefore FDI was

not adversely affected. To accommodate low-wage manufacturing in electronics and
apparel, the state established export-processing zones (or Free Trade Zones - FTZ) for
semi-conductor assemblies as well as production incentives under the Promotion of
Investments Act in the mid—19805 (Jesudason 1989, 180-189). Motorola, Intel, Hitachi,
Monsanto, Ericsson, and Nippon Steel Glass were among the major transnationals that

either provided production in Malaysia solely for exports or for sale in the Malaysian
domestic market (Anuwar and Wong 1993).

From 1961 to 1990, Malaysia received nearly 30 per cent of all investments
coming into the ASEAN region, second only to Singapore (Chia 1993, Table 2). From
1960 to 1980 total investment approvals approximated at US$4.5 billion, while from 1981
to 1990 it nearly tripled to UD$12 billion (Drabble 2000, 240;Chia 1993). The rise can be
explained by a second capital surge across Asia in the 19805, when Japan and the Nle

of East Asia experienced higher production costs especially in semi-skilled labor.
Malaysia was deemed attractive due to its political stability, well-developed

infrastructure, growing markets, and state-supported industrialization programs
(Phongpaichit 1993). The state had earlier embarked on a quite insightful ‘Look East’
policy toattract such capital, which eventually actualized in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
displacing the US and Europe as principal investors during the later part of the 1980
(Bowie 1991, 115-17; Chia 1993, Table 3).
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The recession of the 19805 slowed down investments for exports, but a short
period of import-substitution coincided with the Industrial Master Plan, which aimed at

developing and gearing industrial labor, technology, and infrastructure toward heavy
industrialization. This period saw investments, mainly Japanese, in the domestic
engineering, automobile, cement, petrochemical, and steel industries. The Heavy
Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) was set up to facilitate capital intensive infant
industries in these areas, and tariffs were strengthened for the protection of these
industries (Lucas and Verry 1999,199-202; Alavi 1996,175-178).
By 1987, manufacturing surpassed agriculture as the primary sectoral earner in
Malaysia, which together with services grew at an average of 18.1 per cent from 1978 to
1993 (Lucas and Verry 1999, 205). The growth of manufacturing alone, as percentage
share of GDP increased from 9 per cent in 1965 to 24 per cent in 1990 (Watanabe and
Kim 1996, 69). Foreign direct investments had been crucial for these transformations.
But although increased foreign earnings helped stabilize Malaysia’s balance of
payments, huge amounts of repatriated profits tended to offset any growth of domestic
investments toward technological development (Jomo 1990).
State-partv-capitalist network

Malaysia’s state industrialization under the NEP not only stood out for its

dependence on FDI. Another important feature was the increasingly fine line between
the state and business, characterized by the National Front (formerly the Alliance)

parties’, namely UMNO, easy access to corporate decision making and wealth
accumulation. The linkage between the state and capitalism can be seen in the ways in
which capital was accumulated under state patronage. One way has been through the
creation of non-financial state enterprises to facilitate bumiputera commercial

participation, including trust agencies. The second method has been the establishment
of investment companies related to political parties, while another method involved the
privatization of statutory bodies into private hands. In all of these cases, individuals with
close ties to the state and ruling political parties obtained effortless entry into powerful
positions of these new organizations (Gomez and Jomo 1997).
One of the earliest state business entities is the Ministry of Finance Incorporated,
which primarily functioned as the state’s holding company. It was used as an investment

arm for the state in areas that were deemed to be in public interest. As Malaysia
prospered, and the NEP goals were set, many state-owned enterprises flourished. Since
these enterprises are non-budget entities, a large number of them receive heavy funding
through revenues from Malaysia’s growing oil and gas production. The largest ones
have been the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB - National Equity Corporation) and
Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (Pernas - National Trade Corporation). Through these

corporations, the state managed to purchase the largest British agency houses and
plantation companies such as Guthrie, Harrison and Crossfield, London Tin, and Sime
Darby, thereby completing the ‘nationalized’ control of the natural resource-based
industries in the country (Saruwatari 1991, 384). Later, subsidiaries of these companies
proliferated and diversified into real estate, manufacturing, investments, and even

banking (Barlow, Jayasuriya and Tan 1994; Hara 1991, 358). PNB also held stocks
under its tvvin-subsidiary bumiputera trust schemes, the Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN)

and Amanah Saham Bumiputera (ASB). These trust schemes were aimed at generating
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assets on behalf of bumiputera investors (Yusoff 1991). By 1992 PNB had held RM22.7

billion (US$75 billion) in corporate stock, making it the second largest stockholder in the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), second only to the state’s Ministry of Finance
Incorporated (Malaysian Business December 1 1993).
The state also established various economic development corporations and

public enterprises that dealt in a spectrum of areas ranging from agricultural product
marketing, investment credit, housing, to land development and light manufacturing
(Mehmet 1986, 46-47). Although many of these enterprises originally aimed at improving
rural and regional development as well as poverty eradication, their organizational
growth and employment have been increasingly tied to political connections and
corporate interests. An example is FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority), one of
the most successful land and regional development bodies in the world. By 1992, it had
turned more than half a million hectares of idle jungle land into rubber and palm oil
plantations, worked by a total of 119,000 resettled peasant families (Drabble 2000, 221).
FELDA has also contributed to sustaining Malaysia as the world’s largest palm oil
producer. As an anti-poverty instrument, it has managed to upgrade the quality of life for
many of its settlers by providing social amenities and land titles (Bahrin and Muhamed
1992). But FELDA also functions as a plantation corporation, which in the long run, has
exploited its settlers into low-wage labor. At the higher end of this enterprise are the
politicians, who not only ensure settler loyalty to the ruling party, but also control
decisions regarding its assets and interests. As Malaysia industrialized many state
enterprises such as FELDA, which by 1992 totaled 1,149, reflected a tendency to

engage in areas of finance, manufacturing, and commerce - slowly leaving behind their
original poverty eradication goals (Mohamed 1995). Table 6.3 below illustrates this
point.
A prominent feature in Malaysian industrialization has also been the heavy
involvement in corporate business of political parties through their companies and
affiliated business circles (Bowie 1988, 182). UMNO, in its attempt to move away from
financial dependence on the MCA, created Fleet Holdings as its main holding company.
In the early 19805, Daim Zainuddin, then Finance Minister and formerly appointed

Table 6.3: Number of State Enterprises in Malaysia by
Industry 1965-1992
Type of Industry

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1992

Agriculture & resource-

6

13

44

108

157

178

Transport & construction
Manufacturing & services
Finance
Others

based

22
17
9
0

17
53
17
0

60
208
50
0

110
350
78
0

184
547
116
6

189
636
137
9

Total

54

109

362

656

1,010,

1,149

Source: Mohamed 1995.
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UMNO trustee, abused his position to channel much of UMNO’s assets into his personal
companies. Former Trade Minister Razaleigh Hamzah’s fallout with UMNO pushed
corruption issues, which all this while had been disregarded, to the fore. Having narrowly
and suspiciously lost to incumbent Dr. Mahathir in the 1987 party presidential elections,

Razaleigh’s faction filed a lawsuit against UMNO for improper registration procedures.
This resulted in a court judgment against UMNO, proclaiming it an illegal entity and
ordering the transfer of its assets to the ofﬁcial assignee (Gomez and Jomo 1997,122123)
To prevent its assets plunging into rival factions, the surviving UMNO leadership,
purged of its challengers, arranged for them to be placed into the hands of nominees.
This way, while UMNO is seen to physically detach itself from its assets it could still
control their transactions. Many of the nominees, such as Halim Saad, Tajudin Ramli,

and Wan Azmi Hamzah, closely linked to Zainuddin, went on to consolidate their power
in UMNO related companies such as United Engineering, TRI, and Land and General
(Gomez and Jomo 1997). By the late 19805, it had become obvious that UMNO had
been using this wealth to finance prominent leaders’ campaigns, generate electoral
support, and patronize prominent business circles. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Anwar

Ibrahim, who had had an unfavorable relationship with Zainuddin, frequently spoke out
against ‘money politics’ and the monopolization of corporate commerce by UMNO
politicians (Far Eastern Economic Review June 6 1991). It was not surprising that when
he assumed the Deputy Prime Minister’s post in 1993, the interests of his own financial

backers, mainly non-UMNO Malay businessmen, collided with that of Zainuddin (New
Straits Times November 3 1993).
The other National Front parties were also not to be left behind. The MCA pooled

its own resources to generate capital through its Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad
(MPHB), which by the early 19805 became the second largest company in terms of

shares held in the KLSE, and the largest company in the country in terms of paid up
capital (Mehmet 1986, 144). MPHB participated in a wide array of businesses ranging

from gambling, real estate, land, banking, and plantations to manufacturing and trade
(Gomez 1994, 215-219; Gale 1985). An example of cross-party business coalition is
illustrated in the UMBC-MPHB affair in the early 19805. To prevent political discord
arising from business transaction within the ruling National Front, UMNO and MCA
brokered a deal in between MPHB and Pernas. Previously competitors for a controlling
stake, each eventually shared a 40 per cent equity in the country’s third-largest bank the
United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC) (Mehmet 1986, 146; New Sunday Times
March 22 1981). The benefits of the NEP were not exceptionally a bumiputera elitist
domain, but that of the other groups as well.

The MIC followed suit with the founding of Maika Holdings, which became its
investment arm. MIC President Samy Vellu had proven to be a reliable political ally of
UMNO President and Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, and although not a listed
company, Maika received substantial beneﬁts in numerous state corporate ventures

(Gomez 1994, 245-280). Even the Gerakan, an opposition party before 1971, has had
business connections through many of their leaders, who have increasingly emerged

from the non-bumiputera professional class. One of them was Alex Lee, son of Henry
Lee, former MCA leader and Malaya’s Finance Minister in the late 19505. Alex Lee

inherited the D&C Bank from his father and was in the process of facing legal action for
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financial irregularities in handling his personal company Roxy Berhad, only to be saved

by his political connections to UMNO stalwarts. Roxy was later acquired by one of Daim
Zainuddin’s prospective billionaire understudy Tajudin Ram“ and renamed Technological
Resources Industries (TRI) (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 61).
Despite the flow of Chinese capital abroad, a significant number of Chinese took
advantage of the NEP to embark on new commercial ventures. Many Chinese capitalists
began to recruit bumiputera politicians and ex-civil servants into their Boards of Directors
and other top positions in their corporations. Some of the main corporations included
Berjaya, Genting, Malayan United Industries (MUI), and Malayan Flour Mills (Cheong
1993, 165-78). Many Chinese capitalists were also known to personally finance
individual UMNO politicians and form beneﬁcial alliances with prominent Malay patrons
(Heng 1993, 132). Two of the best examples are the Kuok family of the Kuok Group and
Quek Leng Chan of the powerful Hong Leong conglomerate. The Kuoks’ business
concerns range from sugar, shipbuilding, and hotel chains to real estate and
newspapers. To maintain an empire that spanned across the Pacific, close ties needed

to be forged with UMNO (Jones 1997, 129). Meanwhile, Quek of Hong Leong was
noticeably a financial backer of Anwar Ibrahim during the latter’s rise to Deputy
Presidency in UMNO (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 48, 66).
Another important strategy of strengthening state-party-capital alliances has
been the privatization of public companies. In line with the current business and political

logic of the conservative 19805 that had filtered into Reagan’s America and Thatcher’s
Britain, huge public spending became the focus of the Malaysian state during this period.
A mid term review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan quoted that by 1987, state investments in
public enterprises reached RM5.7 billion or 78 per cent of total paid up capital for such
bodies (Malaysian Government 1989; Ali 1988, 120-125). Salih and Yusoff (1989, 22-25)
reported that from a sample of 269 agencies, there had already been accumulated
losses of RM137 million (US$42 million). Like many other public bodies throughout the

world, management inefficiency was much to blame. But that many of these enterprises
reported losses were also not surprising since many of the successful ones were bought

or taken over by the bigger conglomerates (Gomez and Jomo 1997, 29-39).
In 1983, Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir announced the privatization plan. From
1983 to the early 19905 privatization of various public bodies through buy-outs,
corporatization, public listings, equity sales, and licenses to build and operate or own
megaprojects went underway. Among the many privatization projects included the
National Electricity Board (renamed Tenaga Nasional), HICOM, Pernas Hotel Chains,
Malaysian Shipping Lines, Peremba (a subsidiary of the Urban Development Authority),
Satellite Services Network, TV3, Metrovision TV4, Malaysia Airlines, Malayan Railways,

and Telekoms (renamed Sistem Telekom Malaysia) (Drabble 2000, 200-201; Rugayah
Mohamed 1995). Many of these privatizations have also benefited non-Bumiputera
capitalists such as Vincent Tan of Berjaya, billionaire Ananda Krishnan, and timber

tycoon Ting Pek Khiing, whose Ekran was granted permission to build the
environmentally disastrous Bakun Darn project in Sarawak (Far Eastern Economic
Review March 3 1994; Mohamed 1995).
Finally, mergers of corporations have enabled the consolidation of assets and
capital within a few politically connected hands. An excellent example of this has been
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the mergers and acquisitions of banking and financial institutions by UMNO-related
companies to control capital and assets. In 1970, Malay share of ownership in the banks
and financial institutions accounted for only 3.3 per cent, but by the mid-19805 it reached
more than 60 per cent (Hing 1987 410-411). The ownership structure of the banking
industry indirectly placed these capitalists over other sectors of the economy.
NEP inequalities and education

The positive element in the Malaysian industrialization drive under NEP has been
its ability to lessen the economic disparity between Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras

during this period. For example, income differentials ratio showed decreased inequality
between Chinese and Malays with ratio of mean income of 2.23 in 1970 to about 1.9 in

1989. The ratio between Indians and Malays also improved from 1.70 to 1.29. In east
Malaysia income differences between Chinese and bumiputeras in both Sabah and

Sarawak decreased respectively from 3.46 to 2.50 and from 3.40 to 1.88 from 1976 to
1989 (Wee 1995, Table 5.3; Perumal 1989).
However, such quantitative indicators can be misleading. Despite bumiputera
equity share rising from 2.3 per cent in 1971 to 20.3 per cent in 1990, non-bumiputera

share also rose for the same period from 34 per cent to 54.6 per cent (Lucas and Verry
1999, 185-186). Although the NEP aimed at facilitating bumiputera parity with nonbumiputeras, income distribution for the period 1970 to 1990 showed that overall

beneﬁts actually favored non-bumiputeras. Interestingly, intra-ethnonational disparity
also widened, and was greatest for Malays. The Gini coefficient on income inequality for
Malays actually increased from 0.46 in 1970 to 0.47 in 1987 (Shari and Mat Zin 1990).

There was also uneven regional development for this period. On the western
coast urban manufacturing areas of the Malay Peninsula (west Malaysia), there had
been marked rises in per capita income and lowering of poverty rates. But in the Malay
majority states of Kelantan and Kedah, which had been less industrialized, high poverty
levels remained as they were before the NEP implementation (Drabble 2000, 279).

Trengganu, the oil rich predominantly Malay rural state on the eastern coast scored
highest in per capita income but its poverty level was surprisingly also among the

highest. Across the South China Sea, the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah,
increasingly precious for their oil, natural gas, and timber, also reflected high incomes
and high poverty rates (Wee 1995). Such uneven regional development tends to

reinforce the evidence of wealth concentration among a few capitalists and wealthy elite.
Perhaps education was the one field in which Malays and bumiputeras generally
benefited under the NEP. One important ‘adjustment mechanism’ was in the
disproportionate award of state scholarships to bumiputera students (Munro-Kua, 7679). Another was the ethnonational quota for bumiputera groups in state higher learning
institutions. For example, a study of four main local universities revealed that in 1970
bumiputera students constituted 40 per cent of all students, while non-bumiputera made
up nearly 57 per cent. In 1980, ten years after the NEP was implemented, bumiputera
student enrollment increased to 63 per cent while non-bumiputeras decreased to 37 per
cent (Tham 1983 150-153). In the 19805, several new state universities were
established to promote greater Malay student enrollment. More importantly, another

mechanism through which the learning capabilities of Malay students were enhanced
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was the institution of Malay as the national education language. By 1980, the Cambridge

University ‘0’ level equivalent Siji/ Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) was fully prepared in Malay
(Hashim 2001).
Scholarships and state facilities were open to all bumiputeras, and not limited to

only those from the lower income group. Thus it was not uncommon for example, for
bumiputera children from privileged backgrounds to take full advantages of state
assistance such as enrolling in well-furnished state residential schools meant for the
lower income. In fact, economic growth in general, which provided access to better
learning environments and influential networking within the top circle, had worked
favorably toward students from the elite class of each ethnonational groups. According
to Ozay Mehmet (1986, 123), ”the method of awarding scholarships is heavily biased in
favor of richer Malay households. To a lesser extent, it also favors the richer Chinese

and Indians.” It is essential to also note that economic growth enabled many nonbumiputeras to pursue their higher studies through private-run institutions. In terms of
total university enrollment, both local and overseas, the proportion of non-bumiputeras to
bumiputeras was pretty much balanced. In 1985, Malays and bumiputeras constituted 51
per cent of all student enrolment in both local and overseas tertiary institutions, while

non-bumiputeras made up nearly 49 per cent (Malaysia 1986, Table 19.3).
Unequal development and disproportionate income levels illustrate the
consequences of dependent development of capitalist peripheral countries. It is no doubt

that the NEP has succeeded in pushing many bumiputeras to a much higher
development level than they had been in 1970. But benefits of industrial development
still favored those who had already been privileged with comparably greater economic
resources and social advantages. It is not incorrect to state that the while NEP has
managed to reduce inequalities between ethnonational groups, to a significant degree, it
has also further enriched the privileged class, the existing capitalists, and those
connected with the ruling class.
Foreign Capital and Social Control in Singapore 1965-1990
The nature and path of Singapore’s political economic development slightly
differs from Malaysia. As mentioned earlier, Singapore’s economic function in the world

division of labor as an entrepot as well as regional financial and service center have
enabled it to develop a pool of relatively skilled industrial labor and a sound social and
economic infrastructure. When Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965 following
two years of bloody racial riots, the PAP was at a loss on the issue of governing a small
island without resources or natural markets. The PAP had striven hard to forge a political
alliance with the Malay elite in Malaysia, but its brazenness in calling for the removal of
Malay-bumiputera privileges and in attempting to usurp the MCA capitalists was

considered too much too quick for Alliance leaders (Chew 1996, 94-98). For Lee Kuan
Yew, chief architect of PAP policies, the expulsion was a personal failure (Far Eastern
Economic Review June 20 1996).

However, a great advantage the PAP possessed was in the fact that despite the
country’s unequal ethonational-class structure favoring the Chinese, unlike Malaysia, the
Chinese in Singapore were also the overwhelming majority of the island’s population.

Such a situation would later facilitate both the political domination of minorities and the

145
formulation of policies that sustained the well being of its more affluent majority group.
Furthermore, consolidation of state power started off on an advantageous footing for the
PAP, since through Singapore’s short merger with Malaysia the leftists had been heavily
defeated, and with its expulsion from the Federation, the party had emerged with
indisputable reputation as patron of Singapore independence (Barr 2000, Minchin 1986).

The PAP’s underlying dilemma was how to sustain capitalist development
through a national economy that lacked natural resources. In this, the PAP’s strategy in
sustaining manifested in two major policy approaches. First has been state alliance with

foreign capital as an effective method to harness existing resource base, namely labor
and economic infrastructure, toward industrialization (Tremewan 1994, 29). Second was
the consolidation of state power through the control and subjugation of the working
classes as well as the minority Muslim Malays in order to suppress potential opposition
to the state (Tajuddin 2001, 66-67; Rahim 2001). The PAP has always viewed the
Malays with political contempt, since it had mainly been the ‘Malay privileges issue’ that

prevented their access to greater state power in Malaysia. Furthermore, Singapore’s
precarious geographical location as a ‘Chinese’ state in a larger Muslim Malay world has

been made increasingly flighty by its traditional dependence on mutual trade with both
Malaysia and Indonesia.
State, capital, and political economic survival

Although impressive, there is nothing ‘miraculous’ about Singapore’s rapid

economic growth (Huff 1994). In the late 19605, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore hooked on to the buyer-driven commodity chain for consumer production of
apparel, toys, and footwear, mainly for foreign firms (Gereffi 1998, 104-105). This period

was also one, in which the first wave of capital flow searching for low value-added labor
costs for re-export manufacturing of electronic components and assemblies, made its
way to East Asia (Borrus 1994, 134-136). With its developed infrastructure and relatively
low cost but adequately skilled labor pool, Singapore naturally attracted such capital.

American firms were highly prized as investors since the United States had made
special tariff provisions for offshore assembly (Arendt 1987, 23). By 1969, Singapore
emerged as the most competitive semi-conductor assembly production location for
United States corporations (Huff 1994, 324; Helleiner 1973, 35-40).
The numerous small Chinese firms, whose activity remained pretty much
confined within the regional commodity trading chain, had made up the bulk of

Singapore’s local capitalist class. But unlike the other countries, Singapore had not
attained an import-substitution industrial economy strong enough to develop a local
technology-capital base, and as such did not proceed to produce on the basis of exports
by domestically owned companies. Instead, Singapore’s capitalist development was

marked by an ordinate reliance on multinational/transnational corporation (MNC/TNCs)
investments rather than investments by its own entrepreneurs (Huff 1994, 35). The state
envisioned an industrialized Singapore, whose economy was diversified and moved
away from its traditional staple-port function. In light of its constrained domestic market,
manufacturing as the engine of industrial development necessitated an export-led
orientation. The absorption of TNC capital was, like Malaysia, an opportune spark for the

export manufacturing drive. Interestingly, local capitalists assumed almost no role in this
sector of the economy (Huff 1994, 330-331; Hamilton 1983, 60-63).
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Since economic growth depended heavily on foreign capital, the state had to
forcefully intervene in the economy in order to continue attracting investors. Social and
economic infrastructure was vigorously tailored toward meeting the needs of foreign
capital, and a stable political climate had to be maintained. To promote investment and
manufacturing, namely in shipbuilding, chemical and electrical equipment, and
engineering, the state founded the Economic Development Board (EDB). In 1967, the

Economic Expansion Incentive Act was passed to facilitate TNC investments by
providing efficient communication networks and the construction of industrial estates
(Jones 1997, 92). According to former Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee “The
government has to be the planner and the mobilizer...the free enterprise system,
correctly nurtured and adroitly handled, can serve as a powerful and versatile instrument
of economic growth” (The Asian August 20 1972).
In the absence of domestic private corporations, the state set up its own
enterprises to enhance the local corporate base as well as to pump in public funding

toward capital accumulation. These corporations came in the form of statutory boards
and state enterprises. Statutory boards are colonial legacies of state participation in the
shipbuilding and repair industry, whereas many of the state enterprises are subsidiaries

of three state holding companies, Temasek Holdings, Singapore Technological
Holdings, and Health Corporation Holdings. Among the big named subsidiaries
supported by these holdings included such corporations as Singapore Airlines, Neptune

Orient Shipping Lines, and Singapore Telecom (Jones 1997, 93-94; Low 1984, 253275). These enterprises brought in efficient management of resources as well as surplus
funds, which were channeled into public sector savings (Low 1985, 216-220). From 1974

to 1985, these savings rose from S$736 million to S$11 billion, translated into 22.8 per
cent of Gross National Savings in 1974 and 66.8 per cent in 1985 (Singapore

Department of Statistics 1986, 216). Much of these savings were invested in overseas
stocks and bonds by the state.
Public sector savings, together with private sector savings were significant

sources of capital formation in the Singapore economy. Private sector savings were
mainly derived from forced savings through the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a social
security scheme for retirees drawing on their pensions through amounts contributed from
salaries and wages (Huff 1994, 334-336). Although not as high as public sector savings
in terms of total gross national savings, private sector savings however made up the bulk
of the capital formation process in Singapore. During the 1960/69 period capital
formation from private sector savings accounted for S$974 million or 66 per cent of
gross fixed capital formation. During the 1980/90 period, capital formation from this
sector reached to about S$11.6 billion or 71.2 per cent of gross fixed capital formation,
reflecting an eight-fold periodical increase (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry
1991,103)
A good portion of capital was invested in public infrastructure such as state-ofthe-art port facilities, telecommunications, airport, and expressways as well as public
housing, which served to cater to TNCs through cheap and efficient production
operations. Much capital was also invested in industrial training for workers (Lim 1982,

50-54). The state offered generous incentives such as tax holidays and full ownership of
firms. In fact, TNCs were given freedom to bring in their entire operational package, from
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capital, technology, marketing, and even management (Huff 1994, 36). Supplemented
by flexible regulations from the state, such infrastructural projects tremendously induced
TNC investments, contributing to high employment and high savings, thereby reinforcing
the state-capital formation cycle. By the end of the 19705, fully owned foreign TNCs
produced more than half of all manufactured products (Rodan 1989, 130). Also, two third
of key decision-making positions was filled by foreigners while large capital and labor
contribution from TNCs nearly entirely constituted the country’s manufacturing growth
(Young 1992).
Singapore’s strategy to aggressively attract foreign capital for export-based
industrialization was not complete without the suppression of labor. The PAP’s expertise

in labor repression had proven itself before the merger with Malaysia, but total
submission of workers was required to keep wages from spiraling upwards. Thus a low-

wage labor policy was pursued through a National Wages Council, which regulated
wage costs (Disney and Ho 1990, 637-638). In 1967, the Criminal Law (Temporary
Provisions) (Amendment) Act virtually outlawed strikes and disciplined the country’s
labor unions (Vasil 1989, 154-155). The Employment Act and Industrial Relations Act

1968 further incapacitated workers from exercising many basic rights, while at the same
time conferring management discretionary powers over industrial disputes (Bello and
Rosenfeld 1990, 304). Shortly after its separation from Malaysia, the PAP had already
nurtured a compliant labor force within the National Trade Union Congress (NTUC)
(Rodan 1989, 29-31). To institutionalize a pro-state labor union, the leadership of the
NTUC comprised several PAP members, while its top post became a government
cabinet position (Tremewan 1994, 33).

By early 19705, manufacturing had become the leading economic sector in
Singapore. Maximizing labor employment meant that women and individuals with smallbusinesses were also geared toward industrial labor. Women joined the labor force in
large numbers after 1970, and constituted 44 per cent of labor in the country by 1980.
Similarly the proportion of hawkers and petty traders declined from about 21 per cent in
1970 to about 13 per cent in 1980, the reason behind this attributable to state policy in

reorganizing and reducing the number of small businesses (Huff 1994, 326; Tremewan
1994). Finally, unemployment rates showed decreasing trends from 8.9 per cent in 1966
to 3.5 per cent in 1980, and further down to approximately 1.7 per cent in 1990 (Lau

1993, 21-37).
The state’s industrial training program succeeded albeit to a limited extent, in
adjusting its labor force toward higher value-added production. For instance, in the
electronic industry, production of finished goods rather than mere component assembly
soon became the primary specialization. By the 19805, computer peripherals and disk
drive production replaced semi-conductor assembly as the more significant part of the
country’s electronic industry (Sandilands and Tan 1986, 35-40).
However, the 1985 recession pulled the state back down to earth for a reality

check. The recession caused significant declines in the demand for its products, while
labor costs began to climb steeply. Despite state-sponsored labor upgrading initiatives,

the state realized the limitations of an industrialization strategy hinging on the strict
alliance with foreign capital. Many TNCS started looking toward Indonesia and Thailand
for better priced labor, while other more technologically-inclined TNCs brought their
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capital back home to the core countries for more sophisticated and efficient production
processes (Rodan 1989; Jenkins 1984). Research and technological development, the
exclusive domain of core countries, were the only methods of adjusting the production

process to world systemic fluctuations through the enhancement of productivity. Despite
the total reliance on and accommodation to foreign capital, technology transfer had not
taken place in Singapore (Young 1992). Furthermore, its capitalist class had not even

been actively involved in the country’s export drive toward full industrialization.
The pointlessness of industrialization without technological development
compelled the state to return to the island’s traditional function as a regional service
center. Inspired by Italian city states of the late Middle ages, Singapore sought to exploit
its locational advantage to become a sophisticated offshore investment center servicing
industry and businesses not only in Southeast Asia but also the rest of the world (Huff

1994, 40-41; Pang and Lim 1982, 7-33). By investing state funds in the core, the state
hoped to obtain a portion of surplus distribution as well as attain some technological
upgrading for its own economy (Jenkins 1984). Investment in the periphery, on the other

hand was a way to link core capital to these countries through Singapore, thereby
uplifting its regional role as a service center (Mirza 1986, 190-200).

The service industry in Singapore has been a formidable sector in the economy
due to its commodity trading function since the colonial period, and had profited

tremendously from the island’s economic growth. In 1980 the real average monthly
earnings from the services sector, which includes financing, real estate, and business

services totaled S$1089 compared to commerce with S$792, and manufacturing, S$676.
In 1990 services recorded a combined average income of S$1785, compared to
commerce S$1294, and manufacturing S$1278 (Singapore Department of Statistics

1990, 23). In finance, the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) and the Monetary
Authority of Singapore (MAS) have both facilitated the growth of the financial markets as
part of the state’s efforts to pull investments into the country by providing high quality

financial services and facilities. The Singapore International Monetary Exchange
(SIMEX) was established to enable the convenience of futures currency exchange,
especially for the merchant banks. At the local retail level, a conglomeration of banks

provided highly efficient services in terms of a ‘financial economy of scale.’ Three
powerful Chinese banks monopolized the industry - the Overseas Chinese Banking
Corporation (OCBC), the United Overseas Bank (UOB), and the Overseas Union Bank
(OUB) (Lee 1990, 73-77). By 1990, Singapore was home to 13 local banks, 68 merchant
banks and 128 foreign and transnational banks (Monetary Authority of Singapore 1992,
81).
Also, it must be reminded that although the state has focused on export
manufacturing, Singapore still remained the leading exporter of rubber exports and the
world’s third largest exporter of spices from Malaysia and Indonesia, contributing to the
enormous wealth of several Chinese capitalists (Huff 1994, 311-312). In 1983, 85 per
cent of trade within the ASEAN region, mostly in natural resources including oil
refinement, was through Singapore (Mirza 1986, 193). A new form of resource
exploitation has emerged in the state’s role of exporting its service industry to other parts

of ASEAN. Through the introduction of core transnational finance capital (TFC), which is
the combined effect of industrial capital through TNCs and banking capital, Singapore
business has made its way into the neighboring countries. Taking advantage of cheap

149
labor and land in these countries, Singapore’s advanced service sector, particularly
finance, has facilitated this process by providing infrastructure investments agreement
with the country concerned to build production zones or promote tourism. Using
Singapore as a base for finance, communications, and other services including export
facilities, foreign capital could be safely invested for production of goods in these zones.
The southern growth triangle linking Batam island in Indonesia, Singapore, and the
southern Malaysian city of Johor Baru is one such example. The proliferation of
production, ﬁnance and tourism services emanating from this triangle has led to
tremendous profit margins for Singapore’s services industry but at the expense of the
other countries. In simple terms, Singapore has basically reinforced its role as
‘middleman’ of the region.
However, none of these services growth has contributed to domestic
technological development. Many of the corporations that partake in such projects have

mainly been Singapore subsidiaries of foreign companies. By 1988, 70 per cent of
Singapore made goods for exports still come from MNC/TNCs (Far Eastern Economic
Review Asia Yearbook 1988, 226). In this respect, Singapore’s capitalist development

has remained tied to foreign capital, rendering its industrial capacity to be technologically
barren (Tremewan 1994 43; Yoshihara 1988).
Race-class reproduction through education

Singapore’s historical process during this period presented two forces that posed
as imminent threats to the political survival of the capitalist state. First is the socialist
movement and second is the country’s Muslim-Malay minority. Singapore’s capitalist

development could not have moved fon/vard without successfully ensuring that these
forces become institutionally crippled. An effective method of containing and subjugating
these political threats to the state has been to formulate policies that would permanently

stratify these forces into politically marginalized positions.
As discussed in the earlier chapter, the PAP’s ascent to power had only been

made possible with the crushing of the leftist movements and the purging of its leaders
from the party. In view of the fragile circumstance surrounding the city-state’s political
economy, such as its lack of natural resources and its unstable ethnonational-class
structure, the state becomes compelled to insure itself against any form of potential

threat emanating from the working class, a hotbed for socialist movements. A bigger
issue seems to be the state’s extreme insecurity about its geographical and historical
existence within a larger Muslim Malay region (Jones 1997). There has always been a
persistent fear on the part of the state that the country’s Malay minority could perform a

subversive fifth column role. This fear is reflected in the state’s deliberate omission of
Malays in strategic positions in the Armed Forces. Responding to why there had been no
Malay fighter pilots in the Singapore Air Force, Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong (son

of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew) then Defense Minister and current Deputy Prime
Minister, explained that: “religion and ethnicity might conflict with their duty to Singapore”
(Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook 1988, 221 ).

In order to dislocate its ethnic Malay minority from the larger Malay world, the
state has embarked on numerous policies to politically marginalize Malays in Singapore.

One way to permanently submerge the Malays into political oblivion has been to
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superﬁcially build the country on a so-called notion of ‘multi-racialism’ that officially

expunges Singapore’s identiﬁcation with the Malay world.60 Singapore’s official history
as written in school texts even begins with the arrival of the British in 1819 (Lai 1995,
150). Blocking out the pre-British Malay history of Singapore or Temasik as part of the
Johor-Riau Sultanate has been an advertent attempt by the state to reconstruct the

origins of Singaporean history as part of the Malay world into that as a migrant society.
Simultaneously, the state has vigorously pursued policies that favorably attached a
strong ‘Chinese character’ to the country (Preston 1994, 213). This effort has been made

relatively smooth considering the Chinese constitute the island’s majority population.
Table 6.4 below illustrates the ethnonational composition of Singapore, which by the
year 2000 stood at 3,263,309 (Singapore Department of Statistics 2001).
The most crucial institution for state control and containment of Malays is
education. In 1967, the PAP declared, ”We will cease making the mistakes which nearly
all developing countries are now making — overproducing unemployable numbers of
educated white-collar workers and not turning out skilled artisans and technicians we
need for industrial growth” (Singapore Ministry of Labour 1967, 1). Such a statement
reverberates the frequent use of the economy as justification for intrusive state

involvement into civil society. The overriding state agenda of controlling the working
class and Malays can be captured in the state’s deliberate channeling of distinct groups
of people into specific labor positions through its educational policies. Randall Collins
(1979) has argued that education in a capitalist society often serves to control minority
and disadvantaged groups. This is evident in Singapore. As the country industrializes,
increasing numbers of Malays have been streamed into the working class through the
education process, making it easier for the state to successfully converge its race-class
policies within a single approach.

The early stages of Singapore statehood were marked by state efforts to disarm
Chinese education due to its close association with left-leaning anti-establishment
political mobilization. After its separation from Malaysia, the state badly needed to direct
its labor toward servicing foreign capital, making mastery of the English language its

priority focus (Seah and Seah 1983). English education, which equips labor with
international communication skills, has to a significant extent contributed to the country’s
competitiveness in attracting foreign investments (Huff 1994). The emphasis on English
has also had several other policy impacts. One, it has broadened the state’s support

Table 6.4: Population Breakdown in Singapore According to
Ethnonational group for 1980, 1990, and 2000 (in percentage)
Ethnonational group
Chinese
Malays
Indians

1980
78.3
14.4
6.3

1990
77.7
14.1
7.1

2000
76.7
13.9
7.9

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics 1987, 2001.

6° Manifested in the PAP’s ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ platform during its merger with Malaysia
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base to include a greater number of the country’s majority Chinese through an Englishspeaking class, an effort that has increasingly relinquished the importance of Chinese
education (Tremewan 1994, 91). Two, by requiring science subjects to be taught only in
English, the state has managed to push vernacular education, particularly Malay, onto
the outer margins of Singapore society. Such a policy has reproduced a class structure
that disproportionately represents relative Chinese social afﬂuence and Malay social
disenfranchisement (Rahim 2001; Chiew 1991; Seah and Seah 1983; Arumugam 1975).
To prevent its assets plunging into rival factions, the surviving UMNO leadership,
purged of its challengers, arranged for them to be placed into the hands of nominees.
This way, while UMNO is seen to physically detach itself from its assets it could still
control their transactions. Many of the nominees, such as Halim Saad, Tajudin Ramli,

and Wan Azmi Hamzah, closely linked to Zainuddin, went on to consolidate their power
in UMNO related companies such as United Engineering, TRI, and Land and General
(Gomez and Jomo 1997). By the late 19805, it had become obvious that UMNO had

been using this wealth to finance prominent leaders’ campaigns, generate electoral
support, and patronize prominent business circles. Meanwhile,

The PAP has always been aware that their political mainstay lies with the
majority Chinese. By stratifying schools into particular areas of study such as academic,
technical, and vocational, the state is able to motivate Chinese parents into sending their
children to English schools (Tremewan 1994, 86-88). The reason is clear. The Primary

School Leaving Examination (PSLE), which streams students into various disciplines in
secondary education, is largely based on student aptitude in English. Good scorers in
the exam leave for the academic stream, where the prospect of entering higher
education is bright (Lai 1995, 157-161). In addition, the core of these high-scorers would
also be tracked into the special and express courses in secondary schools that could
take them on a shorter route toward university and college education, where instruction
is In English (UNESCO 1999). For those who do not perform sufficiently well, they find

themselves heading toward the technical and vocational fields.
Needless to mention, under such a scenario students coming from more affluent
social-economic backgrounds tend to perform better on exams than others due to their
better access to economic resources and to conducive living conditions (Rahim 2001,
193-195 Blake 1991; Ahmad and Wong 1974, 7-9). Table 6.5 on the following page
illustrates the percentage of Special/Express Course eligibility, ‘O’ Level (Cambridge
Certificate) exam passes, and university enrollment by ethnonational group. Chinese
students recorded the highest percentage rates in the eligibility for special courses as

well as ‘O’ Level passes in both 1980 and 1990, while Malays lagged behind all groups
for both years. The Chinese also displayed the highest rates of university enrollment in

1980 and 1990, while Malays again showed the lowest rates (Singapore Department of
Statistics 2000; Singapore Ministry of Education 1998).
Low academic performance by Malays lies in the fact that Malays constitute the A

largest portion of the lower and working classes (Rahim 2001; Jesudason 1993, 16-18).
Low income means less access to resources needed to perform well in a highly
competitive school environment. Unlike Chinese and Indians, who can afford extra
private tuition to prepare for examinations, Malay students usually do not enjoy such
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Table 6.5: Student Eligibility for Special/Express Courses, ‘0’ Level
Exam Passes, and University Enrollment by Ethnonational Group,
Singapore, 1980 and 1990 (Percentage)
Special/Express
Courses Eligibility

‘O’ Level
Passes*

University
Enrolment

Ethnonational group
1980
1990
1980
1990
1980
1990
Chinese
54.3
59.1
28.7
62.6
1.5
4.6
Malays
30.2
28.2
6.6
24.5
0.2
0.6
Indians
34.1
34.6
16.9
37.7
1.4
3.6
* With at least five ‘0’ level passes.
Source: Singapore Ministry of Education 1992, 1998; Singapore Department of Statistics
2000.

advantages due to their parents’ inadequate resources. The use of English as the
language of science and mathematics has further placed Malays at a disadvantage
since a majority of Malay adults had attended only Malay schools, thereby creating a

non-English speaking home environment for their children. In 1990, only 29 per cent
Malay students passed Mathematics at the ‘O’ Level, compared to 73.2 per cent
Chinese and 41.3 per cent Indians. Drop out rates for Malays at the secondary
education level was 7.7 per cent in 1990 compared to 3.5 per cent for Chinese and 5.1
per cent for Indians (Singapore Ministry of Education 1998).
To secure the privileges of the mainly rich Chinese, the state has further

privatized the top schools. Here, admission is tightened partly through high fees and
costs as well as the prioritization of family network and residence as criteria for entrance
(Rahim 2001, 143-146;Tham 1989, 493). Incredibly, despite its privatization rhetoric, the
state had given these schools an added advantage by its provision of the latest facilities
and construction of dormitories (Buchanan 1972, 290). Competition for admission has
been so intense that corruption had been rife, with some schools soliciting up to
S$15,000 from parents (Strait Times January 30 1992). Although the state has devised
various schemes such as the Financial Assistance Scholarship (FAS) and Edusave, the

profound effect of these programs have been to lower state funding costs for education.
The FAS has served only a minimal number of people due to its low salary cut-off point,
while the Edusave has not only been meager in quantity but its non means-tested
requirements have benefited the rich as well (Rahim 2001 143; Straits Times Weekly

December 29 1990). The Edusave functions as a precursor to a resource-saving and
gradual autonomization of education, which will eventually hurt the lower and working
classes.
As a result of the education policy, the impact of education on class reproduction
is glaring. Table 6.6 on the next page depicts the occupational structure in 1980 and
1990, showing disproportionate representation of Chinese in the professional, technical,

and managerial categories, with Malays and Indians constituting higher rates in the
production category, with little changes over a period of ten years (Jesudason 1993, 17).
To complete the suppression of Malays, the state has launched a ‘Speak Mandarin’
campaign as a way to unite the various Chinese groups under a single cultural banner
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Table 6.6: Distribution of Occupation Categories by Ethnonational Group
In Singapore 1980 and 1990 (percentage)
Chinese

Malays

Indians

Occupational category
1980

1990

1980

1990

1980

1990

Professional &
Technical

9.0

17.5

4.8

6.6

8.8

12.0

Admin & Managerial

5.2

9.6

0.5

0.9

3.6

5.4

16.0
22.6
1.9

13.4
14.0
0.3

14.3
20.8
2.3

15.3
14.2
0.2

13.8
28.5
1.3

11.9
12.9
0.0

38.6

38.3

54.2

54.8

36.0

51.3

Clerical
Sales & Services
Agricultural 8
Fisheries
Production
Source: Jesudason 1993.

and to fortify PAP support among the Chinese educated (Huxley 1992, 292-293).
Mandarin has become mandatory for Chinese students and has been developed into a
high profile language in business as well as in public communication (Straits Times May
18 1992). Through this project, the state has reconciled its antagonistic relations with
Chinese education and conspicuously mobilized Chinese chauvinism into an acceptable
enterprise. By so doing the state planned to inculcate essential Confucian values of
patronage and loyalty among the young as well as to strengthen the ‘Chinese identity’ of

Singapore.
Racist position of the state

The state contends that the country’s lack of natural wealth, population, and size
ha-s forced it to exploit the resourcefulness of its citizens in order to attain economic
development (Seah and Seah 1983). As such, the state has often proclaimed that its

‘meritocratic’ education system has been the key to its survival by way of extracting the
‘best and talented’ to fill leadership positions and delegating the less skilled to the lower
rung occupations (Buchanan 1972). By perpetuating the meritocracy myth, the state

justifies the higher position of the Chinese as deserving and imputes the plight of theMalays to their ‘biological and cultural deficiency.’
The PAP has often sidestepped structural factors when explaining Malay
educational underachievement and instead ascribed it to cultural incompetence or poor

parental discipline (Tajuddin 2001, 69). The racist overtones of the state is captured in
its reduction of the cause of the economic disparity between Chinese and Malays to
“four millenium’s worth of Chinese cultural history in comparison to that of the equatorial
peoples, who would go to sleep in the afternoons” (George 1984, 164). When Malays
complained that the education system had not helped improved their standing in relation

to the other groups, the state cautioned them against a ‘psychological trap’ of believing
that they could be at par or better than the Chinese. Instead, the state has suggested
that Malays measure gains made against earlier cohorts (Straits Times February 8 1991;

Straits Times July 7 1987). The state has publicly announced that for biological and
cultural reasons, Malays could never perform better than the Chinese in science and
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mathematics, thereby justifying opposition to any move toward state assistance for the

underprivileged (Tamney 1996; Straits Times June 26 1992). For the state, Malay
‘shiftlessness and indolence’ are innate traits that cannot be rectified. Such official
explanations have inevitably generated a sense of self-denigration among Malays and
growing discontentment toward the state (Li 1989; Busch 1974).
The state has utilized the education system to ensure Malays acquire minimal
education in order to subject them into low-wage labor (Wilson 1978). The false stress

on merit as the criterion for social economic success has served to reproduce the class
structure and created a self-fulfilling prophecy that those at the top deserve their
‘rewards,’ while those at the lower end have their plight coming (Tajuddin 2001, 70). The
state has been unapologetic and blatant in its racist policies, which are often resonated
within the Ieadership’s speeches and writings. For example, amidst laughter and

applause, former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew addressed a
National Day Rally in 1990: “I don’t pretend I don’t share prejudices, I do. If one of my
sons had come back and said ‘l’ve got this American lady whom I met in America,’ my

first question is, what colour is she?” (Straits Times Weekly September 1 1990)
State social enqineerinq

The premise on which Singapore’s social policy has stood has often been
contradictory. On the one hand, it has staunchly abided by a meritocracy system to
harness its population’s ‘skills and talents,’ perceivably determined by factors ascribed to
biology and culture. On the other hand, the state has formulated policies that practically

assist the advantaged groups in their access to and maintenance of privileges, while it
has allowed incredible barriers to exist for the lower classes and Malay minority.
One of the most controversial state policies has been its eugenics approach to
population control and immigration. Anxious to sustain the ‘Chinese character’ of

Singapore, the state has been persistently working to overcome the problems of
decreasing birth rates among the Chinese population, particularly the educated. This is

made all the more serious by the increasing rates of its Muslim-Malay minority as well as
working class. In fact, in the mid-19805, Chinese-Singaporeans had one of the lowest
fertility rates in the world (Far Eastern Economic Review Asia Yearbook 1988). But the

state’s concerns date back all the way to the 19605, when it introduced abortion and
sterilization laws aimed at the poor and Malay minority. At a Parliamentary address, Lee
Kuan Yew stated: “Free education and housing lead to a situation where the less
economically productive people in the community are reproducing themselves at rates
higher than the rest. This will increase the total population of less productive people...
We will regret the time lost if we do not take the first tentative steps towards correcting
the trend, which can leave our society with a large number of the physically,
intellectually, and culturally anemic” (Select Committee Report 1969, 321, cited in
Tremewan 1994, 103).
Based on the steadfast belief that the Chinese are superior to other races, the

state has held on to the conviction that Singapore’s economic success has been the
result of the combination of positive Confucian traits and superior Chinese genetic pool
(Rahim 2001, 56). Thus in order to increase the Chinese ‘breeding stock,’ especially
among the educated class, the state introduced generous tax rebates, health benefits,
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and quality schooling for educated couples to encourage their maximum procreation
(Tajuddin 2001, 70; Quah and Quah 1989; Far Eastern Economic Review Asia

Yearbook 1988). For the working class Chinese, incentives came in the form of tax relief
for additional children. The state cleverly used the income structure to determine the
implementation of these plans, since income would generally reflect class and
ethnonationality. Conversely, not only are the poor encouraged to undergo sterilization
or abortion but regressive costs of hospitalization and tax schemes have caused them
potential hardship should they produce more children (Yap 1989).

Unfortunately for the state, economic growth and strict cultural patriarchy has
produced an increasing trend of unmarried graduate Chinese women and graduate
Chinese men ‘marrying down’ (Tremewan 1994 130-131). In response, the state
improvised various methods of encouraging graduate women to raise families with
graduate men, including a state-sponsored dating service of the Social Development
Unit (SDU). Through this program, the SDU actually managed to place 240 couples
under its patronage in 1988 (Straits Times Weekly April 29 1989). Despite its humorous
undertones, the state’s serious involvement in the project paralleled an earlier version of

social engineering — Adolf Hitler’s Lebensborn babies — the Nazi program of hooking up
‘genetically suitable’ couples of ‘pure Teutonic origin’ to procreate and eventually
produce a superior ‘Aryan’ race for a greater Germany (Clay and Leapman 1995).
When such measures became too lethargic for the impatient state, the facilitation
of educated Chinese from Hong Kong to permanently reside on the island was
undertaken. By 1988, over 4,700 families were admitted, and in 1990, the state

disclosed that it would grant admittance to another 25,000 families over the next eight
years (New Straits Times February 24 1990). Immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Korea are new additions to Chinese-Malaysians as the ‘traditional sources’ of foreign
labor. These workers are easily recruited in the higher paying service sector and have
greater chances of permanent residence in the Republic (Lim and Pang 1986, 62).

To solve the low-wage labor dilemma, the state permitted a good number of
workers from the ‘non-traditional’ sources of foreign workers (mainly from the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand) involved mainly in production and low-paid

contractual jobs, to be fully incorporated into the country’s working class sector.
However, the state has placed stringent restrictions on both employers and workers to
prevent these workers from obtaining permanent residency and from siphoning state
resources. Overstaying would be subject to harsh punishments including caning.
Marriage, which could entail children, would be non-permissible without state approval.
Welfare benefits including health are the responsibility of the employer, while savings

through the CPF are non-existent (Tremewan 1994, 134). Marriage to Singaporeans is
forbidden and women workers have to undergo regular pregnancy tests (Wong 1996).
Such a move satisfied the state in two ways. One, the working class reproductive
capacity is no longer a state burden, and two, the working class itself becomes racially
and ethnonationally fragmented to keep wages down. By mid-19905, 300,000 of these
foreign workers made up 19 per cent of its labor force (Huguet 1995, 525).
The categorization of traditional and non-traditional sources of labor itself
underwrites the state’s racist predilection. Workers from the Philippines and Indonesia

for example, had been working in the Republic much longer than those coming from

156
Hong Kong and Korea. But the fact that people from these ASEAN countries are Malays
in origin while the East Asian countries are determined to be ‘Confucian states’ renders
the latter better treatment under the state’s immigration policies. The eugenics approach
to population control and immigration, whether successful or not, illustrates the state’s
keen commitment to secure Chinese predominance in Singapore as well as to de-link
the accessibility of the working class to state resources.61
Inequalities in Sinqapore

Despite its relatively small population and inspiring economic growth,
Singapore’s social policies have created income inequalities wider than the rest of the
‘FOur Tigers’ and for that matter, the United States. By 1992, the top 20 per cent of

Singaporeans held nearly half of the nation’s income, while the poorest 40 per cent
received only 15 per cent. Compare this to the United States, which has one of the
widest income gaps in the industrialized world and a much larger population. The top 20
per cent in the US received about 40 per cent of the country’s income, while the bottom
40 per cent received 15.7 per cent. Table 6.7 below illustrates comparisons with Korea,

Taiwan, and Hong Kong (World Bank 1993).
Income inequality actually rose from 1975, and by the late 19805, about 30 to 35
per cent of households were poor (Clammer 1987, 190-200). Malays and Indians in
general have seen their economic position, while improved due to economic growth,

have remained stagnant or deteriorated relative to the Chinese between 1970 and 1990
(Lai 1995 154). In fact, Malay share in the higher income professional and technical
occupations dropped from 7.5 per cent in 1970 to 7.3 per cent in 1990, while in the
administrative and managerial positions, they dropped from 1.8 per cent in 1970 to 1.2
per cent in 1990. The Indians displayed similar trends, with reduction in the professional
and technical job category share from 7.4 per cent in 1970 to 6 per cent in 1990, while

having maintained a 5 per cent share in the administrative and managerial occupations
for the same period. In contrast, there was relative increase for the Chinese in both
these job categories from 82 per cent in 1970 to 82.7 per cent in 1990 (Lai 1995, 155;

Chiew 1991). In the manufacturing sector labor market, Malays and women

Table 6.7: National Income for Top 20 Percent and Bottom 40
percent, Selected Countries in 1992 (percentage).
Country
Hong Kong
South Korea
Taiwan
Singapore
United States
Source, World Bank 1993

Bottom 40

Top 20

Per cent
16.2
19.7
17.4
15.0
15.7

Per cent
47.0
42.7
41.8
48.9
41.9

6’ Lee Kuan Yew stated that a minimum 76 per cent Chinese majority must be maintained before
opening the door to Indian and Malay migrants can be considered (Straits Times April 23 1990).
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disproportionately receive lower incomes across all categories of industry (Lee 2001).
Overall, Malays had the highest rates of poverty due to their inability to cope with high
living costs and also to their decreasing remuneration on the basis of low educational
levels (Paul 1993, 294; Islam and Kirkpatrick 1986, 123-124). As in 19605 Malaysia,

Malays have also been discriminated against in the appointments to higher income jobs
in many commercial establishments (Tamney 1996; Li 1989).
Public assistance programs are limited in scope and the CPF does not cover

sickness disability and unemployment. In fact these programs have not only been
insufficient in meeting the needs of the impoverished, but they also operate on a bias
toward the well to do, since they are the ones with the greatest capacity to save (Lee
2001). According to William Lee (2001, 57) “In comparison to other affluent societies,

Singapore has little to offer in terms of social assistance to those living in or near
poverty. Little is known of Singapore’s poor and for that matter how Singapore deals with
them.” The main framework of these social or public assistance programs is built around
the postulation that state money ‘should not be wasted on the undeserving’ (Asher 1991,

Lim 1990).
Industrialization and Women

A brief discussion on women and industrial development in Malaysia and
Slngapore is appropiate at this point. Industrial development in these countries requires
the state to cater to the needs of capital investments, mainly in the supply of cheap and
compliant workforce. The intersection of class, ethnonationality and gender could be

seen in the way state policies in both countries have sought to absorb and incorporate
female workers into their capitalist development through patronization and exploitation.

Historically, Hindu influences in pre-capitalist Malay social structure had placed
women’s role and status secondary to men. But under Islam women in the Malay world
had freedom of movement and many prospered as traders, merchants, and even
landowners. In some places such as Pattani and Perlak, there was a succession of
queens instead of kings (Aliran Monthly April 1999). In Malay peasant societies, men
and women’s task allocation differed according to a social division of labor, but the value
of work in relation to production was the same. Under British colonialism however,
restrictive policies placed Malay women at a great disadvantage since males were

usually given preferences in any threshold opportunity that came for economic mobility
(Kaur 2001,15; Connelly 1978, 25-26).
Due to the contractual nature of Chinese labor, migration of Chinese women into
Malaya and Singapore came much later than men. Participation of Chinese women in
the economy had also been secondary to men. Other than those coming from affluent
homes, who used the benefits of higher education for upward mobility, Chinese women
in the economy were concentrated in the low wage categories of tin production and
domestic-type occupations of family run businesses (Kaur 2001,17). Nevertheless, a

number of Malay and Chinese women had been involved in political groups before the
Second World War, especially as members of several progressive and socialist
movements (Dancz 1987). After the war several women stood out as key political and

social figures, and by the late 19505, women’s wings became a prominent organizational
branch for many political parties in Malaysia (Andaya and Andaya 2001; Ongkili 1985).

158
Mass participation of Malay women in the capitalist economy was initially
confined to cheap wage labor exploitation in free trade zones (Drabble 2000, 248; Hua

1983, 188). Aihwa Ong (1987), in her book Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline
captured the plight of Malay women factory workers as an instrumental-biological
representation of neo-colonial attitude toward capitalist development in the periphery.
The position of Malays as low incomed agrarian workers presented a ready pool of
cheap labor, from which Malay women were drawn to satisfy the needs of both TNCs
and the Malaysian state. For TNCs, Malay female labor represented the profitability in
absorbing ‘dexterity’ and compliance into low wage production. For the state, recruitment
of Malay women into industrial wage labor is propagandized in its favor as emancipating
Malay women from the traditional bondage of the village. In effect, free trade zones
became labor control centers, whose exploitation of the female workforce merely
extended Malay poverty from the rural sector to new urban areas (Ariffin 1983).
However, afﬁrmative action programs under the NEP provided the turning point
for Malay women as far as education and economic mobility were concerned.
Availability of scholarships for Malay students was taken advantage of by many rural
families, who envisioned realistic chances of better life for their children only through

education (De Koninck 1992, 73-75). Furthermore, the return of a majority of Malays to
more practical aspects of Islamic values in the post-colonial era seemed to have helped
reinstate a more equal position of women in Malay-Muslim society, particularly in relation
to education and work. Although a long way to go in terms of total equality with men,
such development has resulted in increased rates of Malay women entering and
occupying numerous professional fields as well as holding leadership positions. By the

year 2000 slightly more than half of all state university students in Malaysia were women
(Time December 3 2001). Muslim Malay women have also held prominent posts in the
state machinery as Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, Senators,

Attorney General, Accountant-General, Secretaries-General of Ministries, and heads of
departments in the civil service. Currently two women, Zeti Aziz and Rafidah Aziz (no
relation), respectively hold two of the country’s most powerful ofﬁces, the Governor of

Bank Negara (Central Bank) and the Minister of Trade and Industry (Time Magazine
December 3 2001).

In general, the industrialization process in Malaysia has marked the positioning of
women in lower wages and exploitation. The increasing number of women entering the
workforce and politics has not expedited their overall social progress as compared to
men. Despite the advancements made by Malaysian women, there remains a lack of
political power to push women’s issues on work and rights to the fore (Ng 1999).

In Singapore, PAP treatment of women has been very much dictated by a strict
patriarchal orientation of labor division that emphasized the subordinate role of women.
The state’s social engineering projects that attempted to control women’s reproductive
rights, the restriction of female entries into universities through policy regulations, and
the housing-labor demographic policies designed to keep working class women in low
wage jobs have been some of the clearest examples (Tremewan 1994 12-113; 840;
Salaff 1988, 267-269; Pugh 1989). Similar to its racist suppression of Malays, the state

has made no apologies for its sexist policies.
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Conclusion

Lacking technology and capital, foreign direct investment from TNCs has become
an important source of development strategy in both Malaysia and Singapore. To
accommodate these corporations, the state provided economic infrastructure and

flexible laws to expedite investments. The state also had to ensure its political climate
was conducive for business. Most importantly, internal political tensions had to be
suppressed. For both countries, the aim to industrialize led the state to assume an

intense role in the direction of economic as well as public policies.
Although Malaysia and Singapore experienced unprecedented economic growth,
dependence on foreign capital constrained the state in their development plans. Labor

employment was basically restricted - usually confined to few selected higher
professional-management positions and low-wage assembly. The early years of
industrialization in Malaysia for example, resulted in some portion of rural labor, namely
female, being employed in free trade zones and large industrial parks (Salih and Young
1989). That many of these factories were located in urban areas meant that although
employment became available for a new set of population, its meager wages entailed a
rural-urban transfer of poverty (Arifﬁn 1983; Young 1975). On the other hand,
Singapore’s regional labor division functioned differently from Malaysia, in which an
urban-based economy made worker remuneration slightly higher. Also, the PAP

effectively turned the whole republic into a large industrial estate resulting in better
economies of scale; hence social amenities for workers were generally better furnished
than Malaysia.
Malaysia’s larger territorial size and plentiful natural resource, especially oil and

gas, enabled the state to minimally develop a local industrial base and the nurturing of
its own capitalist class. But the inter-directorate structure of party, state and capital has

allowed not only concentration of wealth, but also consolidation of power to be in the
hands of the ruling class, namely those belonging to the National Front party and the
capitalists associated with it. While it may be easy to point out corrupt practices and the

NEP as detractors of full industrial success in Malaysia, it may also be helpful to realize
that a major reason lies in the nature of dependent development. Industrial development

in both countries was typically marked by the lack of technology and expertise transfer
from core to periphery, since crucial organizational positions were occupied by

expatriate executives, and technology was often the privilege of TNC home countries
(Lucas and Verry 1999; Yoshihara 1988; Mehmet 1986). In Singapore, the state’s
tireless effort to systematically upgrade labor skills to accommodate changing
commodity chain production requirements did not materialize into meeting the needs of
its full industrialization strategies. Singapore’s total reliance on foreign capital dislocated

its local capitalist base from the wider world technological development (Yoshihara
1988)
Owing to the different perceptions of political threats to state power, the rapidity
in which each state needed to fully industrialize for the sake of political survival also
differed. In Malaysia, preserving long-term capitalist development meant ensuring the
removal of any future threat to the state or the stability of the capitalist system. History
had proven that Malay contentment often became the determinant of state stability.

While the state sought to maintain its legitimacy among the rural Malays, who claim

160
‘ownership’ of Malaysia through their ‘birth-rights’ as bumiputeras, it also needed
Chinese capital and entrepreurship to survive. Dependent capitalist development

resulted in gross inequalities. When state economic policies began to reward the
Chinese, and when Chinese challenge to political power became stronger, Malay fear of

being subdued to the status of Native Americans in the US reminiscent through
memories of the Malayan Union ﬁasco, resulted in seemingly irreconcilable conflict
between the two groups. The resulting racial riots of May 13 had been the culmination of
pent-up emotions and frustrations on both sides, but particularly more so for the
economically disenfranchised Malays. To the Malays, protection lies in the state’s

capacity to safeguard their political and economic well being. If the capitalist system
were to survive in Malaysia, Malay welfare and security have to be well looked after (Far

Eastern Economic Review June 20 1996).
Hence, the logic of capitalism would have driven the state, which was
experiencing impressive economic growth, to invest in infrastructural projects that cater
to both capital-intensive production as well as light manufacturing. This means that In
light of the competition coming from other ASEAN countries, Malaysia could have
allowed its resourceful Chinese capitalists to participate and develop both sectors of

these industries. However, the NEP programs diverted much of the country’s revenues
and resources, primarily oil, toward state-sponsored NEP projects. While some local
Chinese capitalists participated in the NEP, many went elsewhere. The NEP, with its
bumiputera discriminatory requirements, had posed as a stumbling block to rapid capital
accumulation (Bowie and Unger, 1997; Gomez and Jomo, 1997). The state practice of

temporarily foregoing expeditious capital accumulation in order to implement its NEP
projects is illustrative of state ‘structural imperative’ action. Here, the capitalist peripheral
state may at times defy the rationale of capitalism in order to focus on gratifying a
dominant group as a way to sustain both legitimacy and a more stable capitalist
development (Alavi 1982).
Naturally, policies favoring bumiputeras are not well taken with the other
ethnonational groups. Their acceptance of Malay political authority has been one of

confusion at the very least, and non-existent at most, especially for the Chinese. As
Lucian Pye (1985, 251) observes, “Confucian political culture does not contain any

guidelines of minority leadership in a community dominated by a non-Confucian
culture. . ...any Chinese who acts as a leader must be an imposter if he is subservient to
the Malay majority leadership.” Chinese ethnocentrism and Malay bumiputeraism have
contributed to persisting mutual distrust despite relatively peaceful co-existence. Such
antagonisms have culminated into recurring themes in Malaysian politics, and often
exceedingly during times of political crisis or economic hardship. Ethnonational politics
have become rife, and as discussed in the next chapter, it is not uncommon for the state

to also play its part in simultaneously singing the Malay chauvinistic tune in order to
garner declining Malay support for the bourgeois National Front.
In Singapore, the state’s internal tensions were of a different nature. Labor and
an urban-based infrastructure were its only resources. Its past troubles with a militant
labor movement compelled the state to take advantage of its strength and the country’s
fragmented working class to co-opt and ‘guide’ existing unions under its wings. But the
state’s long-range anxiety fixated on its existence within a large and populous Malay
geographical and cultural region. The absence of natural resources on the island and its
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heavy reliance on the neighboring Malay countries exacerbated the state’s extreme
uneasiness of its geopolitical existence. This ‘besieged mentality’ is manifested in the
way the state represses its Malay minority to socially dislocate them from the rest of the
nusantara. Political mobilization for minorities has been proven to function as an

effective instrument to assert and demand civil rights (Marable 1993). Singapore’s Malay
minority lacked the numerical strength for effective mobilization. A political
consciousness energized through Pan-Malay nationalism provides more than thorny
problems to the state.

It is not uncommon for a state under similar situations, as exemplified by state

policies in apartheid South Africa, Israel and Australia”, to respond by propagating
dogmatic beliefs and racist myths against suspected ethnonational groups and minorities
in order to justify its discriminatory policies especially in education, labor, and

immigration (Collins 1991; Baker 1983). But resting on its so-called ‘meritocracy laurel,’
the Singapore state could not be seen to exclude or violently suppress Malays.
Therefore education has become the most significant vehicle to perpetuate Chinese
dominance and Malay political economic subjugation. Through an education process
that benefits the rich and marginalizes the poor, the state perpetuates racist beliefs

concerning Chinese superiority and Malay biological-cultural inadequacy.
Some similarities and differences are noted between Malaysia and Singapore. In
both countries, dependent capitalist development has resulted in increased wealth
concentration toward traditionally and historically privileged groups across all
ethnonational categories. But in Malaysia, inequalities between bumiputeras and non-

bumiputeras have been slightly reduced through the NEP, whereas in Singapore the
absence of effective state efforts to attenuate inequalities reflected in the increasing
income, wealth, and occupational gaps between Chinese and non-Chinese, especially

Malays. Both states intervened in the national economy as a means to pursue economic
growth as well as to formulate internal policies that would strengthen its support and
maintain its political hegemony among important majority groups. In Singapore, the state
has utilized racial and ethnonational issues as well as state institutional mechanisms to
reproduce the class structure and fragment the working and lower classes. In Malaysia,
structural changes through the NEP became attempts to fortify the state’s electoral base
among rural Malays. Such imperatives have strengthened state power over civil society
and weakened prospects of popular alliances to challenge the state in both countries.

62 Australia’s geographical position in the Asia-Pacific region was a primary reason behind its ‘allwhite’ immigration policy up to the late 19605 (Collins 1991).

162
CHAPTER 7
ASCENT IN THE WORLD SYSTEM:
GLOBALIZATION, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND LEGITIMATION

As illustrated in previous chapters, the interaction among a multitude of variables seen in
the colonial character of the state, ethnonational-class inequalities, fragmented internal
social forces, and dependent capitalist development, have contributed to the weakening

of popular democratic forces and the strengthening of the state.
This chapter discusses the impact of globalization on the economic as well as
political developments of both countries. Continued state survival hinges on its links to
the world system and its control over civil society. But increased globalization has meant
further vulnerability of these states’ economies to external market forces, as well as
increased exposure of the state political system to transnational anti-systemic forces.

Already, the transnational forces of political Islam have had a mobilizing effect on a
significant portion of the middle and working classes. Also, the increasingly powerful
transnational Chinese business network has converged Chinese business and
revivalism across Southeast Asia. There is a tendency for all these factors to widen

wealth gaps between the various ethnonational groups in both countries. The diverging
interests and widening income gaps between Malays and Chinese in particular, could
further polarize and fragment the two groups, and weaken any chance for popular

alliances between them.
In light of this new development in the world system, this chapter further looks at
the increasing authoritarian rule by the largest and most dominant political parties in

each country, the UMNO-led National Front in Malaysia and the PAP in Singapore.
Finally, this chapter briefly examines the attempts by the state to impose national
legitimation strategies to justify its authoritarian rule.
Impact of Globalization on Malaysia and Singapore 1990 - present
Since the 19905, the integration of computer and telecommunications
technologies has paved the way for a microelectronic revolution that expedited two

significant historical processes. One has been the surge in global financial capital flow,
marking a new age in economic globalization and growth as well as financial instability
(Bello and Rosenfeld 1992). The other has been the instant accessibility to worldwide

information as well as more expedient transportation, enabling social and political
linkages to be instituted between groups and individuals across national borders
(Castells 1996). As a result, there has been an increasing tendency for ethnonational

and religious groups to identify themselves trans-nationally with each other, leading to
what some scholars call ‘revivalism’ or ‘tribalism’ (Barber 1996, 204-215). Both these
phenomena depict the penetrability of national borders by economic as well as social
and political forces. For the Malaysian and Singaporean states, these developments
highlight the contradictory effects of economic growth and state legitimacy taking place
within a rapidly changing environment in the capitalist world economy.
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Globalization and economic instability
Driven by a meticulously drafted Industrial Master Plan (IMP), the 19905 decade

was a period of remarkable economic growth for Malaysia. To accommodate greater
capital investments, a National Development Policy (NDP), with greater emphasis on

rapid industrialization, replaced the NEP in 1991. By the mid 19905 export growth
reached nearly 80 per cent of GDP, although greater industrialization demands and
consumption patterns began to bring in heavy importation of goods and capital (Lucas
and Verry 1999, 264). In 1995, about 12 per cent of all workers engaged in the
professional, technical, and managerial sectors, about 15 percent were in sales and
services, 30 per cent were in production and about 24 per cent in agriculture (Malaysian
Government 1996). Bumiputeras now made up the majority of the professional and

technical workers, while the Chinese still dominated the administrative, managerial, and
sales groups. lntra-ethnonational disparity was greatest among bumiputeras, as
manifested by their predominance as well in the agricultural and production sectors.
However, share capital control was still dominated by the Chinese with 40 per cent total
ownership. Bumiputeras held 30 per cent shares through individuals and trust agencies,

and Indians at about 2 per cent, while foreigners still substantially controlled a good 28
per cent (Ministry of Finance Malaysia 1997). From 1990 to 1994, Malaysia sustained an
impressive 8.4 per cent average real GDP growth rate, with a per capita income of
US$4,027 and a savings rate of 34 per cent of GNP in 1996 (World Bank 1996, 208;
Malaysian Government 1996).63 As a middle-income country, Malaysia compared

favorably to Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, and was placed ahead of many countries in
Latin America and Eastern Europe (Kahn 1996, 50).

Singapore’s urban-based economy continued to grow exponentially during the
19905 through state-led planning and policy intervention. Deprived of the ability to
effectively compete in TNC-dominated domestic markets, Singaporean entrepreneurs
were encouraged by the state to look to China for investment opportunities (Vasil 1993,

310). Using the advantages of Singapore’s financial center status, many of these local
capitalists were able to deploy their investments into neighboring countries. Thus while
state-led investments concentrated in infrastructural development in the ASEAN
countries, private investments flourished in property and tourism, especially in the

Growth Triangle (Rodan 1993, 236-242). State initiatives to pour Singaporean capital
into China materialized into a state-level agreement to develop the township of Suzhou,

paving the way for a Singapore private sector invasion (Rodan 1996, 28). Rapid
communications and internet technology have enabled Singaporean investors to forge
closer links with China through their business ventures, and inspired many parents to
respond to the state’s call for a re-emphasis on Chinese-Mandarin education (Lam 1999,
268). Lately, China has become a second home for many of these capitalists and their

families.
However, globalization of the economy also meant susceptibility to real-time
fluctuations in global market and capital prices. Heeding US ‘encouragements’ of
facilitating barrier-less economies in the developing world as well as IMF threats of
economic castigation for failure to do so, many emerging industrial countries began to
deregulate their markets since the 19805 (Bhagwati 2001). In the 19905, advances in

“3 Although this figure was a decline from US$5,649 in 1990 (See Kahn 1996, 50).
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computer technology enabled flows of international finances to move in and out of
countries at lightning speed and on fractional differences in exchange rates, increasingly
detaching currency flow from the physical economy. The volatility of currencies became
central to ruthless speculators and investors, mainly from the core, seeking to exploit
price differentials between markets for quick and astronomical profits (Bello, Bullard and
Malhotra 2000).
The same mechanics function in capital investments. Capital has moved from
one market to another in order to seek profit returns from interest rate differentials

created by imperfect globalized market conditions (Eatwell and Taylor 2000, 30-39).
Easy access to their capital markets exposed these newly industrializing countries’ stock
exchanges to a new breed of investors — the foreign portfolio investors (FPI) (Ellwood

2001, 76). Unlike foreign direct investments, which strap investors to the physical capital
of the host country, FPls have greater mobility to move in times of economic uncertainty.
Differences between nominal value and real value of capital are created when stock
speculation as well as heavy borrowing is used to inﬂate its value, and then selling them
for fast profits. From 1990 to 1997, FPls accounted for more than a third of all private
investments, and in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, and Korea, FPls had actually
surpassed FDIs (UNCTC 1998).
Indeed, since the global deregulation trend took hold, short-term speculation has
become the single largest flow of international investments worldwide (Bhagwati 2001).
Short-term immediate profiteering had replaced long-term capital growth as priority goals
for capitalists, likening the new world economy to that of a global Las Vegas. In the
19905, short-term investment money to Malaysia and Thailand, two of the world’s fastest
growing economies and the darlings of IMF and World Bank economists, constituted
more than 10 per cent of GDP. In Malaysia, like in other newly industrializing
economies, heavy injections of funds into real estate, property, and massive state-led
infrastructure projects, usually owned and operated by crony corporations, incurred huge
unprecedented debts. In fact, the total combined debt for Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines, Thailand, and Korea was US$274 billion, more than 60 per cent of which
was in short-term liabilities, and the majority of which was owed to the private sector

(UNDP 1999a).
In 1997, these rising debts forced Thailand to float and devalue its currency, and
soon a contagion of fear spread among investors throughout the East Asian markets,
which marked the spiral toward an Asian financial crisis. It was not long before foreign
private investors started pulling out their assets while financial speculators sold off their

bahts, rupiahs, and ringgits“ to avoid losses and to transfer their funds safely back
home. Uncontrolled debt and capital flight created stock market plunges throughout East
Asia, while many local businesses, tied by dollar denominated contracts, could not
furnish loan repayments, let alone replenish their reserves (Haggard 2000). As quickly
as investments entered this region, they found their way out in pretty much the same

fashion. For the same countries mentioned earlier, private inflows dropped from $93
billion atthe end of 1996 to $12 billion at the end of 1997 (ILO 1998, 2).

6" The baht, rupiah, and ringgit are national currencies of Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia
respectively.

165
Massive unemployment, bankruptcies, and consumer price hikes caused
incredible hardships for many in these countries. Worse, the IMF method in resolving
this crisis was akin to recommending antibiotics for curing a virus. To gain access to IMF
bailouts, many of these countries had to cut back on social spending, severely
disconnecting the poor from basic services. It also curbed the competitiveness of local
firms and opened them up to foreign core ownership (Watkins 1998). Michael Kantor,
US Trade Representative for Asia declared, “When countries seek help from the IMF,

the US and Europe should use the IMF as a battering ram to gain advantage” (quoted in
Ellwood 2001, 83). Sure enough, just as many of the lenders in the Asian financial
gambling den had been European and American banks, the beneficiaries of collapsing
Asian firms were European and American corporations, which bought out majority
ownerships in many of these declining companies (Hahnel 1999, 50-67; Ellwood 2001,
81-84;Henwood 1998).
Although Malaysia’s currency fell by 35 per cent and its equity prices by 53 per

cent, the overall effect of the crisis was not as acute as its neighbors or Korea (ILO
1998, 8). Several factors have been attributed to this. One, Malaysia’s exposure to short
term foreign borrowing had not been that high as compared to Thailand or Korea.
Therefore currency depreciation, which usually causes increased debt repayment and

servicing to be an ovenivhelming burden, was still manageable in Malaysia. Two, the
state quickly pegged its currency to the US dollar, cutting down on further financial
losses. Three, Malaysia’s petroleum and gas supply provided the collateral lifeline for

shoring up the ringgit against an otherwise rapidly declining reserves. Fourth and to its
credit, the state’s defiance of IMF prescriptive measures on strengthening interest rates,
austerity drives, and further capital market liberalization greatly reduced the severity of
social impacts experienced by other countries. Instead, the state imposed restrictions on

capital and monetary flows through taxes to discourage short-term portfolio investments
and contain currency trading. The state also established a National Economic Action
Council (NEAC) to draft out major corporate and structural adjustment measures.
Carefully monitored and guided by the Bank Negara or Central Bank, two new state
institutions were set up as operating agencies. One was Danaharta, which began
acquiring and managing non-performing loans of the banking system, while the other
was Danamodal, which worked on recapitalizing weak banking institutions (World Bank
2001). By the middle of 2001, Danamodal had successfully recapitalized eight out of ten
companies, while Danaharta managed to absorb and restructure nearly US$10 billion or
82 per cent of total gross loans acquired up to that period (World Bank 2001; Mohamad

2001,6)
Nevertheless, to conclude that the Malaysian state boldly undertook its own

resolve to protect citizen interests is to understate the significance of the state-partycapital alliance. Enormous amounts of funds were pumped toward bailing out fledgling

crony companies, especially those that belonged to close family circles of the ruling
elites. For example, Renong, an UMNO connected corporation awarded to build and
operate national expressway projects, received nearly US$3 billion in tax write-offs and
zero coupon bonds that enabled it to pay off foreign creditors (Jomo 1998, 35). Other
examples include firms that received colossal state aid such as the newly privatized
Malaysia Airlines, the Bakun Dam builder Ekran, national car manufacturers Proton and

DRB, and telecommunications firm Timedotcom (Aliran Monthly March 2001).
Particularly distressing was the use of government companies to buy out some of these
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companies’ debts; in other words public sector funds were utilized to rescue private
sector debt. For instance, RHB’s US$1 billion obligations was ﬁnanced by the Pahang
State Economic Development Corporation and the country’s top civil servants’ pension
fund, while national oil company Petronas was used to rescue Mirzan Mahathir’s (Prime
Minister’s son) debt-ridden shipping conglomerate (Asiaweek December 25 1998). In
1997, the state took over the Bakun Dam project, ‘reimbursing’ Ting Pek Khing for work
completed, simultaneously escalating the cost of the project to US$19 billion. Three
years later, the state bought up 29 per cent of Tajudin Ramli’s share in Malaysia Airlines
(Asiaweek January 26 2001). The state’s anti-crisis measures, while seen as protecting
the citizenry from the lMF’s social spending limits, actually saved the politically
connected capitalists from impending financial catastrophe. For a good portion of the
urban middle class, state relaxation of financial controls also enabled many to continue a
lifestyle not typical of a society facing an economic crisis (Shameen and Healy 1999, 3).
The poor and underprivileged on the other hand, found it extremely difficult to
cope with, if at all, soaring food prices and living expenses (UNDP 1999b, 29). For
example the prices of garlic and onion, the basic food ingredients for rural household
diets, tripled within a few months of the crisis (The Star December 23, 1997). The crisis’s
disproportionate impact falling on the poor revealed how weak Malaysia’s social

institutions had been in providing a safety net for those faced with sudden job losses and
declining income as a result of economic downturns (UNDP 1999b, 29-30). The state’s
response in rescuing the rich and neglecting the poor, as will be discussed later,
provided an intense political platform for public mobilization and opposition to the state in

the coming elections. Dr. Syed Husin Ali, President of the People’s Party of Malaysia
asserted, “It is more important to build houses, hospitals, schools and universities than
to waste on unproductive mega-projects; it is more in place to help rubber and oil palm

smallholders as well as workers rather than bailing out corporate cronies and their big
corporations” (Asia Times October 28 1999, 20).

Meanwhile, Singapore’s urban economy, despite its huge foreign exchange and
ﬁscal reserves, was not entirely spared from the crisis’s contagion effects. Its stock
market fell by 13 per cent and its currency depreciated by about 15 per cent (ILO 1998,
5). Wage and pay cuts for public sector employees, depressed property prices, and
restrictions in access to employment funds were some of the social hardships brought

on by the financial crisis. But a relatively high savings rates, current account surpluses,
and negligible external debt were some of Singapore’s economic fundamentals that
managed to offset the crisis’s more devastating impact (Ngiam 2000, 19).
Furthermore, Singapore’s economy had been heavily pivoted on its position as

regional center for intra-ﬁrm trade. TNCs and TNFs have historically used Singapore as
a processing regional center for inter-subsidiary trade across Southeast Asia. In the new
world division of labor, Singapore has functioned in higher-end production of
components and parts for export to ﬁnal markets in the United States and the European

Union. As long as the demand for such products from these core countries was
consistent and stable, Singapore’s trade and finance was not too seriously affected.
Also, like Hong Kong in the past and as a financial center for the region, many core firms

and TNCs have developed sufficient confidence in the island Republic’s stability as not
to be swayed by the rippling paranoia created by investors in the other ASEAN

countries. Singapore’s close economic links with its ASEAN neighbors however, have
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resulted in slower growths for the tourism and transportation sectors due to declines in
the latter’s economies (ILO 1998, 7-8).

By the new millennium, both Malaysia and Singapore emerged impressively from
the ashes of the Asian financial crisis to chart average GDP growth rates of about eight
per cent and ten percent respectively (World Bank 2001). Both countries seem to have
endured the worst of the crisis, although they still remain subjected to the potentially

predatory effects of globalization. Human development indicators as well as economic
data for the year 2000, as shown in Table 7.1 below and Table 7.2 the following page,
illustrate that both countries have recorded substantially strong progress toward
recovery to maintain their semi-peripheral status in the world system. As far as the

economy is concerned, there has been overall growth, and social indicators illustrate
that quality of life in these two countries has not lagged too far behind that of highincome countries.
Islam and Chinese transnational business

A significant feature of this rapid capitalist development in both Malaysia and

Singapore has been the growth and influence of a burgeoning middle class, whose
members participate in a spectrum of white-collar occupations ranging from the

professional-technical to the supervisory and managerial. Different theorists have

Table 7.1: Structure of Economy and their Growth Rates, Key Economic
Indicators and their Growth Rates, Malaysia and Singapore 1999 and 2000
Structure of the

Malaysia

Economy (% of GDP)
and Growth Rate in

Singapore

1999

2000

1999

2000

parenthesis

Agriculture
Industry
Light manufacturing
Services

10.9
46.4
31.5
42.7

(0.4)
(8.5)
(13.5)
(5.0)

8.6
45.1
27.7
46.3

(0.6)
(15.3)
(21.0)
(3.1)

0.2
34.6
25.1
65.2

(-1.1)
(7.1)
(13.6)
(5.2)

0.1
34.3
26.5
65.6

(-1.5)
(10.2)
(15.2)
(9.8)

Key Economic
Indicators

GDP (US $billions)

79.0

89.7

83.8

92.3

GDP (% growth)

6.1

8.3

5.9

9.9

GDP per capita (%
growth)

3.6

5.7

5.1

8.1

Exports goods &

13.4

16.0

na

na

121.7

125.4

na

na

38.2

34.9

58.3

na

services

Exports goods &
services/GDP (ratio)
. Gross National
Savigqs/GDP (ratio)
na = not available

Source: World Bank 2001.
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Table 7.2: Selected Social and Economic Indicators for Malaysia and Singapore
Compared with High Income Countries 2000.
High
Social Indicators

Malaysia

Singapore

23.3
2.4
3.0
57.0
72.0
8.0

4.0
2.7
2.6
100.0
78.0
3.0

Access to clean water source (% of pop.)

90.0

100.0

99.0

Literacy rate (% of population age 15+)

89.0

93.0

95.0

Population (million)
Population growth (%)
Labor force growth (%)
Urban population (% of total population)
Life Expectancy at birth (years)
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)

Income
Countries
903.0
0.7
0.9
77.0
78.0
6.0

Source: World Bank 2001, World Development Indicators 2000

labeled this new group in a variety of terminologies such as ‘new petty bourgeoisie’
(Poulantzas 1978b), ‘new middle class’ (Mills 1983), or ‘professional-managerial class’
(Ehrenreichs 1977). For the purpose of this discussion, the importance of the middle

class is seen in its time-speciﬁc relationship to the state. Within such an analysis,
themiddle class becomes heavily varied in interest and identification, but their

significance as a social force is determined by the extent to which they perform either as
an ally or opposition to the state. Relative affluence and education have brought on

increased political power to this social group, and although their interests may vary, a
consensual point could be drawn along their common desire to retain or improve their
social—economic positions (Burris 1986, 343-345).

In Malaysia, the NEP became the mechanism through which bumiputeras
managed to attain a relatively comfortable lifestyle. UMNO has taken advantage of this
to remind bumiputeras, especially Malays that without the state, many of them would
have remained in the backwaters of their villages and rural areas (New Straits Times

August 3 1997). While not downplaying the importance of the non-bumiputera middle
class, historically it has clearly been their Malay counterpart’s support that the state
seeks to incite. Fearing the Islamic threat, the state had embarked on a ‘guided’ form of
lslamization policy to pacify the Malay electorate and to coalesce basic entrepreneural
elements of capitalism with Islamic values (Sloane 1999). But there have also been
many middle class Malays who have become increasingly disenchanted with the manner
in which the state has sought to attain industrialization at any cost, including corruption
and suppression of human rights (to be discussed in the next section) — a view also

shared by some portions of the non-Malay middle class (Muzaffar 1999, 5). This group
sees in the state, a powerful generator of individual-materialist values that have slowly

diminished the significance of communal spiritualism in daily life, which forms the basis
of Malay-Muslim existence.
Similar to the way in which globalization has chipped away at the state’s ability to
control the ﬂow of capital across national borders, global technological advances have
also incapacitated the state’s power to prevent the flow of information and ideas into
their territories (Falk 1999, 52-55). As newly industrialized or industrializing countries,

the new Singaporean and Malaysian middle class emerged in an age of greater
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communication and information than their earlier cohorts. In Malaysia and Singapore,

The political forces of Islamic resurgence have commanded a large following among
Muslims. Through sophisticated communication systems and rapid modes of
transportation, Muslims in Malaysia as well as Singapore have become better aware and
increasingly conscious of global Islamic movements, which have taken root in many
countries to challenge those respective states’ socially unjust policies. Contrary to
popular beliefs, Islamic resurgence have appeared not because of some doctrinal hatred
toward the ‘infidel’ west, but rather against a backdrop of increasing social injustices
brought on by capitalist state development, reinforced by the belligerent attitudes of
western politicians, media and intellectuals toward Islam (Muhammad 2002).65 In other

words, Islamic resurgence, which had also served as an anti-colonial force in many
countries, has become a catalyst for challenging the social failures brought about by the
modern world system. For the educated middle classes, Islam reinstates a sense of
intellectual and spiritual aesthetics, which have long been transplanted by the social

impact of colonialism and consumerism (Muzaffar 2002). For the poor, political Islam
provides opportunities for the re-assertion of one’s self-dignity, equal status in society,
and democratic rights to challenge a tyrannical state system. Robert Dannin (2002), in
his book “Black Pilgrimage to Islam,” argues this point to explain why African-Americans
constitute 90 per cent of conversions to Islam, the fastest growing religion inthe United
States. Finally, for the state, the threat of Islamic resurgence lies in the Islamic
movements’ ability to forge trans-class alliances (Ayubi 1991, 175).
In Malaysia and in Singapore, many middle class Malay-Muslims have
increasingly recanted their political hopes in western liberalism in favor of progressive
Islamic principles of social justice and community development. Many who subscribe to

these ideals and values are highly educated individuals, holding multiple degrees from
overseas institutions, but increasingly disillusioned by the negative social impacts of
capitalist development as well as the inhibiting effects of traditional interpretations of
Islam. Globalization in this sense has threatened not only the state in its control of Islam,

but also the conservative inward-looking clerics, by whose interpretations of Islam the
masses have abided; Islam as a potent and progressive force threatens to destabilize
the status quo (Halliday 1988). Professor Chandra Muzaffar in an interview with Public

Broadcasting Station’s Frontiine (2002) on Islamic resurgence asserted, “In a sense,
globalization and the changes that are being wrought in the larger environment would
favor the progressives.
As a result of globalization, societies everywhere are

becoming heterogeneous. In other words, ‘the other; is no longer some theoretical
construct out there. The other is a living reality. You have to relate to the other. That's
bound to change your thought processes.”
However, globalization has also similarly allowed extremist and radical forces to
penetrate into the political realm of the state. There have been significant proportions of
middle class Malays in Malaysia who have become totally embittered with the present
system’s emphasis on material attainment and the consequences as captured in rising

65 Islamic movements have long been associated with anti-imperialist causes. But after World
War Two, many such movements have appeared partly in reaction to the hostility generated by
the west against Islam and Muslims, highlighted by the west’s support of Israeli oppression of

Palestinians, their deliberate non-intervention against the genocide of Muslim Bosnians by
Christian Serbs, and the iUN sanctions in Iraq (see Muzaffar 2002; Ayubi 1991; Haydar 1987).
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rates of corruption, crime, and autocratic laws. Furthermore, despite the NEP, many

Muslim-Malays have strongly become aware of the state’s policy prioritization favoring
crony interests, as exemplified in the state’s bailout programs, over that of the masses
(Muzaffar 1999). Many of these people have turned to an assertive but radical version of

Islam that perceivably provides a clear-cut alternative solution to social problems. For
the oppressive state, whichever the brand of Islam, the capacity with which Islamic
resurgence could mobilize the oppressed and minorities becomes the real danger to its

hegemony. In a world in which Muslims are being increasingly alienated by the forces of
capitalism, the prospects for this to occur is glaringly clear. In Malaysia, the less
educated lower class Muslim peasants provide a ready mass base.
The Malaysian state has also been quick to blame the opposition Islamic Party,
PAS, for the rise in Islamic extremism. One result has been the banning of the Darul
Arqam, a self-help community organization consisting of mainly middle class Muslims
and supporter of PAS, on the grounds of spreading ‘deviationist’ teachings (Hamid
1998). At the same time, to counter these influences, the state has portrayed itself as the
real protector and cultivator of Islamic principles by launching its own lslamization drive
through the establishment of state-sponsored organizations, introduction of Islamic laws
in family courts for Muslims, and through the courting of state-sanctioned religious
leaders (Mohamad 2000). Such tussle between the state and Islamic opposition for
support among the Muslim-Malays has intensified the lslamization campaign and left
many Muslims as well as non-Muslims further confused and polarized (Asiaweek
January 26 2001).
The recent post-September 11 2001 ‘war on terrorism’ has furnished the states in

Malaysia and Singapore with blank checks to detain Islamic activists without trial for
indeﬁnite periods. Under each country’s Internal Security Act (ISA), Malaysia has
arrested more than 70 activists and radicals, while Singapore has detained 15 members
of the Jemaah Islamiya, which advocates for a political union of several Muslim

provinces in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Washington Post May 13 2002;
January 18 2002). Details of the arrests and evidence of connection to terrorist groups
are vague since the information has been kept secretly under the guise of national
interest (Asia Times January 5 2002). On an official visit to the US in May 2002, Prime
Minister Dr. Mahathir alleged that the US has sanctioned the ISA, affectionately
comparing it to the US’s Patriot Act 2001, as an effective tool to curb and dismantle
‘terrorist’ networks through intensive interrogation of suspects (New Straits Times May
12 2002). For the state, an aggressive approach to containing the threat of Islam is
perceivably to insulate its middle classes from the inspiration of ‘subversive’ anti-

establishment thoughts. But as an anti-systemic force, political Islam has already
attracted many Muslim Malays into developing an increasingly transnational sense of
identity.

Another transnational force that could flourish and permeate national boundaries
through increased globalization is the increasing power of the regional ‘overseas
Chinese’. commmercial network. Overseas Chinese is the term referring to the ‘diaspora’
of various ethnonational Chinese throughout Southeast Asia, distinguished from the
citizens of the Chinese People’s Republic through their citizenship and nationalities of
the respective countries in the region (Suryadinata 1989). lntensified commercial

transactions throughout this area have shown tremendous correlation with the rise in the
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prosperity of cross-national ‘overseas Chinese’ business networks comprising numerous

powerfully rich groups (Rauch and Trindade 1999). By the mid 19905, according to
Forbes magazine (June 1994), ethnic Chinese capitalists and investors had combined
assets of US$1.14 trillion or 89 per cent of market capitalization in Seoul, Taipei,

Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, and Manila.
In many of these countries, the Chinese make up only a small percentage of the
population, but their wealth and entrepreneurial ownership exceed that of any

ethnnational group in their country. Table 7.3 below shows the comparisons between
each country in Southeast Asia in terms of ethnonational Chinese wealth and
percentage of population in 1994. It is obvious that although the Chinese constitute a
small minority in every country except Malaysia and Singapore, the concentration of

national wealth has been securely placed within that particular community. Cross-border
trade of Chinese businesses was enhanced and motivated by two main factors. First,
these businesses have faced stiff competition from global players domestically;
especially in the case of Singapore. Second, their home markets have become saturated

and often their competitive advantages have dissipated through their deregulation. In
Malaysia, bumiputera requirements in businesses became a push factor for Chinese
enterprises to go elsewhere. In such cases, business practices and better opportunities
lie outside the national borders of their home countries. The pattern of cross-trade is
often through the hooking up with other Chinese suppliers or buyers for the marketing of

particular commodities and services. Without such close cultural affiliations as well as
the ethnocentric character of the guanxi,66 such ventures would not have been possible

(Lingle 1996, 71).
Although there is competition between various groups and families, long-term
macro-business concerns, which are frequently tied to ethnonational sentiments, often
override short-term profit-seeking goals, especially in economically hard times. Such

networking has sustained professional relationships and commercial transactions
between them (Yeung 1999, 104; Naisbitt 1994, 25). For many years, Hong Kong had

provided the base for the cross-border trades between the various Chinese

Table 7.3: Ethnonational Chinese in Selected ASEAN Countries,
Percentage of Population, National Wealth Ownership and Listed

Company Ownership 1994.

Country

Chinese as
percentage of
population

Percentage of
national wealth
owned by Chinese

Malaysia
30
Singapore
76
Thailand
3
Indonesia
4
The Philippines
3
Source: figures compiled from Naisbitt 1996

66

.

.

Percentage of
nationally listed
companies owned
by Chinese
61
81
81
73
50

58
80
60
70
70

.

.

.

Guanxr refers to personal or family contacts mainly for busrness, but such busrness
relationships pre-require Chinese ethnonationality, preferably within similar clan lineage.
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conglomerates and family-based business concerns across Southeast Asia and Taiwan
(Hsing 1996). With the rise of Singapore as a financial center, and the opening up of
China to transnational business, there has been intensification rather than a shift in the
flow of overseas Chinese commerce in the region. The emergence of the information
economy has allowed these business networks to more efficiently link up with each other
Chinese groups through clan-based associations, chambers of commerce and other
linguistic-cultural based organizations (Naisbitt 1996, 23). According to Naisbitt (1996,
23), this ‘overseas’ or ethnonational Chinese business network represents the emerging
globalized business trends, in which the importance of the nation-state has been
superseded by the growing significance of individual and group networks. Already, a
vast network of transnational Chinese cultural organizations, educational institutions,
broadcasting corporations, and industrial associations has flourished throughout the
region to facilitate communications and contacts between the various ethnonational
Chinese groups in Southeast Asia (Yeung 1999, 106-110).
Although fostering cultural pride and expanding business transactions is a
healthy development for any ethnonational group, the danger lies in further aggravating
the disproportionate ethnonational-class arrangements between them and other
ethnonational groups in their country. The political implication for such a massive

ethnonational-based commercial and cultural network is huge. In Singapore, the state's
efforts in emphasizing Mandarin education and in constructing a national Chinese-based
identity would enhance opportunities for the Chinese population. As will be discussed

later, such a climate also becomes conducive for the state to highlighting the
authoritarian elements of Confucianism to justify its authoritarian rule. The emphasis on
Sino-cultural hegemony could further alienate the other ethnonational groups,
particularly the Malays, who have experienced discrimination and repression from the
state. In Malaysia, a proliferation of Chinese commercial monopolies would prevent any

further ‘intrusion’ of Malay-based businesses in the country as well as in other parts of
the region, particularly in the emerging Chinese markets. The ethnocentric and closed
nature of these guanxis, or personal and clan-based networks, could have negative
repercussions that would lead to further consolidation of Chinese wealth in both

countries. Consequently, such a scenario could bring back feelings of contempt and
antagonism amongst Malays toward the Chinese, particularly in Malaysia.
Both Islamic resurgence and Chinese ethnonational revivalism through business
networking have the effect of producing two important social consequences. One, it
could further polarize Malays and Chinese in both countries toward greater
ethnocentrism as well as wider wealth and power disparities. Two, antagonistic
relationships that develop could weaken any opportunity for both groups to form future
alliances to challenge the state and its authoritarian reign. It is no surprise that with
increasing globalization, the prospects of democracy becomes difficult as the rich and
capitalist classes consolidate their wealth while the middle and working classes become
further fragmented.
Authoritarianism and Legitimation in Malaysia and Singapore
In the previous chapter, the dissertation discussed how capitalist development

enabled the state to assume power over civil society through its control of the national
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economy, thereby strengthening the social stratification and class reproduction
processes. It must be kept in mind that in capitalist production, the type of efficient labor
employed is disciplined labor. In such instances, the law is structured to maintain this

disciplined labor in order for it to respect and obey the state, which is vital for sustaining
capitalist production (Hall et al 1978, 202-203). In this section, this dissertation critically
examines the way in which the state in both countries has attempted to discipline its

citizens and deal with various anti-systemic forces through the control of the electoral
process, subjugation of the judiciary, curtailment of free expression and monopolization
of the media, and the use of harsh laws to punish dissenters. The social trepidations
generated by these repressive and punitive state actions could be felt in other areas of
social life, instilling public compliance. In the course of this analysis, there will also be

discussion on how the state uses its nation-building ideologies to further reinforce and
justify its authoritarian actions, thereby generating public disregard of state abuse of
power.
Control of electoral process

Both Malaysia and Singapore inherited the British system of Parliamentary
democracy. In Malaysia, the King is rotated between the rulers of the various states for a
term of four years, functioning purely as a ceremonial figure. But unlike Britain, Malaysia

is a federation and has three tiers of governments at the federal, state, and local levels.67
Both the federal and state governments are elected through a contestation of party
system, with the King (federal level) and Sultan (State level) officially appointing the
Prime Minister (federal) and State Chief Minister (state) respectively from the victorious
party (at the federal and state level). This system of government is quite similar in
Singapore, with executive power resting in the Prime Minister and his cabinet, and an

elected President performing a ceremonial Head of State role. 68But unlike Malaysia,
there is no multi-tiered elected government in the Republic. In both these countries, the
government of the day is answerable to a bicameral and unicameral Parliament
respectively. In Malaysia the legislative institution comprises both the King and
Parliament, in which the power to pass laws lies with the latter’s two houses and the final

assent approved by the King.69 The judiciary completes the check and balance
mechanism of government. The same goes for Singapore, except for its single house in
Parliament and the President giving the assent.

Since 1955, the ruling National Front (National Alliance before 1971) led by
UMNO has dominated the political scene in Malaysia by winning all the national
elections. Table 7.4 on the next page illustrates its performance from the 1955 to 1999
federal elections. In Singapore, there has been even less competition, with the PAP
sweeping the elections clean from 1968 to 1984, as documented in Table 7.5, also on
the following page. Victorious parties and coalitions need two-thirds majority in

67 Local polls were abolished in 1971.
68 In an effort to show that the state is democratic, an elected Presidential office was introduced in
1991. However, the high financial and state-related occupational eligibility to stand for these
elections favors the state, and renders the ineffectiveness of the Presidency as a check and

Egalance mechanism l the legislature (Tremewan 1994, 175).
In Malaysia, the lower house, Dewan Rakyat, comprises elected constituency Members of
Parliament, while the upper house or Dewan Negara functions as a Senate consisting of
appointed notaries and publicly respected figures.
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Table 7.4: Malaysian Federal Election Results 1955-1999
Political Party
National Alliance

‘55

‘59

‘64

‘69

51

74

89

74

National Front*

‘74

‘78

‘82

‘86

‘90

‘95

‘99

135

130

132

148

127

162

148

5

5

9

16

9

24

20

2
154

8
154

4

4

177

180

Islamic Party

1

13

9

Partai Negara
Partai Malaya

(D

1
1
.—‘L

UDP
PAP
Gerakan***
USNO***
SCA
SNAP***
SUPP***

27
1O

.b

PPP***

N

Socialist Front

Pesaka
Spirit of 46
Pekemas
Partai Bersatu
Sabah
Independents
Total Seats

12
13

A-X-hm

DAP
National Justice
Pany

NO‘ICOOJOOCD

(Fa/1,3)"

1
14

52

3
104

104

1
144

154

8

3

192

193

Source: The New Straits Times Malaysia April 23, 1995 and The Star December 3, 1999.
*
The Alliance was enlarged and renamed the National Front. In the 1999 elections it
**

comprised of 12 component parties.
PAS was part of the National Front during the 1974 general elections.

***

These parties laterjoined the National Front.

Table 7.5: Republic of Singapore General Election Results 1968-2001
Parties/year
‘ People’s Action Party (PAP)

‘68

‘72

‘76

‘80

‘84

58

65

69

75

77

58

65

69

75

79

‘88

Worker’s Party
Singapore People’s Party
Singapore Democratic Party
Singapore Democratic

Alliance*
Total

81

81

83

Source: Singapore Election Department 2002.

* Coalition of the SDP, SPP, Singapore Justice Party, and the Singapore Malay National
Party
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Parliament to be able to pass legislation, a condition the ruling parties in both countries
have had no problem meeting. One-party rule in both countries, as illustrated by these
two tables, have become an apparent feature in these countries’ politics.
Apologists for the Singapore state frequently claim that the election process in
Singapore has been incredibly clean (Ooi 1998, 344). A closer analysis reveals that the
main problems in its electoral process lies in its concealed structures, such as in the

state appointment of a Registration Officer, its determination of the number and
arrangement of electorates, its appointment of the Returning Officer, and its latent

control of the press (to be discussed later). Furthermore, the capacity of any government
to rule is influenced to a high degree by its ability to carry out and implement legislation.
In a unicameral parliament it can easily result in authoritarianism (Muffet 2001). In other
words, the state wields its power to determine various crucial aspects of the election

process in order to ensure that its legislative powers are strengthened. As Senior
Minister Lee justifies it, "This is hardball politics. But at the end of it all there is deep
idealism to create a fair and just society, that’s why we did what we did to get here....But
we need hardball politics to win elections and then run our programmes" (Straits Times
Nov 2 2001). Such programs, of course, pertain to the encouragement and

accommodation of foreign capital flow.
Another way in which the state controls the electoral process is by manipulating
constituent boundaries. After the loss of one seat and in the face of declining margins of
victories since 1984, the state has established ‘grassroots’ linkages between housing
value and state loyalty. Through Group Representative Constituencies (GRC), which

formed the basis of Town Councils, the state has attained two goals. One, it has ensured
that residents in the state’s housing project, the Housing Development Board (HDB),

have been closely monitored through PAP control mechanisms, with the setting up of
state programs from PAP-run kindergartens to service maintenance in these areas.70
Simultaneously, by using areas sympathetic to the opposition as examples, HDB

residents are usually threatened into receiving poor services and funds if they don’t
exhibit PAP loyalty during elections (Sydney Morning Herald February 15 1997). Two,
because boundaries have been gerrymandered to the PAP’s beneﬁt, it has become
extremely difficult for opposition candidates and parties to win (Lim 1989, 185).

Furthermore, new HDB legislations have prevented Malays and Indians from forming ‘a
racial enclave’ within their housing areas thereby further weakening opposition
strongholds (Tremewan 1994, 167-168).71
Similar to how it uses a ‘meritocracy’ facade to whitewash its racist education
system, the PAP cleverly disguises its autocratic policies under the name of tolerance
and openness. For example, the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) was
introduced as a political contraption aimed at easing off mounting anti-PAP sentiments
7° GRCs were formed by combining several constituencies, usually opposition strongholds with
traditional PAP areas, and producing two or three MP5 with the highest votes. The result has

been a dilution of opposition votes. (Lim 1989).
7‘ Around 85 percent of Singaporeans live in state owned HDB high rises. The HDB stipulates
that only a certain percentage of each ethnic minority group (not more than the national
percentage, that is, approximately 25 percent for Malays, 5 percent for Indians and 1 percent for
Eurasians) can live in a particular housing estate. Buyers and sellers of the flats must seek

permission from the HDB before a transaction can be made (Muffet 2001).
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during the 19805, especially among the middle class. Here, an opposition member with
the best performance would be nominated into Parliament in the event that less than a
total of three opposition members won their seats in the whole elections. These NCMPs
however are virtually toothless tigers, with neither the voting power nor legitimacy as
elected officials. Also, since there had been a lack of strong opposition in parliament, the
state devised a way to recruit non-elected members as Nominated Members of
Parliament (NMP) to air the grievances and growing discontentment among the middleclasses (Rodan 1996 33). This reversion to the old style colonial appointed legislature
has ensured that the educated middle and upper classes would fill up the positions in the

state policy making process since most of these NMPs come from this particular social
background anyway (Tremewan 1994, 63). These measures taken by the PAP secured

their biggest win since 1980 in the last 2001 elections.
In Malaysia, the electoral system is less complicated and the body that oversees
the process, The Election Commission is officially independent from the state. But
despite its duty to oversee and ensure 'fair and free' elections, the Commission has been
ineffective in preventing the state from placing barriers to a truly democratic electoral
process. One of the reasons is that the Commission is made up of former top civil
servants, aided by a secretariat that is part of the government machinery. A recent report
by the Malaysian Citizen's Election Watch (PEMANTAU) highlighted concerns over the
last election in 1999. 72 The report pointed out that, a) a large number of the adult

citizens eligible to vote were denied the right to vote; b) the administration of the postal
vote was highly questionable; c) certain groups were denied the opportunity to form

political parties by the Registrar of Societies; d) opposition parties were not given
reasonable opportunities to carry out their campaign e) the local broadcasting and print

media were one-sided and blatantly biased toward the ruling coalition, and e) the
secrecy and freedom to cast votes especially among the armed forces and police was
highly questionable. In one particular case, the Sungei Siput constituency, Malaysian
Indian Congress (MIC — one of the main parties of the National Front) President Samy
Vellu won by a mere 5,000 votes. There were blatant discrepancies between registered
and actual voters, giving rise to speculation that busloads of ‘phantom voters’ had been

planted by the MIC chief (Aliran Monthly October 2000).
The 1999 election is especially pertinent to the discussion on state control of the
electoral process in Malaysia and to the theme of this chapter. In the run up to this
election, the state’s handling of the Asian financial crisis, especially its bailout programs,
was increasingly criticized (Aliran Monthly October 2000). Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim had been in consistent disagreement with Dr. Mahathir over a host of matters
(The Guardian November 15 1999). In particular, he had openly stated his preference for
an IMF prescription on austerity measures; such a’move would expose the
inappropriateness of state—capital relationship within UMNO and the National Front.

Whether Anwar had done this for political mileage is debatable, but his charisma,
amiable personality, and popularity both locally and internationally, served him the
‘2 PEMANTAU's steering committee was made up of representatives from eight participating

NGOs. They were Pertubuhan Kebajikan (Welfare Organization), BUDI Malaysia (BUDI), Aliran
Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN — National Consciousness Movement), Angkatan Bella Islam

Malaysia (ABIM- Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), the Human Rights Society of Malaysia
(HAKAM), the International Movement for a JUST World (JUST), Pertubuhan Jemaah Isiah

Malaysia (JIM) and Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM —Voice of Malaysian Citizens).
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support he needed to confront his boss and other UMNO figures on these issues as well
as those pertaining to democratic reform.
A significant portion of middle and working class urban Muslims, through the

internet and satellite television, had readily absorbed ongoing events in Indonesia,
witnessing for themselves Muslim-backed opposition forces toppling long time dictator
Suharto from power. Soon, similar cries of ‘reformasi’ (reform) spilled over from Muslim
groups in Indonesia to their counterparts in Malaysia to activate the struggle for political
reform across the Straits of Malacca. Tens of thousands of protestors took to the streets
of Kuala Lumpur only to be brutally suppressed by the police, in which around 135 were
arrested (Time November 2 1998; Human Rights Watch 1999). The state responded by

swiftly arresting Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998, trumping him up with corruption
charges. To further discredit his reputation among Muslims, he was handed an
additional charge — sodomy involving his chauffeur and a prominent Islamic scholar;
Anwar has denied all charges and argued that they are part of a move to politically

disgrace him (Asiaweek October 2 1999). While in police custody, Anwar the former heir
apparent to the Malaysian leadership, was badly beaten up by the Chief of Police. Such

treatment of the former Deputy shocked Malaysians of all backgrounds, believing the
order to assault him came from higher up (Time October 12 1999). This propelled even
many staunch UMNO supporters to switch over to the Islamic party PAS as well as the
newly formed National Justice Party (KeAdi/an), led by Anwar’s wife Wan Azizah, an
ophthalmic surgeon (Time December 13 1999).
To maximize political opposition against the National Front, the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party (PAS), the Partai Rakyat Malaysia (People’s Party of Malaysia), the
Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the National Justice Party (Keadilan) came together

to form the Alternative Front (BA -Barisan Alternatif) coalition. Losing much Malay
support, UMNO and the National Front desperately fought to split the new MalayChinese (traditionally DAP supporters) electoral pact to disable the Alternative Front.
Utilizing the media and other state machineries, UMNO exploited PAS’s ‘lslamic state’

agenda to scare away Chinese voters from the Alternative Front.‘3 PAS, riding high on
expanded votes in the Malay heartland, captured the oil rich state of Terengganu,
maintained its hold on Kelantan, and nearly went on to take Pahang and Kedah (Time

December 13 1999).74
Indeed, the state had utilized the resources at their disposal and played their

cards well with Chinese voters, who were unduly worried about the possibility of a PAS
dominated state. Despite the fact that it would have been impossible for PAS to emerge
as single majority winners, even if it had taken all its seats, Chinese voters panicked and

abandoned the DAP to vote instead for the National Front, giving it a slim two-thirds
majority in Parliament (Time January 24 2000). Just when Malay voters had discarded
their traditional support for UMNO and the National Front, Chinese voters saved them in

the nick of time. Observed political analyst Maznah Mohamad, "The Chinese have
become purely pragmatic voters, there was not enough of a sea of change among the
Malays to compensate for the Chinese swing except in the Islamic heartland (Kelantan

and Terengganu).ln the Islamic heartland,” she added, ”the change has been
73 MCA President Ling Liong Sik went on the air to warn Chinese voters that a vote for DAP was
a vote for PAS and the Islamic state (The Star December 1 1999).
4 PAS has held the northeastern state of Kelantan since 1990.
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progressive” (Asia Times December 1 1999).75 In fact, the Islamic PAS governments in
these two states have been highly respectful of the rights of its non-Muslim populations.
In Terengganu, despite having its oil royalty payments severed by the federal
government after the elections, the PAS state government has allocated generous
amounts of funding and lands for pig farming, Chinese-language schools, and
construction of Buddhist temples (Malaysiakini December 1 2000; Harakah December 8
2000).76 Furthermore, in a statement supporting Chinese educationist group Suqur’s call
for equal rights in education, PAS asserted that affirmative action should be based on
poverty level and need, and not on ethnicity or religion (Malaysiakini August 18 2000).
Finally, to prevent the use of the electoral process as an expression of mounting
discontent toward the state, the Election Commission rejected around 600,000 new

(young) registered voters on grounds that it would have taken a long time to administer
the large number of people in time for the elections! The 1999 general election was one
of the most hotly contested, and one in which the state managed to abuse public
resources to retain its political hegemony (Aliran Monthly June 2000).
Taming the judiciary
An impartial judiciary serving to address injustices and impartially resolving

constitutional and political crises is a hallmark of a democratic society. But state-led
capitalist development requires a smooth and unimpeded process through which the

state could sustain the flow of capital. In Malaysia, the clamping down of a previously
admired judicial system effectively began in the mid-19805. When the incumbent Dr.
Mahathir and his deputy Ghafar Baba narrowly won after a recount over challenger

Razaleigh Hamzah and Musa Hitam in the 1987 UMNO presidential elections, eleven
former UMNO members filed a suit questioning the legitimacy of the elective process.
The High Court ruled that the ramiﬁcations arising from the discrepancies found in the
registration of its branches under the Societies Act rendered UMNO an ‘unlawful society’
(Shamsul 1988; Far Eastern Economic Review February 18 1988). The case was then
brought up by UMNO on appeal to the Supreme Court. Desperately hanging on to a
thread for political survival, Dr. Mahathir had hoped for the judiciary to blow off the case

in favor of his party. But when the country’s highestjudicial official, Lord President Salleh
Abbas, motioned instead for the appeal to be heard by a bench of nine judges of the

Supreme Court, the Prime Minister used the King to promptly remove the Lord President
and five of the nine judges.7This case exemplified how the state was willing to sacrifice
the sanctity of the federal constitution and the esteem of the judiciary for short-term
political economic goals (Abbas and Das 1990; Harding 1989).
Gradual demise of an autonomous Malaysian judiciary began with the Mahathir
administration closely scrutinizing appointments of every officer to the higher courts. In
true corrupt fashion, less reputable figures went on to occupy high judicial positions. In
July 1996, a High Court judge, Syed Ahmad ldid resigned from office after accusing
colleagues on the country’s highest benches of 39 incidents of corruption, 21 cases of
abuse of power, and 52 acts of misconduct. An example of such misconduct was the

controversial libel lawsuit, in which crony capitalist Vincent Tan was awarded RM 10
7:Asia Times article can be also be retrieved at http://www. atimes. com/se-asia/AL01Ae01. html.
:The largest Buddhist templeIn Malaysia is ironically located in PAS-ruled Kelantan.
77UMNO had no choice but to form a new party, renamed UMNO Baru (New UMNO).

179
million (US$ 2.6 million) in damages against journalist M.G.G. Pillai. It was later found
that Tan’s counsel, V.K. Lingam had sponsored holiday trips to Italy and New Zealand
for Eusoffe Chin, the presiding judge who later became Malaysia’s Lord President
(Asiaweek July 26 1996).
State directives to influence the judiciary in constitutional and political matters
also heightened. During Anwar lbrahim’s trial, presiding judge Augustine Paul had
abused his position by threatening the defense team, amending charges, and expunging
vital evidence from the court record over discredited allegations of sexual misconduct
(Sydney Morning Herald March 27 2002). And in his second trial, Judge Ariffin Jaka
refused to admit Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir as a defense witness. An international
coalition of judges and lawyers raised their concern with the state of the judiciary in
Malaysia, and in a report entitled “Justice in Jeopardy,” it attributed the causes of

miscarriages of justice and transgressions of rule of law, among other things, to the
subsumed position of the judiciary toward the executive (International Bar Association et

al 2000, 55-59; Asiaweek June 30 2000).
However, some glimmer of hope may be on the horizon and it would be
interesting to follow future developments within the judiciary. On May 30, 2001

Hishamudin Mohamad Yunus, a High Court justice refused to bow to executive pressure
and ordered the release of several opposition activists arrested under the Internal

Security Act, citing the arrests were done in bad faith and had violated the detainees’
constitutional rights. Later in June 2001, Justice Muhammad Kamil Awang nullified an
election victory for Yong Teck Lee, a member of Malaysia's governing party in Sabah,
and criticized an apparent attempt by Federal authorities to influence his decision, calling

it an "insult to one's intelligence” (International Herald Tribune June 9 2001). New Chief
Justice Mohammad Dzaiddin Abdullah has also attacked the judiciary’s loss of
independence, and has promised to reinstate public confidence in the institution
(Asiaweek June 29 2001). But it might be a while before such an event could truly
materialize, for as long as the state places its capitalist development as its ultimate
priority, an independent judiciary would remain a hindrance to state objectives.
In Singapore, where opposition to the state’s governing process is less
formidable than Malaysia, court cases involving the state almost always end up in its

favor. A favorite tactic for the state has been to file libel suits against any individual or
organization that dare accuse its leaders of any wrongdoing or unfair practices.
Singapore’s lone opposition member of Parliament for many years, J. B. Jeyaretnam has
had to face relentless persecution and court charges by the Singaporean state. In 1997,
in a libel case filed by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Jeyaretnam was ordered to pay

him and 10 other PAP litigants a sum of about US$10,000 each in order to 'defend their
reputations and maintain the respect of the electorate.’ The suit was in response to

Jeyaretnam’s statement during an election rally that a police report had been filed
against the PAP leaders by Workers Party colleague Tang Liang Hong for their calling
him (Tang) an ‘Anti-Christian Chinese chauvinist.’ In the reverse, the judge found the
PAP leadership justiﬁed in tagging Tang as such and ordered him to pay a total of S$1.4
million in damages (later reduced in half). Tang, who described the Singapore state as
practicing ‘legal terrorism,‘ later fled to Malaysia (South China Morning Post November 7
1997)
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The legal approach suits the state well since in the age of globalization direct and
conspicuous repression could well alienate Singapore in international circles, which is
bad for investments. The latest case involves Chee Soon Juan, leader of the Democratic
Party and Singapore’s opposition, who is facing defamation charges filed by Prime
Minister Goh Chok Tong and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, arising from his claims that
Singapore had loaned S$17 billion (US$92 billion) to former Indonesian dictator Suharto
during the Asian financial crisis (New Sunday Times January 20 2002). If precedence is

anything to go by, Mr Chee may soon find himself bankrupt, entailing expulsion from
Parliament. Stuart Littlemore, Australian Queens Counsel for Jeyaretnam’s case
observed: “The Singapore leadership has a longstanding record of using the High Court
as a mechanism for silencing its opponents by suing them for statements that, in any
comparable jurisdiction, would be seen as part of the robust political debate inseparable
from democratic freedoms, and by being awarded such unconsciounably high damages
and costs as to bankrupt the defendants, forcing them out of Parliament. This is
particularly relevant to Singapore where there are only four opposition members out of a
total of 83 MP5" (quoted in New Straits Times October 3 1997, 20).
That Singapore’s court system has been heavily biased toward the state is well

known, especially among those who had been part of it. Francis Seow, the country’s
former Solicitor-General, and Devan Nair, former President, both of whom became
critical of the state and entered opposition politics, faced its wrath through impending
court cases against each of them. Both fled the country to the United States, knowing
fully well that the judicial system in Singapore would not give them the light of day to
defend themselves fairly. In an attempt to defame them, the state alleged Seow with tax
evasion and subversion charges, and labeled Nair as an ‘alcoholic with bizarre behavior’
(Lingle 1996, 115; Sydney Morning Herald February 15 1997).
There are numerous other autocratic elements that distinguish Singapore’s
judiciary from that of other countries. The state abolished trial by jury in 1968 and
constrained the discretionary powers of judges in 1973 (Jones 1997, 49; Seow 1994,

174-194). But the state has been extremely successful in lulling the world into viewing its
judiciary as a highly impartial, incorruptible, and independent entity. For example, the

state’s accommodative approach in attracting investments and flexibility in enforcing
contracts and property rights for TNCs, the International Institute for Management
Development has awarded the country ﬁrst placing for its legal framework (IMD 2000).
As in the civil service and armed forces, the state uses a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to
promote ‘efﬁciency’ of administration, throwing high salaries and promotions as
incentives (Lingle 1996,92). Judicial efficiency is often mistaken for dispensing fairness

and justice; it is almost never seen in terms of measuring loyalty to the state.
Curtailment of free expression and state control of media

Freedom of expression and association and the thriving of an open and free
media are the cornerstones of a truly functioning civil society. But in both Malaysia and
Singapore, freedom of expression has been a rare commodity, especially when it
involves criticizing the state.
In Singapore, state control of the media began in the early 19605 with the state’s
British-sanctioned suppression of the left. Scores of journalists, editors, and writers were

detained under the country’s emergency laws. The editor of the Malay language Utusan
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Melayu, Said Zahari, was detained without trial for 16 years under the Internal Security
Act on allegations of being a ‘Malay chauvinist’ and a ‘communist,’ accusations which he
steadfastly denied throughout his incarceration (Far Eastern Economic Review July 5

2001). The Utusan Melayu was finally driven out of the country in 1969. Closing of other
newspapers included the Chinese daily Nanyang Slang Pau in 1983, and the Englishlanguage newspapers Eastern Sun and the Singapore Herald in 1971, the latter
incriminated for being agents of foreign subversive elements (Straits Times May 17
2000). Finally, in the early 19805 the state laid effective seizure of Singapore Press
Holdings (SPH), corporatized it, and held significant management shares to control all of
the Republic’s newspapers. Such a move not only enabled the state operative control of

information, but its monopolization of revenues through advertising also made SPH a
lucrative enterprise (Asiaweek March 24 2000).

Similar to the way in which the state has managed to bamboozle the world of its
compliant judiciary, there also seems to be a deceptive concealment of the control of

Singaporean media by the state. To complement Singapore’s aspired role as a global
financial center, the media has sought to play out its ‘international-cosmopolitan’ role by

providing the latest information from around the world through the latest technology
available, impressing on the world that its press is free and sophisticated. But as former

journalist Ravi Veloo commented, “Yes there is press freedom (in Singapore) to publish
sex and crime stories. Unfortunately it doesn’t extend to local politics” (quoted in
Asiaweek March 24 2000, 36)
There is an unwritten code of conduct among media personnel as to how news

reporting and dissemination should function in Singapore. For example, when the editor
of the Business Times was fined for covering information deemed ‘secret’ by the state,
the newspaper ran no editorials protesting its editor’s prosecution under the Official

Secrets Act (OSA) (South China Morning Post April 29 1993).7‘3 In contrast, columnists
have echoed politicians in decrying Western-style press freedoms. In effect, control of

the press is carried out under security laws such as the Official Secrets Act (OSA) and
the Internal Security Act (ISA) that permit media operation only through state licensing.
Media laws inherited from the British require all newspapers to be licensed, which can
be revoked at any time, thereby destroying the publication. Journalists must also be
extremely cautious of the ISA, under which they can be detained indefinitely without trial.
Eventually they can be fined orjailed upon conviction. As in Malaysia, the OSA can be
used to charge journalists or publishers who disclose official statistics in their

publications without prior permission, thus the Act effectively dissuades journalists from
receiving leaks in any type of ofﬁcial data and information (George 2000).79
The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (amendment) 1977 also empowers the

Singaporean state to determine the composition of a newspaper company’s board of
directors. It is mandatory for a newspaper company to be publicly listed, and holders of
its management shares are determined by the state. Through this process, the state

78. The OSA. prosecution of Business Times editor Patrick Daniel, together with four other
individuals, one a civil servant, was not intended to crush either him or the paper but to signal to

gather civil servants that leaks of information would not be tolerated.
The definition of official secret could even include data on trade and finance, which have to be
cleared with relevant authorities before being publicized (South China Morning Post April 29

1993)
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ensures journalists and editors are highly trustworthy for self-censorship. Once this
structure is placed in motion, the state no longer needs to directly control the press. The

same structural mechanism is replicated in the control of broadcasting and radio
stations. The state demands that the media functions more than just disseminating
information; it looks at the media as a tool to support its autocratic laws and policies

(George 2000). For foreign press agencies, this act enables the state to regulate the
circulation of their newspapers (Seow 1998).
Furthermore, libel laws oblige journalists to take extreme caution with information
that could in any way impair state officials’ reputations. In 1994, Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew sued the International Herald Tribune for an article that implicated the
existence of a dynastic ruling structure within the Singapore state (Lingle 1996, 18). That
this was a fact was highly obvious since Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, who had spent
only five years in the country’s armed forces and climbed to the rank of BrigadierGeneral at age 31, was shortly after then elected to Parliament and rapidly appointed as
Deputy Prime Minister. The report also implied Premier Goh Chok Tong as a ‘seat
warmer’ for Lee junior’s imminent grand entrance to top leadership. Lee junior and Goh
joined the bandwagon, despite a forced public apology by the newspaper, and all three
won their cases before a compliantjudge (Lingle 1996, 18-22). It has become
remarkable that international media firms in Singapore would actually toe the line and
submit their professionalism to the state. But as TNCs, these agencies need to take
advantage of the lucrative businesses that Singapore offers. Thus keeping silent about
Singapore’s despotic system is but a negligible price to pay for long-term profits.
Malaysia’s media laws, like Singapore’s, are a legacy of the British colonial state.

In the age of globalization, the Malaysian state embarks on two different approaches
toward media legislation. In line with its Multimedia Super Corridor project, a cyber

industrial park stretching from the world’s tallest buildings, the Petronas Twin Towers in
Kuala Lumpur, to the new administrative capital in Putrajaya, the state has implemented
new ‘cyber laws’ to protect software copyrights of TNCs such as Microsoft, Siemens,
and Sun Technologies. On the other hand, the contradiction in Malaysia’s desire to
launch itself into the information age is evidenced by its refusal to repeal the Official
Secrets Act (Amendment) 1986 and the Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984

(Asiaweek April 1 1997).
The Official Secrets Act (OSA) amendment in 1986, which imposes a one-year
mandatory prison sentence regardless of the extent of offence, had met stern resistance
from Malaysia’s National Union of Journalists, Bar Council, and even former Prime
Ministers Tunku Abdul Rahman and Hussein Onn, to name a few (Munro-Kua 1996,
124). Opposition leaders historically have accused the Government of using the OSA to

cover up corruption. In January 2000 Ezam Mohammad Nor, youth chief of the
opposition National Justice Party, was charged under the OSA with disclosing classified
Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) reports to the press (Time January 24 2000).
Under the 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Act, domestic and foreign
publications must apply annually to the Government for a permit. The act was amended

in 1987 to expand the state's power to ban or restrict publications, and prohibit court
challenges to suspension or revocation of publication permits. State power over license
renewal and other publication related matters has created an atmosphere that inhibits
investigative journalism and resulted in extensive self-censorship. The Deputy Home

183
Minister stated in Parliament that from 1996 through March 1998, action had been taken
under the Act against 164 publishers and authors, including Irene Fernandez of women’s
group Tenaganita for ‘malicious reporting’ of maltreatment of illegal Bangladeshi workers
in detention camps (New Straits Times April 19 1998; Amnesty International 2000). After

the 1999 elections, the decline in Malay support for UMNO resulted in boycotts of
mainstream newspapers by Malay readers, who took to the Internet and alternative

media, especially the Islamic party PAS’s Harakah. When Harakah’s circulation shot up
from 75,000 to 369,000 during the Anwar Ibrahim saga, the Act was used to curtail its
circulation on a fortnightly basis. Soon, the paper’s editor and printer were also arrested
under the Sedition Act 1970 (Asiaweek January 28 2000).
Under the Sedition Act, any statement seen to potentially incite hostility toward
the state or any ethnic or religious group becomes a criminal offence punishable by up to

three years imprisonment or US$1300 ﬁne, or both (Human Rights Watch 2002). In
September 1998, a DAP opposition leader Lim Guan Eng was charged under the act for
statements made against a former UMNO Chief Minister in connection with the latter’s
statutory rape case. Two years later, two other opposition members Karpal Singh of the

DAP, who was also one of Anwar’s counsels, and Marina Yusoff of the National Justice
Party were arrested for making press statements implicating state involvement in
separate criminal incidents (Asiaweek January 28 2000). But the hypocrisy of
enforcement could be seen in the way the state gets away with publishing explicit
advertisements of the 1969 racial bloodbath in the run ups to the 1999 elections as a
morbid way to convince Malaysians that only the National Front could provide political

stability (Human Rights Watch 2002).
The state has bought up majority shares in the largest printing agencies thus
controlling the mainstream media. UMNO, through Fleet Holdings owns the New Straits
Times, Berita Harlan, Shin Min Daily, and The Malay Mail. The MCA in turn, controls The
Star through its Huaren Holdings and controversially bought over the Nanyang Slang
Pau amidst strong protests from Chinese Malaysians (Asia Times June 26 2001). The
MIC owns Tamil Nesan, Thinamani, and Tamil Osai. The satellite TV corporation Astro is
owned by Ananda Krishnan, an Indian-Malaysian capitalist with close ties to the ruling

class (Asiaweek March 24 2000). Lately, the state has even put fonrvard the idea of
tightening some aspects of existing cyber laws to prevent ‘irresponsible’ use of the
Internet in spreading ‘false information’ about the state (New Straits Times April 29

2001)
Defamation suits against publishing houses and foreign journalists have
somewhat been minimized, at least in terms of amounts of damages. In a wake-up call
for Malaysia's criticism fraughtjudiciary, Chief Justice Dzaiddin Abdullah urged judges to
check the size of awards handed out in defamation suits. In a divergence from his
predecessor, he also acknowledged that huge awards made against the print and
electronic media would "tend to stultify and curb press freedom" (New Straits Times
March 24 2001).

Association in social and religious organizations in Singapore and Malaysia is
also subject to state monitoring and permits. The respective Societies Act in Singapore
and Malaysia empowers the state to determine the types of groups and associations that

could exist in each respective country. Internationally, Singapore has not ratified two UN
covenants, one on economic, social, and cultural rights and the other on civil and
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political rights, which cover a wide range of fundamental liberties. Therefore it makes no
apologies when 29 members of the Jehovah Witness group were jailed for refusal to
attend military service, with the religious organization itself banned. It also similarly
rejected an application by gays and lesbians to form their own association on grounds
that homosexuality is illegal (Amnesty International 2001). The state has also applied
double standards in its decisions affecting religious practices. In February 2002, it
suspended two Muslim elementary schoolgirls for refusal to take off their scarves,
justifying its action on grounds of enforcing uniformity among students. In contrast, the
state has never applied a similar policy toward Sikh schoolboys who wear turbans or hair
buns to school (Aliran Monthly February 2002). Any type of punishment taken against a

religious group for their beliefs and practices is a violation of basic human rights, and the
Singapore state has never hesitated to undertake such action on a discriminatory basis.
In Malaysia, despite the setting up of a Commission (Suhakam) to address
human rights issues, Malaysians have witnessed a rapid erosion of human rights and
civil liberties particularly those relating to freedom of expression, assembly and
association. There is a pattern since the banning of AI-Arqam Islamic group, to closely
follow and monitor other Muslim groups in the country. The state has also been brutal in

suppressing large demonstrations such as the one that took place near the port city of
Kelang, in which loads of riot police attacked a 10,000 strong mainly Malay-Muslim
crowd attending an opposition gathering in November 2000 (Aliran Monthly December
2000). Also, legislations such as the Police Act (Amendment) 1988 and Public Order

Preservation Act 1958 have usually been combined with other laws to restrict or prohibit
citizens’ rights to assembly and expression (Anuar 2002). For example, the University
and University Colleges Act 1975 prohibits students from participating in politics, a result
of which 36 students and academics were arrested in pro-reform rallies in 1999
(Asiaweek July 14 2000).
An attempt by the Singapore Law Society in 1986 to present a different opinion

on the state’s Printing and Presses Act amendment proposals resulted in the entire
organization being subjected to condescending lectures and interrogations by various
state ministers, including the Prime Minister himself (Tremewan 1994, 197). Not more
than two years later, the state established an Academy of Law headed by the Chief
Justice, to which all members of the judiciary, law professors, and practicing lawyers
must belong and to whose code of conduct they must subscribe (Straits Times Weekly
August 14 1988). In Malaysia, such severe coercion has been taken less seriously,
viewing them as nothing more than a frivolity of state policies. For example, in view of
students providing a potentially large pool of anti-state activists, in March 2002 the state
required all state university personnel and students to make a pledge of loyalty to the
state and to distance themselves from political activism. The state justified this

requirement as keeping students away from unnecessary distraction for better
concentration on their studies. Many members of faculty and students have humored
this effort as another bureaucratic exercise, but academician Dr. Rosli Omar (quoted in

Aliran Monthly February 2002, 4-5) pointed out the contradiction of state policies with
regards to its role in fostering academic progress in state universities: ”(Mahathir) has
often said that Islamic civilisation has regressed because of the ossification of
knowledge and the lack of a spirit of inquiry.... in and of itself, the pledge of loyalty
contravenes this open-mindedness and spirit of inquiry.”
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Harsh laws and capital punishment

Democratic societies should dispense justice through humane laws that take into
consideration individual rights and liberties. Both Malaysia and Singapore have inherited

repressive British colonial laws that sought to suppress anti-systemic organizations and
movements. The ‘mother of all punitive laws’ in these countries is the respective Internal
Security Act. Under this act, it becomes lawful for the state to detain a person without
trial for an indefinite period of time as long as it reasonably believes that such persons
are a threat to national interests. In Singapore, provisions of the ISA include the legality
to extract information and confessions through intensive interrogations. Such methods
more often than not have resulted in detainees succumbing to extreme physical pain and
mental exhaustion. The provisions also authorize the police and Internal Security
Department officials with a high degree of prerogative powers in conducting their
investigations (Tremewan 1994, 201-203). Former opposition leader Chia Thye Poh of
the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) was held without trial for 22 years from 1966 to

1988 for allegedly being a communist without ever being formally charged in a court of

law (Asiaweek December 11 1998).80
In Malaysia, there had been more than 9500 arrests made under the ISA up to

1993 (Munro-Kua 1996, 152). In 1987, in order to divert national attention away from the
mounting challenges from factions within UMNO, Dr. Mahathir authorized the arrests
and detention of more than 100 prominent figures, mainly opposition party members,

social activists, and even several politicians from the ruling National Front parties.
Named Operasi Lalang (Operation Round-up), the state justified its action in the name of
national security (New Straits Times October 29 1987). In April 2001, ten opposition
party members and pro-reform activists were detained under the ISA. They were

National Justice Party Vice-President Tian Chua, youth chief Ezam Noor, supreme
council member N. Gobalakrishnan, and youth executive member Abdul Ghani Harun as

well as Islamic activist Dr. Saari Sungib and playwright Hishamuddin Rais (Asiaweek
August 17 2001). The ISA has become a convenient instrument in weeding out political
challengers and in deflecting state problems away from public awareness.
In both counties, the death penalty is mandatory for drug trafficking, murder,
treason and firearms offences. The Singapore Home Affairs revealed that 340 peOpIe

were executed between 1991 and 2000, giving Singapore possibly the highest execution
rate per population in the world (Amnesty International 2001). In Malaysia, there had

been a total of 349 executions from 1970 to 1996, with a decreasing trend coming into
the new millennium. Nevertheless, according to Malaysian human rights group Suaram,
these punitive laws have not been effective in deterring drug addiction and trafficking, as
new addicts actually have risen by 18 per cent from 1995 to 1999 (Aliran Monthly
December 1999).
In Singapore, the criminalization process goes right down to the nitty-gritty.

Citiznes have to be extremely vigilant so as not to be fined for jaywalking, sporting long
hair (for men during the 19705), using the wrong type of TV aerial, chewing gum,

8° It was widely believed that the Singapore state released Chia at about the same time as South
Africa’s release of Nelson Mandela, to avoid the dubious distinction of being the remaining

country maintaining a long serving political prisoner (see Lingle 1996, 114). Chia remained in
restricted residence on an island off Singapore until 1997.
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spitting, failing to flush public toilets, and littering, just to name a few. While it is agreed
that these laws do benefit the whole of society, such magnification of trivial offenses is
disproportionately targeted against the politically powerless. For it is usually the working
class who are more likely to spit on the ground or pick fruits in a public park, and it is
often the mentally challenged or emotionally unstable who would urinate in public places
or loiter aimlessly around town (Austin 1988, 923-924). Worse, some of these laws
present a nonsensical logic. For example, beggars who are caught twice by authorities
are produced in court and are most likely to face jail term of up to 6 months if found
guilty, considering the alternative punishment would be a fine of S$3000! (Jeyaretnam
quoted on Radio Australia February 21 1989) Since many of the misdemeanors are
connected to the poor and the disabled, the state has been unabashed in publishing
detailed Information, including photographs, about the offenders in its newspapers
(Tremewan 1994, 217). Humiliating the poor and instilling fear upon the lower classes
has been a prominent feature of state rule in Singapore.

However, as in drug laws, harsh and rigid rules have not retarded the frequency
of violent crimes on the island. In 1993, the UN Commission on Crime and Justice
reported that the rate for total assaults in Singapore was 34.12 per 100,000 people,
while the rate for robberies was 56.3 and homicide, 1.77 per 100,000, compared to
Malaysia at 14.54, 32.75 and 1.76 per 100,000 respectively. In 1997, total crime rate for
Singapore was 1,833 per 100,000 population compared to 1,853 in 1981 (UNDCP

1998).81 For all its strict enforcements of draconian laws, there has been no significant
reduction in crime in the Republic.
State attempts at leqitimation

As the world economy became increasingly globalized and the effects of
transnational forces became more penetrable, the state began to lose some of its power

to maintain its legitimacy. In order to reassert its supremacy, the state in Malaysia and
Singapore has resorted to authoritarianism as a means to consolidate its power. In light
of increased authoritarian rule, the question of legitimacy remained an issue to be dealt
with delicately. An effective type of ideology in this situation is one in which state policies

could be legitimized and extended against broader class interests (Poulantzas 1973,
143). In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, any form of such a legitimacy strategy
must be centered on the notion of economic nationalism.
The strength of economic nationalist ideology arises from two historicalcontextual premises that empower the state. One, peripheral capitalist development has
produced class relationships in which the dominant classes emerged through state
formation. The quest for state modernization reinforces the notion of economic

nationalism, consistently projecting the state as the only agent capable of bringing social
economic prosperity. Two, the British legacy of racism and classism has significantly
filtered into the relationship between state and civil society, through which the state is
able to assert its patronizing position upon its citizens.
Capitalist development brings with it a modernist project synonymously equated
with westernization. The pursuit of industrialization and ‘catch up with the west’ has been

8‘ Figures available from UNCJIN (United nations Criminal Justice Information network) at

http://www.uncjin.org.
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the beau ideal of peripheral statehood in the world system. In Malaysia and Singapore,
the predominance of the English-educated elite within the state machinery heavily
influenced the pro-western outlook of state policies, especially in its alliances with

western capital. But as capitalist peripheral development increasingly introduced an
authoritarian-type regime, these same elites find difficulty in reconciling the contradiction

between westernization and authoritarianism. To cultivate legitimacy among a heavily
Asian and tradition-bound populace, the state sought to find a socially acceptable and
politically justifiable approach to its authoritarian rule in order to attain its capitalist
development. The strategy was to sell the idea that western social decadence has been

a result of unlimited individual rights as advocated by western liberalism (Lingle 1996,
49). Here, state leaders often associated individualism or individual rights with the
flourishing of socially unprofitable practices and values found in the wastage of
resources, conspicuous consumption, and manifested in high rates of crime, divorce,

child illegitimacy and so on and so forth. In other words, to avoid going the deteriorating
western path to development, Malaysia and Singapore needed to adopt western

technology but discard western political notions of liberalism and individualism, adopting
instead a sort of ‘Asian-traditional approach,’ emphasizing thrift, communal concerns,

and loyalty to the state to attain its own brand of capitalist development (Chan 1993, 1516; Mahbubani 1994). This way, the state could win legitimacy of its policies while
simultaneously instilling among its citizens an urgent sense of loyalty to the state. That
capitalist development, and not necessarily eastern or western philosophies or
approaches, had been responsible for the rising rates of social instabilities and

environmental destruction has rarely been mentioned.
Hence, in order to achieve this, the state reverted to the extraction of certain
ideological aspects of ‘Asian values’ that were deemed compatible with state
authoritarian rule, and which emphasizes the subjugation of individual interests to
communitarian interests. In Malaysia, an ‘Asian-based’ economic nationalism became
entrenched within UMNO’s ‘guided democracy’ principle that has resonated through

various previous state ideologies and culminated into a grand national vision aptly
named, Vision 2020 (Hng 1998, 42). Vision 2020, etched out and introduced in 1991,

functions both as an inspirational national dream as well as a serious overarching state
policy with which all other policies must be aligned. The objective of this vision is “a
Malaysia that is fully developed by the year 2020” (Mohamad 1993, 3). The official
statement asserts: “We shall be a fully developed country in our own mould. We must be

fully developed in terms of our economy, in terms of social justice, political stability,
system of government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, national pride and

confidence. There can be no fully developed Malaysia until we have finally overcome the
nine central strategic challenges that have confronted us from the moment of our birth as
an independent nation” (quoted in Hng 1998, 39).
The nine challenges referred to are a set of social, demographic, and political

obstacles to industrial development revolving around issues of wealth distribution,
national integration, social resilience, and educational as well as technological
development. But pertinent to this discussion is a resolution to one of the challenges,
that advocate the precedence of community interests over individual interests, indirectly
implying the prioritization of state or national interests over other interests. The

resolution to the third challenge reads “Fostering and developing a mature democratic
society, practicing a form of mutual consensual, community-oriented Malaysian
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democracy, that can be a model for all developing countries” (quoted in Hng 1998, 40).
In his book dedicated to highlighting the state’s ideological strategy in nation-building,
Hung Yong Hng (1998, 41) writes “whether in good or bad times, the role of the supreme
leader is always that of the grand unifier, the great motivator, the visionary. Vision is
important because unless one can see and explain the Big Picture, one cannot move the
nation from Here to There. Vision 2020 is Mahathir’s Big Picture.” Such understanding
effectively presages a type of Vision 2020 not focused on genuine societal interests or
those associated with popular democratic structures, but rather one that is related to

state deﬁned ‘communitarian’ goals.
For Malays in Malaysia, the monopoly of state power by UMNO since
independence and its promises to correct the imbalances of ethnonational-class
inequalities have numbed them into accepting state patronization. The customary MalayHindu reverence for leadership and respect for authority, embedded in the Sultan-rakyat
(ruler-subject) relational structure, has transposed itself unto modern-day relationships
between state and society. For UMNO, a conservative approach to development,
stressing Malay traditional structures and playing up ultra-Malay ethnocentric
sentiments, has given them, until 1999, the legitimacy and power over the Malay
electorate. For the rest of the country, the desire for a chunk of the benefits of economic

growth seemed to have overcome the aspiration for political change. At the same time,
and as evidenced by the non-Malay votes that retained the National Front in the 1999
elections, there seemed to have developed a type of uncaring acceptance among non-

Malays of the encroaching power of state over civil society so long as the economy
continues to perform well (Aliran Monthly December 2000).
It is quite correct to maintain that the Asian financial crisis and the ensuing 1999
elections temporarily shelved the plans toward the attainment of Vision 2020 goals. The

state has always relied on economic growth as the integral force against opposition to its
authoritarian rule. With the economy still being started up, politically, the state has been

occupied in attempting to win back its Malay constituencies from PAS. The state’s
nation-building strategy has co-opted its own modernist version of Islam as a method to

pull away the Muslim electorate from rising anti-systemic influences of Islamic
resurgence, whether it is connected to PAS or some progressive transnational force.
Recently, UMNO declared that since Islam is the official religion of the country and that
much of Islamic practices and customs have been accommodated into the secular

system for Muslims, Malaysia could well be described as an Islamic state. PAS, on the
other hand, insisted that democratic and political rights and full implementation of syaria
laws were absent, thereby mooting the state’s claim (Aliran Monthly April 2002). While
many feel that such debates have leaned toward the realm of childishness, it is
nevertheless a clear illustration of how desperate the state has become in attempting to
reassert its position as ‘champion’ of Malays and Muslims. Without a strong ideological

premise, the state now finds difficulty in mobilizing its support and reestablishing its
legitimacy.
In Singapore, the state’s perceived geo-political vulnerability induces it to ensure
that capital flow remains uninterrupted. From the time of independence, the PAP has
ruled with a unity of purpose — providing investment opportunities for TNCs and indirectly

furnishing material benefits for the people through economic growth — but with a social
cost. The state explains that due to its fragile position and limited territorial capacity, the
state has to take lead in policy matters and that there would be no room for citizens to
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argue or oppose state decisions if economic goals had to be realized (Chew 1995, 942-

943). That the PAP found itself politically unopposed coming into independent
statehood gave it the advantage to assert a heavily patronizing relationship with society.
To justify one-party hegemony, the state promoted an official ideology of pragmatic
survivalism (Lee 1990, 16). The state has managed to instill fear on the population that
if the state did not take a hard-lined administrative approach, and if citizens did not
respond accordingly, the island would end up in social and political chaos, enabling it to
be swallowed up by hostile Malay-Indonesian peoples. In 1996, Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew, in attempting to wake up young and wealthy, but ‘complacent’ Singaporeans,
insinuated that if they did not emulate the diligence of their forefathers, Singapore would
end up back in Malaysia (Far Eastern Economic Review June 20 1996).82

Thus ‘pragmatism’ and ‘meritocracy,’ as defined by the state and as a political
and social approach to be subscribed in all its institutions, would ensure that the ‘best

and fittest’ would lead and sustain Singapore’s economic prosperity. At the same time,
individual rights must be curtailed and submitted to the all-encompassing and more
important ‘national’ rights of the state. The practices in this brand of democracy are

subjected to the limitations of ‘national’ interests and needs, labeling it as
‘communitarian democracy’ (Scalapino 1992, 152-172).

However, as globalization began to facilitate information sharing and cross
cutting communications, Singaporeans have become aware of the increased
authoritarian trends that contradict the state’s communitarian democracy. For it was not
only the individual right to criticize the state that was being constrained, it was as though
all other social and political institutions from marriage partners to reading material were
being determined by the state. Citizen dissatisfaction was expressed through declining
electoral victory margins for the PAP, and the state responded through suppression of
political opposition and the maneuvering elections. But the state needed another form of
ideology that sought to openly legitimize its undemocratic practices. The state found this
in the ‘Asian development model argument being concurrently propagated by many
Asian analysts (Mahbubani 1994; Chan 1993; Dunn 1991, 27-28).
The ‘Asian model’ was a response to western commentators, who began to

highlight the need to test the emerging economies of East Asia with the democratization
of its polities (Chan 1993, 7). Many sources, including the World Bank, applauded the

thriftiness and diligence of Asians and attributed the ‘positive Asian-Confucian values’ as
being a crucial guiding factor to these countries remarkable growths (Lingle 1996;
Naisbitt 1996; World Bank 1995). Led by China, many of these countries sought to
insulate their citizens from what they perceived as ‘culturally debilitating’ effects of
economic freedoms of the west. These states often equated protection of AsianConfucian culture with sustaining economic growths. Antagonism toward western
concepts of democracy soon found its home in many Asian leaders, who insisted that

the west understand that there was a ‘different form’ of community-oriented’ democracy

82. It is not uncommon for the Singapore state to use Malaysia as a punching bag. On many
occasions for politically comparative purposes, it has labeled Malaysia as corrupted, chaotic, third

world, and crime-infested. When opposition leader Tang fled to Malaysia after having accused
Singapore of practicing legal terrorism, the PAP personally took offense and sarcastically

remarked how of all places, Tang took refuge in ‘crime-infested Johor Baru’ (city cross the Straits
from Singapore) to escape terrorism.
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in Asia. Some, like Mahathir, resented the west’s condescending attitude of confining
post-colonial Asian development within a western ideological straitjacket (Jones 1997,

2;Straits Times August 31 1993). On the other side, western academicians joined the
fray with their ‘ends and clashes of civilization’ theses, implying the west to prepare a
confrontational relationship with the East (Fukuyama 1995; Huntington 1993).
The Singapore state took advantage of this trend to serve its political goals. It
extracted the paternalistic elements of Confucianism to highlight to the people, the
importance of abiding by and supporting of state expertise in economic and political
matters. As far as the state was concerned, and this it consistently drummed into
Singaporeans, the country’s economic success has been sufficient proof of the state’s

justifying the means to attain the end - prosperity for its citizens. In such a case, abuses
of power and authoritarian rule are justified if the goals are achieved. The autocratization
of society that was inherited through colonialism is incredibly perpetuated by the state
through the convenient interpretation of a traditional Asian philosophy. In pure classist
manner, the state, whose positions are mainly filled by English educated elites, often
assume ordinary citizens to be inadequate in their intelligence, capacity, and
trustworthiness of making political decisions (Lingle 1996, 69). As Beng-Huat Chua

(1995, 204) stated, ”the pervasive strategy of rendering all government decisions as
‘technical problems,’ to be solved only by experts, reduces the space for political
practice because the electorate as lay individuals do not posses the requisite knowledge
to be trusted with making informed decisions.”

With the coming of the Pacific century and the intense involvement of overseas
Chinese businesses across the Asian economies, the state has also played upon

Chinese ethnocentrism to strengthen the arguments for the Asian-Confucian
development model. The state’s strategy now is on the reverse. In the 19605, the state

fought hard to suppress Chinese education and cultural chauvinism (Tremewan 1994).
Now, there seems to be a passionate promotion of Mandarin and Chinese education to
exploit commercial opportunities in China. Even then, while the state encourages its

citizens to foster and cultivate Confucian work habits, it reminds them that such cultural
practices also encourage loyalty to the state and its leaders. To the state, it is important

that citizens recognize that good government is based not on good structural framework
or laws, but rather on good leaders (The Economist June 29 1991).
The effectiveness of these strategies has produced mixed results. In Malaysia,
the bulk of the Malay electorate does not seem to buy into the Asian values argument
since Islamic principles, in their view, tend to have its roots more connected with the
western ideals of democratic statehood and individual political rights than ‘Asian
dictatorial paternalism.’ Thus Malays were infuriated when the state lamented on the
‘failure of Malays to learn from and acquire the work habits of the exemplary Chinese’
(The Star July 18 2001). Such statements not only serve to distance the Malay masses

from the state, but it implicitly demonstrated the state’s propagation of Asian-Confucian
values over Malay-Islamic values. To this effect PAS had the support of a good number
of Malays from all classes with its incorruptible leadership and attractive political
philosophies.

However, all that took place before September 11 2002. The one single incident
that may have triggered a catalytic pressure against the democratization process in
Malaysia was the September 11 2001 tragedies. The ensuing war on terrorism has
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become a tool for autocratic states throughout the world to suppress insurrections and
liberation movements at home (New Internationalist May 2002). When the Malaysian
state arrested, mistreated, and jailed Anwar Ibrahim in 1999, the US condemned it and
even threatened to reconsider investments in the country.83 But as soon as PAS

emerged the largest opposition party in the 1999 elections, the US instantaneously
reduced the tone of disdain in its comments on the Anwar affair. Now the current war on
terrorism has witnessed a complete reversal in American attitudes since 1999. Not only
has the US kept silent on the Anwar issue during Mahathir’s visit to the US in May 2002
but the US has even asked the Malaysian state for expert advise on effective counterterrorism measures against lslamist militants (Time October 29 2002).
Indeed in Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir has manipulated the war against terrorism to
justify the use of repressive laws against mostly Muslim groups and activists. According
to Human Rights Watch, Currently, at least 105 people have been being detained under
the ISA. Many of those targeted were minority Shi’a Muslims, supporters of jailed former

Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and youth leaders in the opposition PAS.84
Furthermore, declarations of war by extremist quarters of PAS against the US for its

attacks on Afghanistan seemed to have turned off many of PAS’s supporters, many of
whom have since left the party (Time October 29 2002). The debates arising from the
attacks have played entirely in the state’s favor. PAS seemed to have lost much ground,
as are the other component parties in the Alternative Front. And it was just recently that
the state seemed to have been left in political wilderness with the reduction of its Malay
support. Now, the state has regained its confidence thanks to the turnaround of events,
and at the time of writing, the call for snap elections seems to be on the horizon (Straits
Times May 11 2002). This is bad news for the opposition since any party associated
even in a tangential way with any type of militancy has no chance in Malaysia (Time
October 29 2002).

In Singapore, the last elections highlighted the biggest win for the PAP since
1984. There is likelihood that as Singapore’s economic health gets better, there would
be a return to greater authoritarianism. The younger generation’s great lack of interest in
politics has created anxieties among both progressive analysts and the state (South
China Morning Post April 21 2001). An apolitical generation would replete the future
leadership pool that the state has striven hard to harvest. In this, the state has become a
victim of its own policies since political discussions and activism had been out of bounds
for young people. But an apolitical generation would also produce increased public
apatheticism toward state authoritarian rule. In June 2001, a poll was carried out by a

state-monitored human rights organization, ThinkCentre, on whether Singaporeans
supported the death penalty. The survey was done amidst a young Malay woman’s

emotional plea of clemency for her gallows-bound drug addict brother.85 The results of

83 Anwar Ibrahim had many close associates and acquaintances in the US and European
governments, as well as in prominent non-government organizations. His personal close ties with

US Secretary of Defense James Cohen branded him an American spy among ultra conservative
members of the Malaysian state.
84 Press statement by Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch's Asia
Division from Human Rights Watch news, May 13, 2002. Available at

Elsttp:IIhrw.org/press/2002/05.
Zulfakar Mustaffa was charged in possession of 70 grams of heroin (Straits Times June 6

2002)
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the poll showed more than 80 per cent favored the death penalty (New Straits Times
June 6 2001; AFP June 7 2001).
Conclusion

Globalization and shifting global labor divisions have enabled Malaysia and
Singapore to ascend into semi-peripheral status within the world system through
increased industrial and commercial activities in the capitalist world economy. But
globalization has made national economies even more vulnerable to market fluctuations
through transnational commercial activities that could rapidly enter and leave the country
in seconds. Transnational social forces could also penetrate physical territories of the

state and undermine its authority. The effect of this is two-fold. One, the state has
actually lost significant control of some portions of its citizens’ actions be it through
political or economic activity. The other effect is that in multi-cultural societies such as
Malaysia and Singapore, globalization has enabled different groups to identify with
sources transcending the states’ borders. Politically, such circumstances can lead to
increased social polarization, and economically, it could widen wealth gaps between
different ethnonational groups, as it already has in Malaysia and Singapore. Prospects
for popular democratic alliances in both instances for both countries would be less than
optimistic.
Furthermore this chapter has shown that as both countries industrialized, there

has been greater inclination toward state authoritarian rule. The pursuit of
industrialization has been a matter of state survival that has propelled the state in both
countries to prioritize the capitalist class. Anti-systemic forces in Malaysia seemed to

have had greater chances of destabilizing the state and reforming its authoritarian rule.
But racial politics and ethnonational-class conflicts have kept cross-ethnonational
democratic forces apart. Neither the middle classes nor the lower classes have the
mobilizing power to Initiate an effective coalition. In Singapore, a politically weakened
population, pacified by relative affluence has kept the middle classes politically docile.

Repressive laws in this country have functioned as a campaign of terror against the poor
and working classes, disconnecting them further from the middle classes by high
degrees of racist and classist policies by the state toward these groups. Finally, world

events motivated by the declining hegemonic power, as exemplified by the US war on
terrorism, have also greatly influenced to curtail democratization processes in both
countries, especially Malaysia with its Islamic opposition.

Due to similar historical backgrounds, there is an eerie resemblance in the way
the states in Malaysia and Singapore control the electoral process, emasculate the
judiciary, curtail freedom of expression, and impose drastic control measures through

punitive laws. In both these countries, ideological legitimation strategies have centered
on using national-cultural explanations forjustifying authoritarian rule. The colonial

heritage passed on by the British to both Malaysian and Singaporean states provided
the social context within which state power over society had been shaped. Further
conflation of economics and nationalism seemed to have been the most efficacious
method of mobilizing the masses to abide by state policies and keeping them subdued
through nation-building ideological indoctrination, especially in Singapore. Also, in
vibrant economic times, there was a tendency, particularly among the middle classes, to
overlook state authoritarianism and throw support behind the state. In general, both
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extraneous world systemic factors and internal state-related variables have influenced
the way state authoritarianism is formed, nurtured and strengthened.

1 94
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION — THEORETICAL FINDINGS
AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

This dissertation has been a comparative research on state authoritarianism in Malaysia
and Singapore. The findings of this research are discussed in this chapter in the
following section.
Research Findings
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the theoretical framework of this
research is premised on the historical processes of four state-related developmental
variables. They are, state institutionalization processes, ethnonational-class tensions,

dependent and uneven development, and state ideological strategies. The historical
formation of and interaction between these variables have constrained the
democratization process in both countries.

In order to understand state authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore, it is
essential to analyze the history of the two countries’ state institutionalization process.
This is the process In which the state has consolidated its power and prominence over

civil society. The development of state political institutions in both countries has affected
the degree and nature of democratization, particularly in the ability of the state, through
its institutions, to form alliances with the capitalist and ruling classes. Thus it is crucial to
begin the analysis of this research beginning from each state’s incorporation into the
capitalist world economy. Failure to emphasize this stage of capitalist development
would have entailed weak understanding of the historical context from which the present
political structures emerged. During this period, it was shown that while both countries

were incorporated into the same regional economic network, each differed in their labor
specialization function within the emerging capitalist economy, thereby affecting the
character of colonial state formation.
Malaysia or rather the various Malay states at that time, possessed lands that
were rich in natural resources while Singapore was an island highly prized for its natural
harbor and strategic location between trade routes. The Malay states had been under
the rule of various sultans and rulers. To avoid incurring heavy costs of prolonged wars

with the Malays, the British indirectly colonized these states through a series of biased
and one-sided treaties with individual sultans. Singapore, on the other hand, was

purchased from the Johor sultanate by the East India Company and eventually turned
into a British colony ruled directly from London. Both these countries’ absorption into the

capitalist world economy was forceful and coercive. The old Malay trading network was
displaced, new territories were formed, ofﬁcial borders were drawn, and new legal
systems were implemented to meet the needs of the new capitalist economy.
Consequently, a dictatorial colonial administrative system emerged to displace the

existing Malay political economic structure, implanting British hegemonic rule in the
region. These historical events affirm the proposition in the second chapter that
incorporation of the Malay states and Singapore into the capitalist world economy
entailed oppressive colonial administrations in these countries that delineated the power
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relations between the state and its subjects, giving rise to inequalities between those
who would benefit and those who would be marginalized under this new system.
The formation of a formal colonial state in Singapore came earlier than in British
Malaya due to its unique political-historical circumstances. A fully compliant and
incompetent Malay ruler was instituted in Singapore by virtue of British intervention into
the affairs and conflicts within the Johor royal house. The comparative advantage

derived from such a situation allowed the British to eventually establish their entrepot
commercial center on the island under the command of a British governor accountable
to the colonial office in London. Unlike in the Malay states, in which the ruler possessed
sovereignty over his subjects, Singapore’s indigenous population had been effectively
disconnected from the traditional social structure of the Johor Empire. Direct colonial rule
facilitated the implementation of repressive laws, especially in labor regulation and crime
prevention.

In the Malay states, the situation was different. The existence of Malay rulers
and relatively large Malay population in the Malay states compelled the British to

institutionalize the sultans and rulers into its colonial structure so that control over Malay
society could be attained. By infusing the pre-capitalist Malay tributary structure into the
newly established residential system, the British bestowed official recognition on the
sultan or ruler, whom they backed through military means. The British colonialists found
this kind of political synthesis advantageous since it subtly but effectively suppressed the

Malays in a highly cost-effective manner. It also legitimately protected the British from
ambitious Malay chieftains. Furthermore, it enabled the British to exert their authority

easily through the sultan to uphold their political hegemony over Malay society. The
effects of British political hegemony soon permeated into all other emerging institutions
in the Malay states in areas such as education, legislation, law enforcement, and
commerce. Finally, driven by the need to secure capitalist production, specifically the
production and export of tin, the British sought to centralize the various Malay states into
a unified colonial political-territorial unit.
In both Malaya and Singapore, the colonial state serviced the needs of the
emerging capitalist class by ensuring smooth operative flow of capitalist production. The

colonial state instituted laws that recognized and protected commercial transactions and
private property as well as prevented political participation by the local population,
thereby protecting the marketing of goods and services imported from and exported to
Britain and Europe. As documented in the preceding chapters, prioritization of capitalist

class interests soon pushed the state to establish its hegemony over other social
institutions, since state survival depended on linkages to the capitalist world economy.

Social and cultural organizations and emerging political movements were either closely
monitored or suppressed. In both countries, the state’s institutions ultimately reigned
supreme. All legislative and financial processes as well as construction of social projects
were tightly controlled by the state to tailor toward capitalist development. Malayan and
Singaporean societies gradually became dependent on the colonial state for their basic

needs, granting unconditional power to the state to formulate and decide on social
policies. The structural transformation process from pre-capitalist Malay societies to
colonial statehood in both countries was marked by the consolidation of state power over
an emerging capitalist society, confirming the proposal in chapter three that the

196
repressive character of political institutions formed through colonialism contributed to
each state’s eventual hegemony over other social forces.
The colonial state’s institutional structure was reinforced, perpetuated and
passed on to independent peripheral statehood. The development of Malaysia and
Singapore into post-colonial states witnessed the automatic inheritance of state power
over civil society. The colonial process had created a class of English-educated elites to
form the crux of emerging national leaders. The existence of this elite eased the process
of transition from colonial statehood to independent statehood, securing British postcolonial interests in the region. Although superficial aspects of democracy such as
forms of voting and representative governance were present in post-colonial Malaya and

Singapore, the predominance of the state in many facets of political and social life in
these two countries as well as the states’ close relationships with Britain typified the neocolonial status of these countries. Political transformation through ‘independence’ had
merely transferred the repressive character of the state from foreign hands to local
elites.
In this regard, both states have shared a rather congruous political
developmental trajectory, in which single dominant political parties, the UMNO in

Malaysia and the PAP in Singapore, have fortified their control of the state through
monopolization of the political process. This affirms the proposal in chapter six that
through capitalist development, state institutionalization processes have enabled the

ruling parties to become sufficiently strong to control the state, formulate policies to
accommodate foreign capital, and facilitate capitalist economic growth, without any of
which the state could not survive. . Even as both countries ascended into semiperipheral status, the state has become more repressive and authoritarian, utilizing

draconian laws and regulations to assert their power over civil society. In the face of
increased globalization, the state has exerted even more authoritarian power over
society in order to face off the penetrating influences of transnational social forces that
threatened to destabilize its hegemony. This phenomenon proves correct for both
countries the proposal in chapter seven that as the state attained higher levels of

industrialization, the greater its orientation toward authoritarianism.
The main difference between the two states lies in the degree of accommodation
toward dominant social forces besides capital. The state in Malaysia, while forced to
facilitate investments by both foreign and local Chinese capitalists, had also been
concerned in maintaining its legitimacy among Malays, who constituted its largest and
most powerful electoral base. In order to sustain the capitalist system, state survival also
depended on policies that protected, or at least be perceived to protect, Malay social and

economic welfare. Thus in the case of Malaysia, a significant degree of adaptation to
Malay interests had been necessary for the state. That was how political threats to the
state emanating from Malay dissatisfaction over wealth distribution materialized into
state affirmative action projects for bumiputeras under the New Economic Policy (NEP).

Such a move by the state could be seen as a structural imperative to secure dominant
group interests as a means in maintaining long-term capitalist state survival. This had
meant prioritizing Malay economic interests at the expense of reducing opportunities for
maximum foreign capital investments. Eventually, as Malaysia industrialized, the state
saw the necessity of nurturing a bumiputera capitalist class to ensure Malay electoral

support through a new state-capitalist alliance. Sustaining the capitalist system in
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Malaysia in other words, required the creation of a local capitalist class closely linked to
the state.

Singapore’s capitalist origins differed slightly from Malaysia. Capitalist
development in the island republic has been heavily determined by its role as a regional
commercial center as well as its legacy as a British crown colony. Lacking natural
resources and dependent on its import-export trade with surrounding countries, the

engines that have successfully driven the country’s economy have always run from the
agency houses, merchant companies, banks, and later, multinational/transnational
corporations. Close state alliances with large business institutions have become
extremely crucial for capitalist development and hence, state survival. That the PAP’s
guiding state policy has had to do more on catering toward TNC needs and less on
nurturing its own capitalist class is a rationalization of this logic.
Another state-related variable that affected the democratization process in both

countries was the formation of ethnonational-class inequalities under capitalist
development. The colonial state in both Malaysia and Singapore embarked on a racial
division of labor to enhance production efficiency as well as to suppress working class

and peasant alliances against the state. Political economic expediency compelled the
British to import Chinese and Indians to work the mines and estates as wage laborers,
while confining Malays within the traditional agricultural labor sector. This employment
policy of channeling particular ethnonational groups into specific labor functions served

to identify each group with a specific occupation, which the colonial state reproduced
through two key approaches. First, racist ideologies, rooted in British and European
racial superiority, were perpetuated through intellectual discourse that legitimized
colonial rule. The notion of British racial superiority not only influenced colonial social

policies but they also served to justify the subordination of Asian ethnonational groups
through a system of ranked occupational hierarchy. Second, state institutions found in

the education system, the various legislative councils, state bureaucracies, law
enforcement agencies, and agricultural and commercial policies sought to sustain this
ethnonational stratiﬁcation process. As a result, one of the most crucial impacts of this
racial division of labor has been the persistent gaps in wealth, income, and educational

levels between the various ethnonational groups as well as between the regions in which
they resided, which had been segregated according to specialized labor functions. This
pattern continued into the post-colonial era for both countries, verifying the theme in

chapter four that the labor stratification process that was created through British
colonialism, have resulted in serious ethnonational-class inequalities within the social

structures of Malaysia and Slngapore.
Inequalities between Asian ethnonational groups also produced situations, in

which one group gained more economic power than others. It made possible for such a
group, the accumulation of greater privileges under the capitalist economic system in

terms of better quality education and access to modern amenities through greater
urbanization. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the Chinese had experienced
better prospects for social economic mobility under the formation of the capitalist
economy than Malays and Indians, enabling them to soon take over the intermediate
commercial networks and to accumulate greater capital compared to the other groups.
Once Chinese capitalists acquired a significant portion of economic power, there was a
tendency for them to perceive Chinese ethnonationality in more superior terms to other

198
Asian groups. In both Malaysia and Singapore, such economic power contributed to

reinforcements of Chinese ethnocentrism and sentiments of racial superiority over the
other ethnonational groups.
Consequently, the effects of this racial division of labor gave rise to tensions
between the Malays and Chinese over political power in Malaysia. Ethnonational
conflicts arising from social inequalities have boiled over to enduring antagonistic
political relations between them. Affirming its proposal, chapter five illustrated that the
failure in the mobilization of popular democratic movements among the various antisystemic forces against the British was largely attributed to the fragmented nature of
ethnonational consciousness among these groups. The divergent ethnonational goals of
each group had been motivated and shaped by each of their distinct social experiences
and labor specialization under the colonial system. Chinese groups, including the
communist factions they dominated, envisioned a Chinese-based independent Malaya,
While the Malays fought to retain what they believed to be their political and social

heritage embedded in the notion of Malaya as the homeland of Malays. In Malaya, the
disparate and disunited character of working class and peasant consciousness have
allowed the elite classes of each ethnonational group to take over the helm of power
from the British. In Singapore, the English-educated class managed to eventually
overcome the working class with the aid of the British as well as the ruling elite from
Malaysia during the island’s merger with its northern neighbors. Ironically, where the
lower classes failed, the ruling classes succeeded in forming a coalition. '
Due to the weakening effect of ethnonational tensions on attempts at popular

alliances, both the state in Malaysia and Singapore have exploited or instigated
ethnonational conflicts to strengthen their political power. Historical development of

Malaysia has been discernibly outlined by the explicit racialization of politics. Since the
colonial period, a segregated economic and demographic structure has shaped a
somewhat polarized social landscape. The lack of positive interaction between the
various ethnonational groups only added to the antagonisms that existed at the political
level. Even into peripheral statehood, political parties, both ruling and opposition, have
tended to pursue particular ethnonational interests despite their pluralist ideological

platforms. To its advantage, the UMNO-led National Front government has utilized the
racial fear factor to dissuade the public from voting for the opposition. Portraying the
aggravation of ethnonational tensions if opposition parties won, the National Front
managed to thwart the emergence of Malay-Chinese alliances against the state to retain
power in the 1990 and 1999 elections. The stirring of Malay ethnocentrism had been an
effective method of playing up Malay sentiments against the Chinese. At the same time,
the state formulated policies to promote industrialization, which together with its capitalist
class has also benefited Chinese businesses.
In Singapore, the English-educated Chinese elite dedicated the early turbulent
years of leadership struggle to the suppression of Chinese education and cultural groups

and derogating their activities as pro-communist and anti-establishment. Later, capitalist
peripheral state development was synonymous with the deterrence of Malay political

mobilization. One effective method was for the state to mask its racist policies against
Malays behind the facade of a so-called meritocracy system. By using state institutions
to sustain Malay poverty and social marginality, the state has justified Malay
backwardness on grounds of biological and cultural deficiency. Consequently, increased
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Malay rates of social delinquencies as well persistent stereotyping of Malay cultural
inferiority have become a political wedge in relations between Malays and other groups.
Such a situation has ensured the state firm control in policy formulation and direction.
Another important variable in constraining the democratization process and

contributing to the rise in authoritarianism is the dependent nature of economic
development. It is evident that both countries’ capitalist developments have been

dictated by the flow of foreign capital investments. In order for the state to strengthen its
internal legitimacy as well as its relative position in the world economy, its policies have
given precedence to the promotion of rapid industrialization. As mentioned earlier, such
policies have catered primarily to the interests of foreign, and to a limited extent, local
capitalists, resulting in the widening of existing inequalities between the privileged and
disenfranchised classes, between the urban and rural areas, and between the Chinese
and Malays. As economic globalization intensifies, class, ethnonational and
demographic inequalities in Malaysia take on more complex dimensions, weakening the
development of a truly independent and civil society. Without strong popular
consciousness to challenge the state, social consciousness needed for popular

democratic alliances became more intricately difficult. In Singapore, the instability of the
world economy has forced the state to prioritize the needs of TNCs and international
banks. It is imperative for the state that these organizations and their investments
remained in the republic. This dependency has propelled the state to impose its
unquestioned authority on Singaporean society so that the citizenry could be shaped
and accustomed to serving the needs of international capitalists. The relationship
between dependent development and authoritarian rule affirms the proposal in chapter
six that peripheral capitalist development not only limits the state’s ability to attain its
own development goals but it also reinforces the contradictions and inequalities within

the state, leading to increased state power and further weakening of civil society.
Hence, in Malaysia increasing ethnonational-class inequalities threaten to disrupt
state legitimacy, while in Singapore ethnonational-class tensions provide a potentially
serious subversion of the state’s goal to promote the country as a commercial and
financial haven. Through the use of nationalist ideologies and alliance building strategies
with particular dominant classes, the state in both countries has managed to legitimize
their authoritarian rule and command compliance from the populace. To justify its

authoritarian rule, the states in Malaysia and Singapore have invoked the ideology of
economic nationalism, which enhances and justifies the managing role of the state in
national development. This theme has been obvious throughout chapter seven of this

dissertation. In Singapore, limited territorial size and resources have given the state the
authority and legitimacy to lead the country and assert its powers to attain national
industrial development. The Singapore state’s ability to successfully suppress the

formation of a strong civil society in light of increased globalization can be attributed to
its ability to simultaneously sustain economic development while imposing on its
population the ideology of authoritarian rule as a political necessity to geopolitical

survival. The very basis of ‘Asian values’ ideology has been based on such ‘art of war’
mentality as the key to economic prosperity. In Malaysia, widening social disparities
caused by globalization have adversely affected the Malays, undermining the credibility
of the state as patron of Malay interests. Events after the 1997 financial crisis have

shown not only the state’s inability to control the impacts of global economic forces on
the national economy, but also its limited capacity to prevent political mobilization of
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Malays to challenge state autocracy. National security, both in its economic development

and national integration sense, has become the paramount reason given by the state to
justify its counter-democratic policies (Rahim 2001, 35-36; Gomez and Jomo 1997;
Munro-Kua 1994; Lingle 1996; Tremewan 1994; Hua 1982). In this respect, both the

Malaysian and Singaporean states have formulated and implemented nationalist
ideological-legitimacy projects, which have successfully commandeered their societies’
generally impassive loyalty to and acceptance of state authoritarian rule (Rahim 1997;
Munro-Kua 1994; Crouch 1993, 40; Hill and Lian 1995, Chapter 1; Seow 1994, 5-10).
However, both the Malaysian and Singaporean states have also found help in
their suppression of opposition at home from a source outside its borders. Assuming its
hegemonic role, the US has backed these states’ campaigns to repress Islamic as well
as local progressive organizations under the guise of an international war on terrorism.
This scenario is not dissimilar to the way the British had stepped in to aid Malaya in its
War against communism in the 19505. Meanwhile, improved economic performances

and the strengthening of economic nationalism ideology in light of increased global
threats have helped the state to reassert and reinforce authoritarian rule as a legitimate
and justified effort. These developments are in line with the second proposal in chapter

seven, that state nation-building ideologies entrenched in economic nationalism have
been strong and consistent justiﬁcations for state authoritarianism in both countries.
There are many similarities between the Malaysian and Singaporean states in

relation to capitalist development and authoritarian rule. Sharing a similar historical origin
has resulted in these states’ relatively similar state development trends. Any difference
or distinction between these states has been mainly attributable to differences in their
territorial size, their possession or lack of natural resources, and in their demographic

structure (urban and rural). These differences have, to a large extent, determined the
states’ respective labor specialization functions in the world economy, which affects the

degree of democratization in each state. This dissertation has revealed that the degree
of dependence to capital investments was higher in Singapore, which seemed to show a
higher degree of authoritarianism than Malaysia.

Finally, this dissertation examined state authoritarianism in Malaysia and
Singapore through the combination of various theories on the state, capitalist
development, and democracy. The aim of this dissertation was to highlight the point that
in such a study, a single level approach would have been deficient in explaining state
authoritarianism. The world system approach was used to provide the structural

background of dependent state development processes of both countries since such
analysis was useful in illustrating the global-historical structure, within which the
dynamics of state development emerged. However, this approach alone is inadequate.

States must also be examined as relatively autonomous units in a system of nations.
State managers are not merely instruments of capitalist or ruling class interests. They

are also autonomous actors with their own goals and interests to be derived under the
system, and who formulate and affect policies to sustain capitalist development. To
complement it, state analysis must also be carried out through the study of internal

domestic variables that influence differences in state behavior.
Conversely, state action however, is very much constrained by the state’s
relative dependence on world systemic forces. In this dissertation, it was shown that the
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tensional pull between the demands of external and internal forces, manifested in

ethnonational-class tensions, disproportionate wealth distribution, and foreign
investment accommodation, have resulted in the state exerting and imposing its power

over civil society. Thus studies of authoritarianism and peripheral capitalist state
development between countries may reveal similar characteristics in certain variable
aspects, but distinct in others. In this study, it it was shoen through historical
comparative analysis that both Malaysia and Slngapore share the four state
development variables that have led to the rise in state authoritarianism. Thus the
implication of this research is that capitalist development and democracy in Malaysia
and Singapore has become somewhat of a theoretical oxymoron. The various
development—related factors discussed in this dissertation are the result of the historical
processes associated with capitalist development, the interaction of which has
culminated in the rise of state authoritarianism in both countries. This means that studies

of authoritarianism cannot be confined to analysis of the state alone without attaching it
to the interactive dynamics that takie place within the larger global equation.
Prospects for Democracy in Malaysia and Singapore
The discussion of capitalist development and state authoritarianism in this
dissertation is not without any shortcoming. Due to limited research material, stringent
laws on utilizing latest data on these countries, and disproportionate emphases on
particular issues pertaining to the historical development of state, capitalism, and

authoritarianism, there has been a lack of deliberation on other equally important areas.
In order to assess prospects of democracy in Malaysia and Singapore, a number of

areas such as women’s organizations, environmental and social justice movements,
deserve some brief mentioning.
Globalization and rapid communications have influenced the growth of many
social organizations in both countries. A number of women’s groups have cropped up

since the 19905 in Malaysia and Singapore, advocating the pursuit of women’s rights in
a variety of situations. Groups such as the Association of Women for Action and
Research (AWARE) and Young Muslim Women’s Association (YMWA) have been quite

active in pursuing for greater equality and rights for Singaporean women in areas of
occupation and welfare (Straits Times November 17 1993; Rahim 2001, 233, 244). In
Malaysia, groups and associations directing public attention to the ascription of women’s

rights in the political, social, and economic spheres of the country range from
Tenaganita, a human rights group protecting abused foreign sex workers, to Sisters in
Islam, a non-governmental organization advancing the cause of Islamic feminism (Straits
Times March 8 2001; Time April 8 1996).
These women’s groups together with other groups represent a spectrum of social
justice and public interest issues, and could well form a formidable coalition to check the

slide toward state authoritarian rule. Already in Malaysia, environmental consciousness
has taken on quite a signiﬁcant following. In light of the recurring haze from forest fires in
neighboring Indonesia that blankets the region annually, the displacement of indigenous
peoples from their homes as a result of state infrastructural projects, and rising levels of
air and water pollution arising from rapid development, it has become increasingly
difficult for the public not to notice the impact of environmental problems on their daily

life. Currently, many environmental groups such as the Malayan Nature Society,
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Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia, and Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of
Nature), have formed collaborative relations with the state, preferring to work within the
system instead of against it (Elmhirst and Saptari 2002). Nevertheless, there is a

possibility, especially in Malaysia, that as environmental impact from rapid development
begins to seriously affect the lifestyle of the middle classes, there should be greater
public awareness of these groups’ activities.
To date in Malaysia, there has been some development, albeit crawling, toward a

coalition of non-government organizations under a single political umbrella in their
struggle to demand social justice and equal rights for all citizens. Human rights-based
groups such as Aliran (National Consciousness Movement) and Suaram, who have
been active and vocal in their cause, comprise many prominent intellectuals and political

leaders in their memberships. In many instances, these groups have also joined in
partnerships with opposition parties to consolidate their political voices. The Anwar
Ibrahim affair (see page 171) could be said to have been the one important event that

managed to mobilize public support for many of these organizations under a collective
and unified political coalition. Although much of the intensity has simmered down, the
experience of political cohesiveness among these groups through the events following

the affair has been a valuable one.
In Singapore however, neither opposition parties nor social movements have
made any impressive inroads into political activism. Due to the phobic nature of the state
of non-government organization, there have been fanatical monitoring and infiltration by
PAP representatives inside many social groups in Singapore. As a result, it can be

concluded that non-government organizations here have been more docile and
compliant as compared to those in Malaysia. Even the few environmental and nature

groups that exist, such as the Nature Society and Singapore Environmental Council, are
either patronized or heavily scrutinized by the state. The organizational goals for many of
these groups relate to educational and inspirational aspects of environmental

awareness, that tend to assign focus on issues of conservation, sustainable
development, and recreation rather than reassessments of state projects and policies
impacting the environment. Overall, many Singaporeans have been quite apathetic in
their response to social environmental issues. A major problem of any political
mobilization in this country lies in the successful accomplishment of the state in creating

a conforming, submissive, and acquiescent population through decades of state
regimentation and rule by fear (Lingle 1996, 96).
In fact, Singaporeans have become well known for their selfish, insecure, and
uncompassionate attitudes embodied in their trademark kiasu (translated from Hokkien
Chinese as ‘fear of failure’) character (Jones and Brown 1995, 79-87). According to
David Martin Jones (1997, 144), ”Kiasu behavior is premised on the belief that if ‘you’re
not one up, you’re one down and condones othenrvise anti-social activity, provided the

progenitor succeeds in achieving collectively desired but scarce social goods whilst
maintaining conformist anonymity. The selfishness central to kiasu behaviour stems not
from self-confidence but from its absence, which makes a fear of failure the dominant
concern in a competitive and highly regulated society.” Kiasuism has appeared in the

behavior of Singaporeans in many modes; as ugly tourists, as brusque consumers; or as
self-centered employees willing to job hop for a few extra dollars (Lingle 1996,100). It is
then not surprising that Singaporean society seems to have lacked the human
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consciousness and compassion for social justice and human rights, which make up the
core elements of a mature civil society. Manifested in low rates of volunteerism and an
almost absent level of charitable work among the population, kiasuism has also
discouraged Singaporeans from taking on the personal risks of political activism, since
such efforts are deemed non-profitable (Lingle 1996, 99). The Singapore state often
downplays the negativities of kiasusm and attributes this as a positive consequence

generated by the competitive spirit of meritocracy (Jones 1997, 96). In effect however,
kiasuism is a symptom of middle class anxiety brought on by the uncertainty of
competition. This is why the certainty and confidence derived from PAP state
intervention have been very much welcomed by a major segment of the population
(Jones 1997, 144).
The struggle for popular democracy in Malaysia and Singapore is indeed
overwhelming due to the social disparities caused by capitalist development,
ethnonational tensions that prevent effective democratic coalitions, and the fearsome
power of state institutions. The key to sharpening the potential of Malaysians and
Singaporeans as effective political forces lies in the ability to mobilize all ethnonational

groups under a common class consciousness found within the effective functioning of a
strong civil society. Gellner (1994, 212) asserts that the growth of civil society, marked
by the separation of the polity from social economic life, reduces the monopolization of
ideology. In this, a formidable civil society ensures the reduction of state power, allowing
for the development and sustenance of democratic processes to take place. In order for
civil society to grow, ethnonational-class inequalities must be corrected.
Ethnonational tensions provide a formidable barrier to political mobilization
across ethnonational lines, and serve to sustain the racialization of politics. Economic

growth does not guarantee the attainment of democracy if social wealth gaps exist along
ethnonational lines. At the same time, class inequalities must also be addressed in order

to close down wealth differences. Political empowerment of the poor and
disenfranchised must be safeguarded through an effective and fair political process,

which means that it is imperative for the state to relinquish its control of fundamental
institutions such as the judiciary and the media. It is also important that affirmative action
programs such as the NEP be extended to non-indigenous ethnonational groups in
Malaysia. In Singapore, a similar type structural corrective mechanism needs to be
implemented. Without sufficient closing of the wealth gap, power differentials serve to

undermine the ability of the working class, and to some extent the middle class, to
initiate progressive political changes.

However, a major stumbling block comes from the middle classes. Both the
Malaysian and Singaporean middle classes have acquired their privileged positions
through the policies of the state, and are therefore highly insecure of any anti-systemic
movement that could destabilize the state (Jones 1997,149-151;Rodan 1996). In the

long run, the middle class would soon realize that its capacity in effecting changes as a
way to protect its interests against the capitalist class could also be potentially subdued
by the authoritarian state. It would be beneficial for the middle classes in both countries
to acquire hindsight and look at events in long-term perspective.
The center of resistance to democratization is the state, whose survival is

dependent on its links to the capitalist world economy. The dynamics of the world
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economy, which promulgates inequalities through resource exploitation, serve only to
reinforce trends of state authoritarianism. As such, a functioning civil society that is
sufficiently strong to check the power of the state must be allowed to flourish in these
countries. Unless such development occurs, the prospects for popular democracy seem

bleak.
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